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SUMMARY 
This thesis provides practical and theoretical perspectives on the legal nature of 
shares. In South Africa and beyond, shares have undergone significant 
transformation over the last decades. They are held and transferred through a 
complex net of intermediaries. While commercial practice and financial markets have 
devised efficient and pragmatic holding and transfer mechanisms, the changes 
brought about by computerisation and a pervasive model of systemic intermediation 
have unsettled the existing consensus on the legal, conceptual underpinning of 
shares. The thesis therefore aims to provide clarity on the legal nature of holding 
mechanisms, the legal nature of transfer mechanisms and the legal nature of shares 
viewed more abstractly within the context of the taxonomy of private law. 
The thesis approaches the first two questions historically and comparatively to show 
how the legal understanding of holding and transfer mechanisms has changed. While 
the nature of intermediation has changed dramatically, the thesis shows that the legal 
concepts and mechanisms underlying the holding of shares predominantly have 
proved to be sufficiently adaptable. This cannot be said to be the case when 
considering the legal nature of transfer mechanisms. Traditional transfer 
mechanisms, such as assignment, negotiation and delivery have largely been 
replaced by mechanical, account-based transfer ones. On this basis, the thesis 
suggests that the continued application of the principles of cession to a South African 
analysis of transfer should be scrutinised in a more fundamental fashion. 
To complement the discussion, it is shown that conceptual alternatives to traditional 
doctrinal thinking can be found in a functional approach to legal reasoning and in a 
procedural “law of accounts” that synthesises the common characteristics shared by 
many rights held on accounts. Moreover, two theoretical models are considered that 
shed light on the question whether systemic intermediation leads to the creation of 
new and multiple assets which derive from a share and are held by lower-tier 
intermediaries and ultimate investors in place of the share itself. This approach, 
made popular by the introduction of “securities entitlements” by Article 8 of the UCC 
and also reflected in the notion of beneficial interests of a trust in English law, can be 
explained as establishing rights against the rights of a higher-tier intermediary. These 
rights function as assets. On the basis of the burdening of rights model, borrowed 
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from German law, the application of the rights-against-rights approach to South 
African law is rejected, however. The thesis concludes that South African law 
evidences neither a multiplication of assets nor a division of ownership in relation to 
intermediaries. 
Lastly, the thesis considers the assertion that shares are, or should be, property or 
“property-like” to provide adequate protection to investors. An enquiry into the legal 
nature of shares is the overarching theme of the thesis that draws together its 
different parts. The thesis proposes an explanatory model that can be used to 
determine whether and under which circumstances obligations can have absolute 
effect in relation to third parties. It asserts that shares are obligations, but that a 
proper evaluation of the internal sphere (the issuer-investor bond) shows that shares 
are simultaneously object-like. The explanatory model suggests that obligations of 
this kind can serve as objects of other obligations (the external sphere) which may 
consequently have real or limited-real effect in relation to third-parties. The model 
therefore narrates the interrelation between property and obligations without calling 
into question the well-established fact that shares are personal rights, albeit with 
limited real effect. 
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OPSOMMING 
Hierdie proefskrif verskaf praktiese en teoretiese perspektiewe op die regsaard van 
aandele. In Suid-Afrika en elders, het aandele die afgelope dekades beduidende 
veranderinge ondergaan. Aandele word gehou en oorgedra deur 'n komplekse stelsel 
van tussengangers (bemiddeling). Terwyl kommersiële praktyk en finansiële markte 
doeltreffende en pragmatiese meganismes vir die houding en oordrag van aandele 
ontwikkel het, het die veranderinge wat deur gerekenaariseerde stelsels en 
omvattende sistemiese bemiddeling tot stand gekom het, die bestaande konsensus 
aangaande die juridiese en konseptuele onderbou van aandele ontwrig. Die 
proefskrif poog om sekerheid te skep oor die regsaard van meganismes waaardeur 
aandele gehou word, die regsaard van oordragsmeganismes en die regsaard van 
aandele beskou uit die oogpunt van die sistematiek van die privaatreg. 
Die proefskrif benader die eerste twee vrae histories en regsvergelykend om aan te 
toon hoe die regasaard van aandeelhouding en oordragsmeganismes verander het. 
Terwyl die aard van tussengangers dramaties verander het, toon die proefskrif dat 
die bstaande regskonsepte en –meganismes oor die algemeen voldoende 
aanpasbaar was. Dieselfde kan nie gesê word van die regsaard van 
oordragsmeganismes nie. Tradisionele oordragsmeganismes, soos sessie, 
verhandeling en lewering, is grotendeels vervang deur meganiese, 
rekeninggebaseerde oordrag. Op grond hiervan dui die proefskrif aan dat die 
voortgesette toepassing van die beginsels van die sessiereg in hierdie verband in die 
Suid-Afrikaanse reg op meer fundamentele wyse ondersoek moet word.  
Om die bespreking aan te vul, word getoon dat konseptuele alternatiewe vir 
tradisionele regsteoretiese denke gevind kan word in 'n funksionele benadering tot 
juridiese analise en in 'n prosedurele "rekeningreg" wat van toepassing kan wees op 
meerdere regte wat op rekeninge gebaseerd is. Gegewe die vraag of sistemiese, 
veelvlakkige bemiddeling lei tot die vermenigvuldiging van bates wat uit 'n aandeel 
voortspruit en deur beleggers en hul tussengangers gehou word, word twee 
teoretiese modelle voorgestel. Die benadering van afsonderlike regte of bates het 
gangbaar geword met die erkenning van "securities entitlements" in Artikel 8 van die 
UCC en word ook weerspieël in die idee van “beneficial interests”, wat voortspruit uit 
die Engelse trustreg. Na aanleiding van op 'n model ontleen aan die Duitse reg, wat 
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behels dat die primêre reg eerder beswaar word, word die Anglo-Amerikaanse 
benadering in hierdie proefskrif van die hand gewys. In die Suid-Afrikaanse reg lei 
sistemiese bemiddeling nóg tot die vermenigvuldiging van bates, nóg tot 'n verdeling 
van eiendomsreg. 
Laastens behandel die proefskrif die bewering dat aandele “eiendom” (sake) is of 
eiendom moet wees om beleggers voldoende te beskerm. Die regsaard van aandele 
is die oorkoepelende tema en onder hierdie sambreel word die verskillende afdelings 
van die proefskrif saamgevat. Die proefskrif stel 'n verduidelikende model voor wat 
gebruik kan word om vas te stel of, en onder watter omstandighede, verbintenisse 
absolute regswerking kan hê. Al word aandele as verbintenisse beskou, toon 'n 
evaluering van die interne sfeer van die verhouding tussen die uitreiker en die 
belegger aan dat aandele terselfdertyd eienskappe van sake vertoon. Die 
verduidelikende model stel voor dat sulke verpligtinge as voorwerpe van ander 
verpligtinge (die eksterne sfeer) kan dien, wat derhalwe absolute regswerking 
teenoor derde partye kan hê. Die vorbeeld van aandele word dus gebruik om die 
verband tussen eiendomsreg en verbintenisreg nader te beskryf, maar sonder om die 
goed gevestigde siening dat aandele persoonlike regte is, maar met beperkte 
absolute werking, oorboord te gooi. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1 1 Context 
Shares and financial instruments1 in their various manifestations have become the 
linchpin of modern corporations and economies. They lie at the core of countless 
commercial transactions undertaken on a daily basis all over the globe. Despite their 
unparalleled importance in the modern economic landscape, their precise legal 
nature and operation remains marred by uncertainty. The introduction to a book on 
the matter dating back to 1917, still rings true today: “Stocks and shares are a matter 
of interest to all, and of bewilderment to most, of civilised society”.2 
Securities have their historical origin in an attempt to finance medieval or colonial 
wars, early merchant trade, pioneering infrastructure projects and corporate 
expansions. 3  In South Africa, the large-scale issuing and trading of shares and 
securities emerged predominantly to finance mining operations, be it the copper 
boom of Namaqualand during the middle of the 19th century, the prospecting and 
mining operations of the first gold rush or the diamond boom in Kimberley.4 The 
capital sums required to fund such ventures were so significant that they could not be 
financed by a single investor or bank. Funding in the form of a loan furthermore ties 
the otherwise liquid and easily exchangeable money of an investor to specific assets 
or ventures, thereby reducing the liquidity of the capital.5 Breaking-up the capital 
financing required into smaller units enabled manufacturers, merchants and pioneers 
to attract a large number of small investors. The units issued to holders were in the 
form of debt instruments or shares. 
This financial innovation enabled ordinary people to invest smaller sums of money 
in large projects. Securities are, however, long-term, even potentially indefinite 
                                            
1
 The Companies Act 71 of 2008 and the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 use the term “securities” as 
an umbrella for various financial instruments. Commercially, the term “securities” is used 
interchangeably with “financial instruments”; see below, 2 2 Shares as securities. 
2
 H Withers Stocks and Shares 2 ed (1917) 1. 
3
 For a detailed history of securities and securities markets see RC Michie The Global Securities 
Market: A History (2006). For a brief overview see also MM Siems “The Foundations of Securities 
Law” (2009) 20 Eur Bus LR 141. 
4
 See E Rosenthal On ‘Change Through the Years: A History of Share Dealing in South Africa (1968); 
FHC Mazando “The Taxonomy of Global Securities: Is the U.S. Definition of a Security too Broad?” 
(2012) 33 NJILB 121 171. 
5
 P Ireland, I Grigg-Spall & D Kelly “The Conceptual Foundations of Modern Company Law” (1987) 14 
J Law & Soc 149 155-157; P Ireland “Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership” (1999) 
63 MLR 32 40-41. 
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investments. A core characteristic, particularly of shares, is the indefinite duration of 
the capital commitment by shareholders.6 This increases the risk for the investor. 
Investors must therefore be provided with an opportunity to withdraw their capital; in 
other words they must be able to transfer their shares to a third party in exchange for 
money. To enable the holder to withdraw the funds if needed, these units have to be 
transferable. Legal design and the establishment of organised markets for securities 
bolster the liquidity and transferability of instruments.7 Markets for securities enhance 
liquidity by providing platforms that bring sellers and potential buyers together. 
Markets also enable indirect exchanges, expediting the exchange process by 
eliminating the need for direct contact between buyers and sellers of securities. A 
lack of liquidity can have serious implications – not only can it dissuade investors to 
purchase securities in the first place, but also assets that cannot be realised may 
decline in value. Transferability in effectively functioning markets has become a 
hallmark of securities. 
The concept of “transfer” is not a simple one. Transfer can be understood, and is 
in fact relevant on various levels. This will emerge from the discussion in Part 2 
below. Economic and market mechanisms dictate how securities change hands 
between market participants. Market mechanisms are aimed primarily at practicability 
and pragmatism. While “transfer” may not be a technical legal term, for a transfer of 
title to have legal effect, economic mechanisms must be underscored with legal 
consequences. At the same time, the law must facilitate efficient economic mobility. 
Any transfer must be convenient (that is speedy and free from excessive formalities), 
secure and final. 
While factors such as deep and well-organised markets and the division of capital 
into small units are pivotal in enhancing the liquidity of shares and securities, the 
fundamental role played by the law must not be underestimated. From a legal 
perspective, the emergence and metamorphosis of securities raises the question how 
the law can and must facilitate their commercial functions. Trust has become a 
cornerstone of modern financial markets. It has become essential that potential 
buyers of securities, particularly on the secondary markets, have trust, both in the 
                                            
6
 Shareholders cannot demand a reimbursement of their capital input from the company, except in the 
case of share redemptions or share buy-backs. In the absence of these, shares must be said to exist 
for as long as the company exists. 
7
 Ireland et al (1987) J Law & Soc 158-160. 
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effective functioning of the markets and in the title to the securities. Inevitably, any 
system of exchange is based on trust – trust in the performance of the counterparty 
and trust in the stability and proper functioning of markets and exchange 
mechanisms. The law must provide the mechanisms that enable valid and efficient 
transfer and exchange and facilitate trust in the system. 
A survey of selected jurisdictions shows that the solutions provided by the law to 
questions of transferability and trust are by no means uniform. All jurisdictions, 
however, evidence that the market structures and mechanisms within which 
securities are held and traded have changed dramatically over the last decades. The 
issue of physical certificates enhanced this trust, further cemented, to a greater or 
lesser degree, by the transfer of securities in good faith, in other words by allowing a 
bona fide purchaser to receive transfer without any defects in title. An investor who 
purchases shares from an existing shareholder on the secondary market needs to 
have some degree of certainty that the legal title has in fact passed to him, or at least 
a level of assurance that he would be protected from adverse claims. It is usually 
argued that a lack of such certainty impedes the functioning of the securities markets 
by imposing an excessive burden on the purchaser to investigate the origin of the 
shares and securities. This would render the instruments less marketable and without 
an active market for shares transferability becomes an empty promise.8 The trio of 
transferability, trust and certainty can be credited for much of the legal development 
in the sphere of shares and securities. 
As the volume and frequency of share transactions increased, the certificates, 
initially devised to facilitate trust, transferability and exchange hampered the effective 
functioning of the markets. A system where certificates have to be delivered between 
market participants is slow, causing significant delays in the settlement of 
transactions. 9  The resulting inability of brokers and other intermediaries in the 
clearing and settlement process to efficiently and timeously handle the sharp 
increase in the volumes of securities traded became known as the “paper crunch” in 
                                            
8
 But see JS Rogers “Negotiability, Property, and Identity” (1991) 12 Cardozo LR 471 478-484, who 
argues that there is little evidence to support this point. The comparative analysis will show that both 
the South African and the English legal systems traditionally functioned without rules on good faith 
acquisition or similar negotiability rules; through estoppel these legal systems incorporate mechanisms 
to ensure a comparable level of certainty of transfer – see E Micheler Property in Securities: A 
Comparative Study (2007) 98. Also see below, 8 4 Certainty of transfer. 
9
 MF Khimji “Intermediary Credit Risk – A Comparative Law Analysis of Property Rights in Indirectly 
Held Securities” (2005) J Bus L 287 290-291. 
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the US.10 Furthermore, paper-based settlement carries the risk of theft and fraud.11 In 
many jurisdictions, the physical movement of paper was consequently replaced by a 
system of electronic settlement. Paper certificates were either relegated to the vaults 
of central securities depositories or completely abandoned.12 Additionally, face-to-
face trading had to make way for a complex network of exchanges, depositories, 
clearing houses, banks, brokers and other intermediaries. 13  As a result of the 
aggregate of these changes, transactions in shares and other securities are now 
settled by corresponding book entries in the accounts of buyers and sellers of shares. 
Physical certificates, once the legal and commercial answer to demands of 
transferability, trust and certainty have fallen out of favour. Shares have morphed 
from certificated instruments to electronic entries in accounts. As a result, 
intermediaries have entered the picture, have impacted on the mechanisms of 
exchange and holding and have mostly severed the direct relationship between an 
issuer and an investor. 
Any exchange brings with it the need for legal and commercial rules on certainty of 
transfer. Where buyers and sellers of securities no longer enter into personal 
relationships, the trust between transacting counterparties has been replaced by trust 
in the market participants and intermediaries that populate the spaces between the 
contracting parties.  
Central to a legal discourse on shares and securities is an analysis of their legal 
nature and classification. 14  A characterisation of shares takes place at the 
intersection of the law regulating companies and securities as well as the private law 
disciplines of property and obligations. Shares seemingly elude clear-cut 
classification into one of these disciplines. The private law classification is particularly 
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 291. 
11
 Khimji (2005) J Bus L 291; See also SA Law Commission Protection for a Purchaser of Securities 
Working Paper 21 (1987) 42-54. 
12
 On immobilisation and dematerialisation, see below, 9 2 Immobilisation and Dematerialisation. 
13
 MJ Aronstein “The Decline and Fall of the Stock Certificate in America” (1978) 1 J Comp Corp L & 
Sec Reg 273 274. For an overview of intermediaries, see below, 9 3 Intermediation and the creation of 
new assets. 
14
 Under the main aims of modern financial regulation, JH Dalhuisen lists: “The creation of a proper 
framework of investments generally in terms of their legal charaterisation and structure…This is an 
important and often still neglected aspect of regulation which may also go into the transferability or 
proper unwinding of investments”; See JH Dalhuisen Dalhuisen on International Commercial, Financial 
and Trade Law (2000) 721. 
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difficult in the case of shares.15 Shares are variably categorised as wealth, assets, 
property and personal rights. 
The debate regarding the legal nature of securities, if ever settled, resurfaced with 
the introduction of book-entry securities. The world of securities has seen significant 
transformation in the last decades, including dematerialisation, electronic settlement 
and pooled, indirect holdings of securities. The changed mechanisms not only raise 
questions about the legal characterisation of securities, but also about the continued 
validity of legal rules and mechanisms developed in the context of certificated 
shares.16 This then is the dual focus of this thesis: A theoretical study of the legal 
nature of shares as well as an examination of the legal and commercial mechanisms 
by which securities are held and transferred. 
1 2 A prospect of the discussion 
The pivotal enquiry into the legal nature of securities is necessarily a complex and 
multifaceted matter. It must be explored within a three-dimensional setting 
comprised, broadly conceptualised, of three separate, yet interconnected sets of 
relationships: 1. issuer-investor; 2. investor-intermediary or intermediary-
intermediary; and 3. investor-third party. These relationships can, and frequently, do, 
exist alongside each other. Particularly the investor-intermediary or intermediary-
intermediary relationships are layered on the issuer-investor relationship and 
transform the way shares are held and transacted with. 
The first relationship can be described as constituting the internal sphere of 
securities. Investor-third party relationships, on the other hand, are primarily those 
that arise between buyers and sellers of securities as well as between investors or 
intermediaries and security-takers. These fall squarely within the external sphere. 
The various intermediary relationships are more difficult to place in a categorical 
fashion. On the one hand intermediaries mediate the relationship that exists in the 
internal sphere between issuers and investors; on the other hand, a change in 
intermediary holdings is akin to a transfer. In addition, intermediaries today play a 
crucial role in facilitating transfers between buyers and sellers of securities and have 
                                            
15
 See M Haentjens “Between Property Law and Contract Law: The Case of Securities” in S van Erp, 
A Salomons & B Akkermans (eds) The Future of European Property Law (2012) 165 167. 
16
 E Micheler “Farewell Quasi-Negotiability? Legal Title and Transfer of Shares in a Paperless World” 
(2002) J Bus L 358 359-660. 
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a significant impact on the form that these transfer mechanisms take. Relationships 
of transfer and holding will therefore be analysed together as part of the external 
sphere. 
 This structure broadly corresponds to the theoretical, explanatory model which will 
be proposed as a framework for guiding the enquiry into the legal nature of shares 
from a private law perspective.17 In terms of this model, obligations can have both an 
internal and an external sphere. An obligation’s characterisation in the internal sphere 
can aid to determine its external effect. Obligations must therefore be conceptualised 
on a continuum ranging from the purely personal to the highly impersonal. 
Obligations located on the highly impersonal end of the continuum are frequently 
described as incorporeal objects.  
The focus of Part 1 is directed at the internal sphere. Due to the breadth of the 
term securities, shares have been selected as a particular manifestation thereof. 
Shares are among the traditional financial instruments; despite the emergence of 
alternative methods of financing, shares remain preeminent for corporate financing; 
and shares are particularly interesting for the unique blend of rights and duties 
incorporated therein. In the words of Pretto-Saakman, “[s]hares are conceptually 
anterior and chronologically antecedent to other financial instruments. It makes sense 
therefore to start with them.”18  
In Part 1 a number of aspects of shares will be illuminated to throw light on the 
“dual nature” of shares;19 that is those facets that highlight the personal nature of 
these instruments as well as those features that are more indicative of their existence 
as incorporeal objects.  
The external sphere will shift into focus in Part 2 with particular emphasis on 
holding structures and transfer mechanisms. A statement that transferability is one of 
the quintessential features of securities is hardly novel. A descriptive analysis of 
transfer mechanisms is embarked upon because transfer can tell us something about 
the legal nature of shares. Usually, the legal nature or characterisation of a right 
determines the legal transfer mechanism. In reverse perspective, the transfer 
                                            
17
 See below, 17 4 3 Developing an explanatory model. 
18
 A Pretto-Saakman Boundaries of Personal Property: Shares and Sub-shares (2005) 3. 
19
 The dual nature of shares is for example highlighted by M Khimji “The Role of Legal Concepts in 
Commercial Law: Comments on Spink, Rogers and Scavone” (2007) 45 Can Bus LJ 94 98. 
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mechanism may reveal something about the legal nature of the right so transferred. 
Part 2 aspires not only to describe the current systems and mechanisms of holding 
and transfer, both commercial and legal, but also to show the progression towards 
the current state of law. This development can be seen to be one from a system of 
direct holding to one of indirect holding; alternatively from a paper-based environment 
to an electronic one. There is truth in both narratives. Yet, intermediaries, the 
analysis will show, were already present in systems often characterised as “direct”. 
Also, legal systems premised on immobilisation continue to rely on some form of 
physical representation of securities. In Part 2 the narrative of progression that most 
accurately catches all the jurisdictions selected is therefore determined to be one 
from “simple intermediation” to “systemic intermediation”.20 The analysis is not strictly 
historical because in some jurisdictions the “old system” retains, at least in theory, 
legal validity. In South Africa, for example, certificated shares continue to exist 
alongside uncertificated ones, although new issues of securities to be traded on a 
stock exchange are required to be in uncertificated form.21 In the US, on the other 
hand, the “old system” based on the concept of negotiability has ceased to exist.22 
The UCC continues to make provision for direct and indirect holding. The intention is 
not to draw a gapless picture of historic holding and transfer mechanisms, but to 
broadly sketch the legal antecedents from which the current systems have 
developed. 
As part of this enquiry a number of subsidiary questions arise. Succinctly stated 
the question is whether existing legal concepts and narratives can be said to apply to 
the changed commercial and technological environment? More specifically, two 
aspects must be examined in more detail: 1. the legal nature of account-based 
intermediary relationships; and 2. the legal nature of account-based transfers.  
The jurisdictions surveyed have in common that shares have always been 
conceptualised as obligations. The type of legal holding structure and transfer 
mechanism, were, however, largely dependent on the characterisation of the 
instrument as either an incorporeal obligation or as a “tokenised” obligation akin to an 
object of property. A characterisation of shares as “things” or objects of “property” 
can be observed in US and German law. English and South African law resisted the 
                                            
20
 See below, 9 3 2 Relationship-based and systemic intermediation. 
21
 See s 33(2) of the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012. 
22
 Rogers (1991) Cardozo LR 507. 
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“tokenisation” or “reification” of the obligation. These choices filter through to the 
traditional transfer mechanisms and intermediary constructs. While the English and 
South African legal systems traditionally exhibit transfer mechanisms that reflect the 
characterisation of shares and other financial instruments as obligations, respectively 
assignment and cession, the US and German legal systems, in accordance with the 
reification of the obligation, selected delivery as the preferred mechanism of transfer. 
Part 2 will also show wide variations in how intermediary relationships were 
traditionally conceptualised in law, ranging from trust constructions in English law, 
agency relationships in South African law to deposit in US and German law. Again, 
the reification of the obligation played its part. Functionally, the intermediary 
constructs were aimed at the same result, namely distinguishing the right to benefit 
from the issuer’s performance from the ability to enforce such performance. 
Theoretically, the reification of obligations did not result in a change of the nature 
of the right; practically, however, it placed such obligations within the realm of 
property law. This is reflected not only in relation to transfer mechanisms, but also 
when considering whether purchasers of shares who acquire the instruments in good 
faith are protected against adverse claimants. The advent of the book-entry system 
that accompanied the demise of the share certificate put the reification of obligations 
and with it the transfer- and holding mechanisms premised on proprietary legal 
concepts, in jeopardy.  
In consequence, the question whether existing legal concepts and mechanisms 
continue to have validity, demands attention. The question has attracted significant 
discussion and debate in many jurisdictions; not so in South Africa. South Africa has 
seen a comparable transformation of the commercial and technological environment 
in which shares and other securities are traded, settled and held. An analysis of the 
conceptual legal underpinning of the relevant systems and mechanisms has been 
sorely neglected, however. Part 2 therefore culminates in an analysis of the South 
African legal position that is not merely descriptive. It includes an assessment of 
whether and to what extent existing transfer processes in the form of cession and 
traditional holding mechanisms in the nature of agency can be said to still be 
appropriate. Such an analysis is not only long outstanding, but particularly pressing 
considering that globally financial markets are once again on the verge of a major 
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technological overhaul triggered by the so-called “blockchain revolution”.23 Clarity on 
existing legal characterisations will go a long way toward evaluating the legal 
implications of commercial and technological innovation. 
Part 2 is not strictly limited to shares. Most legislative instruments work with the 
wider definition of securities. To illustrate with an example: The provisions of the 
South African Financial Markets Act24 as well as the Strate Rules,25 that provide the 
framework within which modern transfer and holding mechanisms must be evaluated, 
apply to “securities” as defined.26 But commercial transfer mechanisms usually do 
distinguish somewhat between different categories of securities. The mechanisms 
described, particularly from a practical and commercial perspective, can thus be said 
to apply generally to equity instruments. Both the terms, “shares” and “securities” will 
therefore be used in Part 2. 
In summary, Part 2 takes a look at exactly how shares can be transferred or held. 
It does so by taking into account that transfer and holding mechanisms have both a 
practical-commercial and a legal dimension. A robust synergy manifests between the 
two dimensions. “Perhaps more than in any other area”, Pretto-Sakmann suggests, 
“practice requires constant rethinking of underlying theory”.27 From the outset, the 
law on securities was a reaction to commercial realities and in consequence a 
regulating rather than a systematising and creating force. The rapid developments in 
financial markets mean that the law is continuously treading behind. This can easily 
result in a lack of theoretical underpinning. The law, including commercial law, needs 
a sound theoretical basis; in fact, “the more flexible the law is, the stronger has to be 
the construction holding it together”.28 
At the same time, Part 2 also indicates the consequences of transfer and 
intermediation – the way in which a purchaser of shares is protected or the rights that 
an investor enjoys against an intermediary, including protection against creditors of 
                                            
23
 Also see, 17 6 Back to “embodied” rights? 
24
 Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012. 
25
 Strate Rules of Strate Pty (Ltd) (September 2017). Strate is no longer the only CSD in South Africa. 
Granite is a CSD for bond securities and money market securities. Considering that this thesis 
purports to focus on shares, its rules and operation will not be analysed further. 
26
 See s 1(2) of the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012. On the definition of “securities” and “financial 
instruments”, also see, 2 2 Shares as securities. 
27
 Pretto-Sakmann Boundaries of Personal Property 9. 
28
 JN Druey “The Practitioner and the Professor: Is there a Theory of Commercial Law?” in E 
Wymeersch & M Tison (eds) Perspectives in Company Law and Financial Regulation: Essays in 
Honour of Eddy Wymeersch (2009) 607 612. 
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the intermediary. These are illustrations of external effects of shares. In the traditional 
taxonomy of the private law, certain rules are said to apply to assets classified as 
property, but not to those known as obligations. Part 3 attempts to provide a 
theoretical foundation to this external sphere.  
In addition to the property-obligations divide, dominant themes that emerge from a 
study of the literature and that will be considered from a theoretical angle are the 
implications of a functionalist approach,29 the notion of a “law of accounts”,30 as well 
as theoretical perspectives on structures of intermediated holdings as either top-
down “rights against rights” or bottom-up burdening of rights.31 Part of this enquiry is 
to contemplate what it means, from a legal perspective to be an account holder or an 
account keeper. 
In this context, much has been written about the “proprietary aspects” of shares. 
The move to a system characterised by intermediary holdings has brought with it the 
fear that shares and securities no longer constitute “property” in the hands of the 
investor.32 Part 3 succinctly identifies that the assertion that shares are “property” or 
“proprietary” is in essence aimed at a finding that transaction in securities can have 
effect outside the contractual relationship. Such external, absolute or erga omnes 
effect is usually thought to be reserved for rights that can be placed in the category of 
“property”. 33  “Property” as distinguished from obligations, it will be shown, is a 
notoriously vague term and the standards for drawing the distinction are far from 
clear. A number of perspectives within the specific context of securities law will be 
considered that show the breadth of the debate and solutions proposed. The 
                                            
29
 This approach is particularly evident in US law, see the references in n 35 below. 
30
 The notion of a “law of accounts” particularly features in the work of Joseph Sommer, see JH 
Sommer “A Law of Financial Accounts: Modern Payment and Securities Transfer Law” (1998) 53 Bus 
L 1181; JH Sommer “International Securities Holding and Transfer Law” (2001) 18 Ariz J of Int & Com 
L 685; JH Sommer “Commentary: Where is the Economic Analysis of Payment Law?” (2008) 83 Chi-
Kent LR 751. Also see M Dubovec The Law of Securities, Commodities and Bank Accounts: The 
Rights of Account Holders (2014). 
31
 The “rights against rights” theory derives from B McFarlane & R Stevens “Interests in Securities: 
Practical Problems and Conceptual Solutions” in L Gullifer & J Payne (eds) Intermediated Securities: 
Legal Problems and Practical Issues (2010) 33. The “burdening of rights” approach can be traced 
back to German legal theory, see K Larenz Allgemeiner Teil des deutschen Bürgerlichen Rechts 7 ed 
(1989); M Wolf & J Neuner Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen Rechts (2012); S Enchelmaier 
Übertragung und Belastung unkörperlicher Gegenstände im deutschen und Englischen Privatrecht 
(2014). For an application of the theory to South African law, see GF Lubbe “Sessie in securitatem 
debiti en die komponente van die skuldeisersbelang” (1989) 52 THRHR 485. 
32
 See for example E Johansson Property Rights in Investment Securities and the Doctrine of 
Specificity (2009) 4. 
33
 See the discussion on the idea of property, 17 4 1 Drawing the boundary between property and 
obligations. 
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propositions can be placed in three categories: 1. Those solutions aimed at re-
drawing the boundary between the law of property and the law of obligations in such 
a way that shares and securities can be said to fall within it.34 2. A recognition that 
securities, due to their absolute or partly absolute effect, are located somewhere 
between the categories of property and obligations. According to the latter view, 
securities are sui generis instruments located somewhere between “property” and 
“obligations”. 35  3. An application of “property mechanisms” and “property 
consequences” by analogy.36  
The model proposed, draws a distinction between the “internal” and “external” 
spheres of obligations by suggesting that a careful examination of the nature of the 
obligation in the internal sphere is imperative. In the internal sphere transactions in or 
relating to shares can be object-related as opposed to person-related. Shares, it will 
be asserted are obligations. Yet, drawing on the insights obtained from Part 1, it will 
be shown that shares can also constitute objects for purposes of other obligations. 
Coupled with underlying considerations and policy arguments the characterisation of 
an obligation in the internal sphere can give some guidance on the possibility and 
scope of the external effect of the obligation.37  
These theoretical considerations cannot be said to be exclusive to shares – they 
apply equally to other securities, provided that, where appropriate, the unique 
elements and considerations that shape the “internal sphere” of the relevant financial 
                                            
34
 See especially the contribution of J Benjamin Interests in Securities: A Proprietary Analysis of the 
International Securities Markets (2000) in the context of English law and M Lehmann 
Finanzinstrumente: Vom Wertpapier- und Sachenrecht zum Recht der unkörperlichen 
Vermögensgegenstände (2009) writing on German law. But cf Pretto-Sakmann Boundaries of 
Personal Property. 
35
 See especially the contributions on US law, including CW Mooney “Beyond Negotiability: A New 
Model for Transfer and Pledge of Interests in Securities Controlled by Intermediaries” (1990) 12 
Cardozo LR 305; Rogers (1991) Cardozo LR 480; JS Rogers “An Essay on Horseless Carriages and 
Paperless Negotiable Instruments: Some Lessons from the Article 8 Revision” (1995) 31 Idaho LR 
689; JS Rogers “Policy Perspectives on Revised U.C.C Article 8” (1996) 48 UCLA LR 1431. In the 
context of German law, see W Zöllner “Zurückdrängung des Verkörperungselements bei den 
Wertpapieren” in L Raiser & F Baur (eds) Funktionswandel der Privatrechtsinstitutionen: Festschrift für 
Ludwig Raiser zum 70. Geburtstag (1974) 249. Also see the work of Eva Micheler, including E 
Micheler “The Legal Nature of Securities: Inspirations from Comparative Law” in L Gullifer & J Payne 
(eds) Intermediated Securities: Legal Problems and Practical Issues (2010) 131 and E Micheler 
“Farewell Quasi-Negotiability? Legal Title and Transfer of Shares in a Paperless World” (2002) J Bus L 
358. 
36
 See especially E Micheler Wertpapierrecht zwischen Schuld- und Sachenrecht: Zu einer 
kapitalmarktrechtlichen Theorie des Wertpapierrechts. Effekten nach österreichischem, deutschem, 
englischem und russischem Recht (2004). 
37
 This model is much indebted to ideas proposed by R Michaels ‘Vor § 241: Systemfragen des 
Schuldrechts” in M Schmoeckel, J Rückert & R Zimmermann (eds) Historisch-kritischer Kommentar 
zum BGB III (2007) 1. 
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instrument are taken into account. For the reasons set out above, for current 
purposes this “internal aspect” of the analysis is restricted to shares. 
Part 3 concludes with a brief prospect of current technological innovations that are, 
again, accompanied by projections of drastic modifications to the way in which 
securities are held, traded and settled. Distributed ledger technology, such as the 
blockchain, is aimed at revolutionising the indirect holding model by establishing a 
network of immutable ledgers that make intermediaries redundant. 38  Securities 
holding is therefore expected to, once again, found a direct relationship between an 
issuer and an investor. Moreover, the technology is said to have the potential to 
combine the trading, clearing and settlement functions into a single real-time 
process. 39  Such technological advances will not only alter commercial and 
technological processes but will challenge underlying legal mechanisms and 
concepts. 
This thesis hopes to complement, from a South African vantage point, the large 
body of international literature that is testament to the importance of contemplating 
the legal nature of securities. While technological progress is imminent, it has as its 
yardstick merely what is technologically possible. Legal progress, on the other hand, 
this thesis aims to show, is only possible if we reflect on conceptual legal questions 
such as the legal nature of securities, the nature of the entitlement of account holders 
and account keepers as well as the nature of transfer mechanisms.40 
1 3 Remarks on methodology 
The origins of the South African law of companies can be found in English law. This 
congruence can be traced back to colonial legislation.41 The close connection was 
severed only by the Companies Act of 197342 and even more so by the Companies 
Act of 2008. Even though both jurisdictions have undergone significant reform in the 
                                            
38
 E Micheler & L von der Heyde “Holding, Clearing and Settling Securities through 
Blockchain/Distributed Ledger Technology: Creating an Efficient System by Empowering Investors” 
(2016) 11 JIBFL 652 653. 
39
 653. 
40
 Technological advancement, Van Erp cautions creates the risk that we replace the “rule of law” by a 
“rule of technology”. Writing from the perspective of property law (and not in the particular context of 
shares) he has repeatedly argued that classical private law is flexible enough to accommodate 
changes in technology. See S van Erp “Editorial: Ownership of Digital Assets?” (2016) 5 EuCML 73 
73. 
41
 JC de Wet & AH van Wyk Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 4 ed (1978) 530. 
42
 JT Pretorius, PA Delport, M Havenga & M Vermaas Hahlo’s South African Company Law through 
the Cases: A Source Book 6 ed (1999) 1-2. 
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field of company law in recent years,43 the historical origin of South African company 
law in English common law is still evident. English law also continues to exert its 
influence through case law.44  
The dominance of English common law is not replicated in South African private 
law. The South African law of property is mainly based on Roman and Roman-Dutch 
principles. 45  Property law is therefore more closely related to continental civilian 
systems. The South African law of contract, on the other hand, is a fusion of Roman-
Dutch and English common law.46  
In any legal system, the interaction between commercial and private law, although 
integral to the functioning of the system as a whole, is difficult to canvas. This 
difficulty is exacerbated in a diverse and hybrid system. A comparative approach will 
therefore be of value. The jurisdictions that will be considered are, in addition to 
South African law, English- and German law, representing the common law and 
civilian legal traditions respectively, as well as the law of the United States of 
America. The latter is particularly influential in the securities landscape and 
illustrates, more so than the other two jurisdictions, a departure from existing legal 
traditions. 
Without going into undue detail on the methodological disputes of comparative 
legal scholarship, it suffices to mention that the predominant approach will be a 
micro-comparison as described by Zweigert and Kötz. 47  This encompasses a 
comparison of the rules used to solve the specific legal problem identified above, 
albeit recognising that the boundaries between micro- and macro-comparison are 
fluid and a certain degree of macro-comparison cannot be avoided.48 The purpose 
will be to use comparison as a tool for the critical evaluation of the South African legal 
                                            
43
 The United Kingdom through the Companies Act 2006 and South Africa through the Companies Act 
71 of 2008. 
44
 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 530-531; Pretorius et al Hahlo’s SA Company Law 
2. 
45
 CG van der Merwe “Law of Property” in CG van der Merwe & JE du Plessis (eds) Introduction to the 
Law of South Africa (2004) 201 201. 
46
 G Lubbe & J du Plessis “Law of Contract” in CG van der Merwe & JE du Plessis (eds) Introduction 
to the Law of South Africa (2004) 243 243-244. 
47
 K Zweigert & H Kötz Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung: auf dem Gebiete des Privatrechts 3 ed 
(1996) 4-5. 
48
 5. 
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landscape on shares and securities.49 The aim is not to supplant the South African 
law, but to assist in an assessment of its doctrinal character i.e. its conceptual clarity 
and coherence and whether it conforms to the systemic approach of South African 
law. 
The focus is a descriptive one with emphasis on the positions de lege lata. An 
account of the South African legal position50 is similarly aimed at describing the 
existing law and identifying the applicable legal principles and concepts. Such an 
exercise necessarily involves a level of careful assessment and evaluation that strays 
from the purely descriptive and introduces a touch of normativity to the analysis. This 
does not mean that the proposition becomes one of de lege ferenda. The legal 
philosopher Svein Eng has shown that lawyers’ propositions about what the law is 
are most accurately construed as including both, elements of descriptivity and 
normativity.51 
Whereas the comparative analysis is most prominent in Part 2, Part 3 proceeds 
from the basis of a literature study. The literature highlights dominant themes that 
emerge across jurisdictions, but must always be read and understood within its 
proper jurisdictional context.  
Where appropriate the comparative analysis will be interspersed with economic 
descriptions.52 These parts are simply descriptive and literature-based and aim to 
enrich the legal and comparative analyses where appropriate. 
Lastly, it is necessary to mention that the thesis purports to focus on shares. This 
and the interplay between shares and securities in the various parts of the thesis 
have been clarified above. To further specify, the emphasis will fall on publicly listed 
                                            
49
 The aim is not to evaluate the range of solutions as “better” or “worse”. Zweigert and Kötz 
Rechtsvergleichung 38-39, 46, caution that this is not possible. For a criticism of the evaluative 
function of comparison see R Michaels “The Functional Method of Comparative Law” in R 
Zimmermann & M Reimann (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (2006) 339 373-376. 
50
 Particularly at the end of Part 2; see below, Chapter 13: The effect of systemic intermediation in 
South Africa. 
51
 Eng coins for this the concept of “fusion of descriptive and normative propositions” and he explains: 
“Often in lawyers' propositions de lege lata, the lawyer's view of what other lawyers will probably 
assume to be the law (the descriptive proposition) fuses with the lawyer's view of what ought to be the 
law (the normative proposition) into the lawyer's view of what is tenable law (the fused descriptive and 
normative proposition)” (italics in the original); see S Eng “Fusion of Descriptive and Normative 
Propositions. The Concepts of ‘Descriptive Proposition’ and ‘Normative Proposition’ as Concepts of 
Degree” (2000) 13 Ratio Juris 236 248. Also see S Eng Analysis of Dis/Agreement – With Particular 
Reference to Law and Legal Theory (2003). 
52
 See especially, 2 3 Economic descriptions and commercial realities; 4 3 The nexus theory; 
9 3 1 The economic theory of intermediation. 
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shares. Despite substantial differences in company law rules and structures across 
various jurisdictions, Hansmann and Kraakman find that the there is a common 
structure of company law and therefore an impressive “underlying uniformity of the 
corporate form”.53 Companies can be identified by five basic legal characteristics, 
namely legal personality, limited liability, transferable shares, delegated management 
under a board structure, and investor ownership.54 Therefore, “a principal function of 
corporate law is to provide business enterprises with a legal form that possesses 
these five core attributes”.55 These features are shared by companies across various 
jurisdictions that raise capital on capital markets. The primary focus will therefore be 
on companies that exhibit all of these characteristics, being public listed companies. 
It is of course true that unlisted public companies and private companies also share 
many of these features, but their shares, although transferable as a general rule, do 
not trade freely in open markets and their transferability may be subject to 
restrictions.56 In addition, mechanisms of transfer may differ. 
                                            
53
 J Armour, H Hansmann, R Kraakman & M Pargendler “What is Corporate Law?” in R Kraakman, J 
Armour, P Davies, L Enriques, H Hansmann, G Hertig, K Hopt, H Kanda, M Pargendler, W-G Ringe & 
E Rock (eds) The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach 3 ed (2017) 1 
1. 
54
 1, 5, 6-15. 
55
 2. 
56
 1-2. 
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Chapter 2: Defining and describing shares 
2 1 Introduction and a prospect of the discussion 
Commercial ventures can only be realised and companies can only come into 
existence and remain in operation if they are able to secure sufficient resources. 
There are various ways in which companies can finance their operations. Shares are 
one of the most important methods for companies to raise capital. More specifically, 
shares are used to raise equity capital. 
The purpose of this part is threefold: to identify some of the characteristic features 
of shares, to properly distinguish between the concepts of capital, rights and shares 
and to provide a brief description of the nature of the relationships that are created 
between issuing companies and investors. More specifically, Part 1 is aimed at 
disseminating the internal sphere of shares. For this part, it is assumed that a direct 
relationship exists between issuers of shares and investors and that no 
intermediaries are involved. An analysis of the internal sphere is based on the 
hypothesis that shares, as obligations, may exhibit characteristics that range from 
personal relationships as established between a company and its shareholders, to 
impersonal asset-like characteristics. While the legal nature of shares and securities 
will be considered in more detail in Part 3, in this part shares are illuminated from 
various angles to further illustrate these two dimensions. The dual nature of shares is 
aptly expressed by Khimji, who writes that “investment securities are creatures of an 
exceptional nature as they, depending on the context, constitute both assets and 
obligations”.1 
The review of the characteristic features of shares will start widely by examining 
shares as part of the genus of securities, by considering economic or commercial 
aspects of shares, both in chapter 2, and by exploring shares within the context of 
capital in chapter 3. An appraisal of these aspects of shares will particularly call 
attention to the “asset-like” features of shares. That this “proprietary” nature of shares 
creates difficulties in conceptualising the relationship between an issuing company 
and investors will appear from the discussion in chapter 4. The obligationary realm 
within which companies and investors must be located is complex and multifaceted. 
                                            
1
 M Khimji “The Role of Legal Concepts in Commercial Law: Comments on Spink, Rogers and 
Scavone” (2007) 45 Can Bus LJ 94 98. 
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This will also appear from chapter 5 where the individual strands that make up the 
issuer-investor relationship and the way they are woven together shift into focus. Part 
1 will conclude with a brief description of the mechanisms through which investors 
obtain shares in chapter 6. 
2 2 Shares as securities 
Securities lie at the core of financial markets and transactions. Nonetheless, the term 
“securities” is a highly abstract legal concept. Part of the difficulty in defining 
securities is that it is in essence an umbrella term, encompassing a wide category of 
highly diversified financial instruments. The continuous and rapid development of 
innovative securities makes the term a dynamic rather than static one.2 
The global character of securities trading suggests that the concept and definition 
of “securities” is homogenous, when, in fact, it varies significantly between countries 
and national legal systems. Although the discrete instruments traded on financial 
markets are remarkably uniform in design and function, no global consensus exists 
on the use and particularly on the reach of the term “securities”. 
It is abundantly clear that shares are part of the genus of “securities”. Shares and 
debt instruments, as the historical foundation of this disparate group, have left their 
mark on it. At the same time, the widespread financial and technological innovations 
of the last decades have changed the face of shares and debt instruments. This has 
been augmented by the need to conceptualise and regulate financial instruments as 
a group – legally, economically and commercially. 
In South African companies’ legislation, a general definition of the term “securities” 
appears for the first time in the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the “Companies Act”).3 
The term is defined as “any shares, debentures or other instruments, irrespective of 
their form or title, issued or authorised to be issued by a profit company”. 4 The 
Companies Act pursues a comparably broad approach with a flexible measure being 
found in the phrases “any”, “other instruments” and “irrespective of their form or 
                                            
2 
GG Castellano “Towards a General Framework for a Common Definition of ‘Securities’: Financial 
Markets Regulation in Multilingual Contexts” (2012) Uniform LR 448 457. 
3  
The South African Companies Act 61 of 1973 refers to securities mainly in the context of 
“uncertificated securities” in provisions inserted through later amendments and with reference to 
definitions provided in the Security Services Act 36 of 2004. 
4 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 1. 
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title”.5 No general criteria can be gleaned from the Act for the identification of “other 
instruments”.6 With its focus on shares and debentures, the Act clearly highlights the 
more traditional capital financing aspect of securities. 
Considerable deviations from, and extensions of the traditional use of the term can 
be found in securities regulation legislation. The South African Financial Markets Act 
19 of 2012 defines the term “securities” in a manner comparable to the approach of 
US securities regulation laws 7  by listing a wide variety of commonly traded, 
standardised instruments. 8  Both listed and unlisted instruments issued by public 
                                            
5 
S 1. 
6 
S 43, titled “Securities other than shares” defines “debt instruments” as including “any securities other 
than shares of a company”. In light of the definition, the use of the term “debt instruments” seems to 
assume that apart from shares, all other securities are debt instruments. 
7 
The definition in s 2(a)(1) of the US Securities Act, 1993 is as follows: “The term ‘security’ means any 
note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-based swap, bond, debenture, evidence of 
indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust 
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-
trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other 
mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or 
group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, 
call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign 
currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a ‘security’, or any certificate 
of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or 
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing”. Although there are small differences between 
the above definition and the one provided in the Securities Exchange Act, 1934, the courts have 
construed them in an identical manner. See MI Steinberg Understanding Securities Law 6 ed (2014). 
8
 South African Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 s 1(1); The full definition reads:  
“securities” means –  
(a) listed and unlisted –  
(i) shares, depository receipts and other equivalent equities in public companies, other than 
shares in a share block company as defined in the Share Blocks Control Act, 1980 (Act 
No. 59 of 1980); 
(ii) debentures, and bonds issued by public companies, public state-owned enterprises, the 
South African Reserve Bank and the Government of the Republic of South Africa; 
(iii) derivative instruments; 
(iv) notes; 
(v) participatory investments in a collective investment scheme as defined in the Collective 
Investment Schemes Control Act, 2002 (Act No. 45 of 2002), and units or any other forms 
of participation in a foreign collective investment scheme approved by the Registrar of 
Collective Investment Schemes in terms of section 65 of that Act; and 
(vi) instruments based on an index; 
(b) units or any other form of participation in a collective investment scheme licensed or 
registered in a country other than the Republic; 
(c) the securities contemplated in paragraphs (a)(i) to (vi) and (b) that are listed on an external 
exchange; 
(d) an instruments similar to one or more of the securities contemplated in paragraphs (a) to (c) 
prescribed by the registrar to be a security for the purposes of this Act; 
(e) rights in the securities referred to in paragraphs (a) to (d), 
but excludes –  
(i) money market securities, except for the purposes of Chapter IV; or if prescribed by the 
registrar as contemplated in paragraph (d); 
the share capital of the South African Reserve Bank referred to in section 21 of the South African 
Reserve Bank Act, 1989 (Act No. 90 of 1989); and 
(ii) any security contemplated in paragraph (a) prescribed by the registrar. 
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companies are included.9 Money market securities are expressly excluded.10 The 
definition is, however, more restricted than the US equivalent.11 Broad and general 
terms are not included. A measure of flexibility is achieved by allowing the registrar to 
add new instruments to the list.12 These must be similar to those already specified.13 
While the term “securities” has gained popularity in legislation, “financial 
instruments” is more commonplace in financial terminology.14 The term does not 
feature prominently in US and South African legislation. It does, however, make a 
timid appearance in UK Companies’ and Financial Markets Laws. The impetus for 
this change comes from European law, where “financial instrument” is a term of 
central importance.15 Employing the laundry-list approach to definition also popular 
for defining “securities” in national legislative instruments, “financial instruments” is an 
umbrella term comparable in meaning and scope to the definition of “securities” in US 
securities regulation laws. 16  With its counterparts it has in common that these 
typological types of definitions that come with the promise to be at once 
comprehensive and sufficiently flexible, provide little guidance when attempting to 
identify common characteristics of the group they purport to define. 
                                            
9
 This was not specified by its predecessor, the Security Services Act 36 of 2004. 
10
 Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 s 1(1). 
11
 US federal securities regulation evidences an exceptionally wide definition of securities, deriving 
from broad legislative language as well as an inclusive interpretation of the term by the US Supreme 
Court. The definition is interspersed with general and descriptive terms, such as “investment contract”, 
“transferable share” and “in general any interest or instrument commonly known as a security” (see the 
definition in n 7 above). The US Supreme Court has used this interpretive room to construe the term 
as including “novel, uncommon, or irregular devices” [SEC v CM Joiner Leasing Corp 320 U.S. 344 
(1943) 351], as a “flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the 
countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the 
promise of profits” [SEC v Howey Co 328 U.S. 293 (1946) 299] and as “sufficiently broad to 
encompass virtually any instrument that might be sold as an investment” [Reves v Ernst & Young 494 
U.S. 56 (1990) 62]. The court emphasises the economic substance of transactions and the 
commercial character of securities [See for example SEC v CM Joiner Leasing Corp 320 U.S. 344 
(1943) 352-353; SEC v Howey Co 328 U.S. 293 (1946) 298; Tcherepnin v Knight 389 U.S. 332 (1967) 
336; Landreth Timber Co v Landreth 471 U.S. 681 (1985) 688]. Despite construing the term 12 times 
since 1943, the Supreme Court has failed to clearly formulate the meaning and ambit of “securities”. 
As a result, the US definition of securities is frequently criticised as being overly-broad and too 
inclusive. 
12
 S 1(1) “securities” (d). 
13
 S 1(1) “securities” (d). 
14
 See below, 2 3 Economic descriptions and commercial realities. 
15
 See Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
markets in financial instruments (“MiFID I”), as well as Directive 2014/65/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments (recast) (“MiFID II“) 
Annex 1 Section C. 
16
 See C Kupman “Financial Instruments”, in J Basedow, KJ Hopt, R Zimmermann & A Stier (eds) The 
Max Planck Encyclopaedia of European Private Law I (2012) 697 697. 
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More instructive, however, is the category of “transferable securities” included 
under the European list of “financial instruments”. The most noteworthy characteristic 
of “transferable securities” as defined in the European context is already apparent 
from the term itself, namely their transferability on capital markets.17 To implement 
the European Directives, the term “Finanzinstrumente” has been incorporated into 
German legislation.18 These include the traditional category of “Wertpapiere”, but 
confined to “übertragbare Wertpapiere” (transferable securities), “die ihrer Art nach 
auf den Finanzmärkten handelbar sind” (that are transferable on capital markets by 
their very nature).19 “Wertpapiere” is a term that originated in German law long before 
the meteoric rise of modern financial markets. Nonetheless, similar to securities, no 
general legal definition exists.20 The term appears in several statutes, but its meaning 
varies, depending on the context and legislative purpose of each statute. Whereas 
paper-based instruments such as bills of lading and cheques form the traditional core 
of the concept, other legislation restricts the use of the term to instruments traded on 
capital markets.21 Frequently the term is not defined at all,22 or is defined in the same 
fashion as described before, namely by providing a list of examples.23 Transferability 
has also been identified as one of the key characteristics of securities in the definition 
put forward in Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code,24 aimed at harmonising 
transactions involving “investment securities”. 
Instead of highlighting the feature of transferability, other instruments, most 
notably the Hague Securities Convention and the UNIDROIT Convention on 
Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities, instead direct focus at the capability 
                                            
17
 See MiFID I/II art 4(1)(18)/(44), which uses the term “negotiability” instead of transferability. Any 
reference to “negotiability” is avoided because of its technical legal meaning in Anglo-American and 
South African law. For a brief overview of the meaning of “transferable”, see Kupman “Financial 
Instruments” in Max Planck Encyclopaedia of European Private Law I 698. 
18
 See especially Wertpapierhandelsgesetz § 2(2b), but also Kreditwesengesetz § 1(11). 
19
 Wertpapierhandelsgesetz § 2(2b) as read with § 2(1).  
20
 Compare this to the position in Switzerland, where such a definition exits: “Wertpapier ist jede 
Urkunde, mit der ein Recht derart verknüpft ist, dass es ohne die Urkunde weder geltend gemacht 
noch auf andere übertragen werden kann”; Art 965 Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht. This definition 
can be traced back to Heinrich Brunner. A Hueck & CW Canaris Recht der Wertpapiere 12 ed (1986) 
1 formulate it as follows: “Ein Wertpapier ist eine Urkunde, in der ein privates Recht in der Weise 
verbrieft ist, dass zur Geltendmachung des Rechts die Innehabung der Urkunde erforderlich ist” (A 
“Wertpapier” is a certificate that reifies/securitises a private law right in such a way that the 
enforcement of the right depends on the possession of the certificate). 
21
 See for example Depotgesetz § 1(1); Wertpapierhandelsgesetz § 2(1).  
22
 The term is for example used numerous times in the BGB without being defined and has different 
meanings throughout. See for example BGB § 232(1), 234, 312g(2) 8, 372, 675b, 700, 702, 783, 
1667(2), 1807(1) 4, 2116. The same is true of the Handelsgesetzbuch and the Zivilprozessordnung. 
23
 See for example § 1(1) Depotgesetz; § 2(1) Wertpapierhandelsgesetz. 
24
 See UCC § 8-102(15). 
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of securities to be credited to an account.25 In the explanatory report to the Hague 
Securities Convention, the definition of “securities” is said to be intentionally broad,26 
with the only limiting factor being, that the instruments in question “must in addition 
be of a kind capable of being credited to a securities account with an intermediary”.27 
Similarly, the UNIDROIT Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated 
Securities defines securities as “any shares, bonds or other financial instruments or 
financial assets (other than cash) which are capable of being credited to a securities 
account”.28 
What are the defining features of securities? - A deceptively easy question with no 
definite answer. A generally applicable definition of the legal concept of securities can 
be found neither in South African law nor in many foreign jurisdictions. In 
contradistinction, legislative definitions abound. Legislative instruments naturally 
formulate definitions in a fashion that best suits their regulatory purpose. They neither 
endeavour to distill a general definition nor crystallise a fixed meaning. In legislation, 
definitional flexibility frequently proves to be advantageous. In the context of a more 
theoretical and normative enquiry, two features of securities emerge from the 
definitions, namely the attribute of transferability as well as, more recently, the fact 
that securities are increasingly credited to accounts. These characteristics have in 
common that they place a high emphasis on shares as incorporeal assets. The same 
is true when considering shares from an economic or commercial angle. Commercial 
mechanisms are transaction-based and transfer is a particularly noteworthy and 
economically important share transaction.  
2 3 Economic descriptions and commercial realities 
Securities must in addition be viewed through the lens of business and economics: 
“What securities law attempts to regulate – and what legal language attempts to 
                                            
25
 Kupman “Financial Instruments” in Max Planck Encyclopaedia of European Private Law I 699. 
26
 “Securities” are defined as “any shares, bonds or other financial instruments or financial assets 
(other than cash) or any interest therein” - Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights 
in Respect of Securities held with an Intermediary (2006) art 1(1)(a). 
27
 R Goode, H Kanda & K Kreuzer Hague Securities Convention: Explanatory Report 2 ed (2017) Note 
1-1. 
28
 UNIDROIT Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities of 25 September 2013 art 
1(a) (own emphasis). 
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capture – is, in fact, a series of transactions shaped to realise a specific economic 
function.”29  
In demarcating the commercial playing field of securities transactions, a brief 
overview of relevant commercial structures and context is merited. In the academic 
and economic study of financial markets, not much time and effort has been devoted 
to a proper demarcation and uniform use of terminology. Market terminology 
developed in response to commercial practices and is not used consistently. The 
exposition below is an attempt to summarise predominant economic classifications 
and terminology. Yet, variations in the use of market terms abound.30 
A market can be described as “a mechanism for effecting purchases and sales of 
assets and services in a relatively public manner”.31 The market can be divided into 
two broad categories based on the type of asset or service traded, namely the 
product market and the factor market, the latter being the market for labour and 
capital. 32  Companies seeking capital become active on the financial market - a 
specific branch of the factor market. 33  On financial markets they interact with 
investors who provide the required capital in exchange for future revenue which is 
either fixed or contingent on the performance of the company. The investors become 
the holders of financial assets as opposed to real or tangible assets. 
Financial assets have no physical existence and can be defined as “claims against 
present or future income from another (or more than one) participant in the 
economy.”34 Newly created financial assets, Moore finds, “originate only in an act of 
borrowing, and are reduced only in an act of debt repayment or default”.35  The 
creation of financial assets is therefore a lending-borrowing transaction as opposed 
to a buying and selling transaction of already existing financial assets.36 Their price is 
                                            
29
 Castellano (2012) Uniform LR 462. 
30
 Particularly the terms financial securities, financial instruments, financial assets or financial claims 
are often used interchangeably. 
31
 JM Burns A Treatise on Markets: Spot, Futures and Options (1979) 5. 
32
 FJ Fabozzi & F Modigliani Capital Markets: Instituions and Instruments 2 ed (1996) 2. 
33
 2. 
34
 RD Auerbach Financial Markets and Institutions (1983) 10; BJ Moore An Introduction to the Theory 
of Finance: Assetholder Behaviour Under Uncertainty (1968) 11-12 specifies that financial assets 
constitute generalised and indirect claims as opposed to the highly specific form and use of real 
assets.  
35
 Moore Theory of Finance 15 (emphasis in the original). 
36
 15. The use of the terms “borrowing”, “lending” and “debt” should be seen as a description of the 
typical commercial transactions in financial assets. They are of course not wholly accurate in the case 
of equity instruments. 
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determined by taking the present value of all expected future cash flows. Financial 
assets do not only arise when companies raise capital – included under the rubric of 
financial assets are cash, any contractual rights to receive cash from another entity, 
ordinary bank deposits, as well as debt and equity instruments, amongst others.37 In 
the particular instance of shares, the company obtains capital in exchange for 
granting a title to revenue in conjunction with certain control rights to the investor. 
According to the International Accounting Standards (IAS), a company issuing shares 
must account for them as equity instruments, while the investor will account for them 
as a financial asset. An “equity instrument” is defined as “any contract that evidences 
a residual interest in the assets of an entity after deducting all of its liabilities”.38 
Both financial assets and equity instruments are classified as financial 
instruments, which are “contract[s] that give rise to a financial asset of one entity and 
a financial liability or equity instrument of another entity”.39 “Financial instrument” is 
therefore an umbrella term. Two parts of the definition merit special mention: 1. 
Financial instruments are contracts. Securities represent legal claims and the 
relationships created when transacting with securities are legal relationships. A legal 
analysis of the nature and working of securities therefore lies at their core. 2. Each 
contractual right to receive a stated benefit (financial asset) is matched by a 
corresponding contractual obligation to pay the benefit (accounted for as a financial 
liability or equity).40  
When such a financial asset in the hands of an investor can easily be transferred 
to another person or entity, the financial instrument is frequently referred to as a 
financial security. While any financial instrument has the inherent potential to be 
traded, financial securities are specifically designed to be traded, be it on organised 
exchanges or in “over-the-counter” (OTC) transactions.41 Their transferability is a 
feature of their legal design, even if their actual liquidity is dependent on other factors 
such as the existence of an active market.42   
                                            
37
 See the definition of “financial assets” in International Accounting Standards Board International 
Accounting Standards (IAS) 32 Financial Instruments: Presentation 11. 
38
 11. 
39
 11. 
40
 Financial instruments in the sense delineated here are therefore sometimes described as “claims” – 
see International Monetary Fund Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual 6 
ed (2009) 81. 
41 
82.
 
42
 82. 
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There are various ways to further classify financial securities. First, a “type of 
claim” classification splits debt securities from equity securities.43 A second method 
of classification is based on the term of maturity of the claim, thereby distinguishing 
money market securities from capital market securities.44 The express exclusion of 
money market securities by South African legislation requires that a distinction is 
drawn between capital markets and money markets. Long-term securities are traded 
on the capital market, whereas short-term securities are traded on the money 
market.45 Short-term is frequently said to refer to a period not exceeding 12 months.46 
In practice, however, (particularly in South Africa) the normal term to maturity of 
short-term instruments is accepted to be three years.47  
The issuing of securities has traditionally attracted most attention.48 In its early 
stages, the trading of securities was often associated with speculative behavior,49 
and was therefore initially not subjected to rigorous economic and legal analysis.50 
This position no longer holds. Both the issuing and trading legs are part of the corpus 
of securities. Economically and legally it is therefore useful to distinguish primary, or 
issuing markets from secondary or trading markets. The trading in securities shifts 
the focus from the issuer-investor relationship that dominates the initial issue of 
securities, towards a variety of investor-third party relationships. Trading, transfer and 
                                            
43
 Fabozzi & Modigliani Capital Markets 12; FJ Fabozzi “Overview of Financial Instruments and 
Financial Markets” in FJ Fabozzi (ed) Handbook of Finance: Financial Markets and Instruments I 
(2008) 3 4; K Pilbeam Finance and Financial Markets (1998) 15, 23; Auerbach Financial Markets and 
Institutions 11. There are, however, financial securities that refuse clear-cut classification into either of 
the categories of “debt” or “equity”. 
44
 Fabozzi & Modigliani Capital Markets 12; Pilbeam Finance and Financial Markets 24; There are 
several other methods to classify financial markets that do not simultaneously also classify financial 
securities. The most common of these methods include firstly a classification in terms of the date of 
issue of the financial security i.e. primary vs secondary markets and secondly the time of completion of 
the transaction i.e. immediate settlement (spot or cash market) vs future settlement (futures market or 
derivatives market); See further Pilbeam Finance and Financial Markets 23-24; B van den Berg 
Understanding Financial Markets and Instruments (2000) 11-12. 
45
 Van den Berg Understanding Financial Markets 12; Fabozzi & Modigliani Capital Markets 12; 
Pilbeam Finance and Financial Markets 24; Fabozzi “Financial Instruments and Markets” in Handbook 
of Finance 6. 
46
 See Van den Berg Understanding Financial Markets and Instruments (2000) 67; Fabozzi & 
Modigliani Capital Markets 12. 
47
 Van den Berg Understanding Financial Markets and Instruments 67. 
48
 RC Michie The Global Securities Market: A History (2006) 1, 333, 336. 
49
 Today, it is the trading of derivatives that is regarded as speculative, not the trading of equities. For 
modern contributions to the speculative nature of trading, see for example J Kay The Truth about 
Markets: Why Some Nations are Rich but Most Remain Poor (2004), who describes markets as 
“arenas for sophisticated professional gambling”, disputes the efficient market theory and states that 
“selling bits of paper to one another at ever-higher prices creates only the illusion of wealth”; See also 
R Schiller Irrational Exuberance 3 ed (2016 revised & expanded); For a historic overview see Michie 
Global Securities Market 1-4. 
50
 Michie Global Securities Market 1, 333, 336. 
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the resulting relationships will be considered in detail in Part 2. As illustrated above, 
the financial market is an important mechanism for the allocation of resources by 
providing “a means of allocating funds to where they can be used most profitably”.51 
Viewed as such, financial markets enable the transfer of funds from market 
participants with surplus funds to those that can utilise them.52 Bringing together 
buyers and seller of securities is a core function of financial intermediation. Securities 
markets, in particular, are a “flexible interface between borrowers and lenders and 
between credit and capital”.53 From an economic viewpoint, the major role played by 
securities markets is threefold: They enable price discovery; they offer liquidity by 
providing for mechanisms of transfer and they reduce transaction costs, particularly 
search and information costs.54 Key characteristics shared by all instruments traded 
on securities markets are therefore their transferability, liquidity and price visibility. 
The degree to which these characteristics are present vary, depending on whether a 
given instrument is traded on public, organised securities markets or on a more ad-
hoc basis. Standardised, homogenous instruments traded on public exchanges 
represent the extreme on this spectrum. 
Although, in a commercial and economic context, securities elude clear definition, 
the structures, characteristics and effects outlined above must form the basis of an 
understanding of the term and its implications. Three core features of securities 
identified above merit repetition as being particularly useful in conceptualising the 
economic and commercial essence of securities: 1. Securities are legal claims 
against present or future income; 2. Securities are issued for the purpose of raising 
capital, traditionally to finance operations and 3. Securities are financial instruments 
that can be traded. The characteristics of transferability, liquidity and price visibility 
are predominantly a result of the last of these features. It is also the potential ease 
with which they can be traded that distinguishes securities from ordinary contracts – 
                                            
51
 Auerbach Financial Markets and Institutions 38. 
52
 Pilbeam Finance and Financial Markets 13-14; This is frequently described as the allocative 
efficiency function of markets. Analysed from an economic perspective, markets are said to exist 
because they promote efficiency. Market efficiency is analysed in three ways: allocative efficiency, 
operational efficiency and informational efficiency. The last is most prominent in academic literature. 
Markets are said to exhibit informational efficiency when market prices instantly and fully reflect 
available information. Liquidity is the primary element of informational efficiency. 
53
 Michie Global Securities Market 3. 
54
 Fabozzi “Financial Instruments and Markets” in Handbook of Finance 6; Fabozzi & Modigliani 
Capital Markets 11; TH McIntish Capital Markets: A Global Perspective (2008) 37. 
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a feature that is as much central to shares and debt instruments as it is to more 
innovative financial products.  
In the specific context of shares, however, the second feature identified above, 
namely that shares are issued for the purpose of raising capital, remains highly 
relevant and merits a closer examination of the concept of capital. While economic 
theory highlights the feature of capital in the hands of the company, the discussion 
below will show that shares themselves are independent units of capital. 
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Chapter 3: The concept of capital  
3 1 Capital and equity 
The term shares depicts an aggregate, namely “[t]he capital raised by a company or 
corporation through the issue or subscription of shares”.1 Shares are capital. This 
conception of capital is a quantitative measure of the monetary pool and financial 
wealth of a company. For a company, capital, at the same time as representing a 
monetary aggregate, denotes its productive assets. Capital today is frequently 
conceived as growth. This sentiment is reflected in the work of many economists – 
Adam Smith may be used as an exemplary illustration. He defines capital as that part 
of a man’s stock “which, he expects, is to afford him [this] revenue”.2 To a company, 
capital is simultaneously the money expended to create a return – the machinery 
purchased to produce a commodity to be sold at a profit or the money spent on 
creating a valuable brand, as well as these physical or intangible capital goods 
themselves. The former is known as financial capital and the latter as productive 
capital. 
In financial circles, shares represent a means of raising equity capital. Equity is 
defined in finance as “the residual interests of the entity after deducting all its 
liabilities”.3 It is sub-divided into funds contributed by shareholders, retained earnings 
and reserves. 4  In finance, equity capital becomes a function of double-entry 
bookkeeping, where equity equals assets less liabilities. 5  A financial concept of 
capital therefore corresponds to a company’s net assets or equity.6  
Capital, however, cannot be confined to a single meaning and this brief overview 
by no means attempts to dabble in the complexities of determining what capital is 
                                            
1
 Oxford Dictionaries (available online). 
2
 A Smith The Wealth of Nations (1776) ch 1, book II, 112. The use of “stocks” by Adam Smith, is 
naturally not confined to company shares. 
3
 International Accounting Standards Board International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS): The 
Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting (2010) 4.4(c). 
4
 4.20. 
5
 This is also known as a financial, as opposed to a physical concept of capital – see International 
Accounting Standards Board IFRS: Conceptual Framework 4.57. Also see Max Weber’s 
understanding of capital, which he defines as “the money value of the means of profit-making available 
to the enterprise at the balancing of the books” – M Weber Economy and Society: An Outline of 
Interpretive Sociology (1978) 91 (translation of the German original Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: 
Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie, edited by G Roth & C Wittich). To Weber, accounting in the 
form of double-entry bookkeeping is essential for the development of rational capitalism. 
6
 International Accounting Standards Board IFRS: Conceptual Framework 4.57. A physical concept of 
capital, on the other hand, denotes the productive capacity of a company – see 4.57. 
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and neither does it attempt to provide a comprehensive summary of the economic 
discourse of this search. The aim is merely to highlight some thoughts on capital that 
assist us in understanding the interaction between capital, rights and shares. 
3 2 Capital in legislation 
The concept of capital is central to the idea of companies and traditionally features 
prominently in companies’ legislation. It is, however, conspicuously absent from the 
South African Companies Act of 2008. Abandoning par-value shares has ushered in 
the decline of the legislative concept of share capital. 
The previous dispensation, even if not prescribing a minimum share capital, 7 
demanded that the share capital with which a company proposed to be registered be 
set out in its memorandum of association, divided either into nominal shares of a 
fixed value or into a certain number of shares (for non-par value shares).8  This 
nominal capital, frequently referred to as authorised share capital, signified the 
maximum capital the company was allowed to raise through issuing shares.9 Any 
supplementary amount paid for shares over and above their nominal value was 
accounted for in share premium accounts and not as share capital. Share capital, or 
legal capital, was thought to provide a buffer for creditors by being non-distributable 
to shareholders, whether as dividends, upon liquidation or otherwise.10 
Today, a company must only set out in its memorandum of incorporation the 
number of shares of each class it is authorised to issue.11 Capital as an expression of 
a monetary aggregate of the nominal value of all shares has vanished together with 
the par value shares and the concept of capital maintenance.12 This change is also 
                                            
7
 JT Pretorius, PA Delport, M Havenga & M Vermaas Hahlo’s South African Company Law through the 
Cases 6 ed (1999) 121. 
8
 See Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 52(2)(a). 
9
 It was calculated by multiplying the maximum number of shares a company was allowed to issue 
with the par value per share. 
10
 See JJ Hanks “The New Legal Capital Regime in South Africa”, in TH Mongalo Modern Company 
Law for a Competitive South African Economy (2010) 131 136. 
11
 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 36(1)(a). Also see s 2.1(1) of Form CoR 15.1B, with which a 
company’s memorandum of incorporation is lodged. 
12
 The concept of capital maintenance prohibited a company from distributing capital to its 
shareholders, except through a reduction of share capital. The capital maintenance rule was intended 
to protect a company’s creditors by preventing that the funds that were contributed by shareholders 
were returned to them. Dividends to shareholders could, for example, be paid only out of profits not 
out of capital. The contributions of shareholders were intended to serve as a buffer for creditor 
protection. This rule was successively abandoned from 1999 onwards in favour of a solvency and 
liquidity test as developed in US law and now found in s 4(1) as read with s 46 of the Companies Act 
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reflected in the definition of a “share” – whereas a share was previously defined as “a 
share in the share capital of that company”, the reference to share capital has been 
discarded.13 Share capital today describes, at most, the number and type of shares 
that a company is authorised to issue. The focus has rightly shifted to the rights of 
which shares are composed, rather than an artificial value that bears no relation to 
the market value of the shares.  
3 3 Shares as capital in their own right 
The value of the concept of share capital is doubtful wherever it is used to refer to the 
aggregate nominal value of shares. Nonetheless, the explanatory value of the notion 
of capital is compelling, particularly in illustrating how shares as a form of capital turn 
into units of capital in their own right, independent of the capital advanced to the 
company by its shareholders. 
Capital was the central concept of Karl Marx’s book of the same name. 
Disregarding the political positions advanced in the book, Marx formulates an 
interesting theory on the evolution of capital culminating in the development of money 
as capital and the emergence of fictitious capital.14 
Sketched in very brief terms, it is useful first to describe the original forms of 
capital, which Marx terms industrial capital and merchant capital. In simple terms, the 
distinguishing feature of capital is the potential to produce surplus value.15 
An industrial capitalist invests his money (M) in commodities (C), in the form of 
labour (L) and means of production (MP). In a process of production (P), these are 
converted to commodities with different characteristics (C1), which are sold for a sum 
of money (M1) greater than that initially invested in the venture. The metamorphosis 
of commodities takes place through production.16 Money changes hands twice during 
                                                                                                                                        
71 of 2008. For a history of the capital maintenance rules, see MS Blackman, RD Jooste, CK 
Everingham, JL Yeats, FHI Cassim & R De La Harpe Commentary on the Companies Act (2002) (RS 
9 2012) 5-8 – 5-16. On the solvency and liquidity test, see K van der Linde “The Solvency and 
Liquidity Approach in the Companies Act 2008” (2009) 2 TSAR 224. 
13
 The legal position in South Africa is comparable to the Model Business Corporation Act in the US, § 
6.01(a), which also demands that the classes of shares and the number of shares of each class that a 
company is authorised to issue, be set out in the articles of incorporation. Direct references to the 
concept of capital are equally absent (but compare this to the position in the Delaware Code). 
14
 For a brief overview, also in the context of shares, see P Ireland, I Grigg-Spall & D Kelly “The 
Conceptual Foundations of Modern Company Law” (1987) 14 J Law & Soc 149 150. 
15
 See K Marx Capital: A Critique of Political Economy I (1867) ch 4, 107. 
16
 See K Marx Capital: A Critique of Political Economy II (1885) ch 1. 
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the process,17 but only functions as a transient form of capital, money-capital, not as 
capital in its own right.18   
M → C … P (L & MP) … C1 → M1 
Commercial capital, on the other hand, is devoted, not to a process of production, 
but to the simple buying and selling of commodities. The merchant expends money 
on commodities, which are resold at a profit. In the process, the merchant does not 
change the character of the commodities. Money changes hands twice, facilitating a 
change of place of the commodity rather than its complete metamorphosis.19 In this 
process, money-capital acts simply as money, as a means of purchasing 
commodities for resale, not as capital.20  
M → C → M1 
Described in its simplest form, the industrial capitalist has to finance the production 
process himself and the merchant likewise has to finance the purchase of 
commodities. The key element of the capital enterprise – the generation of a surplus 
– may at times assume a money-form, at times a commodities form. Money and 
commodities are only capital as long as they keep circulating and creating a 
surplus.21 The essential factor, therefore, is value, which is both self-preserving and 
self-expanding.  
This position changes significantly where the financing of capitalist activity is 
externalised – where money is transferred from one person to another temporarily as 
a loan to be used in the process of production or the buying and re-selling of goods. 
While the money capitalist contributes the funds, the industrial capitalist or the 
merchant capitalist utilises them to produce surplus value. Only the process 
underlying the creation of industrial or commercial capital, as described above, is 
                                            
17
 Marx Capital I ch 4, 105; K Marx Capital: A Critique of Political Economy III (1894) ch 21, 231. 
18 
Marx Capital III ch 24, 267: “In the reproduction process of capital, the money-form is but transient – 
a mere point in transit”. 
19
 Ch 21, 231. 
20
 Ch 21, 232. 
21
 Marx Capital I ch 4, 107. Also see Adam Smith, who draws a distinction between circulating 
(floating) and fixed capital. Circulating capital was employed in manufacturing or the purchasing and 
reselling of goods. Smith writes: “The capital employed in this manner yields no revenue or profit to its 
employer, while it either remains in his possession, or continues in the same shape. … His capital is 
continually going from him in one shape, and returning to him in another, and it is only by means of 
such circulation, or successive exchanges, that it can yield him any profit.” – Smith Wealth of Nations 
112. 
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described by Marx as the actual, active investment as capital.22 The transfer of funds 
(the first outlay of money) from the money capitalist to the active capitalist is a simple 
transfer. Only the 2nd outlay of money by, for example, the merchant to purchase 
commodities for resale, is a phase of the reproduction of capital.23 The double outlay 
of money is matched by a double reflux of money as capital.24 The first reflux is a 
conversion of commodities to money at a value higher than that expended at the 
beginning of the process (M1, which is M + ∆M, while ∆M is made up of profit and 
interest). A part of this surplus must be surrendered to the money capitalist. The 
second reflux is therefore the transfer of the loan amount plus interest from the active 
capitalist to the money capitalist. To the money capitalist, money has the ability to 
produce a surplus in the form of interest (the M1 of the money capitalist is the loan 
amount plus interest). Money becomes capital – a commodity – in its own right. In 
this process, Marx labels money as a commodity sui generis. 25  To the money 
capitalist, the circuit of his capital becomes simply M – M1. 
(M →) M → C … P … C1 → M1 (→ M1) 
(M →) M → C → M1 (→ M1) 
For money to function as capital in the sense just described, it must be expended 
as labour (L) or means of production (MP) in the process of industrial capital or to 
purchase commodities in the process of merchant capital. The active transformation 
of money into capital takes place as part of these processes. According to Marx, 
money as capital (or capital as a commodity) can become disconnected from the 
active function of industrial or merchant capital. This takes place, for example, in the 
case of shares in a company.26 The money invested in the company is industrial or 
merchant capital to the company, actively utilised by the company to produce a 
surplus. This is described as actual or real capital.27 This “loan capital” cannot be 
withdrawn. To ensure the reflux of money to the money-capitalists, they receive 
shares, which are termed titles to revenues or titles to real capital. This process is 
described as capitalisation – the periodic future income that will flow from advancing 
                                            
22
 Marx Capital III ch 21, 231. 
23
 Ch 21, 231. 
24
 Ch 21, 232. 
25
 Ch 21, 230. Also see ch 24. 
26
 Ch 29. 
27
 Ch 29, 334-335. 
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the real capital is capitalised to produce a present value of the title.28 Marx describes 
this as the formation of fictitious capital.29 These titles to revenue can be sold and 
bought freely and in the process develop a value that is disconnected from the 
money initially advanced for these claims as well as from the value created by the 
real capital and the value of the asset-base of the company.30 The value of shares is 
rather a market price influenced by factors such as the interest rate and the expected 
profitability of the company. 
In a company context, it is therefore useful to distinguish two strata of capital: The 
capital of the company and the capital of the shareholder. The latter is the share, 
which is a unit of capital in its own right. As Ireland puts it: “The same sum of money 
thus comes to function as capital for two people. Industrial capitalists use it as capital 
in the production process and money capitalists use it as capital outside the 
production process.” 31  Active markets on which shares are traded promote the 
emergence of shares as distinct units of capital.32  
While a company’s share capital still consists of its authorised and issued shares, 
the conception of shares as a monetary portion of a company’s share capital is in 
decline, 33  as evidenced by a review of the concept of capital in companies’ 
legislation.34 Parallel to this, the notion of shares as independent units of capital has 
increased in importance. This shift in emphasis not only underscores the centrality of 
the feature of transferability of shares as identified above;35 it further highlights the 
relatively impersonal nature of shares are assets. The conceptual severance of the 
company from the holders of its shares can not only be explained with reference to 
the concept of capital. It is also a milestone in the historic development of the 
company as a specific business form. A review of the historic development of the 
legal conception of companies36 as well as on economic theories of the company 
                                            
28
 Ch 29, 335. 
29
 Ch 29, 334. Marx viewed fictitious capital with strong aversion, describing it as “a meaningless form 
of capital” and “the perversion and objectification of production” – ch 24, 267. 
30
 Ch 29, 336. The same applies to the market value of a company, which is today typically much 
greater than the underlying value of its capital goods. 
31
 Ireland et al (1987) J Law & Soc 157. 
32
 158. 
33
 Above, 3 1 Capital and equity. 
34
 Above, 3 2 Capital in legislation. 
35
 Above, 2 2 Shares as securities and 2 3 Economic descriptions and commercial realities. 
36
 Below, 4 2 The entity theory. 
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form,37 even if generally considered to be a moot debate,38 is therefore useful for 
showing, just like Marx’s theory on fictitious capital, the development of shares as 
assets separate from the company. 
                                            
37
 Below, 4 3 The nexus theory. 
38
 See for example 4 2 1 The development of the doctrine of juristic personality, text to nn 49-52, 
below. 
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Chapter 4: Considerations of ownership 
4 1 Introduction 
The entanglement of the capital of shares with the capital of the company frequently 
leads to assertions that “ownership” of the company vests in its shareholders. The 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) Conceptual Framework indicates 
that “[classifications such as equity capital or other reserves] may also reflect the fact 
that parties with ownership interests in an entity have differing rights in relation to the 
receipt of dividends or the repayment of contributed equity”.1 In fact, historically, the 
extensive rights with which shareholders are furnished in relation to the company 
have frequently been justified with reference to their position as “owners” of the 
company.2 The idea of shareholder ownership of the company is deeply woven into 
the fabric of the theory of the firm, its structure, responsibilities, government and 
governance. Ideas of shareholder ownership of the company are the foundation on 
which economic theories such as the separation of ownership and control, the 
agency problem and shareholder primacy are constructed. Conceptions about 
shareholder ownership and shareholder primacy frequently lie at the center of both 
legal and economic theories of the corporation. 
The enquiry into the nature and structure of companies has engaged the minds of 
legal academics and economists alike. A company has both a legal and an economic 
structure, comprised on the one hand of the rules that determine the rights and 
obligations of the parties involved, and on the other the material relations that flow 
from a specific economic arrangement.3 Whilst a company is characterised as a 
juristic person in law, the most prominent theory of the company, or firm, 4  in 
economic circles in the past decades has been the conception of the company as a 
nexus of contracts. Although these theories are aimed at showing how companies 
come into existence, they simultaneously disclose much about the relationship 
between a company and its shareholders. 
                                            
1
 International Accounting Standards Board IFRS: Conceptual Framework 4.20. 
2
 RB Grantham “The Doctrinal Basis of the Rights of Company Shareholders” (1998) 57 Cambridge LJ 
554. 
3
 R Flannigan “The Economic Structure of the Firm” (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall LJ 105 106. 
4
 In economics a firm includes a wide variety of business organisations, including sole proprietorships, 
partnerships and companies. The theory applies to firms in general. As the focus of this thesis is on 
companies, the terms “firm”, “company” and “corporation” will be used interchangeably. 
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4 2 The entity theory 
4 2 1 The development of the doctrine of juristic personality 
The decisive outcome of incorporation is the establishment of juristic personality. 
Juristic personality is so central to the concept of a company that the South African 
Companies Act emphasises it in defining a company. 5  A company, as a juristic 
person, comes into existence upon incorporation6 and “has all of the legal power and 
capacity of an individual”. 7  The concept of juristic personality establishes the 
company as an entity separate from its shareholders and treated in law as having the 
capacities of a natural person, where applicable.8  
What appears to be axiomatic from today’s vantage point was not always as clear-
cut. The British joint-stock company has its origins in partnership law, which dictated 
that a special and personal relationship exists between the partners.9 Partners owned 
the assets of the partnership and were liable jointly and severally for its debts.10 The 
departure of one of the partners from the partnership marked its termination. The 
association of partners constituted the partnership. What worked well in the context 
of a partnership, and still does, was less suitable for an association of a large number 
of natural persons.11 Legislative intervention was required to establish a legal entity 
separate from the persons associating to form it.12 This timid legal initiative, however, 
                                            
5
 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 1: “‘company’ means a juristic person incorporated in terms of this Act”. 
J Armour, H Hansmann, R Kraakman & M Pargendler “What is Corporate Law?” in R Kraakman, J 
Armour, P Davies, L Enriques, H Hansmann, G Hertig, K Hopt, H Kanda, M Pargendler, W-G Ringe & 
E Rock (eds) The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach 3 ed (2017) 1 
5-8 identify legal personality as one of the five core structural characteristics of companies. 
6
 See South African Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 19(1)(a). Also see for the UK, Companies Act 2006 s 
16(2), which refers to a “body corporate“. The Model Business Corporation Act § 2.03(a) refers to a 
“corporate existence”. The terminology of “corporate existence” and “body corporate” is also employed 
by the Delaware Code § 106. The German Aktiengesetz § 1(1) describes the nature of a company 
(“Aktiengesellschaft”) as “eine Gesellschaft mit eigener Rechtspersönlichkeit”. The German BGB 
similarly refers to “Juristische Personen” in Part 2. On “juristic personality” in German legal theory also 
see H Wiedemann Gesellschaftsrecht I (1980) § 4, 191; W Flume Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen 
Rechts I: Die juristische Person (1983) § 1, 1; K Schmidt Gesellschaftsrecht 4 ed (2002) § 8 II, 186. 
7
 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 19(1)(b). A similar provisions can be found in the Model Business 
Corporation Act in § 3.02, stating that a corporation “has the same powers as an individual to do all 
things necessary or convenient to carry out its business and affairs”. Also see Delaware Code § 121.  
8
 Some attributes of natural persons cannot be extended to companies, such as feelings or race. See 
RC Williams “Companies: Part 1” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA 4(1) 2 ed (2012) para 64; 
PA Delport (ed) Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (RS 15 2017) 82-83. Also see s 
19(1)(b)(i) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
9
 Grantham (1998) Cambridge LJ 557-558. 
10
 557-558. 
11
 558. 
12
 This was first stipulated in the English Companies Act of 1844; See Grantham (1998) Cambridge LJ 
558. 
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passed into oblivion for the greater part of the 19th century. Ireland, Grigg-Spall and 
Kelly describe the position prevailing during the 19th century as follows: 
“Incorporation did create an entity, the incorporated company, which was legally 
distinguishable from the people composing it, but there was no suggestion that this entity 
was ‘completely separate’ from its members. On the contrary, up to the middle of the 
nineteenth century incorporated joint stock companies were consistently identified with 
their component members and were conceptualized not as depersonalized objects but as 
entities composed of those members merged into one legally distinguishable body.”13 
Even though the joint stock company exhibited many features still associated with 
companies today, such as transferable shares, a management body and a board of 
directors,14 it was essentially viewed as an entity comprised of an aggregation of 
shareholders – an entity nonetheless, but not one distinct from such shareholders. As 
a logical consequence, the shareholders were considered to be the owners of the 
company.15 As owners of the company the shareholders were simultaneously owners 
of its assets, they could manage the company or dictate how it ought to be managed 
for their benefit. The company was regarded as holding the assets in trust on behalf 
of the shareholders.16  
Only the seminal case of Salomon v A Salomon and Co Ltd17 shifted the focus to 
the legal characterisation of companies as entities not only distinguishable, but also 
completely separate from its members or shareholders. The facts of the case are 
well-known and it suffices to mention that the salient question to be answered by the 
court was whether Mr Salomon, a shareholder and secured creditor, could be held 
personally liable for the debts of the company upon its liquidation.18 It was contended 
that Mr Salomon had established the company to shield himself from his creditors 
and that the other six shareholders, being his family members, were essentially 
“dummies” as he was the only active shareholder. The decision by the House of 
Lords represents a substantial paradigm shift in the conception of a company. A 
                                            
13
 P Ireland, I Grigg-Spall & D Kelly “The Conceptual Foundations of Modern Company Law” (1987) 14 
J Law & Soc 149 150. 
14
 Grantham (1998) Cambridge LJ 558. 
15
 560. 
16
 Child v Hudson’s Bay Co (1723) 2 P Wms 207. See also Grantham (1998) Cambridge LJ 562; 
Ireland et al (1987) J Law & Soc 152. 
17
 [1897] AC 22. 
18
 For a summary of the facts see D Kershaw Company Law in Context: Text and Materials 2 ed 
(2009) 30-31; D French, SW Mayson & CL Ryan Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law 31
 
ed 
(2014-2015) 122-123. 
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company, it was decided, is an entity in itself, completely separated from its 
shareholders: 
“The company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to the 
memorandum; and, though it may be that after incorporation the business is precisely the 
same as it was before, and the same persons are managers, and the same hands receive 
the profits, he company is not in law the agent of the subscribers or the trustee for 
them.”19 
The re-conceptualisation of the company as a separate entity and legal person 
cannot be viewed in isolation. It was heralded by a change in the nature of the share 
itself.20 During the 18th and early 19th century not only the shareholders, but also their 
shares were seen as closely connected to the property of the company – the 
shareholders as owners of the assets and the shares themselves as an equitable 
interest in those assets.21 The concept of a “share” therefore corresponded to the 
ordinary meaning of the word, namely – a part of a whole – to be precise a part of the 
property of the company.22 This had a profound impact on the nature of a share. A 
share, it was commonly believed, could either be personalty or realty depending on 
the type of assets held by the company.23 
The case of Bligh v Brent24 marked a departure from this position. The issue that 
had to be decided by the court was whether shares in an incorporated waterworks 
company were realty.25 Although the decision did not tamper with the concept of 
shareholders as proprietors of the company, 26  the court made it clear that 
shareholders have no direct and severable interest in the assets of the company. The 
nature of a share was thus severed from the nature of the company’s assets. Shares 
were described as personality or personal property irrespective of the nature of the 
assets held by the company.27 This idea of a separation between shares and the 
assets of the company was extended to unincorporated companies in Watson v 
                                            
19
 Lord Mcnaghten in Salomon v A Salomon and Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 51. 
20
 Ireland et al (1987) J Law & Soc 151, Grantham (1998) Cambridge LJ 562-564. 
21
 DG Rice “The Legal Nature of a Share” (1957) 21 Conveyancer & Property Lawyer 433 433-434; 
Ireland et al (1987) J Law & Soc 152. 
22
 Rice (1957) Conveyancer & Property Lawyer 433. 
23
 Rice (1957) Conveyancer & Property Lawyer 433; Ireland (1987) J Law & Soc 152. 
24
 1837 2 Y & C Ex 268. 
25
 All the assets of the company were clearly realty. Realty can be equated to immovable property in 
South African law. 
26
 The separate juristic personality of the company was only articulated in Salomon v A Salomon & Co 
Ltd [1897] AC 22 as illustrated above. 
27
 Bligh v Brent 2 Y & C Ex 268. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
39 
 
Spratley.28 It is a logical step from detaching the nature of the shares from the assets 
of the company, to separating the shareholders from those assets altogether. 
Similar developments took place in American law, as a result of which a company 
was conceptualised as an entity separate from its shareholders. In particular, the 
company was viewed as an artificial entity that owed its existence to the law.29 This 
characterisation of the corporate form followed from a number of features exhibited 
by corporations – the characteristics of immortality, perpetual succession, the ability 
to manage its own affairs as well as the ability to hold property.30 Another important 
factor was the fact that companies were incorporated individually by special charters 
that required an act by the state legislature in each case – incorporation was 
construed as a “concession”, a privilege bestowed by the state.31  
Renewed academic interest in the enquiry about “corporate personality” was 
sparked by both changes in the legal landscape, as well as philosophical legal 
enquiry.32 The emergence of general incorporation statues during the second half of 
the 19th century eliminated the need to incorporate each company individually and 
changed the conception of the corporation from an artificial entity depending for its 
creation on the law, to a natural entity that is the product of the private initiative of 
entrepreneurs and investors. 33  The decline of the ultra vires doctrine, 34  the 
abrogation of prohibitions to act beyond the borders of the state in which a company 
was incorporated35 and the abolition of other regulatory restrictions, contributed to 
this development.36 In the wake of the emerging general incorporation laws, the need 
arose to re-conceptualise the corporation. By making incorporation freely available, 
the theory that corporations are artificial creatures created by the state became 
tenuous. To fill the void, competing theories were put forward. Initially, the prevailing 
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view was that the corporation was similar to a partnership.37 The corporation was 
analysed as being created through the free contracting of its shareholders.38 Central 
to the theory of these early “contractualists” was the primacy of shareholders. Strong 
emphasis was placed on the shareholders as the real actors in the corporation and 
on the property and control rights of shareholders. 39  Gradually, however, a new 
theory emerged in the 1890’s – the “entity theory” that attempted to establish the 
corporation as a “real” or “natural” entity. Instead of portraying the company as 
dependent for its existence on the state, emphasis shifted to the initiative of private 
incorporators and investors in bringing the company to life. With the contractualists, 
the entity theorists had in common that they construed the corporation as “private”, 
as being separate from the state.40 They differed, however, in that the entity theorists 
maintained that the corporation was an entity distinct from its shareholders, albeit one 
that was not created artificially by the law, but was “real” or “natural”. 41  This 
development was both an American one as well as significantly influenced by legal 
theories developed in Europe.42 A good description of the natural entity theory was 
provided by the American academic Ernst Freund: 
“The law does not create the corporate person, but finding it in existence invests it with a 
certain legal capacity. The corporation rests upon a substratum of physical persons, but it 
is not identical with them, for out of the association of the individuals the new personality 
arises, having a distinctive sphere of existence and a will of its own. If corporate rights are 
distinguished from individual rights it is because they are controlled by this distinctive will. 
The corporation as a person distinct from its members is not a fiction, but a reality.”43 
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Freund’s theory, like that of many American jurists at the time, was particularly 
inspired by the theoretical forays of German jurists, most notably Otto Gierke44 and 
his seminal work, Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht. 45  The debate among 
German jurists was particularly lively and influential and ran along similar lines as 
outlined above, split between the traditional “Fiktionstheorie” proposed by famous 
Pandectists such as Savigny and Puchta,46 and the “Realitätstheorien”47 put forward 
by jurists of the Germanic legal school.48 A full exposition of the discussion is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation and is today considered closed and not conducive for 
an understanding of juristic personality.49 The juristic person, Karl Schmidt writes, 
has become a manageable category. 50  Even in American law, it is viewed with 
hindsight as “so abstruse an inquiry”51 so much so, that Horwitz asks: “Why should 
so metaphysical a subject, even if it attracted the speculative instincts of German and 
French jurists, have appealed to the practical, earth-bound sensibilities of English 
and American legal thinkers?”52 The answer lies, at least in part, in the translation 
and discussion of Otto Gierke’s work by the English legal historian Maitland,53 who 
became a staunch defender of the entity theory.54 It was, however, not until 1905 that 
an American court in Hale v Henkel55 confirmed, albeit reluctantly, the natural entity 
theory. By 1900 the theory had gained dominance and by the 1920’s it was at its 
peak, 56 spurred on by the demise of shareholder influence in and control of the 
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company and the somewhat problematic consequences of an “aggregate theory” for 
the construction of limited liability.57  
Today, the theoretical justification of “legal personality” is rarely mentioned in 
company texts. There is widespread consensus, however, that the company is an 
entity separate and distinct from its members. The question whether this entity is 
artificial or natural has passed into oblivion. The focus has rather shifted to the 
consequences of this attribute. One of the underlying motives for the debate was with 
some probability the issue of the status of shareholders – a question that remains 
contentious to this day.58 
4 2 2 The consequences of juristic personality 
The law concerns itself with relationships.59 Juristic personality endows the company 
with the ability to enter into such legal relationships – to become the owner of 
property, to enter into contracts or to become a party to legal proceedings.60 
The pivotal concomitant feature of separate juristic personality is readily apparent: 
the assets of the company belong to the company, not to the shareholders. 61 
Shareholders own the shares, not the company’s assets. As the owner of its assets, 
a company has all the rights normally associated with owning property – it can use 
the assets, sell them or burden them. The separation of company assets from the 
shareholders is described as “asset partitioning”, particularly “entity shielding” by 
Hansmann, Kraakman and Squire.62 As a default rule, creditors can seize the assets 
of a defaulting debtor. A defaulting individual’s creditor can seize assets in this 
manner, as can the creditor of a defaulting company. The law regards the individual 
and the company as separate persons. This formula does not change if shareholders 
are added to the equation. If the company’s assets belong to the company and are 
conceptually separate from the assets of the shareholders, the creditors of the 
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shareholders have no access to the assets of the company in the event of an 
insolvency or default of the shareholder. In addition to the restriction on the creditors 
of a shareholder to demand a share of the assets of the company, strong entity 
shielding also restricts the shareholders themselves to demand such a share of 
company assets.63 The separate existence of a company therefore manifests itself in 
the separate patrimony of the company.  
The flipside of entity shielding is limited liability or so-called “owner shielding”.64 
Shareholders neither own the assets of the company, nor are they liable for the 
company’s debts. Just as the personal creditors of shareholders cannot attach 
company assets, the creditors of the company cannot seize the assets of the 
shareholders. In other words, the liability of shareholders is limited to the capital 
amount invested in the company. 
In order to function effectively as a legal entity, a company must have the ability to 
enter into contracts – be it to purchase assets, procure services, sell products or 
services, incur debt, enter into employment relationships or another of the myriad of 
contracts concluded as part of everyday business transactions. Additionally, a 
company can enter into contracts with its shareholders, illustrated by the allotment 
and issue of shares, 65 for example, or the payment of dividends. As an artificial 
person, a company is unable to fulfil this role itself. The function of contracting for and 
on behalf of the company must be delegated – usually to the board of directors and 
management of the company. 66  An important implication of separate juristic 
personality is that the board acting as a whole is acting as a company organ. The 
tasks performed and the contracts entered into by the board are considered to be 
performed or entered into by the company itself. A catalyst of the transformation of 
companies from partnership-like structures to personified entities was the significant 
growth in the size of companies and their capital demands.67 Shareholders were re-
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conceptualised as contributors of capital and it was no longer deemed appropriate 
that they be involved in the management of the company.68 Nonetheless, as briefly 
described above, the shareholders are sometimes considered to assign this power to 
the board of directors through the constitutional document. 69  Yet, a consistent 
application of the notion of separate juristic personality dictates that the power to 
manage and bind the company flows from the company itself, not from its 
shareholders.70 
As a separate legal entity, a company survives its shareholders. The exit of one or 
even all of its shareholders does not necessitate the dissolution of the entity. This 
characteristic, together with the free transferability of shares, enables shares to be 
traded on secondary markets. In fact, public companies are generally characterised 
by a fluctuating shareholder base. 
4 3 The nexus of contracts theory 
4 3 1 Introduction to the theory 
While the legal theorising about corporate personality exhibited a flurry of activity at 
the beginning of the 20th century, it was only in the 1980’s that a new theory of the 
corporation emerged based primarily on economic conceptions. The theory of the 
corporation as a “nexus of contracts”, as it became known, shifted the focus away 
from an entity-based perspective to an aggregate-view of the company. While the 
theory originated in economics, it became widely accepted in both legal and 
economic circles.71 
A paper by Jensen and Meckling is probably the most widely-known description of 
the neoclassical variant.72 “The private corporation or firm”, they write, “is simply one 
form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships”.73 This 
includes not only the relationship with employees, but also relationships with 
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customers, suppliers, lenders and other creditors; 74  relationships that become 
interwoven, creating a web of contracts. In line with neoclassical economic theory, 
the parties to these transactions are rational, self-interested and wealth-maximising 
individuals.75 The exchange transactions between them create a complex equilibrium 
and the result of their contracting behaviour is the firm. 76  The theory declares 
companies to be creatures of contract created by and consisting of a web of 
voluntary arrangements.77 The literature, also summarised under the rubric “property 
rights”, aims to determine how the rights that flow from such an undertaking 
established through multiple contracts are divided between the owners of the various 
inputs.78 
Ronald Coase is often regarded as laying the foundations of the theory.79 Coase 
draws a distinction between markets and companies and asks why we transact and 
co-ordinate production within companies instead of simply transacting for all our 
needs and wants on the open market.80  In attempting to define the nature of a 
company and in examining why economic activity takes place through companies, he 
introduced the concept of transaction costs.81 Entering into a contract with a third 
party attracts costs beyond the cost of the goods or services that are the subject of 
the contract, in other words the costs of participating in a particular market. Typically, 
these are divided into three categories: search and information costs, bargaining 
costs as well as policing and enforcement costs.82 Production requires various inputs, 
the most common of which are labour and raw materials. Production within a market 
requires an exchange transaction with the “owner” of each factor of production. 
Coase argues that transaction costs can be reduced by centralising the contracting 
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function in a firm, more notably, an entrepreneur, who enters into a contract with 
each factor of production. 83  This greatly reduces the number of contracts to be 
entered into.84 Exchange transactions are organised within a company structure and 
the company has the authority to direct the allocation of resources. In summary, 
Coase finds that “[a] firm, therefore, consists of the system of relationships which 
comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent on an 
entrepreneur”.85  
Alchian and Demsetz take up Coase’s idea and develop it into an explicit notion of 
the firm as a “centralised contractual agent”.86 They propose that the formation of the 
company, in a contractual form, is linked to the benefits of cooperative team 
production.87 In team production, it is not easy to monitor the performance of the 
various team members. This provides an incentive to “shirk”; that is to perform at less 
than full capacity. To minimise the costs of shirking it is sensible that the contracting 
parties appoint a monitor.88 As a reward for reducing the incidence of shirking and as 
incentive himself not to shirk, the monitor receives the right to the residual outputs of 
the joint production. 89  While shareholders themselves were initially envisaged to 
undertake this monitoring exercise, the structure of large corporations with a 
dispersed shareholder base has made it more useful to appoint a third party as the 
monitor. While managers therefore conclude the contracts with and generally 
manage and monitor all other inputs, shareholders retain a measure of control over 
the managers.90 Shareholders are described as centralagent-monitors in this process 
of contracting.91 Note that in the exercise of the monitoring powers, “[n]o authoritarian 
control is involved; the arrangement is simply a contractual structure subject to 
continuous renegotiation”.92 In summary, the essence of the company is described as 
“a contractual structure with: 1) joint input production; 2) several input owners; 3) one 
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party who is common to all the contracts of the joint inputs; 4) who has rights to 
renegotiate any input's contract independently of contracts with other input owners; 
5) who holds the residual claim; and 6) who has the right to sell his central 
contractual residual status. The central agent is called the firm's owner and the 
employer.”93 
Fama criticises the central role that the shareholder takes in the theory developed 
by Alchian and Demsetz.94 While the shareholder to Alchian and Demsetz is both the 
owner-employer and the central-agent-monitor, Fama, like other later scholars, 
criticises the insufficient separation between ownership and control inherent in the 
theory.95 Without using the terminology of “agency costs”, Berle and Means provided 
an early description of the separation of ownership and control that occurs in the 
corporate form.96 In fact, much of the nexus of contracts theory has developed into a 
description of the agency problem. 97  Agency costs arise if the interests of 
shareholders and managers are dis-aligned, in other words if management acts in 
their own interest to the detriment of shareholders.98 Furthermore, managers are 
privy to information unknown to shareholders – resulting in so-called information 
asymmetry. Contractarians argue that in an efficient capital market, the rational 
shareholder would estimate agency costs and take them into account when 
purchasing shares and would pay less for the shares.99 Thus, management bears the 
agency costs and no transfer of value takes place from the shareholders to 
management, which in turn means that rationally acting managers will act to minimise 
agency costs. 100  According to the theory, market forces therefore provide the 
strongest incentive to minimise agency costs. 101  Additionally, managers may be 
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monitored to reduce the agency problem.102 Fama on the other hand, suggests that it 
is the managerial labour market as well as the monitoring of managers by managers 
from the top-down as well as the bottom-up that provides the strongest incentive to 
maximise the performance of the company. 103  The top-level of management is 
monitored in turn by the competition that exists amongst each other as well as by the 
board of directors, in particular nonexecutive directors.104 Fama therefore criticises 
the shareholder-centred monitoring model of Alchian and Demsetz as well as Jensen 
and Meckling, developing instead a model that is based on the complete separation 
of risk-bearing and control.105 All control rests in the managers. All models have in 
common that rational contracting will achieve the efficient monitoring of management.  
Armour and Whincop posit that the focus on asymmetric information and the 
agency problem has been accompanied by a more general shift – the question is no 
longer why firms exist, prominent in the writings of Coase, but rather why contracts 
concerning the firm exist in a particular form.106 In other words, the question has 
become why certain rights such as residual benefits accrue to a certain group of 
contracting parties. 
Proponents of the neoclassical variant of the nexus of contracts theory strongly 
reject the “personalization of the firm”,107 stating that a firm “is not an individual”.108 
The company as an entity “dissolves into disaggregated but interrelated transactions 
among the participating human actors”.109 If the company is depicted as an entity – 
mostly for the purposes of making it one of the contracting parties – it is for 
convenience only.110 In fact, it is likely that the company is the counterparty to every 
contract concluded. Some academic commentators therefore suggest that a more 
accurate characterisation may be of the company as a “nexus for contracts”.111 
                                            
102
 Jensen & Meckling (1976) J Financ Econ 323-325; Jensen (1983) Account Rev 328-329; Alchian & 
Demsetz (1972) Am Econ Rev 381-383. 
103
 Fama (1980) J Polit Econ 293. 
104
 293-294. 
105
 294-295. 
106
 J Armour & MJ Whincop “The Proprietary Functions of Corporate Law” (2007) 27 Oxf J Leg Stud 
420 432-433; also see O Hart “An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm” (1989) 89 
Columbia LR 1757 1764-1765. 
107
 Jensen & Meckling (1976) J Financ Econ 311. 
108
 311. 
109
 Bratton (1989) Cornell LR 420. 
110
 420. 
111
 Armour et al “What is Corporate Law?” in The Anatomy of Corporate Law 5. cf MA Eisenberg “The 
Conception that the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm” (1999) 24 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
49 
 
According to Bratton the nexus of contracts theory diverged into two main variants 
– the neoclassical variant, described above, as well as the institutional variant.112 
Institutionalists work with a watered-down version of the neoclassical assumptions 
that transacting parties are rational and wealth maximising economic actors. Most 
prominently, Williamson argues that transacting parties are at most capable of 
“bounded rationality” and act “opportunistically”.113 The institutionalists acknowledge 
the existence of the company as an entity and highlight the importance of the internal 
organisation of the company. They pick up many of the threads initially spun by 
Coase: Williamson highlights the importance of recognising individual relationships 
within companies. Drafting comprehensive long-term contracts to govern such 
relationships would attract significant transaction costs. The factor that distinguishes 
ordinary markets from companies is the level of organisation of resources that can be 
observed in a company; organisation which reduces transaction costs as well as 
production costs.114 Governance or management structures, particularly hierarchal 
structures of organisation within companies are therefore an essential component of 
the theory. Economic actors within this paradigm organise economic exchange by 
contract. Contracting remains the key explanatory force behind companies. 
Nonetheless, in the light of bounded rationality and opportunistic behaviour, 
contractual economic exchange is incomplete and the drafting of long-term contracts 
to govern a range of eventualities attracts significant transaction costs.115 Transacting 
parties leave some matters open and in turn agree on governance structures to 
resolve them.116  
Although the institutionalist approach acknowledges the existence of the company 
as an entity, like its neoclassical counterpart, it primarily views the company as a 
creature of contract. If the firm exhibits features of central organisation, these are the 
result of private, contractual ordering, not public, legislative concession or 
intervention. Both versions of the new economic theory reject the characterisation of 
                                                                                                                                        
J Corp L 819 830-832, who argues that the nexus of contracts theory lacks intellectual coherence. 
Assuming that the company is the signatory of every contract is non-contractarian as “it is centered on 
a legal entity that is presumably not itself a nexus of contracts”. 
112
 Bratton (1989) Cornell LR 407. 
113
 Williamson (1981) J Econ Lit 1541-1542, 1544-1546; Bratton (1989) Cornell LR 421; R Richter 
Essays on New Institutional Economics (2015) 11. Williamson coined the term “new institutional 
economics”. 
114
 Williamson (1981) J Econ Lit. See Coase (1937) Economica. The factor of production costs is an 
additional dimension that did not feature prominently in the theory of Coase. 
115
 Williamson (1981) J Econ Lit 1545-1546; Hart (1989) Columbia LR 1762-1763. 
116
 Bratton (1989) Cornell LR 421-422. 
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the company as a separate juristic person. Juristic personality is not regarded as a 
representation of reality. 117  The authors recognise that juristic personality is 
associated with many of the basic features which enable the company to contract in 
the first place – separate patrimony as well as the capacity to enter into contracts and 
to enforce them. 118  Nonetheless, they describe juristic personality merely as a 
convenient way to bundle these features together, not as a “necessary precondition” 
for their existence.119 Consequently, it is not legislation that brings a company into 
being, but rather contract.120 At most, legislation may provide a convenient set of 
non-mandatory, standard terms. These “off-the-rack” terms may reduce the costs of 
contracting.121 Additionally, they assist courts to resolve uncertainties and conflicts 
not anticipated by the contracting parties.122 A public company is one example of 
such a “standard-form” contract. 123  It follows that the contractarian view of the 
company strongly rejects the notion of mandatory legal rules. 124  Contractarians 
consequently reject state intervention, not only in the formation of a company, but 
also in regulating its operation. This position is justified with reference to the 
principles of freedom of contract, which dictates that parties may structure their 
relations as they see fit.125 The role of the state is limited to providing legal rules and 
mechanisms for the enforcement of contracts.126 
The notion of the company as a creature of contracts is primarily an ontological 
enquiry that seeks to reveal the nature and structure of companies either as 
hierarchal, manager-driven structures or as networks of voluntary arrangements.127 
Theories of the corporation are furthermore aimed at revealing: 1. how companies 
are created; 2. how a company is “regulated” during its existence; and 3. how the 
relationship between the company and its shareholders is structured. The theory may 
                                            
117
 See Easterbrook & Fischel (1989) Columbia LR 1425-1426. 
118
 Armour et al “What is Corporate Law?” in The Anatomy of Corporate Law 6-9. 
119
 9. 
120
 Companies, Easterbrook and Fischel posit, are therefore “arrangements that depend on contracts 
and positive law, not on corporate law”; Easterbrook & Fischel (1989) Columbia LR 1426. 
121
 Easterbrook & Fischel (1989) Columbia LR 1444. Additional reasons for relying on default terms 
rather than detailed contracts are the cost of enforcement as well as strategic reasons, whereby 
information withheld may reduce the price. See Armour & Whincop (2007) Oxf J Leg Stud 435 and 
n 25. 
122
 Easterbrook & Fischel (1989) Columbia LR 1444-1445. 
123
 Also see Hart (1989) Columbia LR 1764. 
124
 See 6 3 The obligationary realms of shares and some conclusions, especially nn 73 and 74. 
125
 HN Butler “The Contractual Theory of the Corporation” (1989) 11 George Mason Uni LR 99 100.  
126
 100. 
127
 Bratton (1989) Cornell LR 412. 
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present a useful manner of deconstructing the company to examine the relationships 
it invariably enters into.128  
4 3 2 Shareholder ownership and shareholder primacy 
Of particular interest is what the nexus of contracts theory reveals about the status of 
shareholders as “owners”. Despite legal assertions to the contrary, shareholders are 
regarded by many as “owners” of a company. Within this line of thinking, companies 
must prioritise the interests of shareholders, in other words, maximise profits. 129 
Assertions of shareholder primacy may, however, be independent of shareholder 
ownership. This is primarily an issue of corporate governance and the shareholder 
versus stakeholder debate. From the perspective of understanding the nature of 
shares, shareholder “ownership” reveals what the totality of rights may or may not 
entitle the shareholder to. 
Generally, shareholder ownership of the company is said to be irreconcilable with 
basic tenets of the nexus of contracts idea. The denial of shareholder ownership of 
the company is a critical feature of the nexus of contracts theory: shareholder 
ownership would make the company more than a simple web of contracts. Alchian 
and Demsetz describe shareholders simply as one of the various inputs. As Bratton 
aptly puts it “[e]quity capital, the traditional legal situs of ownership, devolves into one 
of many types of inputs”.130 Nonetheless, the description of shareholders as owners 
of a company appears quite often in the work of Alchian and Demsetz. They define 
the owner of the company as “the party common to all input contracts and the 
residual claimant”.131 Furthermore, the focus on the agency theory, which has at its 
core the separation between ownership and control, implies that something must be 
owned and that this is the firm. Many scholars are in fact imprecise on the content of 
the “ownership” concept. The incident of residuarity is a recurring feature; Jensen 
and Meckling define the firm as being “characterized by the existence of divisible 
                                            
128
 BR Cheffins Company Law: Theory, Structure, and Operation (1997) 32. 
129
 See below, nn 141-145. Milton Friedman, famously stated that “a corporation’s responsibility is to 
make as much money for the stockholders as possible“. M Friedman & RD Friedman Capitalism and 
Freedom 40th Anniversary ed (2002) 133. 
130
 Bratton (1989) Cornell LR 420. Also see JR Macey “An Economic Analysis of the Various 
Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties” (1991) 
21 Stetson LR 23 27-28; Millon (1990) Duke LJ 229. 
131
 Alchian & Demsetz (1972) Am Econ Rev 783.  
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residual claims on the assets and cash flows of the organization”,132 held by an 
“owner-manager” having an “ownership interest in the firm”.133  
Proponents of the so-called “property-rights theory of the firm”, also known as the 
Grossman-Hart-Moore theory, in addition emphasise the importance of control. They 
define a firm/company as consisting of “those [physical] assets that it owns or over 
which it has control”,134 while ownership is defined as the power to exercise residual 
rights of control.135 They focus on the residual control, not the monetary value of 
residual claims. Based on this, they deduce that shareholders are the owners of the 
firm, justified by Hart with this circular explanation: “Finally, identify a firm with all the 
non-human assets that belong to it, assets that the firm’s owners possess by virtue of 
being owners of the firm”.136 Shareholders, so the argument runs, are owners of the 
firm, which makes them owners of the firm’s assets, which gives them residual 
control rights.137 
Eugene Fama is more specific about “ownership” claims, signalling clearly that 
shareholders own only their input.138 They are, however, described as owners of the 
capital, which Ireland criticises as meaning essentially the same thing as owning the 
company.139 Fama also consistently distinguishes between “security ownership and 
control of the firm” and identifies risk-bearing (security ownership) and management 
(control) as entirely separate functions and factors of production. He writes: 
“However, ownership of capital should not be confused with ownership of the firm. Each 
factor in a firm is owned by somebody. The firm is just the set of contracts covering the 
way inputs are joined to create outputs and the way receipts from outputs are shared 
                                            
132
 Jensen & Meckling (1976) J Financ Econ 311. 
133
 314. 
134 
SJ Grossman & OD Hart “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral 
Integration” (1986) 94 J Polit Econ 691 693 
135
 692, 693-694. 
136 
Hart (1989) Columbia LR 1766. 
137
 The theory aims, amongst others, to explain incomplete contracts. Specific rights are created by 
concluding a contract. Frequently, however, a contract cannot cover all eventualities, thus the party 
who exercises residual control over an asset fills the gaps in the contract. Ownership therefore 
determines who will have the power to shape a relationship in the post-contracting stage. See Hart 
(1989) Columbia LR 1765. 
138
 Fama (1980) J Polit Econ 290. 
139
 P Ireland “Property and Contract in Contemporary Corporate Theory” (2003) 23 Legal Studies 453 
474. Similar, V Brudney “Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract” (1985) 
85 Columbia LR 1403 1436, who finds that there is barely any difference between considering 
shareholders as owners of the corporation or as residual claimants as the result is the same, namely 
that shareholder interests must be prioritised. 
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among inputs. In this "nexus of contracts" perspective, ownership of the firm is an 
irrelevant concept.”140 
Some authors suggest that shareholder ownership matters because it determines 
in whose interests the management of a company must act.141 In fact, shareholder 
ownership and the maximisation of shareholder value are closely connected. That 
shareholder primacy is not necessarily dependent on shareholder ownership appears 
from the nexus of contracts theory. The theory is said to support both a shareholder- 
or stakeholder-centred approach. 142  Mostly, however, the theory finds that the 
interests of the shareholder are paramount. While Easterbrook and Fischel ask “what 
is the goal of the corporation? Is it profit (and for whom)? Social welfare more broadly 
defined? … Our response to such questions is: ‘Who Cares?’”143 On the other hand 
they recognise that “[f]or most firms the expectation is that the residual riskbearers 
have contracted for a promise to maximize long-run profits of the firm”.144 In the wake 
of the increasing recognition of the social responsibility of corporations in the 
corporate governance discourse the shareholder-centred approach has become 
increasingly marginal.145 
Whatever the corporate governance implications of assertions of shareholder 
ownership and shareholder primacy are, which cannot be discussed here, it is trite to 
reiterate that shareholders do not own the assets of the company; they do not own 
the company, if and in what form it may exist. They own the unit of capital that is their 
share. About this the entity theory and the nexus theory are generally in consensus. 
Their share gives investors certain rights that can be enforced against the company 
and may include rights that can be termed “interests in the company”. These rights 
                                            
140
 Fama (1980) J Polit Econ 290. 
141
 See for example the more recent contribution by J Velasco “Shareholder Ownership and Primacy” 
(2010) University of Illinois LR 897 944. 
142
 See for example Eisenberg (1999) J Corp L 833: “the nexus-of-contracts conception does not give 
primacy to any single group”. Also see JR Macey “Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to 
Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective” (1999) 84 Cornell LR 1266 
1267-1269, 1727-1273, who argues that shareholder primacy is the default rules of the nexus of 
contracts theory, but not the mandatory rule. 
143
 Easterbrook & Fischel (1989) Columbia LR 1446-1447. 
144
 1446-1447. 
145
 The father of the stakeholder theory is thought to be RE Freeman “Stockholders and Stakeholders: 
A New Perspective on Corporate Governance” (1983) 25 Calif Manag Rev 88. Also notable: T 
Donaldson & LE Preston “The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and 
Implications” (1995) 20 Acad Manag Rev 65. On the development towards a non-shareholder-centred 
approach, see Grantham (1998) Cambrige LJ. 
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depend on the design of share classes and the apportionment of rights to those 
classes.  
4 4 Concluding remarks 
The legal theory of separate juristic personality primarily achieves one objective: It 
establishes the company and its assets as an entity separate in law from its 
shareholders. In reverse, it therefore asserts that shares are assets separate from 
the company and as such constitute assets or units of “property” in their own right. In 
addition, the theory establishes that these units are obligations. 
What the entity theory does not do is provide any detail on particular aspects of 
these units of shares and particularly on the nature and content of its obligationary 
facet. The economic nexus of contracts theory, on the other hand, takes 
characteristics such as residuarity and the control aspect of shares into account. This 
has utility because it provides a more accurate description of the dual nature of 
shares as both assets and personal relationships. In addition, the nexus theory 
emphasises that the shareholder input is expressed in a complicated obligationary 
relationship of the shareholder with the company and that shareholders are claimants 
or creditors, albeit of a special kind. The nexus theory therefore places much more 
stress on individual relationships. It is within this context that the theory is described 
as an ontological enquiry. 146  While the entity theory explains the formal legal 
relationships resulting from the incorporation of a company it gives no sense of the 
dynamic reality of its activities, namely the orchestration of a multitude of inputs and 
the continual transformation of these by means of economic exchanges. 
Far from contradicting the entity theory, the nexus theory rather complements it. 
The two theories are in agreement on the basic precepts of the company-shareholder 
relationship, namely that shareholders own neither the assets of the company nor the 
company itself. In addition, the nexus theory highlights both individual as well as 
systemic aspects of the obligationary realm of shares. It underscores that it is 
necessary to take into account elements of the individual relationship that arises 
between an issuer of shares and an investor. Also, it attempts to place this 
relationship into its proper context taking into account the various other relationships 
that converge within a firm. The nexus theory therefore, in addition to showing that 
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 See text to n 127 above. 
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companies and shareholders are separate, also seeks to clarify the nature of their 
interconnection. Whether or not the economists’ understanding of concepts such as 
“contract” or “ownership” are perfectly aligned with those held by lawyers is therefore 
of secondary importance, considering that the value of the nexus theory lies not so 
much in its theoretical or empirical accuracy but rather in its descriptive and narrative 
persuasiveness. 
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Chapter 5: Rights, obligations and classes of shares 
5 1 Contract, bargaining and the origin of rights 
By placing emphasis on shares as separate assets, the discussions above on the 
transformation of the concept of capital as well as on the historical legal and 
economic evolution of the company articulate the importance of appraising the 
substance of the asset. The essence of shares is comprised of certain rights that can 
be exercised against the company. More important still, the crux of shares lies in the 
manner in which these rights and duties are grouped together.  
The rights flowing from shares have their origin in company law statutes as well as 
in a “contract” concluded between the company and a shareholder. Whereas the 
statute puts a basic framework of rights in place, in most jurisdictions companies 
have significant powers to vary these rights in the constitutional document and 
fashion them to fit the unique requirements and preferences of the company. The 
constitutional document is alternatively known as the memorandum of incorporation, 
articles of association, constitutional document or “Satzung”.1 It is a body of rules that 
sets out the companies’ objectives, the persons authorised to act on its behalf as well 
as its relations with shareholders and other parties. The constitutional document 
therefore regulates both the internal and external relationships of the company. 
Concerning the former, Kershaw points out that the constitution, together with the 
relevant statutory provisions, aims to establish, organise and balance two structural 
elements of the company: a body of “owners” or shareholders and a governing or 
                                            
1
 The term “constitution” derives from English law. The English Companies Act 2006 distinguishes 
between a “memorandum of association“, which is the founding document of the company and is no 
longer considered to be part of the company’s “constitution” and the “articles of association“ which are 
part of the “constitution”; see Companies Act 2006 s 8 and Part 3, especially ss 17 and 18. The South 
African Companies Act provides or a “memorandum of incorporation”, which is both the incorporation 
document and the document setting out the internal structure of the company, including directors’ 
duties and shareholders’ rights; see the definition of “memorandum”, Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 1. 
The same distinction as in English law could be found in the previous South African Companies Act; 
see the definitions of “articles“ and “memorandum“ in the Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 1. US law, like 
its South African counterpart predominantly employs one document for both incorporation and internal 
governance questions – the “articles of incorporation” in the Model Business Corporation Act or the 
“certificate of incorporation” in the Delaware Code; see definition of “articles of incorporation” Model 
Business Corporation Act § 1.40, §§ 2.02 and 2.03; see Delaware Code §§ 101-105. German law also 
provides for a combined document, the “Satzung”, alternatively known as “Gesellschaftsvertrag” 
(company contract); see Aktiengesetz § 23 and Part 4. BGB § 705 applies to companies incorporated 
under the Aktiengesetz. The provision emphasises the contractual nature of incorporation: “Durch den 
Gesellschaftsvertrag verpflichten sich die Gesellschafter gegenseitig, die Erreichung eines 
gemeinsamen Zweckes in der durch den Vertrag bestimmten Weise zu fördern, insbesondere die 
vereinbarten Beiträge zu leisten”. 
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managing body.2 On the side of the shareholders, of central importance are the rights 
and duties that flow from their relationship with the company as well as the manner in 
which the relationship is established. To reflect this, the South African Companies Act 
defines a “Memorandum of Incorporation” as “the document … that sets out rights, 
duties and responsibilities of shareholders [amongst others]”.3  
The constitutional document is therefore, at least partly, the root of the rights that 
flow from shares, prompting the frequently-held assumption that such rights are 
contractual in nature. To state it in the words of Farwell J in Borland’s Trustee v Steel 
Brothers & Co,4 “[t]he contract contained in the articles of association is one of the 
original incidents of the share”. 5  The legislation makes the memorandum of 
incorporation, as it is known in South African legal parlance, binding between the 
company and each shareholder as well as amongst shareholders.6 Of course the 
company does not contract with each shareholder individually. The memorandum is 
construed as if it were a contract.7 This presumption of an act of contracting appears 
even more clearly from the provisions of the UK Companies Act which state that 
“[t]he provisions of a company’s constitution bind the company and its members to 
the same extent as if there were covenants on the part of the company and of each 
member to observe those provisions”.8  
The contractual idea also features in German company law literature. The 
mechanism through which the “Satzung” is finalised, known as the 
“Satzungsfeststellung”,9 is characterised as a sui generis contract containing both 
subjective rights and duties of its founders as well as objective norms.10 Through 
                                            
2
 D Kershaw Company Law in Context: Text and Materials 2 ed (2009) 80. 
3
 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 1. Also see s 36(1)(b)(ii). 
4
 1901 1 Ch 279. 
5
 Borland’s Trustee v Steel Brothers & Co 1901 1 Ch 279 288. Also see In Re Sir William Thomas 
Paulin; In Re Percy Crossman [1935] 1 KB 26 57. 
6
 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 15(6)(a)-(b); also see Gohlke & Schneider v Westies Minerale (Pty) Ltd 
1970 2 SA 685 (A) 692F; Smuts v Booyens 2001 4 SA 15 (SCA) para 14. After a thorough analysis, 
DG Rice still concluded in an article published in 1957 that the shareholders (or members) do not 
contract with each other, but only with the company. This uncertainty is clarified by the wording of the 
Companies Act 2006. See DG Rice “The Legal Nature of a Share” (1957) 21 Conveyancer & Property 
Lawyer 433 438-447. 
7
 In Gohlke & Schneider v Westies Minerale (Pty) Ltd 1970 2 SA 685 (A) 692G-F the court states: “The 
company and its members are bound only to the same extent as if the articles had been signed by 
each member, that is, as if they had contracted in terms of the articles.” (own emphasis). 
8
 Companies Act 2006 s 33 (own emphasis). 
9
 In general, see Aktiengesetz § 23. 
10
 The literature describes it as a “Schuld- und Organisationsvertrag”. A Pentz “§§ 23-53” in W Goette, 
M Habersack & S Kalss (eds) Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengestz 4 ed (2016) § 23 [27]-[28]; U 
Hüffer & J Koch Aktiengesetz 13 ed (2018) § 23 [7]. The dual character of the document emphasised 
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incorporation the document is separated from the will of the company founders and 
becomes valid against third parties, particularly new shareholders.11 It is described as 
an objective system of norms fulfilling the functions of objective law.12 
The idea that the constitutional document is a contract concluded between the 
company and every shareholder does not always find favour. Van der Walt and 
Sutherland describe the notion of the constitutional document as a contract as 
artificial, finding that “[t]he memorandum and articles are a statutory rather than a real 
contract … Many of the rights of shareholders flow from the common law and the Act 
rather than from the constitution of a company”.13 The memorandum is in any case 
subject to regulatory approval before the company is registered,14 and can thus be 
said to gain validity only upon the receipt of such approval. Even if companies have 
considerable scope to delineate such rights and duties, legislation dictates the basic 
framework within which this freedom must be exercised, including a number of 
mandatory rules. A company may, for example, issue shares without voting rights, as 
is typical for preference shares, yet, legislation requires at least one class of shares 
to have voting rights.15 Likewise, shares may yield fixed dividends, provided that the 
company is in a financial position to make distributions.16 Gulliver and Payne make 
                                                                                                                                        
here, is, at least partly, a reflection of the fact that the documents of incorporation and association are 
not split, as is the case in English law – see, n 1 above. Vetter, like other German authors, therefore 
finds: “Die Satzung hat eine doppelte Funktion und ist einerseits schuldrechtliche Vereinbarung der 
Gründer über die Errichtung der AG und zugleich Grundordnung der Vereinigung sowie Herrschafts- 
und Organisationvertrag.”; E Vetter “Aktiengesetz § 23” in M Henssler & L Strohn Gesellschaftsrecht 3 
ed (2016) § 23 [1]. 
11
 Pentz “§§ 23-53” in Münchener Kommentar zum AktG § 23 [27]; Hüffer & Koch Aktiengesetz § 23 
[7]. 
12
 Hüffer & Koch Aktiengesetz § 23 [7]. 
13
 AJ van der Walt & PJ Sutherland “Dispossession of Incorporeals or Rights – Is the Mandament van 
Spolie the Appropriate Remedy?” (2003) 15 SA Merc LJ 95 97. The statutory basis is also recognised 
by Cameron, JA in Smuts v Booyens 2001 4 SA 15 (SCA) para 14, when he finds: “Enersyds is die 
statute 'n reeks verbintenisse tussen die aandeelhouers. In dié opsig is hulle kontraktueel van aard. 
Andersyds word die kontrak in ooreenstemming met en binne die perke van die 
maatskappywetgewing aangegaan. Aan die aard van die regte wat in die aandeelhouding vervat word, 
word derhalwe statutêre beslag gegee“. Eisenberg refers to the “dual nature” of the corporation, which 
he understands to consist of both reciprocal arrangements as well as hierarchical bureaucratic rules; 
MA Eisenberg “The Conception that the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of 
the Firm” (1999) 24 J Corp L 819 827-830. 
14
 In South Africa, the memorandum must be lodged together with a Notice of Incorporation, see s 
13(1), 13(2)(b) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008; and an amendment to the memorandum must 
similarly be filed together with a Notice of Amendment, see s 16(7). 
15
 South African Companies Act 71 of 2008 ss 37(2), 37(3), 37(4); For US law see Delaware Code 
Title 8 § 151(b); Model Business Corporation Act § 6.01(b)(1). 
16
 This example is also provided by L Gullifer & J Payne Corporate Finance Law: Principles and Policy 
2 ed (2015) 11. For South Africa see Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 37(c) and (d) as read with s 46(b) 
and (c). The company must meet the solvency and liquidity tests immediately after making the 
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an important point in relation to debt instruments, which are generally regarded to be 
purely contractual in nature: “The restrictions [imposed by legislation] contrast with 
the position regarding debt, where the parties are, in principle, free to make their own 
bargain”. 17  The contractual idea conveys an image of bargaining between the 
contracting parties. Shares in public companies, particularly those listed on a stock 
exchange, are, however, standardised packages of rights and duties.18  Investors 
have no basis for negotiating these terms. 
The basic rights which make up shares can be said to come into existence upon 
the registration of the company,19 or, if shares have been left unclassified or rights 
and limitations have not yet been affixed to a class of shares set out in the 
memorandum, once such a classification or determination of rights has taken place in 
accordance with the provisions of the Act and the memorandum.20  
5 2 Rights and duties encapsulated in shares 
The rights flowing from shares can have both economic content and embody an 
aspect of control. Central to the nature of shares as instruments of investment are 
economic considerations. Shareholders primarily invest in companies for the financial 
return yielded by the investment. The total return on equity is the net cash flow 
generated by the company for the duration of its existence.21 Economically, the total 
return yielded by shares is therefore composed of distributions made by the company 
throughout its life as well as distributions made upon its liquidation.22 Distributions 
made during a company’s lifetime are frequently referred to as income-sharing, 
whereas the right to a final distribution, made when a company ceases to exist, is 
known as a right to the capital of the company.23 Shareholders may therefore have 
the right to a share of the profits generated by the company. In addition, a 
shareholder may have the right to share in the surplus funds at liquidation. If the 
financial claim of shareholders against the company is comprised of the value of the 
                                                                                                                                        
distribution. See s 4 for the solvency and liquidity tests. For UK law see Companies Act, 2006 ss 830 
and 831. 
17
 Gullifer & Payne Corporate Finance Law 11. 
18
 BR Cheffins Company Law: Theory, Structure, and Operation (1997) 66-67. 
19
 In South Africa, a company is incorporated as from the date stated on the registration certificate – 
see ss 14(1)(iii) and 14(4)(b) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
20
 For details, see the country expositions below. 
21
 Cheffins Company Law 54-55. 
22
 54. 
23
 See for example Gullifer & Payne Corporate Finance Law 11; PL Davies & S Worthington Gower 
and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 9 ed (2012) 868 [23-4]. 
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company at winding-up, after assets are sold and after all other claims against the 
company have been settled, then any dividends or other distributions made during 
the lifetime of the company are essentially a reduction or pre-payment of the residual 
value. The incident of “residuarity” is frequently seen as the distinguishing feature of 
shares.24 The International Accounting Standard on financial instruments (IAS 32)25 
reflects the centrality of the residuarity principle in its definition of an equity 
instrument, being “any contract that evidences a residual interest in the assets of an 
entity after deducting all of its liabilities”.26 A residual claim is always variable – it 
fluctuates as the ability of a company to generate profit changes.27 Associated with 
residuarity is risk – as residual claimants, shareholders find themselves at the back of 
the queue both when it comes to receiving dividends and when sharing in the 
surplus.28 
Rights to distributions, be it in the form of profit or residual distributions, can be 
meaningless without the ability to exercise some form of control over the company. 
Thus, a shareholder also has certain administrative participation rights, most 
importantly the right to vote at the annual general meeting and on matters affecting 
shareholders. If one buys into the premise of the constitutional document as a 
contract, the shareholders can use this contract to assign responsibility for managing 
the company. In this way the constitutional document delineates the balance of 
power between the two primary organs of the company – the board and the 
shareholders.29 Even if this power is almost invariably delegated to the board of 
directors, so the argument runs, the shareholders can still elect the members of the 
board. 30  The board of directors therefore manages the company, but ultimately, 
control vests in the shareholders.31 This argument is tenuous, not only due to the lack 
of bargaining power of the shareholders in determining the contents of the 
                                            
24
 A Cahn & DC Donald Comparative Company Law – Text and Cases on the Laws Governing 
Corporations in Germany, the UK and the USA (2010) 261-262; Kershaw Company Law in Context 
709. 
25
 International Accounting Standards Board IAS 32 Financial Instruments: Presentation; also see 
International Accounting Standards Board International Accounting Standards (IAS) 39 Financial 
Instruments: Recognition and Measurement as well as International Accounting Standards Board 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 9 Financial Instruments. 
26
 International Accounting Standards Board IAS 32 Financial Instruments: Presentation 11 (own 
emphasis). 
27
 Kershaw Company Law in Context 709. 
28
 On shareholder risk see Cheffins Company Law 58-61. 
29
 Kershaw Company Law in Context 80. 
30
 Cheffins Company Law 61. 
31
 61-62. 
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constitutional document, but also owing to the lack of actual shareholder 
involvement.32  This criticism rings particularly true for public, listed companies in 
which a considerable number of shareholders vote by proxy, if at all. Shareholder 
apathy, Berle and Means argue, leads to the separation of ownership and control.33 
Theirs is an early formulation for what is today known as the agency problem.34 To 
counter the agency problem and the loss of control by shareholders, legislative 
measures are put in place, including mechanisms that become part of the 
constitutional document. 35  What is true is that shareholders have certain 
“participation rights”, whether these rights give the shareholders control over the 
entity, is a contentious issue36 and probably an incorrect assertion in the light of 
significantly decreasing shareholder involvement and authority in the running of the 
company. Control rights are, however, commercially valuable for shareholders who 
own large blocks of shares and have an interest in actively exercising control.  
The exercise of these rights is enabled through a number of supporting rights,37 
such as the right to receive and access information of the company. 38  It is not 
common for burdens to be imposed on shareholders. Usually, the only liability flowing 
from shares is the duty to pay for the share,39 if payment has not been made in full 
                                            
32
 62. 
33
 In general see AA Berle & GC Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932). 
34
 For a brief summary of the agency problem see Kershaw Company Law in Context 171-188. 
35
 These may include regulating the composition of the board of directors and to implement 
mechanisms to balance the power between management, the board of directors and the shareholders. 
For a comprehensive list of mechanisms see J Armour, H Hansmann & R Kraakman “Agency 
Problems and Legal Strategies” in R Kraakman, J Armour, P Davies, L Enriques, H Hansmann, G 
Hertig, K Hopt, H Kanda, M Pargendler, W-G Ringe & E Rock (eds) The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A 
Comparative and Functional Approach 3 ed (2017) 29 31. For a summary see Kershaw Company Law 
in Context 185-188. 
36
 Also see the discussion of shareholder “ownership” above, 4 3 2 Shareholder ownership and 
shareholder primacy. 
37
 A classification of rights into primary and supporting rights (“Haupt- und Hilfsrechte”) is frequently 
undertaken by German authors, is however described by Heider as legally irrelevant; see K Heider “§§ 
1-14“ in W Goette, M Habersack & S Kalss (eds) Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengestz 4 ed (2016) 
§ 11 [17]. 
38
 See the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 26 for the right to access company records. 
What comprises company records is set out in s 25. Also see UK Companies Act 2006 s 32. On US 
Law see Model Business Corporation Act § 16.01-16.03. German law enables access to information 
through Aktiengesetz § 131. Furthermore, a company must provide shareholders with certain 
information without being prompted to do so. Typically this includes, amongst others, annual financial 
statements; see for example s 31 of the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008 and s 423 of the 
English Companies Act 2006. 
39
 On the duty to pay, see below 6 2 Allotment and issue of shares. 
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already. 40  Furthermore, shareholders undertake to honour the terms of the 
constitutional document.41 
The concept of a share must be understood as constituting a cluster of a variety of 
very specific rights and duties. For this reason, a share is frequently described as “a 
bundle of rights”.42 The law presumes that all shares issued by a company confer the 
same combination of rights and duties – the principle of equal treatment of 
shareholders.43 This presumption can be modified in the constitutional document.44 
The bundle of rights can be varied thereby creating different classes of shares. Most 
commonly, this is achieved by creating one class with preferential rights. Rights to 
redeem and convert shares can also be attributed to specific classes of shares only. 
Class rights are therefore all the rights that attach to a particular class of shares. The 
creation of classes allows for the customisation of shares to meet the needs of 
specific investors and the company.45 In the context of share rights, the constitutional 
document has two primary functions: to determine rights and duties of shareholder 
over and above those set by legislation and to bundle these rights and duties. 
Across jurisdictions, it is not so much the types of rights and duties that flow from 
shares that differ, but rather the interaction between the statute and the constitutional 
document and the flexibility of the company to create rights, duties and classes of 
shares. Thus, the questions are: Which baseline of rights, duties and terms are set by 
legislation and how much room is given to the company to add and vary rights and 
duties? How can the rights be bundled and how creative can a company be in 
packaging these rights? 
                                            
40
 Davies & Worthington Modern Company Law 864 [23-5]. 
41
 HS Cilliers & ML Benade Company Law 4 ed (1982) 151. 
42
 See for example Standard Bank of South Africa v Ocean Commodities Inc 1983 1 SA 276 (A) 288H. 
43
 In South African law, this presumption, also known as the doctrine of equality, can be found in 
s 37(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. See PA Delport (ed) Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 
of 2008 (RS 15 2017) 167-168; South African Mutual Life Assurance Society v Anglo-Transvaal 
Collieries Ltd 1977 3 SA 642 (AD) 644H. 
44
 This is in line with the freedom to formulate an association document, aptly named 
“Satzungsautonomie” in German law; see KW Lange “Aktiengesetz §§1-14” in M Henssler & L Strohn 
Gesellschaftsrecht 3 ed (2016) § 11 [1]. 
45
 Cahn & Donald Comparative Company Law 264. 
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5 3 Comparative overview 
5 3 1 US law 
The articles of incorporation are the point of departure for the determination of rights 
and duties attaching to shares.46 According to the Model Business Corporation Act, a 
company’s articles of incorporation may authorise shares with the following rights: 1. 
special, conditional or limited voting rights or no voting rights, 2. rights to redeem or 
convert shares, 3. distributions, including cumulative, non-cumulative or partially 
cumulative dividends, 4. preferences to distributions, including distributions at 
dissolution and 5. terms based on objectively ascertainable facts.47 Similar provisions 
can be found in the Delaware Code.48 
In addition to this broad framework of rights, the Model Business Corporation Act 
states that “the description of the preferences, rights and limitations… is not 
exhaustive”.49 The types of rights and restrictions that can be attached to shares are 
therefore unlimited. At the very minimum, at least one class of shares must have 
unlimited voting rights 50  and one must be entitled to receive the net assets at 
liquidation.51 
The considerable freedom to create different types of rights and duties also 
extends to the creation of diverse classes and series of shares. All shares of one 
class or series must have identical terms.52 Within a class of shares, a company may 
create series, which may have different characteristics than other series in the same 
class. Traditionally, a distinction is drawn between common shares (ordinary shares) 
and preferred shares (preference shares).  
A company may also authorise unclassified shares. The terms attaching to such 
shares must be determined before they can be issued.53 This determination can be 
done by the board of directors without shareholder approval.54 Considering that US 
                                            
46
 The Delaware Code Title 8 refers to a certificate of incorporation. 
47
 Model Business Corporation Act § 6.01(c)-(d). 
48
 Delaware Code Title 8 § 151. 
49
 Model Business Corporation Act § 6.01(f); See also Delaware Code Title 8 § 151(a). 
50
 Delaware Code Title 8 § 151(b); Model Business Corporation Act § 6.01(b)(1). 
51
 Model Business Corporation Act § 6.01(b)(2). 
52
 § 6.01(a). 
53
 Model Business Corporation Act § 6.02; Delaware Code Title 8 §§ 151(a), 151(g). 
54
 Model Business Corporation Act § 6.02; Delaware Code Title 8 §§ 151(a), 151(g). 
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company law is predominantly a loose set of default rules, a company has 
considerable flexibility in creating share rights and classes or series of shares.55 
Classes and series of shares and the number of shares in each class or series 
must be set out in the articles of incorporation.56 Each class or series must be given a 
distinguishing designation.57 Prior to their issue, the terms, preferences, rights and 
limitations must also be expressly set out in the articles.58 This is particularly true for 
rights that distinguish one class or series from another.59 In the case of unclassified 
shares, the terms may be specified in a resolution by the board.60 Only those rights 
and other terms specified will attach to the shares. Contrary to English law, rights will 
not be inferred by presumption.61 
The US legal framework on classes of shares and the rights that attach thereto is 
particularly wide and flexible. A company may create any number of rights and 
classes of shares, provided that these are clearly set out in the articles of 
incorporation. Thus, the legal framework is said to be “strategic rather than 
compliance oriented”.62  
5 3 2 English law 
Contrary to US law, the UK Companies Act does not provide a statutory framework 
for the type of rights and duties that may be created. Typically, the rights would be 
the same as those set out above, namely the right to distributions, the right to share 
in the surplus at liquidation and the right to vote.63 The same appears from the Model 
Articles, which determine that “without prejudice to the rights attached to any existing 
share, the company may issue shares with such rights or restrictions as may be 
determined by ordinary resolution”.64  
A company also has considerable creativity to create classes of shares with 
different combinations of rights, provided that shares of a class all have the same 
                                            
55
 Cahn & Donald Comparative Company Law 274. 
56
 Model Business Corporation Act § 6.01(a). 
57
 Model Business Corporation Act § 6.01(a); Delaware Code Title 8 § 151(a). 
58
 Model Business Corporation Act § 6.01(a); Delaware Code Title 8 § 151(a). 
59
 Model Business Corporation Act § 6.01(e). 
60
 Model Business Corporation Act § 6.02; Delaware Code Title 8 §§ 151(a), 151(g). 
61
 Cahn & Donald Comparative Company Law 274. Also see below at 5 3 2 English law. 
62
 Cahn & Donald Comparative Company Law 274. 
63
 See above, 5 2 Rights and duties encapsulated in shares. 
64
 Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 Schedule 3 Reg 43(1). As per s 17(b) of the English 
Companies Act 2006, a resolution determining shareholder rights will become part of the “constitution”. 
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rights attached to them.65 Traditionally, English law distinguishes between ordinary 
shares and preference shares.66  
Normally, the different classes and the rights and duties attaching to each class 
will be set out in the articles of association. This is not compulsory, however.67 If a 
company assigns a name or designation to a class of shares, it must give notice 
thereof to the registrar within one month of doing so.68 The lack of specification of the 
types of classes and the rights and duties attaching to such classes in the articles of 
association or other documents, obliges courts to use a variety of canons of 
construction.69 Ordinary shares, unless specified otherwise in the articles, carry rights 
to share in distributions of profit during the lifetime of the company and in distributions 
of the surplus at its dissolution.70 Preferences (either to profits, surplus or voting) 
must be expressly specified, otherwise rights are presumed to be the same as those 
of ordinary shares.71 A preference to dividends is presumed to be non-participating, 
cumulative and payable only once declared.72 
5 3 3 German law 
Paragraph 11 of the Aktiengesetz makes provision for a variety of rights; shares with 
the same rights and duties form a “Gattung” or class.73 Cahn and Donald find that, 
although the reference to “various rights”74 in § 11 indicates substantial freedom in 
the creation of rights and the bundling of these rights into classes, in reality the 
bundling exercise is closely regulated. 75  The “Satzung” may deviate from the 
legislative provisions only where expressly allowed to do so. 76  The focus is on 
                                            
65
 See Companies Act 2006 s 629(1); also see s 629(2) in terms of which shares are not of a different 
class “by reason only that they do not carry the same rights to dividends in the twelve months 
immediately following their allotment”. 
66
 For a brief discussion on the distinction between ordinary and preference shares see 5 3 4 South 
African law. 
67
 Davies & Worthington Modern Company Law 866 [23-7]. 
68
 Companies Act 2006 s 636(1). 
69
 See Davies & Worthington Modern Company Law 867-870. 
70
 See the definition of “ordinary shares” in s 560(1) of the Companies Act 2006. 
71
 See reference to case law in Davies & Worthington Modern Company Law 867-868 [23-8]. 
72
 867-869. 
73
 Aktiengesetz § 11. Despite only mentioning equal rights in sentence 2, for completeness sake, a 
class of shares is defined by equal rights and duties; Heider “§§ 1-14” in Münchener Kommentar zum 
AktG § 11 [4], [28]. 
74
 Aktiengesetz §11: “Die Aktien können verschiedene Rechte gewähren …”. 
75
 Cahn & Donald Comparative Company Law 268. Despite stipulating a possible variation of profit- 
and surplus-sharing rights, Heider points out that this was not intended to be a conclusive list; see 
Aktiengesetz § 11 and Heider “§§ 1-14” in Münchener Kommentar zum AktG § 11 [3]. 
76
 Aktiengesetz § 23(5). 
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compliance and shareholder protection rather than the strategic structuring of 
shareholding. 
The Aktiengesetz contains no list or framework of rights and duties that may be 
attached to shares, but specific rights are set out in detailed provisions of the Act.77 
They are frequently categorised as follows: First, “Vermögensrechte” (patrimonial 
rights), namely the right to participate in profits,78 the right to receive a share of the 
surplus at liquidation79  and the right to subscribe to new shares during a rights 
issue.80 Any patrimonial rights that go beyond these three categories could be found 
to be a prohibited refund of the shareholder contribution.81 The second category of 
rights is “Mitverwaltungsrechte” (participation and administrative rights), such as the 
right to vote,82  the right to attend the annual general meeting 83  and the right to 
information.84 Both categories of rights broadly correspond to those typically present 
in systems of common law. 
A basic division of ordinary shares (“Stammaktien”) and preference shares 
(“Vorzugsaktien”) exists in German law. The rights to share in profits and liquidation 
surplus can generally be varied, with preference shares usually enjoying a 
preferential right to profits. Voting rights can only be restricted for a class of shares 
which have a cumulative preferential right to dividends.85 Furthermore, a variation of 
the voting rights of ordinary shares is only possible within the limits set by the Act. 
Multiple votes per share are prohibited 86  and votes may only be reduced per 
shareholder.87 Such a reduction is therefore not a class right and is only possible in 
the case of unlisted companies.88  
                                            
77
 These rights are together classified as membership rights (“Mitgliedschaftsrechte”). For an overview 
of the rights and duties see K Schmidt Gesellschaftsrecht 4 ed (2009) 797-803.  
78
 Aktiengesetz §§ 58(4) and 60. 
79
 § 271. 
80
 § 186. 
81
 Aktiengesetz § 57. See Heider “§§ 1-14” in Münchener Kommentar zum AktG § 11 [12]. 
82
 Aktiengesetz §§ 12, 133-137. 
83
 § 118(1). 
84
 § 131. 
85
 § 139(1). In the case of non-payment of preference dividends, such preference shareholders have 
voting rights; § 140(2). 
86
 Aktiengesetz § 12(2). See Heider “§§ 1-14” in Münchener Kommentar zum AktG § 12. 
87
 Aktiengesetz § 134(1). 
88
 § 134(1). 
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If a company has different classes of shares, the classes and the number of 
shares per class must be set out in the “Satzung” (articles of incorporation).89 This 
includes a detailed account of the rights and duties.90 Information on the different 
classes of shares is classified as “materielle Satzungsbestimmungen” – being 
material provisions that regulate the relationship of the company to its founders and 
shareholders, including future shareholders. 91  Such provisions obtain normative 
force,92 provided they are within the requisite legislative boundaries.93 German law 
makes no provision for unclassified shares. 
5 3 4 South African law 
Section 37 of the South African Companies Act authorises the creation of different 
classes of shares. In section 37(5), a framework of rights, that a company may 
establish, is provided. The framework is based, almost verbatim, on the relevant 
provisions in the Model Business Corporation Act.94  Like its US counterpart, the 
section states that a company, in its memorandum of incorporation, may establish 
preferences, rights, limitations and other terms that confer voting rights (special, 
conditional or limited), provide for redemption or conversion of shares, entitle the 
shareholder to receive distributions, whether cumulative, non-cumulative or partially 
cumulative or to provide for shares that confer preferential rights to distributions or 
proceeds upon liquidation. Additionally, the memorandum may provide for rights to 
vary “in response to any objectively ascertainable external fact or facts”.95 The Act 
therefore provides an extensive and flexible list of different types of rights that may be 
created. In contrast to US law, the Companies Act does not make provision for a 
catch-all, determining that the list of terms set out above is not exhaustive. 96 
                                            
89
 § 23(3)(4). 
90
 Hüffer & Koch Aktiengesetz § 23 [29]; Pentz “§§ 23-53” in Münchener Kommentar zum AktG § 23 
[132]. 
91
 The counterpart is “formelle Satzungsbestimmungen”. See Pentz “§§ 23-53” in Münchener 
Kommentar zum AktG § 23 [39], [40] and [41]; Hüffer & Koch Aktiengesetz § 23 [4]. 
92
 Rights of the category of “formelle Satzungsbestimmungen“, on the other hand, are only of a 
contractual nature and therefore do not bind third parties and successors. 
93
 See n 76 above and § 23(5) Aktiengesetz. If rights are created or bundled in contravention of 
legislation, they are “formelle Satzungsbestimmungen”. On the normative, objective force of the 
“Satzung“, see nn 10, 11 and 12 above. 
94
 See text to n 47 above. For a brief description of the references, rights or limitations contained in the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 37(5)(a)-(d), see Delport Henochsberg 172-174(1). 
95
 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 37(6). 
96
 See the text to n 49 above. 
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Considering, that the provision is alterable, the result is probably the same. 97 
Furthermore, the memorandum of incorporation may also include such rights and 
privileges not provided for by the Act.98 
Companies therefore have the freedom to determine rights and duties within this 
framework set by the Act, provided that a minimum standard of rights applies.99 If a 
company only has one class of shares, the shares must have voting rights and the 
holders of the shares must be entitled to share in the surplus assets at liquidation.100 
The content of these rights and duties does not need to be the same for all issued 
shares. A company may bundle the rights and duties into different classes of shares. 
Shares with the same rights and duties are treated as a class.101 At least one of the 
classes must carry general voting rights102 and one class must be entitled to receive 
the surplus assets upon liquidation.103  
Traditionally a distinction is drawn between ordinary shares and preference 
shares. Whilst ordinary shares are characterised by full participation in dividends and 
liquidation surplus as well as general voting rights, preference shares enjoy a 
preference of some sort over ordinary shares, usually by way of a preferential right to 
dividends.104 
A class of shares may also be unclassified105 or be part of a class with unspecified 
rights and duties.106 The company’s board must, however, classify the shares or 
determine their rights and duties before they can be issued. 107  This practice 
recognises that shares, before being issued, confer no rights.108 
                                            
97
 An “alterable provision“ is defined as “a provision of this Act in which it is expressly contemplated 
that its effect on a particular company may be negated, restricted, limited, qualified, extended or 
otherwise altered in substance or effect by that company’s Memorandum of Incorporation“; see s 1 of 
the Companies Act 71 of 2008; also see s 15(2)(ii). 
98
 See s 15(2)(i). 
99
 This practice also aligns with US law – see for example the text to nn 50 and 51. 
100
 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 37(3)(b). 
101
 Section 37(1). 
102
 Section 37(4)(a). 
103
 Section 37(4)(b). 
104
 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 37(5)(d); For an overview on preference shares see FHI Cassim, MF 
Cassim, R Cassim, R Jooste, J Shev & J Yeats Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2012) 216-219. 
105
 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 36(c).  
106
 Section 36(d).  
107
 See s 36(3)(c) and (d) respectively. 
108
 PL Davies Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 7 ed (2003) 626. 
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Resembling the legal framework in US law, the memorandum of incorporation is 
central to determining share terms and classes of shares. The memorandum must 
set out the different classes of shares,109 the number of shares of each class,110 a 
distinguishing designation of each class111 and the preferences, rights, limitations and 
other terms associated with each class.112  
In comparison to the position in English law, South African law reflects the US 
arrangement of a legislative framework of default rules, which may be amended and 
augmented. Davies and Worthington find this indicative of a legislative approach to 
the creation and bundling of shareholder rights and the structuring of the 
constitutional document as compared to a shareholder-controlled approach in 
England.113 English, US and South African law can all be summarised as follows: 
rights can be created and bundled as desired, unless prohibited by legislation. 
German law exhibits far greater statutory control over the classes of shares and the 
rights and duties attaching to them – a deviation in the “Satzung” is only allowed 
where legislation expressly provides for it.114 
                                            
109
 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 36(1)(a). 
110
 Section 36(1)(a). 
111
 Section 36(1)(b)(i). 
112
 Section 36(1)(b)(ii). 
113
 Davies & Worthington Modern Company Law 65-66 [3-13]. Although the Model Articles now 
provide a suggested framework in the UK; see n 64 above. 
114
 Aktiengesetz § 23(5). Also see n 76 above. This is known as “Prinzip der Satzungsstrenge” 
(principle of the strictness of articles of association). See Pentz “§§ 23-53” in Münchener Kommentar 
zum AktG § 23 [6]. 
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Chapter 6: Issuing shares 
6 1 Registered and bearer shares 
Companies may issue shares either in bearer or in registered form. In the former, a 
piece of paper serves as the carrier of the rights described above; in the latter, an 
account entry performs the function of lending some form of “tangibility” to rights. The 
form, Part 2 will show, has an impact on the relationship between the company and 
its shareholders and determines how shares are evidenced and transferred.1  
Central to the notion of a bearer share is a physical certificate. Printed on the 
certificate is a promise by the issuing company to perform towards or pay the bearer 
of the instrument.2 The paper instrument embodies the rights that it represents.3 This 
is also known as “reification”. According to this legal fiction the physical share 
certificate is treated as if it, itself, is the underlying right or claim. Bearer shares are 
therefore considered to be tangibles and negotiable instruments in the common law.4 
The bearer or holder of the certificate is the person who is in possession of the 
physical certificate.5 Bearer shares are simply transferred by physical delivery – in 
other words by transferring possession from one person to another.6 The company 
does not register or record shareholding or ownership of a bearer share. Dividends 
are paid to the person who presents the company with a physical coupon.  
As the holding of bearer shares is not recorded, holding, ownership and therefore 
transactions in shares can easily be concealed. Hence, bearer shares have 
frequently been associated with fraud, money-laundering and tax evasion.7 Bearer 
shares are also susceptible to theft, as the mere possession of the certificate entitles 
the possessor or holder to performance from the company. Consequently, bearer 
shares are not in common use or are even prohibited in some jurisdictions including 
                                            
1
 M Yates & G Montagu The Law of Global Custody: Legal Risk Management in Securities Investment 
and Collateral 4 ed (2013) 8 [1.23]; J Benjamin Interests in Securities: A Proprietary Analysis of the 
International Securities Markets (2000) 32. 
2
 Benjamin Interests in Securities 32. 
3
 JS Rogers The End of Negotiable Instruments: Bringing Payment Systems Law out of the Past 
(2012) 45. 
4
 Yates & Montagu The Law of Global Custody 16 [2.15]. 
5
 Benjamin Interests in Securities 32. 
6
 32. 
7
 32. 
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England, South Africa and the US. In contrast, not only are bearer shares sanctioned 
in civil law jurisdictions such as Germany,8 they are also more commonplace.9 
Before the dematerialisation of shares, certificates were also issued for registered 
shares and in fact, are still issued for immobilised registered shares. What 
distinguishes bearer shares from registered shares is not the presence or absence of 
a certificate, but rather the function performed by the piece of paper. Whereas the 
certificate embodies the rights and therefore constitutes the bearer share, the 
certificate merely evidences the rights and therefore only represents the registered 
share.10 Physical delivery of the certificate thus does not suffice to transfer the rights 
and physical possession of the certificate is not necessarily indicative of the identity 
of the shareholder. The additional act of registration is required. A list of all holders of 
shares, known as a register, is maintained by the issuer11 and amended upon each 
transfer. Although both the certificate and register are simply evidentiary, the register 
is decisive. Registered securities are thus intangibles. In practice, shares in South 
Africa, the UK and the US are primarily in registered form.  
In the US, registered shares are also regarded as negotiable instruments, making 
them look a lot like bearer shares. Indeed, negotiability in this sense achieves the 
“reification of abstract rights into pieces of paper”.12  Whereas bearer shares are 
transferable by mere delivery, however, registered shares are transferable by 
delivery and indorsement and the transfer must be registered by the issuer.13 Unlike 
bearer shares, which facilitate anonymity, registered shares, even if in negotiable 
form, do not.  
In Germany, shares may take the form of either “Inhaberaktien” (bearer shares) or 
“Namensaktien” (registered shares).14 Before the amendment of the Aktiengesetz in 
2015, a company could freely choose between the two types provided the form was 
                                            
8
 See Aktiengesetz § 10(1), § 23(3)(5). Bearer shares are known as “Inhaberaktien”. Registered 
shares, on the other hand are “Namensaktien”. 
9
 E Micheler Property in Securities: A Comparative Study (2007) 145. Shares and securities are 
simultaneously categorised as “Wertpapiere”. This includes bearer as well as registered shares. 
10
 See Benjamin Interests in Securities 32. 
11
 Frequently, the register is maintained by a registrar on behalf of the company. 
12
 Rogers End of Negotiable Instruments 49; in general see 49-53. Also see JS Rogers “Negotiability, 
Property and Identity” (1991) 12 Cardozo LR 471. 
13
 See the distinction between “bearer form” and “registered form” in UCC §§ 8-102(a) and (13). Also 
see UCC Parts 3 and 4. 
14
 The provision that the company has to stipulate the form in its constitutional document remains; 
Aktiengesetz § 23(3)(5). 
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stated in its constitutional document. Paragraph 10(1) of the amended version, 
however, favours “Namensaktien”, stating that “Inhaberaktien” may only be issued if 
certain conditions are met, namely if the company is publicly listed or the issuance of 
individual share certificates (as opposed to global certificates) is excluded and if the 
shares are held in collective deposit. 15  Furthermore, shares must be issued as 
“Namensaktien” if the share has been issued before the shareholder has performed 
in full16 or if share scrip is issued.17 If certificates are issued for “Namensaktien” they 
are typically held in collective deposit in the same manner as “Inhaberaktien”.18 
Furthermore, in certificated form, both registered and bearer shares are 
“Wertpapiere”. Despite the rise of registered shares in Germany,19 they are still of 
minor importance compared to bearer shares.20 
6 2 Allotment and issue of shares 
Section 35(4) of the South African Companies Act reads: “An authorised share of a 
company has no rights associated with it until it has been issued”. 
The exchange of monetary capital for shares is said to be the result of a contract. 
The normal contractual rules of offer and acceptance apply.21 In Moosa v Lalloo22 the 
                                            
15
 § 10(1). 
16
 § 10(2). 
17
 § 10(3)-(4). 
18
 See P Stein Die Aktiengesellschaft: Gründung, Organisation und Finanzverfassung (2016) 6-7. 
19
 See for example U Hüffer & J Koch Aktiengesetz 13 ed (2018) § 67 [3]; Stein Aktiengesellschaft 6-7; 
K Heider “§§ 1-14“ in W Goette, M Habersack & S Kalss (eds) Münchener Kommentar zum 
Aktiengestz 4 ed (2016) § 10 [18]. This trend is also described by D Meppen Das Inhaberpapier: Von 
der Verbriefung zum unverbrieften Wertrecht? (2014) 162-163, who reasons that first, companies want 
to manage the relationship with their members more efficiently and second, globalisation increasingly 
causes an interaction with foreign capital markets, particularly the US market, where registered shares 
dominate. The dominance of bearer shares in Germany only developed during the second half of the 
19
th
 century, prior to which registered shares were more common. In fact, bearer shares required 
special regulatory permission. This only changed with the coming into force of the General German 
Commercial Code of 1861 (“Allgemeines Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch”, the predecessor of the 
“Handelsgsetzbuch”) and the 1
st
 “Aktienrechtsnovelle” of 1870; see Meppen Inhaberpapier 81-83. The 
Aktiengesetz of 1937 contained a provision stipulating that, unless determined otherwise in the 
constitutional document, shares would be issued as “Namensaktien”; see § 17 Aktiengesetz of 1937; 
Meppen Inhaberpapier 160. “Namensaktien” will not be analysed in any detail, but see below, 
8 2 1 The functions of registration n 17. 
20
 D Einsele Wertpapierrecht als Schuldrecht: Funktionsverlust von Effektenurkunden im 
internationalen Rechtsverkehr (1995) 10; A Hueck & C-W Canaris Recht der Wertpapiere 12 ed 
(1986) § 25 I 2 a-b; K-H Gursky Wertpapierrecht 3 ed (2007) 154; Heider “§§ 1-14” in Münchener 
Kommentar zum AktG § 10 [18]. 
21
 Moosa v Lalloo 1957 4 SA 207 (N) 219; McKenzie v Farmers’ Co-Operative Meat Industries Ltd 
1922 AD 16 22; FHI Cassim, MF Cassim, R Cassim, R Jooste, J Shev & J Yeats Contemporary 
Company Law 2 ed (2012) 240. On English law see In re Florence Land and Public Works Company; 
Nicol’s Case v Tufnell & Ponsonby’s Case (1885) 29 ChD 421 426; D French, SW Mayson & CL Ryan 
Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law 31 ed (2014-2015) 166. 
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court explains that “[n]o ceremonious ritual, nor any magic formula, is required for the 
process of allotting the share”23 and in In re Florence Land and Public Works Co, 
Nicol’s Case v Tufnell & Ponsonby’s Case,24 allotment was described as “neither 
more nor less than the acceptance of the company of the offer to take shares”.25 In 
effect the offer-acceptance construction can take two forms:26 Listed companies most 
frequently issue a prospectus, inviting the general public to subscribe to shares in the 
company.27 The subscriber offers to take up shares in the company and the company 
subsequently accepts the offer by allotting shares to the subscriber.28 Allotment is 
particularly relevant where the demand for a particular issue of shares exceeds the 
number of shares being issued (oversubscription). The prospectus does not 
constitute an offer, because it does not set out all the terms of the proposed contract; 
most notably the identity of the prospective shareholder as well as the number of 
shares he will take up, are unknown at that stage. 29  Alternatively, the company 
makes the offer through a provisional letter of allotment or allocation pending 
acceptance of the offer by the addressee of the letter.30 This is the typical procedure 
for a rights offer, which is an offer to existing shareholders to take up additional 
shares.31 Regardless of the form, an offer to take up shares can be withdrawn at any 
time before acceptance. 32  Required, for the conclusion of a binding contract, is 
mutual assent between the subscriber offering to take up the shares and the 
company wishing to issue them. A communication of the acceptance by the company 
                                                                                                                                        
22
 1957 4 SA 207 (N). 
23
 219B. 
24
 (1885) 29 ChD 421. 
25
 426. 
26
 See French et al Mayson Company Law 166. Also see Moosa v Lalloo 1957 4 SA 207 (N) 219B-C. 
27
 This is known as a public offer of shares. Public offers of shares are extensively regulated. For the 
regulation of public offerings of shares and other securities in South Africa see ch 4 of the Companies 
Act 71 of 2008.  
28
 See s 107 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 which uses the terminology of allotment or acceptance 
of the subscription. See Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 240-241; RR Pennington 
Pennington’s Company Law 8 ed (2001) 346. 
29
 Pennington Company Law 346. 
30
 See the definitions “letter of allocation” and “rights offer” in the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
31
 In certain circumstances companies are obliged to first offer shares to existing shareholders in terms 
of a rights issue so that shareholders proportion of total equity remains constant. See definitions in s 
95(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
32
 In re London and Northern Bank, Ex parte Jones [1900] 1 Ch 220. This is also generally true for 
South African law, see MS Blackman, RD Jooste, CK Everingham, JL Yeats, FHI Cassim & R De La 
Harpe Commentary on the Companies Act (2002) (RS 9 2012) 5-242 and the cases cited in n 3. It is 
not true for German law, where an offer is generally irrevocable. 
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to the subscriber is therefore ordinarily required, but acceptance can similarly be 
communicated by conduct,33 or it can be dispensed with entirely.34 
The contract concluded between the company and the subscriber to the shares 
creates reciprocal duties: The company undertakes to issue the shares, whilst the 
subscriber undertakes to take up a particular number of shares and pay for these.35 
In line with these duties, the contract of allotment creates personal rights – the right 
to demand the issue of the shares and the right to demand payment – provided that 
the time for performance has arrived. Any remedies for non-performance are 
contractual. 
It is said that the allotment of shares cannot be equated to their issue. Allotment 
and issue are not defined by the South African Companies Act, yet, it is frequently 
said that the act of registration completes the issue after the allotment of shares.36 In 
England the Companies Act determines that “shares in a company are taken to be 
allotted when a person acquires the unconditional right to be included in the 
company’s register of members”.37 Allotment merely gives the subscriber the right to 
have his name inserted on the share register. In the English case of National 
Westminster Bank plc v Inland Revenue Commissioners38 the court determined that 
“[t]he applicant is neither a member nor a shareholder while his rights rest in contract 
and until the issue of the shares has been completed by registration” and “[a]llotment 
confers a right to be registered. Registration confers title”.39 The right to be entered 
on the register must be unconditional. Thus, any conditions, such as the duty of the 
applicant to pay a determined amount for the shares, must be fulfilled before shares 
are regarded to be allotted. 40  Yet, before registration (but after the fulfilment of 
conditions), equitable title is conferred. This view is by no means undisputed. On the 
basis of case law41 Pennington argues that allotment occurs when the directors of a 
company apportion shares to the subscriber (thus taking the form of a tacit 
                                            
33
 Pretorius v Natal South Sea Investment Trust Ltd 1965 3 SA 410 (W) 413-414. 
34
 McKenzie v Farmers’Co-Operative Meat Industries Ltd 1922 AD 16 22. 
35
 In re Florence Land and Public Works Company; Nicol’s Case v Tufnell & Ponsonby’s Case (1885) 
29 ChD 421 426-427; also quoted in Moosa v Lalloo 1957 4 SA 207 (N) 221C.  
36
 Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 241. Also see Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 35(4), which 
states that authorised shares only obtain rights once they have been issued. 
37
 Companies Act 2006 s 558. 
38
 [1995] 1 AC 119 123-124 (Lord Templeman). 
39
 126 (Lord Templeman). 
40
 French et al Mayson Company Law 165.  
41
 See the cases listed by Pennington in Company Law 363 n 17 and 18. 
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acceptance), whereas the issue of shares takes place when the company informs the 
subscriber of the allotment and provides evidence of his shareholding.42 The tacit 
acceptance of an offer proposed by Pennington is certainly contrary to ordinary 
principles of offer and acceptance in English contract law, which typically requires 
that the acceptance be communicated to the offeror.43 Uncontested, however, is that 
the issue of a share certificate is not necessary for shares to be regarded as 
issued.44 
The origins of the distinction between allotment and issue of shares can thus 
clearly be traced to English law. The act of registration is frequently described as “a 
mere matter of form” and a “ministerial act”.45 Nonetheless, under English law the 
Companies Act is said to draw a distinction between the enforceable contract for the 
issue of shares and the actual issue of shares.46 Only registration is considered to 
perfect the title of a shareholder and to make him a member. Therefore, “[a] person 
who has been allotted shares is in as good a position in equity as a person to whom 
shares have been issued”.47 Yet, only registration makes him “a complete master of 
the shares”.48 This view is in line with the concept of “membership”, as well as the 
acquisition of full legal title, both of which require registration.49 
Similar terminology can be encountered in German law. A subscription of shares is 
known as “Zeichnung”, which is construed as an offer (“Zeichnungsangebot”). In line 
with the general approach in German law, the subscriber is bound to his offer, which 
is thus irrevocable.50 The contract (“Zeichnungsvertrag”) comes into existence as 
soon as the issuer accepts the offer. Whereas the offer typically has to comply with 
certain formalities,51 acceptance is frequently construed tacitly, the receipt of the 
                                            
42
 Pennington Company Law 363-366. Also see the dissenting judgment of Lord Jauncey of 
Tullichettle in National Westminster Bank plc v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1995] 1 AC 119. 
43
 Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1893] 1 QB 256 262. In general see J Beatson, A Burrows & J 
Cartwright Anson’s Law of Contract 30 ed (2016) 45-46. The requirement of communication can 
however be waived – see 47-48. 
44
 Re Heaton’s Steel and Iron Co, Blyth’s Case (1876) 4 ChD 140 142. 
45
 In re Florence Land and Public Works Company; Nicol’s Case v Tufnell & Ponsonby’s Case (1885) 
29 ChD 421 426. 
46
 See National Westminster Bank plc v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1995] 1 AC 119 126. 
47
 126. 
48
 128. 
49
 Pennington’s approach can be explained with reference to his opinion that full legal title is 
transferred (by analogy therefore also when first issued) prior to registration; see Pennington 
Company Law 416. 
50
 BGB § 145. 
51
 See in general Aktiengesetz § 185. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
76 
 
acceptance by the offeror being dispensable.52 The allotment of shares (“Zuteilung”) 
is sometimes construed as a form of tacit acceptance. Issuing shares (“Ausgabe”) 
additionally requires the issuance of the certificate. Being classified as a 
“Wertpapier”, a share is said to come into existence through making out and properly 
signing the share certificate (“Ausstellung der Urkunde”) in combination with the 
delivery of the certificate to the subscriber as the first purchaser.53 What is required is 
a “Begebungsvertrag”, an implied agreement devoid of formalities but rather based 
on the specific act of delivery. 54  Instead of drawing a distinction between the 
allotment and issue of shares along the lines of registration, as is customary in 
English law, German law demands that the share certificate be issued and delivered 
to the shareholder. 
Both, the English and German approaches accommodate the fact that (full) title 
only vests, and a share is therefore only issued once an additional act has been 
performed, whereas the binding contract of allotment is concluded at an earlier date. 
Whether the issuing of shares is construed as performance of the contract of 
allotment, as a separate, tacit contract, or a combination thereof, what these theories 
have in common is that through issuing, (full) title vests for the first time, in other 
words, shares are created. The importance of contemplating the proper meaning of 
allotment and issue lies in determining when a share is created. Shares are said to 
only come into existence upon being issued.55 As a result, a subscriber is said not to 
purchase the shares from the company.56  
Taking their cue from English law, most South African authors find that the issue of 
shares is distinct from allotment and requires entry in the share register.57 In Moosa v 
Lalloo, Caney, J finds, however, that a share comes into existence independently of 
the act of registration:  
                                            
52
 G Apfelbacher & G Niggemann “§ 185” in W Hölters (ed) Aktiengesetz: Kommentar 3 ed (2017) [5]. 
This follows the general rules for acceptance of an offer – see BGB § 151 sentence 1. 
53
 H-P Westermann “Allgemeine Vorschriften §§ 1-29” in T Bürgers & T Körber (eds) Aktiengestz 4 ed 
(2017) 25 [8]. 
54
 Gursky Wertpapierrecht 17. 
55
 Moosa v Lalloo 1957 4 SA 207 (N) 219. Bavasah v Stirton 2014 JDR 0230 (WCC) 44. 
56
 Moosa v Lalloo 1957 4 SA 207 (N) 219. 
57
 See for example, Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 241; PA Delport (ed) Henochsberg on 
the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (RS 15 2017) 163, 175: “’issue’ must be taken as meaning something 
distinct from allotment and as importing that some subsequent act has been done whereby the title of 
the allotee becomes complete”; Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 5-256-4: 
“Although the right to a share springs from the offer and acceptance, a share is created and comes 
into existence as an item of property upon its original issue by the company, and not before”. Also see 
Bavasah v Stirton 2014 JDR 0230 (WCC) 39-40. 
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“[I]t seems to me that it would be a negation of realities to hold that such a right [a jus in 
personam]58 did not come into existence in the circumstances of the present case, merely 
because the company’s officers have failed to perform the ministerial act of placing the 
plaintiff’s name on the Company’s register of members”.59  
At the same time, the court recognises that membership (today shareholding) 
hinges on registration.60 Registration enables the company to know towards whom it 
must perform. Although a person may acquire the title to the shares before 
registration (if the finding in Moosa v Lalloo is followed), companies and other 
persons are entitled to only recognise the registered shareholder as having rights in 
respect of a security.61 Full control over the shares can therefore only be obtained 
through the last step of registration.  
According to section 35(4) of the South African Companies Act “[a]n authorised 
share … has no rights associated with it until it has been issued”. The Act does not, 
however, define or describe what the act of issuing constitutes. Whereas section 
37(9) indicates that rights in shares are acquired only upon registration, 62 section 
50(2) of the Companies Act, obliges a company to make an entry in its register “[a]s 
soon as practicable after issuing any securities”.63  
The contract of allotment does confer a right to be registered and, traditionally at 
least, a right to demand a share certificate. At The separate act of registration 
functions to establish control (more specifically the power to enforce rights) over a 
share vis-à-vis the issuer. A proper understanding of this functional difference is what 
matters – placing the various stages of contracting into compartments of “allotment” 
or “issue” is a mere matter of terminology. 
                                            
58
 The court refers here to the personal rights which make up shares, not the personal rights of the 
contract of allotment set out above namely the right to demand issue of the shares. 
59
 Moosa v Lalloo 1957 4 SA 207 (N) 219 222A-B. On the distinguishing facts in Moosa v Lalloo, see 
Bavasah v Stirton 2014 JDR 0230 (WCC) 41-44 
60
 Moosa v Lalloo 1957 4 SA 207 (N) 219 221G. 
61
 Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & Investment Co (Pty) Ltd 1976 1 SA 441 (A) 453A; 
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Ocean Commodities Inc 1983 1 SA 276 (A) 289. 
62
 See RD Jooste “Capitalisation of Profit Companies (ss 35-48)” in JL Yeats (ed) Commentary on the 
Companies Act of 2008 (OS 2018) 2-274 2-304, who comments on the interaction between s 37(9) 
and s 35(4) that before registration “the rights can exist even though they are not held by anyone”. 
63
 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 50(2), (own emphasis). The English Companies Act requires the 
registration of an allotment of shares as soon as practicable and within two months; see Companies 
Act 2006 s 554(1). Rather than setting a definite time limit for registration, the South African 
Companies Act sets a limit of four months for acceptance of the offer; see Companies Act 71 of 2008 
s 107. 
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6 3  The obligationary realms of shares and some conclusions 
The obligationary realm of shares is multifaceted. It consists in the first place of the 
capital that underlies the issue of shares. Secondly, it incorporates the rights that 
make up shares and particularly also dictates the way in which these rights are 
combined. Lastly, it necessitates an apportionment of rights to specific persons. 
The authorised share capital (be it in the form of a monetary aggregate or a 
number of shares) can be said to be created upon the successful registration of a 
company (pursuant to lodging a memorandum of association or the like) or the 
approval of an application for a capital increase.64  
Similarly, the rights underlying shares come into existence upon registration of the 
company or later classification of unclassified shares.65 Rights, as illustrated above, 
have their origin in the constitutional document. Whether the constitutional document 
and therefore the rights established therein are contractual in nature has been 
considered above.66 Critics of the contractual notion have noted that the creation of 
the constitutional document does not evidence contractual mechanisms and is 
contingent on regulatory approval.67 In addition, the content and grouping of rights is 
regulated by legislation and the common law. 68  This leaves little scope for 
bargaining.69 
The creation of shares takes place in another obligationary realm than the creation 
of capital or rights. In addition to the underlying capital and rights it is premised on an 
apportionment of the rights and the underlying capital value. In the first place, a 
contract of allotment is central to the creation of a share.70 Furthermore, the brief 
overview of commercial and economic terminology above has shown that shares and 
financial instruments are perceived to be contractual in nature. 71  Moreover, the 
contractual notion resonates with the economic theory of the firm as a nexus of 
contracts.  
                                            
64
 See above, 3 2 Capital in legislation. 
65
 See above, 5 1 Contract, bargaining and the origin of rights. 
66
 Above, 5 1 Contract, bargaining and the origin of rights.  
67
 Above, 5 1 Contract, bargaining and the origin of rights n 13, 14. 
68
 Above, 5 1 Contract, bargaining and the origin of rights n 13. 
69
 Above, 5 1 Contract, bargaining and the origin of rights n 17, 18. 
70
 See above, 6 2 Allotment and issue of shares. 
71
 See above, 2 3 Economic descriptions and commercial realities. See for example the definition of 
“financial instruments” in IAS 32 at n 39. 
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According to Jensen and Meckling “[t]here is in a very real sense only a multitude 
of complex relationships (i.e. contracts) between the legal fiction (the firm) and the 
owners of labour, material and capital inputs and the consumers of output”.72  A 
company, rather than being a distinct entity, is characterised as a pivot on which a 
series of contracts are hinged. One of these contracts defines the relationship 
between the company and the shareholders as the owners of capital inputs. The 
theory therefore makes two assertions: that the company is created through 
contracting and that the issuer-investor relationship is created by contract. 
Implicit in the notion of the company as a creature of contract is the idea of 
contractual freedom.73 Companies, it is argued, should not be unduly constrained by 
regulation. Companies should be free to create their own rules and define the terms 
of their relationships – in this case the terms of the relationship with the shareholders. 
At the least, companies should be able to opt out of legal rules.74 Much criticism has, 
however, been directed at the idea that a company is created through contracting 
only. Critics have pointed out that a company is not a creature of contract as the law 
continues to play a significant role in its creation.75 Furthermore, the tendency of 
nexus of contracts scholars to eschew mandatory legal rules has been reproved.76 In 
this context it must be mentioned that an economist’s understanding of a contract is 
considerably more expansive than a lawyer’s. In law, a contract gives rise to legally 
enforceable rights and duties, while to economists, a contract is any voluntary 
arrangement between economic actors that results in reciprocal rights and duties, 
which may or may not be legally enforceable and do not have to display the indicia of 
                                            
72
 MC Jensen & WH Meckling “The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structures” (1976) 3 J Finan Econ 305 311. 
73
 In general see LA Bebchuk “Foreword: The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law” 
(1989) 89 Columbia LR 1395. 
74
 Bebchuk (1989) Columbia LR 1395-1396. cf MA Eisenberg “The Conception that the Corporation is 
a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm” (1999) 24 J Corp L 819 824, who argues that 
the positive assertion that the company is a nexus of contracts has no implications for mandatory legal 
rules. 
75
 GM Hayden & MT Bodie “The ‘Unincorporation’ and the Unraveling of ‘Nexus of Contracts’ Theory” 
(2011) 109 Michigan LR 1127 1130. 
76
 Eisenberg (1999) J Corp L 823-825; S Deakin, D Gindis, GM Hodgson, K Huang & K Pistor “Legal 
Institutionalism: Capitalism, and the Constitutive Role of Law” (2017) 45 J Comp Econ 188 196. Even 
nexus of contracts scholars have recognised the existence of mandatory rules but downplay their 
importance – example FH Easterbrook & DR Fischel “The Corporate Contract” (1989) 89 Columbia LR 
1416 1444-14445, state that such rules are always supplementary but never displace the contractual 
bargain; JR Macey “Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder 
Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective” (1999) 84 Cornell LR 1266 1270, recognises 
the influence of corporate law, but argues that it is enabling rather than mandatory. Lastly it is criticised 
that the nexus of contracts theory is a theory of agency costs rather than a theory of the firm – Hayden 
& Bodie (2011) Michigan LR, n 8 and the sources cited there. 
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contracts usually required by the law.77 According to Brudney, the theory “stretches 
the concept ‘contract’ beyond recognition”;78 and Easterbrook and Fischel postulate 
that the “corporate contract” may be no more than a “construct” or a “rhetorical 
device”.79 
What does this reveal about the contractual nature of the share itself? Without 
doubt, the rights that make up shares and their bundling are subject to significant 
statutory control and cannot be explained with reference to ordinary rules of 
contracting only. Apportioned to a particular person, however, they form an 
obligationary nexus between the issuer and the holder. Between an issuer and a 
holder of securities, there exists a personal relationship. This nexus is the result of a 
complex process of contracting. Contracts are legal instruments that evidence 
incredible flexibility. They can and in fact regularly accommodate and incorporate 
rights and duties significantly shaped by legislation and the common law or set out in 
external documents such as the company constitution. In the same vein they may be 
subject to statutory formalities. That one or more of the contracting parties lack 
bargaining power is also a phenomenon not unique to shares and financial 
instruments. In fact, this is the price that must be paid for contracts that are at once 
extraordinarily mobile and perpetual in duration. 
The rights, viewed individually, also have contractual character, particularly the 
right to distributions. Nonetheless, there is an understanding that some of the rights 
transcend a purely contractual or “claim-based” paradigm. This primarily includes 
control- and other participation rights. The aim is to distinguish shares from mere 
debts.80 
                                            
77
 JN Gordon “The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law” (1989) 89 Columbia LR 1549 1549-1150; 
O Hart “An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm” (1989) 89 Columbia LR 1757 1764, n 
30; BR Cheffins Company Law: Theory, Structure, and Operation (1997) Introduction, text to n 7 and 
8. In fact, Eisenberg finds that the theory is more accurately described as a “nexus of reciprocal 
arrangements”, see Eisenberg (1999) J Corp L 822-823. 
78
 V Brudney “Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract” (1985) 85 
Columbia LR 1403 1412 
79
 Easterbrook & Fischel (1989) Columbia LR 1428-1429. Also see J Armour & MJ Whincop “The 
Proprietary Functions of Corporate Law” (2007) 27 Oxf J Leg Stud 420 430, who state that “the 
economic theory of the firm has never sought to be anything but instrumental… For corporate lawyers 
applying this theory, the goal is to understand how particular patterns of corporate law may affect 
these processes [when and why firms come into existence], so as to inform debate about how best it 
might achieve regulatory or facilitative goals”. 
80
 Also see below, 15 2 Why the issue of property arises. 
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The idea that the rights, once bundled together, are unique finds expression in 
German legal theory. In German law the aggregate of rights is known as 
“Mitgliedschaftsrechte” (“membership rights”), which are construed as forming the 
basis for the existence of shares. “Mitgliedschaft” is described as both a legal 
relationship from which rights and duties flow as well as a subjective right.81 As a 
subjective right, it is not simply a bundle of subjective rights and duties, but rather a 
“coherent whole” (“geschlossenes Ganzes”). 82  The share is regarded as the 
embodiment of all the rights and duties that accrue to the shareholder as a result of 
his membership and participation in a company. 83  “Mitgliedschaftrechte” are 
conceptually distinct from mere rights to claim (“Forderungsrechte”) and even if they 
are perceived to be subjective rights, they are clearly distinguishable from the other, 
more common types of subjective rights.84 Membership rights come into existence 
upon the initial entry of the company in the “Handelsregister” (register of companies), 
respectively upon the entry of a capital increase.85 This entry is constitutive for the 
creation of membership rights; the issue of share certificates merely has declaratory 
effect in relation to the creation of rights.86 
Such a concept is useful for holistically drawing together the different obligationary 
realms, not all of which are purely contractual. It further reiterates that shares exist as 
both personal relationships and as highly mobile incorporeal assets that can be 
conceptualised as bundles of rights, independent units of capital and contracts. 
 
                                            
81
 See K Schmidt Gesellschaftsrecht 4 ed (2009) 549 and the references provided there. 
82
 550. 
83
 Heider “§§ 1-14” in Münchener Kommentar zum AktG §10 [5]. 
84
 M Habersack Die Mitgliedschaft – subjektives und ‚sonstiges‘ Recht (1996) 28 § 5 I. 
85
 Heider “§§ 1-14” in Münchener Kommentar zum AktG §10 [5]; Hueck & Canaris Wertpapiere § 25 II 
1. In fact membership rights are created through entry in the register of companies and a take-over 
declaration (“Übernahmeerklärung”) by the transferee. The third step of certification is optional. See 
Heider “§§ 1-14” in Münchener Kommentar zum AktG [8], [15]. Also see Aktiengesetz § 41(4) and § 
191. 
86
 Heider “§§ 1-14” in Münchener Kommentar zum AktG §10 [8]; Gursky Wertpapierrecht 153; Meppen 
Inhaberpapier 28. 
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Part 2 
The external sphere: Holding structures and transfer mechanisms 
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Chapter 7: Introduction and a prospect of the discussion 
Shares have been demonstrated to entail a complex symbiosis of rights, which 
although they lack physical substance, also constitute assets i.e. distinct units of 
wealth. Between the issuer and the investor exists a personal relationship.1 This 
relationship, it has been illustrated in Part 1, primarily falls within the purview of 
company law.2 Company law also contains a set of specific rules and provisions that 
determine how shares pass from one shareholder to another. At the same time, 
private law is relevant for ascertaining whether and how a transaction between two 
private parties can result in a transfer of rights.3 Whereas the former relationship is 
typically continuous, also described as concrete and active, the latter is traditionally 
general and latent. 4 The latter relationships arise when shares and securities are 
transacted with, for example when they are sold or provided as security. Alternatively 
they are triggered if a third party infringes certain rights flowing from the issuer-
investor relationship. Relationships of the second kind are typically restricted in time 
– they come to an end when the transaction is concluded or the dispute is resolved. 
A share or security is anomalous in the sense that it can be held without the 
company being aware of the identity of its true owner. There is a disconnect between 
the parties to a personal relationship. A third type of relationship hence plays a 
pivotal role in the context of shares – that between investors and intermediaries or 
between intermediaries inter se. Like the first type of relationship that exists between 
issuers and investors, it is apt to characterise intermediary relationships as 
continuous and active. 
Part 2 will focus on relationships of the second and third kind. It will proceed, in 
chapter 8, with an analysis of the conceptual or doctrinal basis of transfer and holding 
mechanisms. This will include a description of the functions performed by both 
certificates and registers. Traditionally, transfer mechanisms range from assignment 
and cession in English and South African law respectively, to negotiation and delivery 
                                            
1
 On the question whether this relationship can be said to be purely contractual, see above, 6 3 The 
obligationary realms of shares and some conclusions. Also see MF Khimji “The Role of Legal 
Concepts in Commercial Law: Comments on Spink, Rogers and Scavone” (2007) 45 Can Bus LJ 94 
96. 
2
 MF Khimji “Intermediary Credit Risk: A Comparative Law Analysis of Property Rights in Indirectly 
Held Securities” (2005) J Bus L 287 302. 
3
 302. 
4
 M Habersack Die Mitgliedschaft – subjektives und ‚sonstiges‘ Recht (1996) 70 § 6 II 2 b. 
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in US and German law. It is furthermore important to differentiate between the 
structures, mechanisms and relationships that are relevant when transacting in 
shares and those that are at play when holding them. Although they are intertwined, 
they remain conceptually separate. Traditional holding mechanisms include trusts in 
English law, agency in South African law, the physical possession of certificates in 
line with the rules of property law and deposit in German law as well as physical 
possession in the context of the principles governing negotiable instruments and 
bailment in US law. Even if share certificates and registration have their origin in 
company law legislation, chapter 8 will demonstrate that underlying these legislative 
mechanisms are doctrinal mechanisms that have their origin in private law. Micheler, 
in her detailed exposition on English, German and Austrian securities law, makes a 
compelling argument for the strong path dependence of legal development. 5 
Identifying the underlying doctrinal rules is therefore indispensable for a proper 
evaluation of the changed commercial and legal environment. 
The study will continue in chapter 9 with a consideration of the electronic 
environment. In commercial practice, mechanisms of transfer and holding have 
undergone significant transformation. Technology served as the catalyst for the 
widespread introduction of account-based, book-entry systems, accompanied in 
some jurisdictions by the abandonment of physical certificates. In other legal systems 
certificates continue to exist, but their role and functions have been modified. 
Whereas the former systems are said to have dematerialised securities, the latter 
have immobilised the certificates. After the two concepts of “dematerialisation” and 
“immobilisation” are briefly introduced, the focus will shift to intermediation. In 
particular, it is proposed that the primary progression that accompanied the 
establishment of electronic, account-based systems lies neither in the development 
from certificated to uncertificated securities, nor in the change from direct to indirect 
holding. The essence of the evolution is rather captured by the change from “simple” 
to “systemic” intermediation. Intermediation in the context of securities is not a new 
phenomenon. Chapter 8 illustrates this. What chapter 9 attempts to show is that the 
manner, functions and structures of intermediation have changed. The chapter will 
draw on the economic theory of intermediation to narrate some of these changes. 
                                            
5
 E Micheler Property in Securities: A Comparative Study (2007) 225-230. 
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The characterisation of the share as a highly mobile asset, perpetual in duration 
and held through an intermediary, necessitates the establishment of a regime of 
holding and control. Commonly, the term “holding” symbolises having a grasp or grip 
on something; to physically possess something.6 In respect of tangible things, the 
concept of holding and control ordinarily entails possession i.e. physical control of the 
asset. To hold something can also simply denote power and control in the absence of 
any physical element.7 Where the object to be subjected to control is intangible, 
control and holding consist of legally effective commercial relations which invest a 
party with control over the intangible asset. 
Holding must be understood to signify the ability to enforce the rights that flow 
from shares. In other words, a holder of shares is one who has a relationship with the 
issuer or whoever intermediates in such a relationship. This relationship is 
established either through physical possession of a share certificate or through 
conceptual control exercised by virtue of being registered. Holding can be direct or 
indirect. 
A special emphasis must be placed on the ability to enforce the rights that flow 
from shares, because the law in all jurisdictions has developed to accommodate a 
division between the ability to enforce performance and the entitlement to the same 
performance. “Ownership” of shares is usually associated with an entitlement to 
receive certain benefits (whether flowing from a personal or a real right) and with the 
ability to enforce such an entitlement.8 The former is potentially meaningless without 
the latter. For many owners of shares, it is more convenient, however, that another 
person, acting on their behalf, receives dividends and other distributions from the 
company, takes receipt of notices and financial statements and possibly even votes 
on their behalf. This division has implications for how shares are held, transferred 
and otherwise transacted with. 
To determine how systemic intermediation transforms the transfer and holding of 
shares and securities, chapter 9 concludes with an overview of the commercial 
environment. To transfer securities, commercial mechanisms are divided into the 
phases of trading, clearing and settlement and lastly, payment. Commercial 
                                            
6
 See Oxford Dictionaries (available online). 
7
 See Oxford Dictionaries (available online). 
8
 On ownership also see below, 13 2 3 4 Ownership and holding. 
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mechanisms, the comparative chapters 10 to 13 will show, are constructed on a legal 
foundation. In commercial practice, transfer and holding have undergone significant 
transformation. The aim of these chapters is to assess the corresponding 
transformation in the underlying legal mechanisms (both in commercial and private 
law). In matters of commerce, the law is said to lag behind the market. Nowhere is 
this more accurate than in the fast-paced financial and securities markets. The 
existing legal rules therefore need to be carefully disentangled to clarify legal 
uncertainties and to provide a solid basis for future development. 
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Chapter 8: The conceptual basis 
8 1 The functions of the share certificate 
The common denominator of all shares before the advent of the electronic age was 
the share certificate. The entanglement of the share with the share certificate has 
become so complex – and commonplace – that we find it difficult to imagine a world 
without certificates.  
Before the emergence of modern securities settlement systems, the reliance on 
share certificates was remarkably uniform across disparate jurisdictions and legal 
families. Whereas share certificates may be comparable in form, they are frequently 
disparate in function. As described in the previous chapter, the certificate plays a part 
in delineating the relationship between a shareholder and a company, depending on 
whether the share is in bearer or registered form.1 Even beyond the issuer-investor 
relationship, certificates, although conceptualised to facilitate broadly the same 
functions as those described above, namely transferability, trust and certainty,2 can 
do so in remarkably different ways.  
In some jurisdictions the share certificate has always been conceived to be more 
important than in others. The primary reason for this is that the delivery of the 
certificate has in these systems traditionally played a more significant role when 
transacting with shares. This is for example the case in Germany, which traditionally 
classifies shares as tangibles, and the US, where shares were for a long time 
considered to be negotiable instruments. As will appear from the description of its 
functions below, this does not mean that the share certificate plays no role in 
facilitating these functions in other jurisdictions; its role is just modified by the 
existence of other mechanisms such as registration. Writing on the role of share 
certificates in South Africa, Malan finds: “The share certificate is not without 
importance. It is not merely prima facie evidence of the shareholder’s right …, but 
much more. It fulfills an essential role, and plays an integral part, in the transfer of the 
share from one person to another, and in the existence of the right to be on the 
register.”3 It is helpful therefore to set out the functions performed by certificates. 
                                            
1
 On registered and bearer shares, see 6 1 Registered and bearer shares. 
2
 See above, 1 1 Context. 
3
 FR Malan “Share Certificates, Money and Negotiability: Recent Cases” (1977) 94 SALJ 245 252. 
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Share certificates provide prima facie evidence that the person in possession of 
the certificate is in fact the owner of the rights. This evidence is not conclusive and 
may be rebutted – a rule that applies not only to registered shares,4 but also to 
bearer shares and those shares that are in negotiable form. In German law, for 
example, a certificate is subject to a rebuttable presumption of correctness and 
completeness (“Vermutung der Richtigkeit und Vollständigkeit”), provided its content 
is clear and unambiguous.5 In US law, a certificate is likewise proof “in the absence 
of evidence to the contrary”. 6  Acting as evidence, the certificate is particularly 
important in facilitating the mobility of shares by providing an indication of ownership 
that may be relied upon by a third party entering into a transaction in connection to 
that share. Physical possession functions to reduce information costs.7 
In all jurisdictions compared, a distinction is drawn between the paper evidencing 
the share and the share itself. The only difference is that in some jurisdictions, the 
certificates are treated in ordinary transactions as if they are the thing symbolised. 
Yet, there is recognition that shares themselves are abstract and not susceptible to 
physical possession. The “object” of value is the share, not the share certificate. 
Legal systems consistently classify shares as intangibles. 
The most important function of certificates is their ability to enhance the 
transferability of incorporeal rights, known in German law as the “Transportfunktion”. 
This function is of particular importance in German and US law, where the delivery of 
the certificate is required for a valid legal transfer of shares. Indeed, in the German 
system, it is the delivery of the certificate that satisfies the publicity requirement for a 
transfer of tangibles. In England and South Africa, on the other hand, delivery of the 
share certificate is not required. This was long contested in South Africa and finally 
                                            
4
 See the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 51(1)(c). Also see the UK Companies Act 2006 
s 768.  
5
 See D Meppen Das Inhaberpapier: Von der Verbriefung zum unverbrieften Wertrecht? (2014) 31. 
Also see § 1006 BGB, which creates a presumption of ownership in favour of the possessor of 
movable tangibles. 
6
 See the definition of “security certificate” in UCC article 8 § 8-102(a)(16) as well as the definition of 
“security” in UCC § 8-102(a)(15)(i); also see Model Business Corporation Act § 6.25(a) and Delaware 
Code § 158. For case law, see Pierpoint v Hoyt 260 N.Y. 26 (1932) 28-29; Jermain v The Lake Shore 
and Michigan Southern Railway Company 91 N.Y. 483 (1883) 492; Lockwood v United States Steel 
Corp. 209 N.Y. 375 (1913) 380. Further, JW Daniel The Elements of the Law of Negotiable 
Instruments (1903) 27, § 45: “The certificate of stock is the customary and convenient evidence of the 
holder’s interest in the corporation which issues it, but in the absence of legal provisions requiring it, 
no certificate of stock is necessary to attest the rights of the shareholder.” 
7
 TW Merrill “Ownership and Possession” in Y Chang (ed) Law and Economics of Possession (2015) 
9 9. 
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settled only by the court in Botha v Fick,8 confirming that delivery of the certificate is 
not necessary for the valid transfer of rights.9 Instead, delivery of a “proper instrument 
of transfer” is required for a passing of both legal and equitable title in English law. 
The certificate nonetheless plays a vital role in facilitating the ease of transfer. This 
purpose is recognised in Re The Bahia & San Francisco Railway Co Ltd10 finding that 
the “power of granting certificates is to give the shareholders the opportunity of more 
easily dealing with their shares in the market, and to afford facilities to them of selling 
their shares by at once showing a marketable title, and the effect of this facility is to 
make the share of greater value”.11 
The function of certainty and finality of transfer is much less clear-cut. Good-faith 
acquisition (“gutgläubiger Erwerb”) in German law flows from the classification of 
shares as tangible movables and therefore from the characterisation of certificates as 
physical embodiments of rights. Similarly, in US law, the embodiment of rights in 
certificates leads to the creation of negotiable instruments with all their typical 
characteristics, including good faith acquisition. Good-faith acquisition of shares is 
traditionally not recognised in either English or South African law.12 This stems from 
the fact that shares are neither movable property nor negotiable instruments.13 In 
these legal systems, certificates are not the primary tool used to enhance the 
certainty of transfer – a solution is rather found in the doctrine of estoppel. The 
delivery of a share certificate to an unauthorised agent or a representation made by a 
company on a share certificate may give rise to a reasonable expectation on the part 
of a party who, acting to its detriment on such conduct, may be protected by a 
reliance on estoppel.14 
                                            
8
 1995 2 SA 750 (A). 
9
 Until the decision in Botha v Fick 1995 2 SA 750 (A), it was unclear whether a document that 
evidences a right (such as a share certificate) must be delivered for a valid cession to take place. For 
the historic development and an overview of the case law, see MR Vermaas Aspekte van die 
Dematerialisasie van Genoteerde Aandele in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg LLD thesis University of South 
Africa (1995) 56-79. For delivery as a requirement for a valid cession, see Jeffrey v Pollak and 
Freemantle 1938 AD 1 14 and 22. 
10
 (1868) LR 3 QB 584. 
11
 594-595. 
12
 On South African law, see LF van Huyssteen, MFB Reynecke & GF Lubbe Contract: General 
Principles 5 ed (2016) 437 [12.11] n 62. 
13
 A classification of shares as movable property in English and South African law would, naturally, not 
result in good faith acquisition. 
14
 See below, 8 4 4 Estoppel and the protection of bona fide purchasers in English law and 
8 4 5 Estoppel and the protection of bona fide purchasers in South African law. 
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A certificate (or in the case of bearer shares, the coupons attached to it) entitles, 
even mandates, the company to render performance only to the holder of the 
certificate, a function known in German law as the legitimating or liberating function in 
favour of the issuer (“Legitimations- und Liberationsfunktion zugunsten des 
Ausstellers”). In England, South Africa and the United States this function is 
performed by the register, not the certificate. The delivery of the certificate or transfer 
instrument by the seller to the company, however, ordinarily provides important 
evidence as to who is entitled to be registered. 
The counterpart to the legitimating function of the certificate in favour of the issuer, 
is its legitimating function in favour of the possessor of the certificate. Only the person 
in possession of the certificate can enforce rights against the issuer. Again, this 
function is performed by the register in English and South African law. 
8 2 Registration 
8 2 1 The functions of registration 
When shares are issued in registered form, the share register plays an important part 
in facilitating efficient transactions in, and holding of shares. The obligation placed on 
an issuer of shares to maintain a share register is particularly pertinent in England, 
South Africa and the United States. Registration traditionally plays only a negligible 
role in German law, which is a system dominated by bearer shares.15 Owing to the 
advantages of increased transparency, ease of communications between the issuing 
company and its shareholders as well as the adjustment to international custom, 
many authors consider registered shares to be on the rise.16 Due to the continued 
dominance of bearer shares and the similarity between the two in respect of both 
their character as “Wertpapiere” and their treatment as “things” susceptible to 
collective deposit, German registered shares will, however, not be considered in any 
further detail.17 
                                            
15
 See above, 6 1 Registered and bearer shares. 
16
 See above, 6 1 Registered and bearer shares n 19. 
17
 Only so much: Like US registered shares, “Namensaktien” are typically transferred by delivery and 
indorsement; Aktiengesetz § 68(1). The entry on the share register is therefore merely a declaratory 
act in relation to the transfer of the share – see K Schmidt Gesellschaftsrecht 4 ed (2002) 777, § 26 IV. 
Both bearer shares and registered shares are therefore “Wertpapiere”, the former payable to bearer 
and the latter to order (like their US counterparts). 
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Like the share certificate, the register functions as prima facie evidence of the 
facts recorded in it. In the revised South African Companies Act for example, a 
securities register is deemed to be “sufficient proof of the facts recorded in it, in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary”.18 The change of wording from “prima facie 
evidence”19 to “sufficient evidence” appears to be without consequence. A register 
provides prima facie, as opposed to conclusive proof of all the recorded facts.20 The 
register performs this evidentiary function both in relation to the issuer and in relation 
to third parties.21 In relation to third parties, the certificate is more readily accessible. 
It follows, that the evidentiary value of the register is the same as that of a share 
certificate. In English and South African law, there is consensus, however, that where 
there is a conflict between the certificate and the register, the register trumps the 
share certificate.22  
The record of shareholders is primarily aimed at determining towards whom a 
company may and in fact must perform. A key characteristic of shares is the ease 
with which they can be transferred from one person to another. Where the company 
cannot rely on an external token such as the share certificate, it is imperative that it 
keeps track of the movement of shares for the purpose of rendering performance. To 
enable a company to render performance, shares must be recorded on the register 
when first issued. For the same reason, every transfer of shares must be recorded. 
The share register does not circulate in the market in the same way as certificates 
do. Thus, it does not perform the same function of enhancing the liquidity and 
marketability of shares as the certificate does. 
In legal systems designed to facilitate the division of the enforcement of rights and 
their entitlement, the register becomes the relevant record for determining who holds 
shares; in other words, who can enforce the rights that flow from shares. At the same 
time, the register is construed as prima facie evidence of the identity of the person 
who is entitled to the benefits of shares. Where the ability to enforce and the 
entitlement to receive the benefits diverge, this presumption can be rebutted.  
                                            
18
 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 50(4). For English law, see the Companies Act 2006 s 127. 
19
 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 109. 
20
 Randfontein Estates Ltd v The Master 1909 TS 978 980; also Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Ocean 
Commodities Inc 1980 2 SA 175 (T) 181: “The fact, therefore, that the shares are registered in the 
name of Standard Bank Nominees does not mean that it is the actual owner or that one cannot look 
behind the register to ascertain the identity of the true owner”. 
21
 Farrar’s Estate v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1926 TPD 501 508. 
22
 PL Davies & S Worthington Gower & Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 9 ed (2012) 986 
[27-5]. 
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8 2 2 Registration in English law 
The primary relationship flowing from English company law revolves around the idea 
of membership. A member is either 1. a subscriber to the company’s memorandum 
who became a member at incorporation; or 2. every other person who agrees to 
become a member and whose name is entered in the register of members. 23 
Membership hinges on registration. In terms of section 113(1) of the Companies Act 
2006, every company is obliged to keep a register of its members. 
To enable the effective distribution of dividends and notices and the exercise of 
voting rights, amongst other rights and entitlement, a company must maintain an 
updated record of its members. For this reason, an allotment of shares must be 
entered on the register “as soon as practicable and in any event within two months 
after the date of the allotment”.24 The registration of a transfer of shares or refusal 
thereof must likewise take place as soon as practicable and within two months after 
being lodged with the company.25 In the context of certificated shares, a company 
may not register a transfer unless it has received a proper instrument of transfer.26 A 
delivery of the share certificate to the company is not required. 
Registration is frequently said to result in a transfer of the legal title to shares. The 
distinction between legal and equitable title becomes relevant only where the 
member is not the person entitled to the benefits that flow from shares. Where this 
happens the member is said to hold the interest of the beneficial owner on trust. 
From a functional perspective, the division between legal and equitable title is 
another way of describing the distinction between the ability to enforce rights and the 
entitlement to benefit from them. If a share is held in trust, the Act determines that 
such trusts shall not be entered on the register.27 The company thus strictly renders 
performance to members only.  
                                            
23
 Companies Act 2006 s 112. 
24
 S 554. 
25
 S 771(1). 
26
 S 770(1)(a). 
27
 S 126. 
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8 2 3 Registration in US law 
The Model Act similarly compels companies to maintain a record of its 
shareholders.28 A “shareholder” is defined as “the person in whose name shares are 
registered in the records of a corporation or the beneficial owner of shares to the 
extent of the rights granted by a nominee certificate on file with a corporation”.29 The 
definition links shareholding to registration. At the same time, it recognises that the 
shareholder may be a mere nominee acting for a “beneficial owner”. Ordinarily it is 
the shareholder that enforces the rights against the company. 30  The definition 
provides a measure of flexibility by allowing the beneficial owner to enforce some of 
the rights him- or herself. In addition, a company may under certain circumstances 
recognise beneficial owners as shareholders. 31  Where the shareholder and the 
beneficial owner are different persons, the basic distinction between a shareholder’s 
ability to enforce rights and a beneficial owner’s entitlement to the benefits that flow 
from these rights is maintained.  
Although the terminology of the “beneficial owner” has been retained, it no longer 
has the same effect as in English law. It has been found in Jones v Central State 
Investment Co, 32  that “[a] book transfer speaks only to the issues of record 
ownership, and not of legal or equitable title and is not a condition precedent to a 
valid transfer as between the parties to the transaction”.33  
8 2 4 Registration in South African law 
In terms of section 50(1) of the Companies Act, every company must establish and 
maintain a securities register.34  
To fully appreciate the purpose and ambit of registration, it is necessary to have an 
understanding of the parties involved. Prior to the significant changes introduced by 
the Companies Act of 2008, South African company law, taking its cue from English 
                                            
28
 Model Business Corporation Act § 16.01(c). 
29
 § 1.40 (21) 
30
 It is for example the shareholder that receives notices of annual and special meetings and attends 
these - §§ 7.01, 7.02, 7.05. It is also the shareholder who votes at these meetings - §§ 7.21 and 7.22. 
31
 § 7.23. 
32
 654 P.2d 717 (1982). See below, 8 3 3 2 Negotiation, assignment and the transfer of shares. 
33
 Jones v Central State Investment Co 654 P.2d 717 (1982) 733 (own emphasis). 
34
 Also see Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 24(4)(a); Companies Regulations, 2011 GN R 619 in GG 
36759 of 20-08-2013 reg 32. 
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law, made provision for members of a company.35 In contrast, a shareholder was not 
defined by the Act and the terms “member” and “shareholder” were frequently used 
interchangeably. Depending on the context, shareholding, however, did not 
necessarily imply registration.36  
In South Africa, the concept of membership in addition to shareholding has now 
been abandoned. The revised legislative regime has replaced the idea of 
membership with that of shareholding.37 The definition of a “shareholder” has two 
parts: A shareholder is “the holder of a share issued by a company”. In addition, he is 
the person “who is entered as such in the certificated or uncertificated securities 
register”.38 The Act therefore sets two requirements for qualification as a shareholder, 
the material requirement of being the holder of securities and the formal requirement 
of registration.39  
The Act does not clarify who it envisages to be holders of securities. A holder 
cannot be equated to an owner, however. Nominees are also defined as holders.40 
Such an interpretation would imply that in the case of nominee holdings, neither the 
nominee nor the owner would meet the definition of a shareholder – the nominee 
because he is not the owner and the owner because he is not recorded on the 
register.41 One of the aims of registration is to enable the company to determine the 
identity of the person towards whom it must render performance. The company will 
perform towards the holder. This construction gives the shareholder the ability to 
enforce the rights that flow from shares. 
This leads to a few conclusions: 1. Shareholding and ownership of shares do not 
necessarily coincide. 2. A shareholder is nothing more than a member under the 
previous regime. 3. Shareholding is primarily concerned with the fact of registration, 
which establishes a direct relationship between the shareholder and the company. 
The frequent use of the term “registered shareholder” in case law and literature 
                                            
35
 Companies Act 61 of 1973 s 103(1)-(2). 
36
 See MS Blackman, RD Jooste, CK Everingham, JL Yeats, FHI Cassim & R De La Harpe 
Commentary on the Companies Act (2002) (RS 9 2012) 5-174. 
37
 The term “member” is now only applied to non-profit companies; See the definition of member in s 1 
of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.  
38
 S 1. 
39
 JC de Wet & AH van Wyk De Wet en Yeats – Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 4 ed 
(1978) 613; this statement was made in relation to “membership” in the Companies Act 61 of 1973, but 
can be equally applied to the definition of a “shareholder” as it is now. 
40
 See n 43 below. 
41
 Also see R Rachlitz “Disclosure of Ownership in South African Company Law” (2013) 3 Stell LR 406 
410. 
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creates the impression that a “registered shareholder” must be distinguished from a 
“shareholder”. This is not the case. A shareholder as defined is always registered.  
This construction makes it possible for an investor to hold and register the shares, 
not in his own name, but in the name of an agent, commonly known as a nominee.42 
The drawback of this structure: it creates opportunities for abuse by both the nominee 
and the owner. The relationships between an owner and his nominee and between 
ownership and registration therefore need to be carefully regulated.  
A “nominee” is a person that “act[s] as the holder of securities or of an interest in 
securities on behalf of other persons”.43 The descriptor “registered holder”, included 
by the Securities Services Act, the predecessor of the Financial Markets Act, is now 
omitted; a correction that makes provision for tiers of nominees. As a result, not every 
nominee is also a shareholder. A nominee acts as an agent of the owner.44 He 
enforces the rights attached to shares on behalf of the owner, who is the beneficiary 
of the rights. 
The purpose of registration is twofold: It provides prima facie evidence of title, but 
also recognises that such title may vest in a person other than the shareholder, in the 
case of which shareholding and ownership are separate enquiries. 45  In an 
environment of increasing nominee holdings coupled with a rapid turnover of shares, 
registration enables a company to easily determine the person to whom performance 
must be tendered, regardless of her status as nominee or owner. Section 37(9) of the 
Companies Act provides that “a person- acquires the rights associated with any 
particular security of a company- (i) when that person’s name is entered in…the 
securities register”. This provision places an obligation on the company to only 
recognise and render performance to shareholders.46 The purpose of registration, 
therefore, does not differ from that in English and US law. South African law achieves 
                                            
42
 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 56(1). 
43
 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 1 as based on s 1 of the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 (and its 
predecessor, the Security Services Act s 1). 
44
 Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & Investment Co (Pty) Ltd 1976 1 SA 441 (A) 453; 
Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining Co Ltd 1969 3 SA 629 (A) 666C-F; Standard Bank of South 
Africa Ltd v Ocean Commodities Inc 1983 1 SA 276 (A) 289. Also see below, 8 3 5 4 Agency, 
representation and mandate. 
45
 See for example Verrin Trust & Finance Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Zeeland House (Pty) Ltd 1973 4 SA 
1 (C) 13 where the court clearly distinguishes “the question of title to the shares” from “title to be on 
the register”. Also, Jeffrey v Pollak and Freemantle 1938 AD 1 at 18: “the right to be on the register 
may be independent of ownership”. 
46
 Also see Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining Co Ltd 1969 3 SA 629 (A) 666: “a company shall 
concern itself only with the registered holder and not the owner or beneficial owner of the shares”. 
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the distinction between the ability to enforce rights and the entitlement to those rights 
without having to resort to a dual concept of legal and beneficial ownership. Any 
reference to a “beneficial owner” in the South African context is therefore 
misplaced.47 The correct construction in South African law is that both the entitlement 
to benefits and the ability to enforce them, vest in the owner, who can subsequently 
contract out, whether expressly or tacitly, the ability to enforce the rights to an agent.  
8 3 Transfer and holding in paper-based environments 
8 3 1 Introductory remarks 
It has been repeatedly emphasised that it is crucial for the company to know who its 
shareholders are. It is essential that some mechanism exists for the company to 
ascertain their identity. This mechanism may be registration or it may be possession 
of the share certificate. Ordinarily, both the entitlement to benefits and the ability to 
enforce these benefits are part and parcel of owning an asset and would usually be 
transferred together. What both mechanisms have in common, from a functional 
perspective, is that the entitlement to benefits can be construed as vesting separately 
from the ability to enforce them.  
This makes transfer a difficult concept in the context of shares. A change in 
registration is known in ordinary parlance as a transfer, is described as such by 
writers and courts, but it is subject to “transfer rules” that differ from a transfer of the 
share as an asset. It is therefore useful to distinguish between the concepts of a 
change in registration and a transfer in the narrow sense. 
                                            
47
 Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 5-172. Also see the statement made by Corbett 
JA in Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Ocean Commodities Inc 1983 1 SA 276 (A) 289: “The term 
‘beneficial owner’ is, juristically speaking, not wholly accurate, but it is a convenient and well-used 
label to denote the person in whom, as between himself and the registered shareholder, the benefit of 
the bundle of rights constituting the share vests.” A Borrowdale “The Transfer of Proprietary Rights in 
Shares: A South African Distillation out of English Roots” (1985) 18 CILSA 36 37, 40. The term 
“beneficial owner” differs from that of a holder of a “beneficial interest”; see the definition of the term 
“beneficial interest” in Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 1 as read with s 56(2); also see the discussion 
below at 13 2 4 Registration. The latter is much wider and is further broadened by the categories of 
persons “deemed” to be beneficial interest holders in s 56, including but not limited to persons married 
or related to holders of a “beneficial interest”. Whereas a “beneficial owner” in terms of the common 
law was simply the ultimate “owner” of all of the rights that attach to securities, the holder of a 
“beneficial interest” appears to be a person that is entitled to any one or more of these rights. This 
results in a multiplication of “beneficial interest” holders; see See PA Delport (ed) Henochsberg on the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 (RS 15 2017) 220.  
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8 3 2 Transfer and holding in English law 
8 3 2 1 General remarks 
It is commonly assumed that a transfer of shares takes place in three stages: 1. an 
agreement; 2. delivery of the transfer form and certificate by the seller as well as 
payment of the agreed price by the buyer; 3. lodgement of the instrument of transfer 
and registration by the company. 48  English law is premised on the distinction 
between legal title and beneficial interest. Where these do not diverge, the legal 
owner is the absolute owner and no distinction is drawn between his legal and 
beneficial interest.49 All three of these steps are part and parcel of becoming an 
absolute owner. Only where legal and beneficial ownership vest separately, does it 
become necessary to carefully unpick them and to draw a distinction between the 
mechanisms available to bring about their transfer. 
 As illustrated above, registration is essential for becoming a member of a 
company and therefore for vesting legal title. In J Sainsbury Plc v O’Connor 
(Inspector of Taxes), 50  it was held, for example, that “[t]here is no difficulty in 
ascertaining the legal ownership in shares, which is invariably vested in the 
registered holder.”51  
Beneficial ownership, on the other hand, already passes at stage two or even one. 
As much becomes clear from the following passage quoted from Société Générale 
de Paris v Walker:52 
“Such a transfer [unregistered] might, indeed, give a legal right of action against the 
company if they, without just cause, refused to register it; it might also be a good 
                                            
48
 See Davies & Worthington Modern Company Law 991 [27-8]. 
49
 See the dictum of Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington 
LBC [1996] AC 669 (HL) 706: “A person solely entitled to the full beneficial ownership of money or 
property, both at law and in equity, does not enjoy an equitable interest in that property. The legal title 
carries with it all rights. Unless and until there is a separation of the legal and equitable estates, there 
is no separate equitable title.” Also see J Sainsbury Plc v O’Connor (Inspector of Taxes) [1991] 1 WLR 
963 (CA) 978B-C: “It means ownership for your own benefit as opposed to ownership as trustee for 
another. It exists either where there is no division of legal and beneficial ownership or where legal 
ownership is vested in one person and beneficial ownership or, which is the same thing, the equitable 
interest in the property in another.” 
50
 [1991] 1 WLR 963 (CA). 
51
 977. 
52
 (1885) App Cas 20. 
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foundation for an application to a competent Court to rectify the register. But it could not 
… confer (while unregistered) a legal title to the shares themselves”.53  
8 3 2 2 Choses in action 
Under English law, shares are choses in action. Following the characterisation of 
shares in Bligh v Brent as personal property,54 courts have commonly described 
shares as “choses in action”,55 which according to Pennington “does nothing more 
than assure us that they are personality, and are not tangible chattels, which is self-
evident”.56 A “chose in action”, Gower states, “is a notoriously vague term used to 
describe a mass of interests which have little or nothing in common”.57 Holdsworth 
concludes that the category of choses in action “cover[s] a miscellaneous mass of 
very difficult things”, 58  and Pretto-Saakman finds that they, “[f]or purposes of 
classification … are best encouraged to slip into obsolescence”.59 
Today, the category of choses in action comprises a list as variable as debt, bank 
deposits, company shares and goodwill. To understand how shares came to be 
classified as choses in action, a brief historic excursion must be embarked upon.60  
Initially, the category of choses in action referred simply to rights which can only 
be enforced by action.61 Although an action can be personal or real, in its original 
form a chose in action seems to refer chiefly to personal actions.62 A personal action 
is enforced by a specific plaintiff against a specific defendant.63 It is this personal 
nature of choses in action that rendered them incapable of being alienated, be it by 
                                            
53
 28. 
54
 The term “personal property” is still used in the Companies Act 2006 s 541 to describe shares. 
55
 Humble v Mitchell (1839) 11 Ad & El 205; Colonial Bank v Whinney (1886) 11 App Cas 426; Harrold 
v Plenty [1901] 2 Ch 314 316; Re VGM Holdings Ltd [1942] Ch 235 241. 
56
 RR Pennington Pennington’s Company Law 8 ed (2001) 56. 
57
 Davies & Worthington Modern Company Law 860 [23-1]. 
58
 WS Holdsworth “The History of the Treatment of ‘Choses’ in Action by the Common Law” (1920) 33 
Harvard LR 997 1029. 
59
 A Pretto-Sakmann Boundaries of Personal Property: Shares and Sub-Shares (2005) 65. 
60
 A comprehensive presentation of the historical origins of choses in action can be found in 
Holdsworth (1920) Harvard LR. 
61
 This appears from the definition in Torkington v Magee [1902] 2 KB 427 430, describing choses in 
action as “all personal rights of property which can only be claimed or enforced by action, and not by 
taking physical possession”. Also see C Sweet “Choses in Action” (1894) 10 LQR 303 304; 
Holdsworth (1920) Harvard LR 998-999, 1001. 
62
 Holdsworth (1920) Harvard LR 1001. 
63
 1000, 1003. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
99 
 
assignment or will.64 Personal actions typically derive from obligations in the form of 
contracts or torts. 
Subsequent developments saw the erosion of the common denominator, namely 
that the category of choses in action encompassed only rights that could be enforced 
by instituting an action. In due course, documents evidencing rights in action were 
taken to be choses in action as well; over the course of the next centuries many 
instruments of commercial practice thus came to be classified as choses in action, 
including bonds, shares and negotiable instruments.65 Particularly the characteristic 
of non-assignability lead to further extensions of the concept of choses in action, 
including within its ambit any rights which were incapable of being assigned.66 These 
rights, at most, were analogous to rights of action. Illustrated with obligations arising 
from contract, this means: Initially, only rights of action arising from contract were 
choses in action, typically arising only when a contract had been breached. Later, 
however, any contractual right was regarded to be a chose in action, even if not 
giving rise to a right of action, in other words even if the contract had not been 
breached. Likewise, future debts were regarded as choses in action.67  
All the choses in action considered thus far derived from the common law. They 
are therefore legal choses in action. When the category of choses in actions began to 
expand, it was asserted that equitable interests, including interests in a trust, were 
essentially personal, being enforced between specific parties only and were non-
assignable to discourage maintenance. 68  The courts of equity only exercised 
jurisdiction over persons, not over property; thus, equity is said to always act in 
personam.69 Again, it was the desired non-assignability that acted as a prominent 
                                            
64
 Holdsworth (1920) Harvard LR 1000, 1003; M Smith & N Leslie The Law of Assignment 2 ed (2013) 
26, [2.56]. 
65
 Holdsworth (1920) Harvard LR 1011. Also see Sweet (1894) LQR 303, who strongly opposed the 
classification of shares as choses in action. 
66
 Holdsworth (1920) Harvard LR 1013. 
67
 Smith & Leslie Assignment 28-29 at [2.59]-[2.60]. This is the basis upon which Sweet (1894) LQR 
303 viewed the classification of shares as choses in action with scepticism: “A share in a company is 
an interest in a certain property or undertaking; it gives a right to participate in the management, profits 
and assets of the company, but it need not, and in the majority of cases never does, give rise to any 
right of action against the company to recover what the share represents.” (footnotes omitted).  
68
 Holdsworth (1920) Harvard LR 1014-1015. 
69
 This is one of the maxims of equity; see R Clements & A Abass Equity and Trusts: Text, Cases, and 
Materials 4 ed (2015) 37-38; PH Pettit Equity and the Law of Trusts 11 ed (2009) 27-28. Equity is 
enforced against a person, not against an object. Equity, unlike law, therefore appeals to a person’s 
conscience. The maxim, must not, however distract from the fact that an equitable right to property 
may be a proprietary right. 
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factor in the classification of equitable interests as choses in action.70 These interests 
came to be classified as equitable choses. 
It is abundantly clear that the category of choses in action has become a disparate 
mass of legal rights and interests, historically joined primarily by their inability to be 
assigned. Despite the rule against maintenance, courts began to articulate the 
practical obsolescence of the non-assignability of choses in action. 71  Whereas 
assignments of choses in action were initially not possible in the common law, they 
could be assigned in equity.72 Such equitable assignments are relatively weak as the 
assignee acquires only equitable, not legal title and thus may be subjected to 
adverse claims.73 Statutory or legal assignments of choses in action were only made 
possible in 1873 by what is today section 136 of the Law of Property Act 1925.74 
8 3 2 3 Registration and the passing of legal title 
Today, the characterisation of shares as choses in action has little relevance for the 
passing of the legal title to shares. This makes it increasingly difficult to treat shares 
in the same fashion as other choses in action. Transfer mechanisms for shares are 
today primarily determined by statute. According to Millet J in MacMillan Inc v 
Bishopsgate Trust (No 3),75 shares “form a special sub-species of choses in action 
with its own rules. No one seeking to discover the rules relating to the transfer of 
shares would look for them under the heading ‘assignment of choses in action’”.76 
                                            
70
 Holdsworth (1920) Harvard LR 1015. 
71
 See for example Master v Miller (1791) 4 Term Rep 320 at 340 per Buller J: “It is laid down in our 
old books, that for avoiding maintenance, a chose in action cannot be assigned … The good sense of 
that rule seems to me to be very questionable; and in early as well as modern times it has been so 
explained away, that it remains at most only an objection to the form of the action in any case“. 
72
 See for example Balfour v The Official Manager of the Sea Fire Life Assurance Company (1857) 3 
Common Bench Reports (New Series) 300 at 308 per Willes J, which was decided before the courts at 
common law and the equity courts merged: “I should have though a much better authority might have 
found for the proposition that a court of equity would prevent a party from suing upon a security the 
consideration for which had failed. The court there seems to have considered that there could not be 
an assignment of a debt. That doctrine has, as everyone must know, long long since exploded“. Also 
see Fitzroy v Cave [1905] 2 KB 364 at 371-372. 
73
 Warner Bros Records Inc v Rollgreen Ltd [1976] QB 430 at 443-444. A detailed description of the 
operation of equitable choses can be found in Smith & Leslie Assignment 218-244. See in general the 
difference between law and equity below, 8 3 2 6 Equity and trusts. 
74
 The predecessor being the repealed Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873, s 25(6). 
75
 [1995] 1 WLR 978 992 (The statement was made in the context of a dispute regarding the legal 
situs of shares in private international law). 
76
 MacMillan Inc v Bishopsgate Trust (No 3) [1995] 1 WLR 978 at 992; also quoted in Smith & Leslie 
Assignment 154 [6.216]. 
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On the transferability of shares, the Companies Act merely states that “[t]he 
shares, or other interest of any member in a company, are transferable in accordance 
with the company’s articles”.77 The formal procedure to transfer a certificated share is 
set out in the Stock Transfer Act 1963. The transfer of shares is facilitated by a stock 
transfer form, which must be executed by the transferor only and which must include 
details of the consideration paid, the description and number of securities transferred, 
the particulars of the transferor as well as the full name and address of the 
transferee.78 The execution of the form need not be attested79 and it is valid as long 
as it complies with the requirements of the Act, regardless of its form.80 The stock 
transfer form serves as the “proper instrument of transfer” without which a company 
may not register the transfer. 
The stock transfer form (or other instrument of transfer) must be delivered to the 
transferee and in the ordinary course of events the transferee lodges the form and 
other documents81 with the company for registration.82 This can also be done by the 
transferor.83 Registration is generally considered to be necessary to vest legal title.84 
8 3 2 4 Novation and assignment 
The historic classification of shares as choses in action suggests that they should 
pass from one person to another by assignment. Assignment is understood to be the 
transfer of a right or interest in intangible property owned by the assignor, from the 
assignor to the assignee.85 Briefly stated, the requirements for an effective statutory 
assignment today are as follows:86 1. the assignment must be absolute; meaning that 
it must be unconditional87 as well as encompass the entire debt, not just a part of it;88 
                                            
77
 Companies Act 2006 s 544(1). 
78
 Stock Transfer Act 1963 s 1(1). 
79
 S 1(2). 
80
 S 1(3). 
81
 This usually includes the share certificate. Although the share certificate is not required, the 
company may refuse to register the transfer unless the certificate is supplied or accounted for. See 
Pennington Company Law 341 n 8. 
82
 Companies Act 2006 s 770. 
83
 S 771. 
84
 But cf Pennington Company Law 416-417, who argues that legal title passes prior to registration. 
85
 YK Liew Guest on The Law of Assignment 3 ed (2018) 1 [1-01]. 
86
 S 136(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925. For more detail see J Beatson, A Burrows & J Cartwright 
Anson’s Law of Contract 30 ed (2016) 699-701. 
87
 In other words, future choses in action cannot be assigned; see Durham Brothers v Robertson 
[1898] 1 QB 765 at 773; Raiffaisen Zentralbank Österreich AG v Five Star General Trading LLC [2001] 
EWCA Civ 68, [2001] QB 825 at 850. 
88
 See Durham Brothers v Robertson [1898] 1 QB 765 at 772; In Re Steel Wing Co, Limited [1921] 1 
Ch 349 at 352; Jones v Humphreys [1902] 1 KB 10. 
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2. it must be in writing and signed by the assignor; and 3. notice must be given to the 
debtor.89 The notification requirement poses no problems in the context of certificated 
shares, as the company must be informed of the transfer for purposes of registration. 
Likewise, the stock transfer form required by the Stock Transfer Act 1963 satisfies 
the prerequisite of writing. The requirement of notice only captures the act of giving 
notice, not the actual recording of the notice required to pass legal title. From this 
perspective, novation, discussed below, provides the better explanatory basis. 
An assignment is a transfer in the true sense of the word, as the interest (debt) in 
the hands of the assignee is the same interest that the assignor held.90 There are two 
notable characteristics of assignment: First, the assignee always takes “subject to 
equities”, meaning “subject to all such defences as might have prevailed against the 
assignor”.91 Second, only a benefit, not a burden can be assigned.92 The reason for 
this rule is that a person should be able to choose his debtor freely.93 Considering the 
paucity of shareholder duties, this requirement is, however, devoid of much practical 
relevance in the context of shares. 
If an assignment does not comply with all of these requirements it may still be an 
equitable assignment. 94  Equitable assignments will be considered in more detail 
below.95 
An increasing number of authors see the statutory method described above, not 
as an example of an assignment, but rather a type of novation. 96 Novation is a 
technique by which both benefits and burdens, or rights and obligations, can be 
transferred to a third party.97 The cooperation of all three parties is required for a 
                                            
89
 The notice requirement is construed strictly and only takes effect once the notice is received by the 
debtor; see Holt v Heatherfield Trust Ltd [1942] 2 KB 1 at 5-6. 
90
 See Beatson et al Anson’s 705 for a contrary position in respect of equitable assignments. 
91
 705. 
92
 See Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85 at 103B, per Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson: “It is trite law that it is, in any event, impossible to assign “the contract” as a whole, 
i.e. including both burden and benefit. The burden of a contract can never be assigned without the 
consent of the other party to the contract in which event such consent will give rise to a novation”. 
93
 See Robson and Sharpe v Drummond (1831) 109 ER 1156. 
94
 Warner Bros Records Inc v Rollgreen Ltd and Others [1976] QB 430 at 441. Beatson et al Anson’s 
701. 
95
 See below, 8 3 2 7 Equitable assignment. 
96
 See E Micheler Property in Securities: A Comparative Study (2007) 30, J Benjamin Interests in 
Securities: A Proprietary Analysis of the International Securities Markets (2000) 64-65 [3.05]-[3.06], 
Pennington Company Law 398-399, Liew Guest on Assignment 18 [1-28], Petto-Sakmann Boundaries 
of Personal Property 117-121. 
97
 Beatson et al Anson’s 712; Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd [1994] 1 AC 
85 at 103B. 
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valid novation.98 Technically, a novation is not a transfer, because it leads to the 
creation of a new contract. 99  The reasons advanced to support the novation 
argument vary.  
It is firstly suggested, that registration is an implicit approval by the issuer of the 
member. The default rule in modern company law is of course that shares are freely 
transferable, unless stated otherwise in the articles of association. 100  Free 
transferability is a key characteristic of public listed companies and is required by 
stock exchange listing rules. It is therefore unlikely that public listed companies will 
restrict the transferability of shares in any way. This means that the issuer’s consent 
is technically not a requirement for transfer to take place. Benjamin nonetheless 
argues that through the required involvement of the issuer in registering shares, the 
issuer implicitly agrees to the “transfer”.101  
Pennington and Micheler argue that the central role played by registration in 
English law can be traced back to the origin of the company in the law of 
partnerships.102 Partnerships (like early joint stock companies) do not confer limited 
liability on the partners or shareholders. Thus, every change of partnership or 
shareholding had an impact on the funds and the administration of the company. 
Existing partners or shareholders would therefore want a say in the admission of new 
partners. This was initially achieved by limiting the transferability of shares. Every 
transfer would be decided on individually; a certificate would be issued and the 
transfer would be entered on a register. In a system where the identity of its 
shareholders was of cardinal importance, it follows that it is not the delivery of the 
certificate to a purchaser of shares, but rather the change in the register that caused 
shares to be transferred. Even as shares became freely transferable as a general 
rule, 103  English law has maintained the practice of issuing shares in registered 
form.104 The purpose of registration no longer lies in approving a suitable transferee, 
                                            
98
 Beatson et al Anson’s 712; E Peel Treitel on the Law of Contract 14 ed (2015) 798 [15-003]. 
99
 Peel Treitel 798 [15-003], 835 [15-078]. 
100
 See Companies Act 2006 s 544(1). 
101
 Benjamin Interests in Securities 64 [3.05]-[3.06]. Free transferability is of course a key 
characteristic of public listed companies and the ability of the issuer to refuse registration is limited. 
But see s 63(5) of the Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008, which allows directors to refuse 
registration in certain cases.  
102
 Micheler Property in Securities 21-25; Pennington Company Law 399. 
103
 Restrictions on the transfer of shares are prohibited in the case of listed public companies. 
104
 Micheler Property in Securities 24-25. 
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but rather in receiving the required instruments of transfer, to issue certificates once 
these instruments are deemed to be proper and lastly by registering the transfer.105  
According to Micheler, “[t]he legal environment that existed when securities first 
became widespread shaped the formalities of the transfer process, and these 
formalities continued to develop in a path-dependent manner”.106 Micheler further 
argues that the initial unavailability of assignment to bring about a transfer of a chose 
in action could have caused the law to instead utilise novation as a method of 
transfer.107 
In addition, it is argued that shares consist of benefits and burdens. As the transfer 
of burdens is generally not captured by an assignment, novation seems more fitting. 
Petto-Sakmann explains that the issuer is simultaneously a debtor (in respect of 
dividends for example) and a creditor (in respect of the payment payable for the 
shares).108 Although unusual, it is possible that other duties are attached to shares109 
and it is undeniable that assignment indeed has a problem with liabilities. 
8 3 2 5 The creation and transfer of equitable title 
The statutory mechanism of registration applies only to the passing of legal title. 
Where legal and beneficial ownership do not coincide, the latter can be subject to the 
rules and mechanisms of equity, including trusts and equitable assignments. 110 
These mechanisms of transfer are not subject to the statutory provisions set out in 
the Companies Act and elsewhere. In MacMillan v Bishopsgate Millet J stated clearly 
that: 
“The corporate rights [including the right to be registered] of the transferee depend entirely 
on the law of incorporation. But the effect of a transfer on the company and its effect on 
the transferor and persons claiming under him are two different questions, and there is no 
rational basis for applying the law of incorporation to a question of the second kind”.111 
                                            
105
 25. 
106
 25. 
107
 Micheler Property in Securities 24. 
108
 Pretto-Sakmann Boundaries of Personal Property 119. 
109
 See Benjamin Interests in Securities 67-68 [3.18]. 
110
 Liew Guest on Assignment 17-18 [1-29], 170-171 [6-38]. 
111
 MacMillan Inc v Bishopsgate Trust (No 3) [1995] 1 WLR 978 993-994. 
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It is important, also, to distinguish the vesting of a trust from an assignment.112 The 
creation of a trust creates new rights in favour of a beneficiary. Assignment transfers 
existing rights from one person to another. Should an absolute owner, for example, 
decide to sell her shares to a purchaser, this will vest in the purchaser, pending 
registration, an equitable interest in the shares. In the meantime, the seller will retain 
legal ownership, holding the shares on trust for the purchaser. There is no transfer, 
but rather the creation of a beneficial interest. The same applies where a purported 
transfer of the full, legal title falls short of the requirements for a legal assignment. As 
a result, a beneficial interest may arise in certain circumstances, not by virtue of an 
equitable assignment, but rather through the creation of a trust.113 Where, however, 
legal and beneficial ownership are already vested in different persons, such an 
equitable interest is transferred from one person to another by an equitable 
assignment. If, on the other hand, a beneficiary of a trust declares that he in turn 
holds for another beneficiary, the result is the creation of a sub-trust, not an 
assignment.114 The difference, broadly speaking, is between the creation of vertical 
structures of holding (trusts) and horizontal transfers (assignment). The creation of a 
trust and the assignment of a chose in action can of course not always be neatly 
separated. Depending on the situation, a transfer of property may precede the 
declaration of a trust. 
8 3 2 6 Equity and trusts 
A comparative study of the structure of English law will inevitably lead to the 
discovery of a legal concept that is foreign to both South African law and continental 
legal systems, namely that of equity.115 A comprehensive analysis of equity and its 
nature is beyond the scope of this thesis, but a brief sketch is required to understand 
the structure of shareholding in English law. 
 English law is premised on the dualistic model of law and equity. This division is 
particularly prominent in the area of property law. The courts of equity developed to 
                                            
112
 Liew Guest on Assignment 39-40 [1-70], who however recognises that the two concepts overlap 
significantly – see 58-60; J Edelman & S Elliot “Two Conceptions of Equitable Assignment” (2013) 
<http://www.supremecourt.wa.gov.au/_files/Two_Conceptions_Equitable_Assignment_%20EdelmanJ.
pd> (accessed 01-03-2018).  
113
 See Liew Guest on Assignment 83 [3-26]. 
114
 See below, 10 5 Equity and trusts. 
115
 For a brief overview of law and equity see A Hudson Understanding Equity and Trusts 3 ed (2008) 
1-3 and Micheler Property in Securities 26-29.  
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provide exceptions to the rigid application of the law by the courts at common law.116 
The courts of equity developed out of petitions brought to the Chancery, initially a 
department of state, in cases where the parties felt that justice had not been done by 
the common law courts.117 The precedent developed by the courts at common law 
became known as “law”, whilst the body of case law and rules of procedure 
formulated by the equity courts became known as “equity”. As a result, the judiciary 
and the administration of justice stood on two legs: law and equity. Although the two 
branches of the judiciary have long merged,118 the difference between law and equity 
continues to shape the structure of English law. The distinction between law and 
equity is not one based along the lines of substantive private law, but rather 
originates out of case law developed either by the courts of law or equity.119 Hence, 
English property law knows two concepts of ownership – legal and equitable or 
beneficial ownership.120  Legal title is ordinarily said to pass from one person to 
another when all the requirements set by the law have been met. Equitable title, on 
the other hand, passes when a transfer falls short of the legal requirements, but it is 
just, as between the parties to recognise that a transfer has taken place. This is, 
stated in broad terms, the basic operation of equity. Although the courts at equity 
developed an array of claims, remedies and legal rules not available at common law, 
one of the most important equitable concepts is the construct of trusts.121 The trust 
has historically played a significant role in structuring the holding of shares and 
continues to influence the re-imagination of legal structures pursuant to the significant 
changes that have taken place in the area of securities law in the last decades. 
Trust law, a notion created by the equity courts, is the mechanism used by the law 
to confer beneficial ownership. The trust is a legal construct in terms of which a 
person (the trustee) is obliged to deal with property (real or personal), as owner,122 in 
such a manner that it benefits another person or persons (the beneficiaries)123 or 
                                            
116
 Hudson Understanding Equity & Trusts 2; also see Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v 
Islington LBC [1996] AC 669 (HL) 692B.  
117
 A Hudson Equity and Trusts 8 ed (2015) 18; Hudson Understanding Equity & Trusts 2; Micheler 
Property in Securities 26-27. For a brief history of the Court of Chancery see Pettit Equity 2-8; Hudson 
Equity and Trusts 16-18. 
118
 The courts were merged by the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875. On the fusion see Pettit Equity 
8-12. 
119
 Micheler Property in Securities 27. 
120
 28-29. 
121
 Hudson Equity & Trusts 45. 
122
 A trustee can either be legal or beneficial owner (in the case of a sub-trust). See Pettit Equity 30 n 
2. 
123
 Ayerst (Inspector of Taxes) v C&K (Construction) Ltd [1976] AC 167 at 177G-H. 
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fulfils another purpose as determined.124 Provided that the requirements for a trust 
are met, the legal owner (in the case of shares the member) will act as a trustee for 
the beneficial owner, who becomes the beneficiary of the trust. The trustee may 
simultaneously be a beneficiary of the trust.125 The trustee is not entitled to enjoy the 
fruits of the shares or dispose of them for his own benefit.126 Dividends and other 
profits are collected by the trustee on behalf of the beneficial owner. Hudson 
describes the trust as a construct “under which a beneficiary is able to assert 
equitable rights to particular property held by a trustee and thus control the way in 
which the trustee of that property is entitled to deal with it”.127 A trust is created over 
“property” - contractual rights, licences, intangible property, such as copyright as well 
as equitable proprietary interests can all be property for purposes of a trust.128 It is 
said that for a valid trust to be created, the three certainties of words (intention), 
subject matter (trust property) and object (beneficiary) have to be present.129  
A trust may be express, meaning that it is deliberately established by the trustee 
for beneficiaries that are clearly identifiable.130 In addition, the trust property must be 
sufficiently identifiable.131 In the context of shares an express trust can serve many 
purposes: It allows control and management to be divorced from the benefits that 
flow from owning certain property; the benefits of shareholding may be split amongst 
several beneficiaries; and the identity of the beneficial owner may be obscured. 
Apart from the express trust, a trust can also arise by operation of law. Such a 
trust is known as a constructive trust. Instead of being established through express 
agreement between the parties, a constructive trust is inferred by the courts from the 
conduct of the parties.132 Although a constructive trust cannot be defined with any 
precision, the general tenor is that a constructive trust arises where a person holds 
property in such a way that it would be unconscionable or contrary to equity for him to 
                                            
124
 This may for example be a charitable purpose. See the definition in Pettit Equity 30. 
125
 Provided that he is not the only trustee; Pettit Equity 30. 
126
 Ayerst (Inspector of Taxes) v C&K (Construction) Ltd [1976] AC 167 at 177G-H. 
127
 Hudson Equity & Trusts 12. 
128
 See for example Swift v Dairywise Farms Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 1177 at 1184, in which a milk quota 
was held to be property under a trust; Lord Strathcona Steamship Co v Dominion Coal Co Ltd [1926] 
AC 108 at 124 and Don King Productions, Inc v Frank Warren [1998] RPC 817 at 825, where the court 
confirmed that a contract could be property held on trust. 
129
 Knight v Knight (1849) Beav 148, 49 ER 58 at 63. For further detail on these certainties see Pettit 
Equity 47-57. 
130
 See Hudson Equity & Trusts 49 and the cases cited there.  
131
 49 and the cases cited there. 
132
 50. 
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deny that another person holds a beneficial interest in the same property.133 English 
law concerns itself with institutional constructive trusts, in terms of which a court 
recognises and declares that the conduct of the parties and the surrounding 
circumstances are such that a trust has arisen on the date of such conduct i.e. the 
declaration of the court has retrospective effect.134  
There is some debate in English law as to the circumstances under which a 
constructive trust can arise in the context of a sale. 135 It seems clear that a trust can 
arise where a contract of sale is specifically enforceable.136 Specific performance is 
not the default remedy in English contract law.137 It is subject to the discretion of the 
courts, but is granted in accordance with well-established requirements. 138  First, 
there must be an enforceable contract – being a valid as well as an unconditional 
contract.139 Second, the claimant must have either already performed or be ready 
and able to perform. Third, the subject matter of the contract (and the resulting 
constructive trust) must be specific or ascertained.140 This requirement reflects the 
importance of certainty of subject matter that applies to trusts in general.141 Last, the 
default remedy of damages is insufficient or inadequate. 142  Where specific 
performance is available, a constructive trust is said to arise at the moment of 
                                            
133
 See for example James v Williams [2000] Ch 1 at 10: “as a general rules, a constructive trust 
attaches by law to property which is held by a person in circumstances where it would be inequitable 
to allow him to assert full beneficial ownership of the property”. Similar, Paragon Finance plc v DB 
Thakerar and Co [1999] 1 All ER 400; In Re Montagu’s Settlement Trusts, Duke of Manchester v 
National Westminster Bank Ltd [1987] Ch 264 at 277; Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v 
Islington LBC [1996] A.C 669 at 705. On the central idea of “unconscionableness” in the context of 
constructive trusts also see Hudson Equity & Trusts 95-107. Micheler Property in Securities at 34 
however points out that “[t]he original basis of the enforcement, that of unconscionable conduct by the 
second buyer, has long since given way to the rule that everybody except the buyer of the legal estate 
without notice is bound”.  
134
 See Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] A.C 669 at 714G-H. The 
alternative is a remedial constructive trust, which is popular in the US and is not automatically 
retrospective; see Clements & Abass Equity and Trusts 476-480; Pettit Equity 69-70. 
135
 For more detail see Micheler Property in Securities 37-57. 
136
 Oughtred v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1960] AC 206 at 240; J Sainsbury Plc v O’Connor 
(Inspector of Taxes) [1991] 1 WLR 963 (CA) at 972; Wood Preservation Ltd v Prior (Inspector of 
Taxes) [1969] 1 WLR 1077 at 1094. 
137
 See E Fry & GR Northcote A Treatise on the Specific Performance of Contracts 6 ed (1921) 21. 
138
 Micheler Property in Securities 38-48 examines the requirements for an order of specific 
performance to be granted in more detail. 
139
 But see Wood Preservation Ltd v Prior (Inspector of Taxes) [1969] 1 WLR 1077 at 1094 where the 
court held, that a condition that solely benefits the purchaser and can therefore be waived by him at 
any time before its fulfilment does not prevent a claim for specific performance by the purchaser. In 
these cases, a constructive trust therefore arises upon conclusion of the contract and not only upon 
fulfilment of the condition. 
140
 Also see M Chen-Wishart “Specific Performance and Injunction” in HG Beale (ed) Chitty on 
Contracts I 32 ed (2015) 1961 1970 [27-014]. 
141
 See the three certainties above. 
142
 Chen-Wishart “Specific Performance” in Chitty on Contracts 1963-1969 [27-005]-[27-012]. 
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conclusion of the contract, otherwise from the moment the contract becomes 
specifically enforceable. A contract for shares, in particular, may be specifically 
enforceable – a purchaser may therefore compel the seller of the shares to furnish 
him with the documents of transfer and undertake all steps necessary to effect 
registration.143 In the case of listed shares, identical shares are readily available in 
the market and damages will therefore be a sufficient remedy, barring, in most cases, 
a claim for specific performance.144  
Secondly, a constructive trust is said to arise where a donor or seller of shares has 
done everything in his power to divest himself of the shares.145  
A third context which may lead to the creation of a constructive trust, 
independently of a claim for specific performance, is where the subject matter of the 
trust is appropriated to the contract.146 The trust therefore arises as soon as the 
subject matter of the contract has been identified. In the context of certificated 
shares, the shares are usually specified by number and quantity when the instrument 
of transfer is handed to the purchaser.147 Other commentators argue that in addition 
to the specification of the subject matter of the contract, the purchase price must also 
have been paid for a constructive trust to arise.148  
In the context of certificated shares, a constructive trust could arise where a 
purchaser of shares failed to have her name inserted on the register. A constructive 
trust could also arise where there was a delay between the sale of shares and the 
insertion of the transferee’s name on the register of members. This delay was 
frequently substantial before the introduction of electronic settlement systems.149 
                                            
143
 Fry & Northcote Specific Performance of Contracts 678 [1497]. 
144
 See for example Cud v Rutter (1719) 24 ER 521; Fry & Northcote Specific Performance 33-34 [73]; 
Micheler Property in Securities 45. If the contract is, however, for the particular shares held by the 
seller and not any shares of the same kind, specific performance is considered to be available; see In 
Re A Debtor [1943] Ch 213; Micheler Property in Securities 46-47. 
145
 See In Re Rose, Midland Bank Executor and Trustee Company Limited v Rose [1949] Ch 78; In Re 
Rose, Rose v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1952] Ch 499 and the more recent case of Pennington 
v Waine [2002] 2 BCLC 448 in relation to a donation of shares; Micheler Property in Securities 52-57; 
Davies & Worthington Modern Company Law 993 [27-9]; Pennington Company Law 354-355, 402-
404. This requirement is discussed in more detail below, 8 3 2 7 Equitable assignment. 
146
 See Pennington Company Law 374-375. Micheler Property in Securities 48-52 provides a brief 
summary of the debate.  
147
 Micheler Property in Securities 49. 
148
 Micheler Property in Securities 50-52. S Worthington “Proprietary Remedies: The Nexus between 
Specific Performance and Constructive Trusts” (1996) 11 J Con L 1 7, on the other hand, finds that no 
constructive trust can arise if a contract is not specifically enforceable. 
149
 In terms of the Companies Act 2006 s 554 and s 771, the company has up to 2 months to effect the 
registration.  
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The division of full ownership into legal and beneficial ownership takes place when 
the trust is created.150 The trust construct allows two or more people to hold rights in 
respect of the same item of property at the same time.151 Whereas legal ownership is 
fairly straightforward, the gist of beneficial ownership is not quite as easy to pinpoint 
with precision. Pettit formulates the conundrum succinctly:  
“It may seem strange, although it is not untypical of English law, that although the trust is 
so highly developed an institution, it is impossible to say with assurance what is the juristic 
nature of the interest of a cestui que trust.”152 
It is frequently said that a trust vests proprietary rights in the beneficiary against 
the trust itself as well as personal rights against the trustee for the proper 
administration of the trust.153 Maitland, however, was adamant, that the beneficial 
interest in a trust is a right in personam.154 He describes the rights of a trust as “the 
benefit of an obligation”,155 albeit ones that have “come to look so very like real 
proprietary rights”.156  Maitland examines beneficial interests from an internal and 
external perspective. Internally (as regards their duration, transmission and 
alienation), he describes them as analogous to rights in land or goods.157 Beneficial 
interests are rights in “the use” of land, a thing or other.158 “We might say that ‘the 
use’ is turned into an incorporeal thing … and in this incorporeal thing you may have 
all those rights … which you could have in a real tangible piece of land [or in movable 
goods or obligations held in trust].”159 Externally, the question is against whom the 
rights in a trust can be enforced. The beneficial interests in a trust can be enforced 
against anyone, except a bona fide purchaser for value, who did not have notice of 
the trust, either actual or constructive.160 Maitland therefore concludes that equitable 
interests in a trust are personal rights, but also recognises the tension between 
purely personal and proprietary interests when writing “though we must not call it a 
true dominium rei, [the right of the beneficiary] is far more than the mere benefit of a 
                                            
150
 Hudson Equity & Trusts 15, 17; Ayerst (Inspector of Taxes) v C&K (Construction) Ltd [1976] AC 
167 at 177G-H. 
 
152
 Pettit Equity 83. 
153
 Hudson Equity & Trusts 16. 
154
 See FW Maitland Equity – A Couse of Lectures 2 ed (1936) (revised by J Brunyate) 106-136. 
155
 112. 
156
 112. 
157
 112. 
158
 FW Maitland Selected Essays (1936) (edited by HD Hazeltine, G Lapsley & PH Winfield) 164. 
159
 164-165. 
160
 Pilcher v Rawlins (1872) LR 7 Ch App 259. 
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promise”. 161  A similar opinion was asserted by Langdell, who recognises that a 
beneficial interest is applied analogous to rights in rem, but remains personal, for “the 
moment it reaches a purchaser for value and without notice, equity stops short: for 
otherwise it would convert the personal obligation into a real obligation or into 
ownership”.162 At the same time, Langdell illustrates that the equitable interest in 
relation to the trust property as its subject must be conceptually separated from the 
equitable interest as a subject in itself. While an equitable interest in trust property 
confers only rights in personam, the equitable interest itself is a res that can be 
owned and that creates rights in rem between the beneficiary and the rest of the 
world, but not between the beneficiary and the trustee.163 Scott, however, reasons 
that the beneficiary of a trust does have rights in rem – not only in the equitable 
obligation itself, but also in the trust property.164 The controversial question, therefore, 
is whether there is a tangible link between the beneficiary and the trust property. He 
views the doctrine of the bona fide purchaser, construed by Maitland and Langdell, 
amongst others, as the main obstacle against the recognition of rights in rem, as a 
mere limitation to the rights of a property owner.165 The argument in favour of rights in 
rem receives support from case law. In Tinsley v Milligan,166 the court found that the 
property, whether consisting of a legal or an equitable interest, confers a right in rem 
and not only a right in personam.167 In Baker v Archer-Shee,168 the court found that 
“the respondent’s wife was sole beneficial owner of the interest and dividends of all 
the securities, stocks and shares forming part of the trust fund”, 169  which was 
interpreted by the court in Archer-Shee v Garland170 to mean a “property interest in 
the income arising from the securities, stocks and shares”.171 Part of the problem is 
without doubt the tension between law and equity. Considerably more significant, 
                                            
161
 Maitland Selected Essays 174. 
162
 CC Langdell A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction 2 ed (1908) 6. Langdell, as an American jurist, is 
cited here for the congruence with Maitland’s perspective. 
163
 See especially 5, n 1 and 6, n 1. This corresponds to the internal perspective of Maitland. 
164
 AW Scott “The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust” (1917) 17 Columbia LR 269 274-275. 
165
 Scott (1917) Columbia LR 280; see especially the quote from CA Huston The Enforcement of 
Decrees in Equity (1915) 127-128: “The basis of the doctrine of bona fide purchaser is not a principle 
confined to its recognition in court of equity, and availing to cut off equitable titles only, but one which 
runs through the whole fabric of modern law: - an effort to ensure security in commercial transactions 
and acquisitions by imposing certain responsibilities on owners of property with respect to that 
property as a price of legal protection to their interests in it”.  
166
 [1994] 1 AC 340. 
167
 371. 
168
 [1927] AC 844. 
169
 870 (own emphasis). 
170
 [1931] AC 212. 
171
 222 (own emphasis). 
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however, is the fact that English law neither defines property in the same fashion as 
civilian legal systems do, nor does it attach the same meaning and significance to the 
distinction between rights in rem and in personam.172 In effect, whether a right is 
classified as in rem or in personam depends to a large degree on the facts of a 
specific case.173 The dispute may in fact largely be one revolving around terminology 
– all authors, including Maitland and Langdell, seem to agree on the content of the 
beneficiary’s rights in the trust property. Much can in fact be said for the view that 
equitable rights are more than rights in personam, but less than rights in rem - in fact, 
being rights sui generis.174  
8 3 2 7 Equitable assignment 
Equitable assignment can play a role in transferring both legal and equitable choses 
in action. Equitable assignments of legal choses, such as shares, originally 
developed to counter the non-assignability of choses in action at law.175 Today, legal 
choses can be assigned in law; 176 where a statutory assignment of shares fails there 
is a possibility that a valid equitable assignment took place. An equitable assignment 
takes effect in equity, not in law. It cannot bring about the transfer of legal ownership. 
Whether this “assignment” is correctly construed as an equitable assignment or as 
the creation of a trust depends on the specific context.177 
Equitable choses, such as beneficial interests in shares, can likewise be the 
subject of both a statutory and an equitable assignment. A beneficiary of a trust can 
therefore assign her equitable interest to another or can approximate the effects of an 
assignment by declaring to hold on trust for another. To achieve the same result, a 
beneficiary can also request a trustee to hold for a third party instead of him. 
                                            
172
 See J Garton, G Moffat, G Bean & R Probert Moffat’s Trust Law: Text and Materials 6 ed (2015) 
273, who describe the classification as “an inadequate straightjacket”. 
173
 The type of trust may for example be a decisive factor. To determine the nature of a beneficiary’s 
interest in the trust property of a discretionary trust in which the trustees may have wide powers to 
distribute or apply trust proceeds and in which the class of beneficiaries may not be identifiable in a 
conclusive fashion, see the discussion in Garton et al Moffat’s Trust Law 273-276. On the flexible 
terms of a trust and the implications thereof, see Garton et al Moffat’s Trust Law 276-278. The nature 
of the claim will also determine its classification, see for example Webb v Webb [1994] QB 696; ECJ, 
17.05.1994 – C-294/92. 
174
 Pettit Equity 84; Garton et al Moffat’s Trust Law 273. 
175
 See above, 8 3 2 2 Choses in action, n 72. Also see Liew Guest on Assignment 67-70, who points 
out that the assignability of equitable and legal choses in equity developed differently. 
176
 On statutory assignments, see above, 8 3 2 4 Novation and assignment. 
177
 See Liew Guest on Assignment 39-41. 
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An equitable assignment is less formal than a statutory assignment and it should 
therefore not be allowed to sidestep a legal assignment through an equitable 
assignment.178 Notice to the debtor is not required.179 An equitable assignment of an 
equitable chose must, however, be effected in writing.180 The requirement of writing 
neither extends to an equitable assignment of a legal chose, nor to a valid declaration 
of trust.181  
Another requirement of a valid equitable assignment is said to be that “the 
assignor must have done everything necessary according to the nature of the chose 
in question to transfer title to the assignee”.182 A number of cases, most prominently 
In Re Fry, Chase National Executors and Trustees Corporation v Fry,183 In Re Rose, 
Midland Bank Executor and Trustee Company Limited v Rose184 and In Re Rose, 
Rose v Inland Revenue Commissioners185 illustrate how difficult it is to determine the 
exact meaning of that requirement. Whereas the court in Re Fry formulated a strict 
test, in terms of which the transferor (a deceased testator in this case), must have 
“done everything that was required to be done by him at the time of his death”, the 
court in Re Rose (1949) and Re Rose (1952) required only execution and delivery of 
the documents of transfer.186 Although the rule developed in relation to donations, 
Micheler finds that it can be applied by analogy to sales transactions.187 
8 3 3 Transfer and holding in US law 
8 3 3 1 General remarks 
Shares are choses in action. This statement is not surprising considering their 
common law classification and is particularly evident from the older cases decided 
                                            
178
 Smith & Leslie Assignment 252 [11.88]. 
179
 See Liew Guest on Assignment 98 n 270 and the cases cited there. 
180
 Law of Property Act 1925 s 53(1)(c). 
181
 Liew Guest on Assignment 83-84. 
182
 Smith & Leslie Assignment 252 and the cases cited in n 166 and 167. Also see the cases cited 
above at 8 3 2 6 Equity and trusts, n 145. If this requirement is satisfied, a constructive trust arises. 
183
 [1946] Ch 312. 
184
 [1949] Ch 78. 
185
 [1952] Ch 499. 
186
 For more detail on the requirement and the surrounding debate see Micheler Property in Securities 
52-57; Smith & Leslie Assignment 251-264. 
187
 Micheler Property in Securities 53. 
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before the promulgation of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act in 1910.188 The share itself 
was considered to be the chose and the certificate was merely the evidence of it.189  
8 3 3 2 Negotiation, assignment and the transfer of shares 
The early history of US shares aptly illustrates that share certificates, despite being 
virtually identical to their English counterparts in form and function, were 
conceptualised to play a more significant role from the outset. Even before the 
promulgation of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, shares were frequently described by 
courts and commentators alike as quasi-negotiables. In reality, the situation was 
summed up by Justice Davies in the 1870 case of Bank v Lanier:190 “Although neither 
in form or character negotiable paper, they approximate to it as nearly as 
practicable”.191 In a 1903 treatise on the law of negotiable instruments, Daniel writes 
that “[t]he phrase quasi-negotiable has been termed an unhappy one; … [b]ut still it 
describes better than any other short-hand expression the nature of those 
instruments which, while not negotiable in the sense of the law merchant, are so 
framed and so dealt with, as frequently to convey as good a title to the transferee as 
if they were negotiable”. 192  True negotiability status was only conferred by the 
promulgation of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act. 193  At the same time it was still 
recognised that share certificates are in their essence merely evidence of choses in 
action.194 
The Uniform Stock Transfer Act sought especially to standardise the modes of 
transferring shares. In doing so, it was said to have simply confirmed the common 
law position.195 Shares were transferrable by delivery of the share certificate together 
with a written record of the transfer. This written record could be in the form of an 
endorsement in blank or to a specific person made on the back of the certificate, or it 
                                            
188
 See for example Allen v Pegram 16 Iowa 163 173; Slaymaker v Bank of Gettysburg 10 Pa. 373 
(1849) 374; Leyson v Davis 17 Mont. 220 (1895); First National Bank of Richmond v Holland 99 Va. 
495 (1901). 
189
 Slaymaker v Bank of Gettysburg 10 Pa. 373 (1849) 374; Winslow v Fletcher 53 Conn. 390 (1886) 
253; First National Bank of Richmond v Holland 99 Va. 495 (1901) 504. 
190
 78 U.S. 369 (1870). 
191
 377. 
192
 Daniel Negotiable Instruments 26 § 44 (emphasis in original). 
193
 CG Ehrle “The Uniform Stock Transfer Act” (1921) 5 Marquette LR 91 94; JS Rogers “Negotiability, 
Property, and Identity” (1991) 12 Cardozo LR 471 478. 
194
 Blodgett v Silberman 277 U.S. 1 (1928) 14-15. It is useful to remember the words of WS 
Holdsworth “The Origins and Early History of Negotiable Instruments, Part 1” (1915) 31 LQR 12 13 
“Even in modern times the legal consequences of negotiability are exceptions to the ordinary rules of 
law.” 
195
 Davis Laundry & Cleaning Co v Whitmore 92 Ohio St. 44 (1915) 54; Ehrle (1921) Marquette LR 96. 
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could be a separate written assignment. 196  The old common law concept of 
assignment was therefore retained. The change from the common law was that the 
default method was no longer the delivery of the “proper instrument of transfer”, as it 
was known in English law, but rather the delivery of the share certificate. The 
implications, it was argued, “was that the indicia of stock ownership now centered in 
the stock certificates”.197 The change reflected a practice that had been recognised 
by the courts for decades. In First National Bank of Richmond v Holland, the court 
clearly stated that “[t]he delivery therefore of a certificate of stock … with intent to 
transfer title … is effectual as an equitable assignment”.198  
The other significant change was the point in time at which legal title was said to 
vest. Prior to the commencement of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, legal title was 
said to pass following registration on the books of the issuer.199 This followed the cue 
of English law. The Act, however, was said to make “legal title to the shares 
inseparable from legal title to the certificate evidencing the shares”.200 Between the 
parties to the transfer, equitable title thus transferred once the parties reached 
agreement to that effect and intended the transfer to take place. Legal title however 
passed upon delivery of either the endorsed certificate or another agreement in 
writing.201 
Once the negotiability of shares and securities had been established by the 
Uniform Stock Transfer Act, the concept took hold and was replicated in the Uniform 
Commercial Code.202 Article 8 of the UCC established a separate negotiability regime 
                                            
196
 Uniform Stock Transfer Act 1910 s 1. 
197
 Reynolds v Reynolds 54 Cal. 2d 669 (1960) 676. 
198
 Winslow v Fletcher 53 Conn. 390 (1886) 398; First National Bank of Richmond v Holland 99 Va. 
495 (1901) 502. Also see Daniel Negotiable Instruments 27 § 46: “As between transferrer and 
transferee of a stock certificate, it is very well settled that, in the absence of statutory restrictions, the 
beneficial interest passes by assignment, and delivery of the certificate …”.  
199
 First National Bank of Richmond v Holland 99 Va. 495 (1901) 502, 503. 
200
 HD Crotty “California and the Uniform Stock Transfer Act” (1931) 19 California LR 150 151. 
201
 Stuart v Sargent 283 Mass. 536 (1933) 541; Anonymous “Notes: Reconsideration of Share 
Certificate Negotiability” (1940) 7 Uni Chicago LR 497 499 n 7. Also see Uniform Stock Transfer Act s 
1(2). Also see the later case of In the Matter of the Succession of Dunham 408 So. 2d 888 (1981) 893, 
896-897: “The sale is considered to be perfect between the parties and the property is of right 
acquired to the purchaser with regard to the seller, as soon as there exists an agreement for the object 
and for the price thereof, although the object has not yet been delivered, nor the price paid.” 
202
 The original Article 8 dates back to 1952 with amendments being made 1962 and 1977. A complete 
overhaul of Article 8 resulted in the current 1994 version. 
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for equity securities, distinct from the ordinary provisions on negotiable 
instruments.203 
Negotiability is aimed at enhancing the ease of transfer of abstract rights in two 
ways. It is a concept that denotes that the rights embodied in specific instruments are 
transferable by mere delivery or indorsement and delivery. 204  The central notion 
underlying the negotiability idea is that the certificate is a complete reification of the 
rights – that is, the piece of paper is fused with the rights; it turns abstract rights into 
physical objects, or as Rogers aptly describes it, it is “[t]he idea that the paper on 
which words are written has significance beyond the words themselves”.205 Shares 
can therefore be transferred in the same manner as physical goods, namely by 
delivery. 206  Transferability of course, can be achieved in a myriad of ways, 
assignment being the typical mode in English law. However, reification means that a 
bill, note or certificate can be passed from one person to another by simply handing it 
over – more convenient and concrete than an assignment of abstract rights. 
Consequently, ownership is evidenced by possession of the certificate. 207  The 
second central premise of negotiability is that the transferee who obtains the rights in 
good faith does so without any defects in title.208 This is known in US law as the 
“holder in due course” doctrine.209 Ordinarily, a transfer of goods under the law of 
property does not protect the purchaser from adverse claims; the purchaser cannot 
receive a better title than the seller had. The same can be said of rights transferred 
by means of an assignment. The purchaser of a negotiable instrument can, however, 
acquire it without having to enquire about its previous holders and, provided he acts 
in good faith, is not affected by them. 
The nature of negotiable instruments is quite complex – in fact, negotiable 
instruments are said to have dual characteristics: They are both chattels (movable 
                                            
203
 Negotiable instruments are the subject of UCC Articles 3 and 4. Securities were however clearly 
described as negotiable instruments – see for example UCC § 8-105(1) in the 1972 Official Text with 
Comments. 
204
 Daniel Negotiable Instruments 1 § 1; J McLoughlin Introduction to Negotiable Instruments 
(1975) 28. 
205
 JS Rogers The End of Negotiable Instruments: Bringing Payment Systems Law out of the Past 
(2012) 64. 
206
 JS Rogers “An Essay on Horseless Carriages and Paperless Negotiable Instruments: Some 
Lessons from the Article 8 Revision” (1995) 31 Idaho LR 689 693. 
207
 The certificate is prima facie proof of ownership. On the other hand, the registered holder has a 
direct relationship with the issuer by virtue of being recorded on the register maintained by the issuer. 
208
 Daniel Negotiable Instruments 2 § 1; McLoughlin Introduction to Negotiable Instruments 28. 
209
 See UCC Articles 3 and 4. 
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property) and choses in action.210 The physical document that “reifies” the rights is a 
chattel and the rights themselves are choses in action. As choses in action, shares 
do not have to be negotiated – they can also be transferred from one person to 
another by assignment. Not only does the mode of transfer under an assignment 
differ, but also, the transferee will not be protected from adverse claims. If negotiated, 
the mode of transfer is determined by the type of negotiable instrument: bearer 
instruments are transferred by delivery alone, while negotiable instruments payable 
to order are transferable by indorsement in addition to delivery.211  
8 3 3 3 The change in registration 
Most company law statutes retained the provision that, as against the company, 
only the registered owner is entitled to receive benefits. Registration remains a 
convenient determinant of entitlement. Nevertheless, a change in registration can no 
longer be equated to a passing of legal title.212 At most, it may serve as rebuttable 
evidence of ownership, and to establish a structure of holding shares.213  
8 3 3 4 Deposit and bailment 
Functionally, the ability to exercise and enforce the rights that flow from shares and 
the right to benefit from them are separated in the same way as in English law – the 
dividing line is drawn by the entry on the register. English law has traditionally 
managed this discrepancy by making use of the trust concept. The fusion of the 
rights with the paper, inherent in negotiable instruments, has the effect that the 
symbol can be used as if it is the real thing; it has a physical existence. As a 
consequence, another method became available following the classification of shares 
as negotiable instruments: bailment or deposit.  
The safe custody of movable things was already known in Roman law. Schulz 
describes contracts of depositum as “among the earliest legal institutions in all 
systems”.214 A deposit was a contract in terms of which one person (the depositor) 
handed over a movable thing to another person (the depositee) for safekeeping.215 
The contract was strictly gratuitous – the depositee was therefore not remunerated 
                                            
210
 See Z Chafee, Jr “Rights in Overdue Paper” (1918) 31 Harvard LR 1104 1109. 
211
 In general, see UCC Article 3. 
212
 See above, 8 3 3 2 Negotiation, assignment and the transfer of shares. 
213
 See above, 8 2 1 The functions of registration. 
214
 F Schulz Classical Roman Law (1951) 518. 
215
 Papinianus D.16.3.24. 
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for his services.216 The depositee did not acquire ownership or possession of the 
deposited thing, only mere detentio.217 He was not permitted to use the thing218 and 
had to return the thing on demand219 and in the same condition as received, 220 
excusing reasonable wear and tear.221 In performance of this duty of safekeeping, the 
depositee had to act in good faith and was generally considered to be liable only for 
dolus.222 Return of the thing deposited as well as damages for wrongdoing could be 
claimed by the depositor with the actio depositi, 223  whereas the depositee had 
available the actio depositi contraria to recover any expenses incurred.224 Over time, 
the claim was transformed from a delictual to a contractual one.225 The essence of an 
ordinary deposit was therefore that the exact same thing was restored to the 
depositor. The depositee was not allowed to use the thing and merely restore a thing 
of the same kind. 
The default position was challenged by the practice of depositing money and other 
fungible things. The existence and treatment of what later became known as 
depositum irregulare, is marred by controversy. Leading authors agree that the most 
likely construction under classical Roman law was as follows: A deposit of money 
only qualified as such if the same coins were eventually returned.226 If the recipient 
was permitted to use the money and return only an equivalent, he acquired 
ownership and the contract was one of mutuum rather than depositum. 227  The 
                                            
216
 If remuneration was received by the depositee, it was considered a contract of hire (locatio 
conductio). See Ulpianus D.16.3.1.8; P du Plessis Borkowski’s Textbook on Roman Law 5 ed (2015) 
308. The depositor however had to reimburse the depositee for any expenses incurred. 
217
 Florentinus D.16.3.17.1; Schulz Roman Law 517; M Kaser Das Römische Privatrecht I (1971) § 
126 I 3; Du Plessis Textbook on Roman Law 308. 
218
 Gaius Institutiones 3, 196; Kaser Das Römische Privatrecht I § 126 I 3. 
219
 Papinianus D.16.3.24; Gaius D.44.7.1.5. 
220
 Ulpianus D.16.3.1.16. 
221
 Du Plessis Textbook on Roman Law 308. 
222
 See Ulpianus D.16.3.1; Ulpianus D.16.3.1.23 (on good faith); Ulpianus D.16.3.1.8; Gaius 
D.44.7.1.5 (on dolus and bad faith). The parties could agree to a stricter standard, but they could not 
agree to exclude liability based on fraud; see Du Plessis Textbook on Roman Law 308. 
223
 On the development of the actio depositi, see Kaser Das Römische Privatrecht I § 126 I 1 and the 
sources cited there; Schulz Roman Law 518; Du Plessis Textbook on Roman Law 309. For a contract 
of depositum, a formula in law (in ius concepta) and in fact (in factum) was permitted; see Gaius 
Institutiones 4, 47; P Birks & E Descheemaeker (ed) The Roman Law of Obligations (2014) 136, 142-
143; R Zimmermann The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1996) 206 
n 140. 
224
 Modestinus D.16.3.23; Schulz Roman Law 518; Du Plessis Textbook on Roman Law 309. 
225
 Kaser Das Römische Privatrecht I § 126 I 1. 
226
 Schulz Roman Law 519; Birks & Descheemaeker Roman Law of Obligations 144. 
227
 Schulz Roman Law 520; Birks & Descheemaeker Roman Law of Obligations 144; Kaser Das 
Römische Privatrecht I § 126 II. Somewhat ambiguous are the passages from Papinianus D.16.3.24. 
as well as Paulus D.16.3.26.1. On the moment at which a contract of mutuum comes into existence, 
see the contradicting passages in Ulpianus D.12.1.9.9 and Ulpianus D.12.1.10. For a critical overview 
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classification as a contract of mutuum had certain disadvantages. Under a contract of 
mutuum things in kind could be restored, but any agreement on interest was 
unenforceable, except if concluded separately by stipulatio.228 Conceptualising such 
a transaction as depositum had the advantage that the action would be based on 
bona fides and interest agreed to informally could be claimed.229 Such a construction, 
particularly in the context of deposit banking, is believed to have originated in 
Hellenistic law, being subsequently recognised by Roman jurists of the late classical 
period.230 The depositum irregulare is therefore generally considered to be a later 
development in terms of which, along with the intention that the depositee may use 
the thing deposited, ownership passed to him.  
To conclude the brief excursion into the Roman law of deposit, it is remarkable, 
that even in Roman law, provision was made for tiered deposits: 
“If he with whom you deposit property deposits it with someone else and that person is 
guilty of any fraud on account of the fraud of him with whom the deposit was afterward 
made, he with whom you deposit is liable to the extent that he must assign his actions to 
you.”231 
Derived from Roman law, a relationship of deposit is known in English law as 
bailment.232 Bailment is considered to be a sui generis claim that may lie in property, 
contract, tort or unjustified enrichment.233 It does not have to be gratuitous and is 
frequently divided into five or six different classes, 234  including classes such as 
mandatum and commodatum, which were still considered to stand separate from 
depositum in Roman law. The goods to be delivered under bailment are personal 
chattels, being tangible movable objects; more specifically, the actual or constructive 
possession of the goods has to be delivered,235 and the goods have to be returned 
                                                                                                                                        
of the passages, see WM Gordon Roman Law, Scots Law and Legal History: Selected Essays (2007) 
61. 
228
 On the contract of mutuum see Schulz Roman Law 508-512. 
229
 Birks & Descheemaeker Roman Law of Obligations 144; Schulz Roman Law 520; Zimmermann 
Obligations 216-217. 
230
 Zimmermann Obligations 216-216; Kaser Das Römische Privatrecht I § 126 III. 
231
 Africanus D.16.3.16 translated by A Watson The Digest of Justinian II (1985). 
232
 For a definition of bailment see “Bailment” in JPH Mackay of Clashfern (ed) Halsbury’s Laws of 
England 3(1) 4 ed (2005 Reissue) 3 [1] as well as n 1. Halsbury, however, defines bailment as a kind 
of trust. 
233
 “Bailment” in Halsbury’s Laws of England 3(1) 4 ed (2005 Reissue) 3 [1], 74 [86]. 
234
 For the classes see Coggs v Bernard (1703) 2 Ld Raym 909 at 912-913; “Bailment” in Halsbury’s 
3(1) 6 at [2]. 
235
 “Bailment” in Halsbury’s 3(1) 3 at [1]. 
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“in either their original or altered form”.236 Bailment deviates from its Roman law 
origins in that it does not have to be gratuitous. Traditionally, bailment played a 
negligible role in English law in relation to shares. Only bearer shares were held by 
intermediaries through bailment.237 Registered shares, being incorporeal, were and 
are not susceptible to an analysis according to the rules on bailment. Where 
registered, certificated shares are held through a nominee, the relationship is rather 
analysed through trust law.  
The opposite is true when looking to US law. Negotiable instruments are 
susceptible to fraud and theft, necessitating some form of safekeeping. Courts have 
analysed these relationships in terms of the common law principles of bailment.238 In 
terms of the principles of bailment, a bailee owes a duty of care to the bailor in 
respect of the object of deposit. The bailee comes into possession of the object while 
the bailor retains ownership. 239  A separation between ownership and control is 
therefore achieved by splitting ownership and possession.  
In 1973 the Depository Trust Company (DTC) was established as a centralised 
institution for retaining possession of securities certificates, which enabled trading 
without the physical movement of certificates. This spawned the development of a 
number of intermediaries. Investors would deposit certificates with a broker or 
custodian bank, who would in turn deposit them with a participant of the DTC, who 
would deposit it with the DTC. These chains of deposit continued, until the 1994 
revision of Article 8 of the UCC, to be analysed in terms of the principles of the law of 
bailment. 240  In addition to bailment, the law of agency traditionally played an 
important role in delineating many of these relationships.241 
                                            
236
 [1] n 1. 
237
 Benjamin Interests in Securities 40 [2.36]. 
238
 See for example Pattison v Syracuse National Bank 80 N.Y. 82 (1880) and Ouderkirk v Central 
National Bank of Troy 119 N.Y. 263 (1890), which analyse the relationship between a depositor of 
certificates and a bank for purposes of safekeeping as bailment. Also see JS Rogers “Policy 
Perspectives on Revised U.C.C Article 8” (1996) 48 UCLA LR 1431 1505.  
239
 M Dubovec The Law of Securities, Commodities and Bank Accounts: The Rights of Account 
Holders (2014) 31-32. 
240
 See Shields v Newbridge Securities Inc No. 90-0985S; 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1706 (1992), which 
applies principles of bailment to a customer-broker/custodian relationship. Also see Rogers (1996) 
UCLA LR 1505; JL Schroeder “Is Article 8 Finally Ready This Time? The Radical Reform of Secured 
Lending on Wall Street” (1994) Columbia Bus LR 291 328-331. 
241
 According to CH Meyer The Law of Stockbrokers and Stock Exchanges, and of Commodity 
Brokers and Commodity Exchanges I (1931, supplemented 1936) as quoted by CW Mooney “Beyond 
Negotiability: A New Model for Transfer and Pledge of Interests in Securities Controlled by 
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8 3 4 Transfer and holding in German law 
8 3 4 1 General remarks 
Not being part of the common law family, concepts such as legal and beneficial title, 
equity and trusts will not be matched by equivalent institutions in German law. 
Nevertheless, many of the concepts and mechanisms that developed in response to 
commercial demands are remarkably similar to concepts of negotiability and deposit 
that dominated US law for decades. 
8 3 4 2 “Wertpapiere” and the materialisation of intangible rights 
The foundation of German capital markets is the so-called “Wertpapierrecht”. A 
“Wertpapier”, literally a paper of value, can be defined as any document that 
embodies a private law right in such a way that the enforcement of the right depends 
on the possession of the certificate. At the core of the concept lies the embodiment of 
private law rights in a certificate. These can be obligatory, proprietary or membership 
rights. A simple recording of rights in the certificate is not sufficient; essential is rather 
their embodiment or materialisation, aptly described in German as “Verkörperung”. 
The paper becomes the bearer of the rights and the operation of this area of the law 
is entirely aimed at determining the effects of this tie between right and paper.  
One facet of this relationship is worthy of advance mention: Two rights must be 
distinguished, the right embodied in the paper (“Recht aus dem Papier”) and the right 
to the paper (“Recht am Papier”).242 According to Hueck and Canaris, it is desirable 
that both rights accrue to the same person; an objective that can be achieved in more 
than one way.243 First, the owner of the paper can simultaneously receive the rights 
embodied in the paper.244 In this case the physical paper and therefore the rules 
relating to tangible things take precedence. Second, the holder of the rights 
embodied in the paper can simultaneously be regarded as the owner of the paper.245 
In this construction, the intangible rights are paramount, thereby necessitating a 
predominantly obligationary perspective.  
                                                                                                                                        
Intermediaries” (1990) 12 305 377 nn 259 and 260, a stockbroker holding as an intermediary for 
another is not a trustee, but rather an agent. 
242
 A Hueck & C-W Canaris Recht der Wertpapiere 12 ed (1986) § 1 I 4(a). 
243
 § 1 I 4(a). 
244
 § 1 I 4(a). 
245
 § 1 I 4(a). 
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The choice between the two constructions determines how shares and other 
“Wertpapiere” circulate. In the course of the 19th century a lively debate among legal 
academics ensued surrounding the transfer mechanisms of certain rights embodied 
in instruments of paper. During large parts of the 19th century, “Wertpapiere” were 
considered in legislation and by authors to be intangibles close in character to debt 
instruments. 246  The default position was therefore that securities should be 
transferred by cession. To circumvent the shortcomings of a cession, a number of 
alternative propositions were made: While some advocated in favour of novation, 
other authors resorted to characterising securities as a legal category of its own or 
argued that certain rules on cession could be contracted out of. 247 All these theories 
indicate that scholars identified not only the deficiencies of the law of cession, but 
also the complexity of the relationship between the rights and the paper.  
It was in this context that Friedrich Carl von Savigny grappled with the treatment 
and transfer of rights embodied in certificates as movable, tangible things although 
contractual claims should ordinarily be transferred by cession. 248  New modes of 
treating contractual claims, he found, may be recognised if the exigencies of the 
economy demand it.249 He identified two problematic aspects of a cession, namely 
the requirement of the debtor’s consent and secondly, that the transferee must, in 
theory, prove all the (possibly numerous) cessions that have taken place in the 
past.250 What differentiates such rights from otherwise similar claims, according to 
Savigny, is the presence of the certificate. The certificate is a corporeal thing, an 
object capable of being possessed and owned. 251  In embodying the claim in a 
certificate, the proprietary characteristics of the certificate can be extended to the 
otherwise incorporeal rights;252 the certificate becomes the carrier or bearer of the 
                                            
246
 See for example Preussisches Allgemeines Landrecht (the predecessor of the BGB), which states 
in part 1, title 2, s 12: “Die auf jeden Inhaber lautende Papiere, z. B. Banknoten, Pfandbriefe, Aktien u. 
s. w., sie mögen Zinsen tragen, oder nicht, werden, gleich andern Schuldinstrumenten, zum 
Kapitalsvermögen gerechnet” (own emphasis). Also see JC Bluntschli Deutsches Privatrecht II (1854) 
21. For a brief summary see Micheler Property in Securities 150-164. 
247
 For a brief summary of the diverging positions see Meppen Inhaberpapier 94-95; Micheler Property 
in Securities 157-160. 
248
 FC von Savigny Das Obliationenrecht als Theil des Heutigen Römischen Rechts II (1853). Note 
that Savigny’s discussion focuses specifically on “Papiere auf den Inhaber”. 
249
 94, 97. 
250
 98. 
251
 99. 
252
 Savigny Obligationenrecht terms this the embodiment or materialisation of an obligation, see 99, 
further 130 where Savigny describes “Verkörperung” as follows: “Die Anknüpfung des 
Forderungsrechts an das Verhältnis der Person zum Papier”. The concept of “Verkörperung” can be 
traced to other authors before Savigny; see W Zöllner “Zurückdrängung des Verkörperungselements 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
123 
 
right and the claim morphs into a tangible thing, if not for the eye, then for legal 
thinking.253  
The theory developed by Savigny became known as the “Verkörperungstheorie”. 
Lehmann describes the materialisation theory as convincing in its simplicity, at least 
at first glance.254 Tying the intangible rights to a tangible object provided a convenient 
way of explaining the already-existing, “thing-based” mechanisms of treating 
transactions in shares without having to modify the well-established boundaries 
between rights and things.255 In addition, the theory suggested a solution to the 
shortcomings of cession. Lastly, the reasons for tying the “rights embodied in the 
paper” to the “rights to the paper” lie in the structure of German private law, 
particularly the limitation of the law of things to tangible objects256 as well as the 
protection of bona fide purchasers in terms of the law of things, but not the law of 
obligations.257 It is not surprising therefore, that in time the proprietary notion gained 
widespread popularity.  
The “propertiness” of securities is a mere fiction. Such fictions dot the legal 
landscape but they have an uncanny habit of gaining considerable momentum.258 
Lehmann therefore warns that it is useful to recall that the rights and the certificate 
are not identical. 259  The embodiment (“Verkörperung”) and securitisation 
(“Verbriefung”) of rights (in the case of shares membership rights) has the effect of 
both reifying (“versachlichen”) and mobilising these rights. What it does not do, 
Canaris cautions, is to convert these personal rights into real rights.260 He argues that 
subjecting personal rights to the rules of property law is neither sufficient nor 
                                                                                                                                        
bei den Wertpapieren” in L Raiser & F Baur (eds) Funktionswandel der Privatrechtsinstitutionen: 
Festschrift für Ludwig Raiser zum 70. Geburtstag (1974) 249 n 1. 
253
 See C von Schwerin Recht der Wertpapiere (einschließlich Wechsel- und Scheckrecht) (1924) 3. 
This statement is criticised by Zöllner “Zurückdrängung” in Raiser & Baur Festschrift für Ludwig Raiser 
250 n 1 because it negates the importance of the intangible rights. 
254
 M Lehmann Finanzinstrumente: Vom Wertpapier- und Sachenrecht zum Recht der unkörperlichen 
Vermögensgegenstände (2009) 180. 
255
 180. For Lehmann’s proposition on how the boundary between rights and things can be redrawn, 
see below, 16 3 4 Matthias Lehmann. 
256
 171. 
257
 Micheler Property in Securities 149,156-157, points out that securities or “Wertpapiere” were only 
classified as tangible property once the legal framework of the numerous German nation states 
developed to accomodate good faith acquisition of tangible property.  
258
 See Lehmann Finanzinstrumente (2009) 182. 
259
 182. 
260
 C-W Canaris “Die verdinglichung obligatorischer Rechte” in HH Jakobs, B Knobbe-Keuk, E Picker 
& J Wilhelm (eds) Festschrift für Werner Flume zum 70. Geburtstag I (1978) 371 374-375. 
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necessary to transform the personal rights to real ones. 261  It is furthermore 
impossible to convert an intangible right to a tangible thing – the right is merely 
treated as if it is a thing.262 This construction subjects intangible rights to the regime 
of the law of things without changing the nature of such rights. 
In light of the above, it follows that Savigny’s idea, although hugely influential, has 
not been without its critics. Brunner questioned whether it is wise or even possible to 
describe rights as corporeal.263 He argues that all rights are essentially intangible and 
criticises Savigny’s theory as “legal imagery”.264 The value, he cautions, does not lie 
in the certificate, but in the rights. 265  Bluntschli similarly observed the tension 
between the tangible properties of the certificate and the intangible nature of rights, 
describing bearer securities as a “special type of obligation”, 266  intangible, but 
transferred by delivery, not assignment. 267  Hueck and Canaris caution that the 
connection between the rights and the paper should not be unduly exaggerated. 
Possession of the paper is only required for the enforcement of the rights, not 
necessarily for the creation and continued existence of the rights.268 This can best be 
illustrated in relation to shares. As recounted above, 269  the membership rights 
embodied in a share certificate are created upon entry in the register of companies 
and therefore exist independently of the certificate and continue to exist even if the 
certificate is lost or destroyed.270 In this instance they are incapable of being enforced 
until the certificate is declared invalid.271 The certificate is not decisive for the creation 
of rights that flow from shares – these rights come into existence independently of the 
                                            
261
 374-375. 
262
 Lehmann Finanzinstrumente 182. 
263
 H Brunner “Die Werthpapiere” in W Endemann (ed) Handbuch des Deutschen Handels-, See, und 
Wechselrechts II (1882) 140 142-143. 
264
 143. 
265
 144. 
266
 Bluntschli Deutsches Privatrecht II 22: “Sie bilden um der Form willen eine besondere Gattung von 
Obligationen mit einem eigenthümlichen Charakter.” 
267
 Bluntschli Deutsches Privatrecht II 21-27; Micheler Property in Securities 152. 
268
 Hueck & Canaris Wertpapiere § 1 I 5; Meppen Inhaberpapier 29. The distinction between three 
types of functions that may be performed by certificates was already drawn by Brunner. He 
distinguished between the role of the certificate 1. to create the rights; 2. to transfer the right; and 3. to 
enforce the right; see Brunner “Wertpapiere” in Handbuch des Deutschen Handelsrechts II. 
269
 See above, 6 3 The obligationary realms of shares and some conclusions, n 85. 
270
 This was also emphasised by Savigny Obligationenrecht 179, who writes that these certificates 
have no value in themselves. The continued existence of the obligation is therefore completely 
independent of the physical existence of the paper. He describes these papers as merely evidentiary 
certificates. 
271
 See Aktiengesetz § 72; BGB § 799 and 800. 
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certificate.272 The share certificate is therefore known as a declaratory certificate 
(“deklaratorisches Wertpapier”).273 From the declaratory character of the certificate in 
relation to the creation of membership rights does not follow, however, that the share 
certificate plays an insignificant role in the German legal discourse. It is the certificate 
that allows certain rules of the law of things to apply to “Wertpapiere”, particularly 
transfer- and bona fide acquisition rules.274 In relation to the creation and continued 
existence of the membership rights, a certificate is merely evidentiary in nature 
(“Beweisurkunde”). However, a certificate can, in addition, perform core private law 
functions, specifically in relation to a transfer and enforcement of a right.275 A transfer 
of possession is not a necessary concomitant requirement of the transfer of all types 
of “Wertpapiere”.276 In relation to bearer shares, a transfer of possession of the share 
certificate is, however, ordinarily required for a transfer of the share.277 The specific 
attribute of the general concept of “Wertpapiere” lies in the fact also captured by the 
definition, namely that the enforcement (and at times the transfer) of the right 
depends on the possession of the certificate.278 The well-known maxim of “Das Recht 
aus dem Papier folgt dem Recht am Papier” (the rights flowing from the paper follow 
the rights to the paper) is therefore not wholly accurate, or is at least too narrow.279  
The category of “Wertpapiere” is an impossibly broad notion and several 
classifications can be undertaken. “Wertpapiere” can be classified according to their 
economic function. “Effekten” or capital markets instruments would be one category 
under this classification, specifically being fungible instruments designed to be 
traded.280  
                                            
272
 In this context, also see Brunner “Wertpapiere” in Handbuch des Deutschen Handelsrechts II 144-
149; K-H Gursky Wertpapierrecht 3 ed (2007) 12-13. 
273
 This is not true for all certificates – some are constitutive, meaning that the rights are only created 
when the certificate is issued. This is the case, for example, for cheques and debentures in bearer 
form (“Inhaberschuldverschreibung”) – see Gursky Wertpapierrecht 13. 
274
 See above, 8 1 The functions of the share certificate. 
275
 Brunner “Wertpapiere” in Handbuch des Deutschen Handelsrechts II 146. 
276
 Hueck & Canaris Wertpapiere § 1 I 5. 
277
 See below, 8 3 4 3 The transfer of shares. 
278
 Hueck & Canaris Wertpapiere § 1 I 4(b). 
279
 For the maxim see J von Gierke Das Recht der Wertpapiere (1954) 2; see Gursky Wertpapierrecht 
2-3 for a brief summary of the two concepts or definitions. For criticism, see for example Hueck & 
Canaris Wertpapiere § 1 I 4(a). Also critical is Zöllner “Zurückdrängung” in Raiser & Baur Festschrift 
für Ludwig Raiser 249 n 1, who describes the maxim as “verfehlt” and “unbrauchbar” (misplaced and 
without use). Than however points out that for purposes of capital market practice the narrower maxim 
is both sufficient and easier to grasp; see J Than “Wertpapierrecht ohne Wertpapiere?” in N Horn, H-J 
Lwowski & G Nobbe (eds) Bankrecht- Schwerpunkte und Perpsektiven: Festschrift für Herbert 
Schimansky (1999) 821 823-824. 
280
 See Hueck & Canaris Wertpapiere § 2 I 2; Gursky Wertpapierrecht 10-14. 
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An alternative method of classification is according to the nature of the rights 
embodied in the paper. The categories under this classification include “Wertpapiere” 
of an obligatory, proprietary as well as membership-based nature. 281  Whereas, 
debentures would be obligatory in nature, shares are clearly based on rights of 
membership.282  
The most common classification is according to the means of determining the 
beneficiary, including “Rektapapiere”, “Orderpapiere” as well as “Inhaberpapiere”. 
German bearer shares (“Inhaberaktien”) are, as the name suggests, 
“Inhaberpapiere”. “Namensaktien”, on the other hand, are “Orderpapiere”. 
“Inhaberpapiere” are those instruments where the possessor (“Inhaber”) of the 
certificate can enforce the rights embodied in the certificate. The rights therefore 
accrue to the person who exercises control over the certificate through possession; 
no specific person or beneficiary is named on the certificate. The exercise of the 
rights therefore necessitates possession of the certificate. This does not mean that 
any possessor automatically becomes the legally recognised beneficiary of the rights; 
the position is rather that the possessor does not have to prove his entitlement 
(“Rechtsschein”) and the issuer has to perform towards the possessor, unless he can 
prove that the possessor is not entitled.283 Ultimately, only the owner is entitled, there 
merely exists a rebuttable presumption in favour of the possessor. 
An “Orderpapier”, on the other hand, is one where the issuer promises to perform 
towards a specific, named person or towards another person indicated by the first 
person through endorsement. 284  “Namensaktien” are an example of instruments 
issued to order.  
Comparable to the position concerning property interests, “Wertpapiere” are 
subject to a numerus clausus. The materialisation of rights in certificates is only 
possible where provided for by the law (“Typenzwang”). The law will also determine 
the form that the instrument will take i.e. whether it is “Inhaber-“, “Rekta-“ or 
“Orderpapier” (“Typenfixierung”).285 
                                            
281
 “Schuldrechtliche Wertpapiere”, “Sachenrechtliche Wertpapiere” and “Mitgliedspapiere”. 
282
 See Hueck & Canaris Wertpapiere § 2 II.  
283
 BGB § 793(1), also see § 1006; Hueck & Canaris Wertpapiere 24 § 2 III 3, 33-35; Gursky 
Wertpapierrecht 13. 
284
 Hueck & Canaris Wertpapiere 22-23 § 2 III 2; Gursky Wertpapierrecht 11-12. 
285
 Gursky Wertpapierrecht 14-15; Lehmann Finanzinstrumente 13, 176. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
127 
 
8 3 4 3 The transfer of shares 
The embodiment of rights in a share certificate has implications for their transfer. As 
set out above, the share certificate is a thing (“Sache”), more specifically a movable 
thing (“bewegliche Sache”). § 90 of the BGB restricts “things” to corporeal objects. 
Shares of public listed companies that are traded on a stock exchange are 
furthermore fungibles (“vertretbare Sachen”), being movable things that are usually 
specified in business dealings according to their number, measure or weight.286 
The law of things is the doctrinal foundation on which the law relating to the 
transfer and holding of “Wertpapiere” is constructed.287 An investor becomes owner 
(“Eigentümer”) of the thing. For the enforcement of the rights embodied in the 
certificate, possession (“Besitz”) of the certificate is more significant than ownership. 
Ownership and possession are closely related. Possession is the foundation of the 
presumption of ownership,288 plays a vital role in the transfer of ownership and the 
protection of the bona fide purchaser. In summary, possession fulfills the function of 
publicity.289  
The prerequisites for a valid transfer of ownership of a movable thing are delivery 
of the thing as well as an agreement that ownership shall pass (“Übergabe” and 
“Einigung”).290 Delivery is a real act, not a legal transaction.291 Delivery of possession 
of the thing publicises the transfer. The acquisition of actual control over a thing 
constitutes possession.292 For delivery, the transition of actual, physical control i.e. 
possession over the movable object to the buyer is insufficient; it must be 
accompanied by an actual consensus to give up or alternatively to obtain 
possession.293  
Delivery of possession alone does not suffice to transfer ownership; additionally 
the parties must agree that ownership shall pass from the transferor to the transferee. 
                                            
286
 BGB § 91. 
287
 Lehmann Finanzinstrumente 171. 
288
 BGB § 1006. 
289
 See F Baur, JF Baur & R Stürner Sachenrecht 18 ed (2009) § 4 II [9]. 
290
 BGB § 929 sent 1; alse see FC von Savigny System des heutigen römischen Rechts II (1840) III 
312. 
291
 D Leenen BGB Allgemeiner Teil: Rechtsgeschäftslehre 2 ed (2015) 31 [5]-[6]. 
292
 BGB § 854(1). 
293
 J Oechsler “§ 929 Einigung und Übergabe” in FJ Säcker, R Rixecker, H Oetker & B Limperg (eds) 
Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch VII 7 ed (2017) [48]. Obtaining possession and 
delivery are therefore not synonymous. Differentiate here the will of the parties to transfer possession, 
which is part of delivery and the will to transfer ownership, which constitutes the real agreement. 
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This agreement constitutes a legal transaction (“Rechtsgeschäft”). 294  German 
property law is characterised by the principle of separation (“Trennungsprinzip”) and 
the principle of abstraction (“Abstraktionsprinzip”).295 Two different legal transactions 
must be carefully distinguished - the contractual transaction (“Verpflichtugsgeschäft”) 
and the material transaction (“Verfügungsgeschäft”).296 The recognition that, even 
though they may coincide, the material transaction is legally independent of the 
contractual transaction is the gist of the principle of separation.297 Underlying the 
contractual transaction is an obligationary agreement (“obligatorischer Vertrag”) while 
for the material transaction a real agreement (“dinglicher Vertrag”) is concluded.298 In 
an abstract system for the transfer of property, these agreements must be 
differentiated. While the obligationary agreement (for example a contract of sale) 
creates an obligation to perform, it does not transfer the real right. For a transfer of 
real rights an independent agreement is required that is detached and abstracted 
from the causa. The real agreement constitutes the mutual intention of the parties to 
transfer and receive rights. This intention is abstracted from the causa and exists 
independently of it; this is known as contentional abstraction (“inhaltliche 
Abstraktion”).299 Additionally, the validity of the real agreement is not dependent on 
the existence or validity of the underlying causa – an aspect known as external 
abstraction (“äußerliche Abstraktion”). 300  The obligationary agreement to sell the 
shares can therefore be invalid as long as the real agreement is valid, i.e. both the 
seller and the buyer intend to transfer the shares. Provided that this mutual intention 
is coupled with the delivery of the share certificate, ownership will pass. The real 
agreement is not subject to any formalities and is frequently entered into tacitly.301 In 
addition, the real agreement must specify the subject matter to be transferred 
                                            
294
 Oechsler “§ 929” in Münchener Kommentar zum BGB VII [23]. 
295
 In general see Baur et al Sachenrecht § 5 IV [40]-[43]; HJ Wieling Sachenrecht 5 ed (2007) 12-15, 
95; A Stadler Gestaltungsfreiheit und Verkehrsschutz durch Abstraktion: Eine rechtsvergleichende 
Studie zur abstrakten und kausalen Gestaltung rechtsgeschäftlicher Zuwendungen anhand des 
deutschen, schweizerischen, österreichischen, französischen und US-amerikanischen Rechts (1996) 
7-8. 
296
 Leenen Rechtsgeschäftslehre 33-34 [19]. 
297
 Stadler Gestaltungsfreiheit und Verkehrsschutz durch Abstraktion 7. 
298
 B Mugdan Die gesammten Materialien zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch für das Deutsche Reich 1 
(1899) 422 [127]-[128]; The idea of the abstract real agreement can be traced back to Savigny, who 
described the traditio as a true contract: “denn sie enthält von beiden Seiten die auf gegenwärtige 
Übertragung des Besitzes und des Eigenthums gerichtete Willenserklärung, und es werden die 
Rechtsverhältnisse der Handelnden dadurch neu bestimmt”; Savigny System III 312; also see H Coing 
Europäisches Privatrecht II (1985) 393-394. 
299
 Baur et al Sachenrecht § 5 IV [41]; Oechsler “§ 929” in Münchener Kommentar zum BGB VII [8]. 
300
 Baur et al Sachenrecht § 5 IV [41]; Oechsler “§ 929” in Münchener Kommentar zum BGG VII [8]. 
301
 Wieling Sachenrecht 95; Baur et al Sachenrecht § 51 [7]. 
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(“sachenrechtlicher Bestimmtheitsgrundsatz”/”Spezialitätsgrundsatz”), in other words 
the specific shares or share certificates to be transferred must be individually 
identified.302 
As a default rule, the transfer of physical possession is thus required. If the buyer 
is already in possession of the certificate, only an agreement that ownership shall 
pass is required.303 Should a third party be in possession of the certificate, the seller 
(and owner) can assign to the buyer the right to claim the certificate from the third 
party.304 As a last alternative to the transfer of possession, the seller can remain in 
possession, provided that the parties agree that the seller now holds the certificates 
for the buyer and new owner.305 Possession can also be transferred independently of 
a transfer of ownership. 306  Through these mechanisms, German law enables 
ownership and control to be split.  
While some authors contend that “Inhaberpapiere” such as bearer shares can only 
be transferred in accordance with the principles for movable property,307 it seems 
relatively uncontroversial that such a transfer can also take place by cession 
(“Abtretung”) in accordance with §§ 398 and 413.308 If this mechanism of transfer is 
used, the rules on the protection of good faith purchasers, set out below,309 do not 
apply. 
8 3 4 4 Deposit 
Exercising control through demanding and receiving performance from the issuer 
depends on possession of the certificate. From the perspective of the company the 
                                            
302
 Baur et al Sachenrecht § 51 [8]; W Wiegand “§ 929 Einigung und Übergabe” in “§ 929 Einigung 
und Übergabe” in Wiegand W (ed) J. von Staudingers Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit 
Einführungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen 3(2) (2017) [11]; J Oechsler “Anh. §§ 929-936” in FJ Säcker, 
R Rixecker, H Oetker & B Limperg (ed) Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch VII 7 
ed (2017) [5]; BGH (1956) NJW 1315, 1316; For the lack of usefulness in distinguishing between the 
“Bestimmtheitsgrundsatz” and “Spezialitätsgrundsatz” see D Einsele Wertpapierrecht als Schuldrecht: 
Funktionsverlust von Effektenurkunden im internationalen Rechtsverkehr (1995) 40 n 192. But other 
authors still treat them separately; see for example Oechsler “§ 929” in Münchener Kommentar zum 
BGB VII [6]. 
303
 BGB § 929. 
304
 BGB § 931. 
305
 BGB § 930. 
306
 BGB § 854. 
307
 See for example Wieling Sachenrecht 112. 
308
 See for example Hueck & Canaris Wertpapiere 7, 24-25, who argue that a cession, i.e. a transfer 
without delivery or constructive delivery, is possible for shares and other securities because the 
certificate has lost much of its importance; Gursky Wertpapierrecht 11; Meppen Inhaberpapier 154; 
Oechsler “§ 929” in Münchener Kommentar zum BGB VII [15]. 
309
 See below, 8 4 2 “Verkehrsschutz” and the protection of bona fide purchasers in German law. 
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holder of the certificate is the holder of the shares. Despite the advantages of bearer 
shares, such as easy and convenient transferability and good faith acquisition, 
significant risks exist, primarily the risk that the certificates get into the wrong hands 
as well as the inconvenience of having to move certificates between market 
participants. For reasons of safekeeping and convenience, shareholders began to 
deposit their certificates with banks and other financial institutions.  
A contract of deposit is known in German law as “Verwahrungsvertrag”. 310 
According to § 688 BGB, only movable things can be deposited.311 The depositee 
(“Verwahrer”) becomes the direct possessor and mediates possession for the 
depositor, who is the indirect possessor (“mittelbarer Besitzer”) as defined by § 868 
BGB. Actual or constructive co-possession has to be delivered to the depositee.312 A 
relationship of deposit does not have to be gratuitous. In the case of a regular 
deposit, the same things have to be returned to the depositor.313 For shares and 
securities, a special regime of deposit in the context of systemic intermediation314 
was created in the “Depotgesetz”.315 
Banks taking deposits of securities became known as “Massenverwahrer” and the 
practice as “Fremdverwahrung”.316 The next step in the development of securities 
deposits was the so-called “Zentralverwahrung”. A centralised depository replaced 
the numerous individual banks and institutions as a collective depository. Collective 
custody (“Sammelverwahrung”) means that all securities (“Wertpapiere”) of the same 
kind, whether they belong to the investor, banks, the depositor or third parties, are 
deposited together.317  The first collective depository (“Wertpapiersammelbank”) in 
Germany was the Berliner Kassenverein founded in 1823. 318  Initially, only the 
securities belonging to the banks themselves were deposited there.319 It was only 
                                            
310
 See BGB § 688. 
311
 Also see M Henssler “§ 688 Vertragstypische Pflichten bei der Verwahrung” in FJ Säcker, R 
Rixecker, H Oetker & B Limperg (eds) Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch V(II) 7 
ed (2017) [8]. 
312
 [17]-[18]. 
313
 See BGB §§ 695, 696. Distinguish this from an irregular deposit in BGB § 700(1). 
314
 On systemic intermediation, see below, 9 3 2 Relationship-based and systemic intermediation. 
315
 See below, Chapter 12: The effect of systematic intermediation in Germany. 
316
 For a brief historic overview see Lehmann Finanzinstrumente 20-22. 
317
 See § 5(1) Depotgesetz; T Heinsius, A Horn & J Than Depotgesetz (1975) 96. 
318
 U Brink Rechtsbeziehungen und Rechtsübertragung im nationalen und internationelen 
Effektengiroverkehr (1976) 23; Heinsius et al Depotgesetz 90. 
319
 This practice took place from 1882. H Delorme Die Wertpapiersammelbanken (1970) 11; Heinsius 
et al Depotgesetz 90. 
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after the First World War and the inflation of the 1920’s that banks began to deposit 
the securities of their clients centrally and collectively.320 
Collective custody alone did not solve all the problems brought about by the 
inflation. The hyperinflation, in conjunction with the increased popularity of shares 
among ordinary members of society, dramatically increased the volume of shares in 
circulation and hence the cost of transporting the certificates. 321  Accompanying 
collective custody was therefore the “stückeloser Effektengiroverkehr”, which literally 
translated means certificateless transfer. As certificates were no longer in the hands 
of investors, alternatives to physical delivery had to be found. The mechanisms used 
in cashless payment transactions inspired the development of book-entry transfers of 
securities without the movement of certificates.322 
In practice certificates were therefore acquired by banks on behalf of investors and 
immediately placed into collective custody, as a result of which the certificate was 
neither required to affect transfer, nor to enforce rights. Certificates therefore played, 
at most, a subordinate role in practice. In addition, the printing and safekeeping of a 
large number of certificates became expensive.323 Hence, individual certificates were 
eliminated and replaced by global certificates (“Globalurkunde”). Lehmann 
differentiates this development from immobilisation and terms it “de-individualisation” 
(“Entindividualisierung”).324 Global certificates first appeared in Germany in relation to 
government bonds before the Second World War.325 After the Second World War, 
global certificates were used on a large scale to replace certificates lost or destroyed 
during the war.326 The statutory basis for the use of global certificates only followed 
with the amendment of the Depotgesetz of 1972.327 
                                            
320
 Delorme Wertpapiersammelbanken 11; Lehmann Finanzinstrumente 22; Meppen Inhaberpapier 
172; Brink Effektengiroverkehr 25. 
321
 Meppen Inhaberpapier 172.  
322
 Meppen Inhaberpapier 172-173; Delorme Wertpapiersammelbanken 29; Heinsius et al 
Depotgesetz 91. From payment systems also derives part of the name, namely “Giroverkehr”. For a 
definition or description of “Effektengiroverkehr” see Brink Effektengiroverkehr 17; Delorme 
Wertpapiersammelbanken 29, 74. 
323
 Zöllner “Zurückdrängung” in Raiser & Baur Festschrift für Ludwig Raiser 252-253. 
324
 See Lehmann Finanzinstrumente 28-29. 
325
 Than “Wertpapierrecht ohne Wertpapiere” in Festschrift Schimansky 828; Lehmann 
Finanzinstrumente 29. 
326
 Lehmann Finanzinstrumente 29-30; Meppen Inhaberpapier 174; Brink Effektengiroverkehr 29. 
327
 Novelle zum Depotgesetz vom 24.5.1972, which inserted § 9a; Zöllner “Zurückdrängung” in Raiser 
& Baur Festschrift für Ludwig Raiser 253-254; Meppen Inhaberpapier 74; Lehmann Finanzinstrumente 
31-32, Than “Wertpapierrecht ohne Wertpapiere” in Festschrift Schimansky 828. 
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8 3 5 Transfer and holding in South African law 
8 3 5 1 General remarks 
Transfer, as remarked in the opening passages of this chapter, is an elusive concept. 
In the case of Inland Property Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Cilliers328 the 
court stated that: 
“In regard to shares, the word “transfer”, in its full and technical sense, is not a single act 
but consists of a series of steps, namely an agreement to transfer, the execution of a deed 
of transfer and, finally, the registration of the transfer”.329 
At the same time the court remarked that the ordinary meaning of the term 
“transfer” refers to the transfer of shares excluding registration. 330  Similarly, 
Borrowdale recognises that “it must always be a matter of construction whether 
‘transfer’ refers to the transfer of the registered title or the beneficial ownership”.331 
8 3 5 2 The transfer of shares 
In characterising a share, South African law reflects its English heritage – shares are 
frequently described by courts as “rights of action”, being ius in personae.332 This 
classification dictates the method of transfer: South African courts have long 
established that shares pass from one person to another by cession. Indeed, cession 
plays a pivotal role in modern commerce by “facilitate[ing] the mobility of personal 
rights as incorporeal assets”.333 A cession encompasses the transfer of rights from 
the transferor (the cedent) to a transferee (the cessionary) by mere agreement.334 
                                            
328
 1973 3 SA 245 (A). 
329
 Inland Property Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Cilliers 1973 3 SA 245 (A) 251B-C; See also 
Smuts v Booyensmarkplaas (Edms) Bpk v Booyens 2001 4 SA 15 (SCA). 
330
 Inland Property Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Cilliers 1973 3 SA 245 (A) 251E. This 
conclusion, which is obiter dictum, was based on the English case of Lyle and Scott Ltd v Scott’s 
Trustees and British Investment Trust Ltd 1959 AC 763 at 778. 
331
 A Borrowdale “Shares and the Elusive Meaning of ‘Transfer’” (1985) 102 SALJ 277 277. 
332
 See for example McGregor’s Estate v Silberbauer (1891) 9 SC 36; Randfontein Estates Ltd v The 
Master 1909 TS 978; Liquidators Union Share Agency v Hatton 1927 AD 240; Jeffery v Pollak and 
Freemantle 1938 AD 1; Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Ocean Commodities Inc 1983 1 SA 276 
(A); Cooper v Boyes 1994 4 SA 521 (C).  
333
 Van Huyssteen et al Contract 430. 
334
 LTA Engineering Co Ltd v Seacat Investments (Pty) Ltd 1974 1 SA 747 (A) 762; Johnson v 
Incorporated General Insurances Ltd 1983 1 SA 318 (A) 331G-H; Lynn & Main Inc v Brits Community 
Sandworks CC 2009 1 SA 308 (SCA) 311B-C; GF Lubbe & PM Nienaber “Cession” in WA Joubert & 
JA Faris LAWSA 3 3 ed (2013) para 128; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 430. 
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Specifically, cession is frequently described as a “method of transferring incorporeal 
rights from one person to another”.335 
Along similar lines as the assignment of choses in action in English law, the 
possibility of a cession of personal rights was brought about by centuries of legal 
development. The English concept of assignment of choses in action, however, 
exerted at most a negligible influence on the development of the South African law of 
cession.336 Personal rights are ceded by a real agreement, which need not be in a 
particular form, unless the parties have agreed otherwise.337 The real agreement 
requires consensus. Both parties to the agreement must intend to cede the rights 
(animus contrahendi) – the cedent intends to transfer the rights (animus transferendi) 
and the cessionary intends to receive them (animus acquirendi).338 This intention 
must be “clear and beyond doubt”; a “loose understanding” does not suffice.339 
Underlying the real agreement is an obligationary agreement, which gives rise to the 
duty to cede the rights. This is the underlying iusta causa of the cession. 340 The 
obligationary agreement is typically a contract of sale, exchange, donation or the like. 
Notwithstanding initial ambivalence, cession is today regarded as an abstract legal 
act.341 This means that the validity of the cession is not dependent on the validity of 
the underlying causa.342 
In addition to consensus, the transfer of corporeal property requires delivery in the 
case of movables or registration in the case of immovables.343 A contentious issue for 
many years was thus the question whether the delivery of a share certificate is 
required for a valid cession of the share. This was answered in the negative by the 
                                            
335
 Uxbury Investment (Pty) Ltd v Sunbury Investment (Pty) Ltd 1963 1 SA 747 (C) 752A; Lynn & Main 
Inc v Brits Community Sandworks CC 2009 1 SA 308 (SCA) 311B. 
336
 Estate Fitzpatrick v Estate Frankel, Denoon v Estate Frankel 1943 AD 207 at 220; Lubbe & 
Nienaber “Cession” in LAWSA 3 para 142. 
337
 Wright & Co v Colonial Government 1891 8 SC 260 269; McGregor’s Trustees v Silberbauer 1891 
9 SC 36 38; Botha v Fick 1995 2 SA 750 (A) 762F; Grobbelaar v Shoprite Checkers Ltd [2011] ZASCA 
11 18; Van Huyssteen et al Contract 440. 
338
 McGregor’s Trustees v Silberbauer 1891 9 SC 36; Jeffrey v Pollak and Freemantle 1938 AD 1 6-7; 
Johnson v Incorporated General Insurances Ltd 1983 1 SA 318 (A) 331G-H; Lubbe & Nienaber 
“Cession” in LAWSA 3 para 153. 
339
 Wright & Co v Colonial Government 1891 8 SC 260 269. 
340
 Johnson v Incorporated General Insurances Ltd 1983 1 SA 318 (A) 331G-H; Van Huyssteen et al 
Contract 433-436; Lubbe & Nienaber “Cession” in LAWSA 3 para 155. 
341
 Grobbelaar v Shoprite Checkers Ltd [2011] ZASCA 11 17-18; Rabinowitz v De Beers Consolidated 
Mines Ltd 1958 3 SA 619 (A) 637A; Lubbe & Nienaber “Cession” in LAWSA 3 para 155; Zimmermann 
Law of Obligations 65 n 229. 
342
 Grobbelaar v Shoprite Checkers Ltd [2011] ZASCA 11 18. 
343
 See for example Dreyer NNO v AXZS Industries (Pty) Ltd 2006 5 SA 548 (SCA) 554. 
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court in Botha v Fick.344 Shares, it was held, exist independently of the document345 
and thus the delivery of the document is not required.346 The same applies to the so-
called “doctrine of all effort”. Early cases such as McGregor’s Trustees v Silberbauer 
held that “when the cedent, the vendor, has done everything in his power to effect the 
cession of his right of action, the cession is completed”.347 This doctrine was rejected 
in Botha v Fick.348  
Being based exclusively on consensus, it follows that a valid cession does not 
require the cooperation or consent of a third party, most notably the debtor. The 
debtor, the issuer in the context of shares, need not even be notified of the 
cession,349 although notification is advisable in light of the effects of a performance by 
the debtor to the cedent.350 Notification not being a validity requirement, the company 
is not involved in the transfer of rights. It is a well-established principle, therefore, that 
performance by the debtor to the cedent, without knowledge of the cession or by 
acting in good faith, discharges the debt and releases the debtor. 351  The notice 
requirement may also explain the historical status of registration when compared to 
English law: In English law assignment requires notice to the debtor (but not consent 
of the debtor),352 without which a legal (or statutory) assignment has not taken place. 
Notice is therefore a validity requirement in English law (at least in relation to 
statutory assignments) as opposed to merely influencing the effectiveness of the 
cession vis-à-vis the cessionary.353 
                                            
344
 Botha v Fick 1995 2 SA 750 (A). 
345
 764 G-I; 769; 778H. 
346
 778H-I. 
347
 McGregor’s Trustees v Silberbauer 1891 9 SC 36 38; See also Jeffrey v Pollak and Freemantle 
1938 AD 1 14. 
348
 Botha v Fick 778H-I. 
349
 Brook v Jones 1964 1 SA 765 (N) 767A-B, and more recently National Sorghum Breweries Ltd v 
Corpcapital Bank Ltd 2006 6 SA 208 (SCA) 209E-F; Van Staden v Firstrand Ltd 2008 3 SA 530 (T) 
paras 27, 28.  
350
 See paragraph immediately below; also see Van Staden v Firstrand Ltd 2008 3 SA 530 (T) para 27. 
351
 Brook v Jones 1964 1 SA 765 (N) 767; Agricultural and Industrial Mechanisation (Vereeniging) 
(Edms) Bpk) v Lombard 1974 3 SA 485 (O) 494G-495; Pillay v Harichand 1976 2 SA 681 (D) 684; 
Lynn & Main Inc v Brits Community Sandworks CC 2009 1 SA 308 (SCA) para 12. For further details, 
which cannot be discussed here, see Lubbe & Nienaber “Cession” in LAWSA 3 para 175. 
352
 On the requirements of a valid assignment in English law, see above, 8 3 2 4 Novation and 
assignment. 
353
 For a comparative overview of the notice requirement, see S Scott “The Comparative Method in 
Action – Aspects of the Law of Cession (Part 2)” (2001) 34 De Jure 1 1-3. 
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8 3 5 3 The change in registration and holding 
Despite the provision in section 35(1) of the Companies Act pronouncing that a share 
is “transferable in any manner provided for or recognised by this Act or other 
legislation”,354 the Act is mostly silent on the transfer of certificated shares. In section 
51, titled “Registration and transfer of certificated securities”, it is merely provided that 
“a company must enter in its securities register every transfer of any certificated 
securities”.355 A company may only record such a transfer if “(a) it is evidenced by a 
proper instrument of transfer that has been delivered to the company; or (b) was 
effected by operation of law”.356 What the Act in essence concerns itself with is the 
registration of shares that have been transferred from one person to another.  
Although the Act does not specify this, it is typically the responsibility of the 
purchaser to ensure registration.357 The seller only has to deliver the instrument of 
transfer to the purchaser and do everything necessary to enable the registration of 
the purchaser.358 The company need not be handed the share certificate to effect a 
transfer. Until registration of the purchaser in the place of the seller, it appears that 
the seller would act as the nominee of the purchaser.359 
The practical effect of a change in registration is that the name of the previous 
shareholder is deleted from the register and is replaced with that of the new 
shareholder. A change in holding takes place. It would be inaccurate to describe this 
change as a transfer. 
8 3 5 4 Agency, representation and mandate 
On nominees, Justice Trollip in Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining Co Ltd360 
writes: 
“Hence, no one can be registered as holding the shares as the agent for another; he, the 
agent, must himself appear on the register as the holder of the shares. Consequently, 
                                            
354
 S 35(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
355
 S 51(5) (own emphasis added). 
356
 S 51(6)(a)-(b). 
357
 Delport Henochsberg 210(1)-211, 214; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 628. 
358
 Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Ocean Commodities Inc 1980 2 SA 175 (T) 181; Delport Henochsberg 
210(1); De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 629. 
359
 Moosa v Lalloo 1957 4 SA 207 (N); Delport Henochsberg 211; P Sutherland “Companies and Other 
Business Entities” in CG van der Merwe & JE du Plessis (eds) Introduction to the Law of South Africa 
(2004) 365 377. In Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Ocean Commodities Inc 1980 2 SA 175 (T) 182, the 
court refers to the transferor as a trustee for the transferee. 
360
 1969 3 SA 629 (A). 
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such a person came to be known in ordinary commercial parlance as the 'nominee' of the 
owner of the shares, probably because the word conveniently and usefully synthesized 
the dual concepts that the person was nominated by the owner to hold the shares for him 
in his name and that he thus held them only nominally, i.e., in name only.”361 
This passage makes it clear that relationships between investors and nominees or 
between nominees inter se are not traditionally considered in the light of the rules on 
deposit, but are rather thought to be agency relationships.362 This is in line with the 
classification of shares as intangibles. 
The meaning of the concept “agency” is manifold.363 It is therefore suggested that 
the term agency does not convey the branch of the law applicable to a specific 
situation.364 Most commonly, agency describes the situation where one person (the 
agent) is authorised by another person (the principal) to enter into a transaction with 
a third party or perform another juristic act on behalf of and in the name of the 
principal and this transaction will take effect as between the principal and the third 
party. 365  Thus, the agent acts, but the effects of his action are imputed to the 
principal. This is a description of agency as representation. Its focus lies on the 
resulting contractual relationship between the principal and the third party.366 At the 
same time, the concept necessarily denotes a contractual relationship (whether 
express or implied) between the principal and the agent as well as a delineation of 
the capacity of the agent originating in a grant of authority. 367  The relationship 
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 666 F-G. 
362
 Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act 5-169 n 3, 5-172 – 5-172-1. Also see Holmes 
JA in Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & Investment Co (Pty) Ltd 1976 1 SA 441 (A) 453: 
“A nominee is an agent with limited authority: he holds shares in name only” (own emphasis). The 
position of the nominee that holds securities must be distinguished from that of a stockbroker that 
concludes trades in securities. Stockbrokers are generally thought to act as principals. See RA de la 
Harpe “Securities Registration and Transfer (ss 49-56)” in JL Yeats (ed) Commentary on the 
Companies Act of 2008 (OS 2018) 2-506 2-1012–2-1014. Also see below, n 371. 
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 See especially M Dendy & JC de Wet “Agency and Representation” in WA Joubert & JA Faris 
LAWSA 1 3 ed (2014) para 125. 
364
 DJ Joubert & DH van Zyl “Mandate and Negotiorum Gestio” in WA Joubert & JA Faris LAWSA 
17(1) 2 ed (2009) para 1. 
365
 G Bradfield “Agency” in F Du Bois Wille’s Principles of South African Law 9 ed (2007) 983 984; 
Zimmermann Law of Obligations 46; Dendy & De Wet “Agency and Representation” in LAWSA 1 para 
125, 126. 
366
 Bradfield “Agency” in Wille’s Principles 986. German legal theorists distinguish between the 
mandate as regulating the internal relationship between the principal and his agent and the grant of 
authority as determining the scope of the external relationship between the principal and the third party 
as brought about by the agent – see P Laband “Die Stellvertretung bei dem Abschluss von 
Rechtsgeschäften nach dem Allgemeinen Deutschen Handelsgesetzbuch” (1866) 10 ZHR 183 183-
241; also see Zimmermann Law of Obligations 57-58. 
367
 Dendy & De Wet “Agency and Representation” in LAWSA 1 para 125. 
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between the principal and his agent is contractual, most commonly a contract of 
mandate coupled with the power of representation.368 The contract of mandate may 
relate to the performance of any number of juristic or non-juristic acts, including the 
conclusion of a contract, its novation or the receipt- or making of performance.369 
Whether a mandate relates to a single act or is more general in nature depends on 
the agreement between the parties.370 In share transactions, agency relationships 
abound. Where a broker, for example, is contracted to bring about a sale and 
purchase of shares, he acts as an agent. According to Malan, such a broker acts as a 
mere mandatary, without the power of representation.371 It is not necessary to test 
this assertion, as the legal relationships pursuant to the holding of securities are of 
primary interest. 
To determine the precise meaning of the term agency as used in relation to the 
holding of shares, it may be useful to accurately identify what is being intermediated 
by a nominee. It is only the power to enforce performance which is held by another 
person and which enables him to collect performance and generally administer 
securities on behalf of an investor. The agent does so in his own name, evidenced by 
registration in his name and the fact that a company is mandated to look only towards 
such person for performance.372 Registration is the mere recognition of title and not a 
requirement for obtaining title to shares.373 By registration, a shareholder does not 
enter into a contract with an issuer for obtaining title to shares. Rather, the issuer is 
statutorily obliged to perform towards the shareholder. Registration relates to holding, 
not ownership, but the power to hold follows ownership. It is a power that must be 
either exercised by the owner or conferred by him to be exercised by another person. 
The holder is an agent with limited authority. An agent contracts with a third party in 
his own name, or in this case assumes the statutory role of a shareholder, but subject 
                                            
368
 Bradfield “Agency” in Wille’s Principles 986. The contract does not have to be one of mandate 
however, see AJ Kerr The Law of Agency 4 ed (2006) 5-6. 
369
 Joubert & Van Zyl “Mandate and Negotiorum Gestio” in LAWSA 17(1) para 3. 
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 FR Malan Collective Securities Depositories and the Transfer of Securities (1984) 169-160. But see 
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to limited authority granted by the principal.374 The identity of the investor is irrelevant 
to the relationship between the mandatary and the issuer. In terms of the grant of 
authority, the mandatary has to pass on all benefits received by him from the issuer 
to the mandatory. The shareholder does not act as a conduit to bring about a legal 
relationship between an investor and an issuer. He is authorised only to bring about a 
legal relationship between himself and the issuer through registration, but acts as a 
mere conduit for the principal in respect of the performance that flows from the 
relationship. 
The fact that an agent (acting as a nominee) acts in his own name and, at least 
traditionally, is neither obliged to reveal the identity of the principal, nor that he is 
acting as an agent, distinguishes nominees as agents from ordinary agency 
constructs. Ordinarily, an agent must either act in the name of the principal or 
indicate that he is acting for an unnamed principal.375 An exception to this rule can be 
found in the doctrine of the undisclosed principal, which is considered to be 
anomalous, but justified by commercial convenience.376 In this sense, a nominee is 
analogous to an agent of an undisclosed principal. 377  On the other hand, it is 
important to recognise that a shareholder as an agent is simultaneously a legislative 
construct and a nominee must be viewed in the context of specific legislative 
provisions. The Companies Act has traditionally not obliged shareholders that act as 
nominees to reveal their agency status to the company. To only view nominees as 
common law agents therefore falls short of their true characterisation. In addition, one 
of the most controversial aspects of the undisclosed principal is the fear that the 
principal can suddenly emerge from obscurity and enforce contractual rights.378 This 
possibility is, however, expressly excluded in the context of shareholders acting as 
nominees.379 In the context of mandatory beneficial interest disclosures for listed 
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 FR Malan “Depositories, Nominees and the Uncertificated Security” (1987) Moderne Besigheidsreg 
73 78, writes: “A nominee is an agent with limited authority who holds securities in his own name but 
on behalf of the owner. The precise nature of the relationship between the owner and the nominee is 
determined by contract which in the case of a managed securities portfolio, usually contains elements 
of a mandate”. Also see Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & Investment Co (Pty) Ltd 1976 
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 Dendy & De Wet “Agency and Representation” in LAWSA 1 para 136. 
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shares, any analogy of nominees acting in their own name, but on behalf of other, 
unidentified persons to the doctrine of the undisclosed principal has become moot. 
8 4 Certainty of transfer 
8 4 1 Certainty of transfer and trust 
“Trust is fundamental to commercial transactions”.380 Yet, trust always poses a risk to 
the transacting parties. There are several factors that contribute to this risk when 
transacting with shares. One of them is that the parties rarely ever transact face-to-
face. These elements of anonymity and multi-party involvement, while greatly 
enhancing the liquidity of shares, have the downside of increasing the risk of trust 
and reliance. This risk can be mitigated by conducting research into the reputation 
and reliability of a counterparty to a transaction.381 Comprehensive research may 
attract significant transactions costs.382  
The law has therefore devised several mechanisms to help ameliorate the trust 
conundrum.383  The existence of the share certificate, and somewhat less so the 
register, in conjunction with the statements it makes about ownership presumptions is 
one such mechanism.384  
When concluding a contract for the purchase of shares, the purchaser has the 
legitimate expectation that he will become the owner of the shares in due course. An 
existing owner similarly places his confidence in a legal system to protect his 
ownership interests. Balancing these expectations may be one of the most difficult 
tasks undertaken by the law. Although both expectations are founded in trust, trust is 
a legally empty concept385 that must be given content by distinct legal mechanisms, 
the construction of which is dependent on discrete policy choices. These policy 
choices run like a golden thread through the development of the law on shares and 
securities. 
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 FB Cross & RA Prentice Law and Corporate Finance (2007) 28. 
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 28-29. 
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 29. 
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 Legal regulation and enforcement attracts transactions costs as well. This is at the root of the 
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8 4 2 “Verkehrsschutz” and the protection of bona fide purchasers in German law 
The principal advantage of classifying shares as tangibles is the protection afforded 
to bona fide purchasers. This also appears to be the main motivation behind 
Savigny’s rejection of a transfer mechanism based on cession and his advocacy for 
treating shares as tangibles.386  It has had a significant impact on the course of 
development of German securities law.  
The German law of things recognises that two conflicting interests have to be 
balanced: On the one hand the interests of ownership have to be protected 
(“Eigentümerschutz”), on the other hand the expectations and interests of the 
acquirer are worthy of protection (“Erwerberschutz”), the recognition of which 
enhances the marketability and circulation of goods in the market 
(“Verkehrsschutz”).387 One guarantor of the efficient circulation of movable property is 
the principle of abstraction. The separation of the real agreement from the underlying 
causa ensures that goods can circulate quickly and efficiently. 388  The ability to 
circulate is further strengthened by the good faith acquisition of movable tangibles.389 
If a disposal takes place,390 the acquirer becomes owner even if the transferor is not 
the owner, provided that the acquirer is in good faith.391 The acquirer is not in good 
faith if he knows that the transferor is not the owner of the thing or if he (the acquirer) 
is grossly negligent in not ascertaining this fact.392 Possession of a movable thing 
ordinarily creates an impression of ownership (“Rechtsschein”).393 The Federal Court 
of Justice has therefore clarified that the prerequisite for the good faith acquisition of 
ownership of a movable thing is the bona fides of the acquirer as well as the 
impression of ownership created by the possession of the movable thing.394 Simple 
delivery in terms of § 929(1) sentence 1 is sufficient to create such an impression.395 
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 See above, 8 3 4 2 “Wertpapiere” and the materialisation of intangible rights. 
387
 For justifications of the bona fide acquisition rule, see Baur et al Sachenrecht § 52 [8]-[10]. 
388
 Stadler Gestaltungsfreiheit und Verkehrsschutz durch Abstraktion 728. Also see B Häcker 
Consequences of Impaired Consent Transfers: A Structural Comparison of English and German Law 
(2009). 
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 Although Häcker Impaired Consent Transfers 252 notes that “it is indeed hard to deny that the 
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 This is a disposal in accordance with §§ 329-331 BGB. 
391
 BGB § 932(1) sent. 1. 
392
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To succeed with a defence based on good faith acquisition, the acquirer must 
therefore obtain some form of possession, particularly such possession that excludes 
the possession of the transferor.396 This includes cases where a third party is in 
possession of the thing and the transferor merely assigns to the transferee, the right 
to claim the delivery of the thing from the third party (§ 931 as read with § 934 
BGB),397 but excludes those cases where possession remains with the transferor in 
terms of § 930 and 933 BGB.398 In the latter case, it is argued, no impression of 
ownership is created for the acquirer to act upon.399  
If the requirements of good faith and possession are met, the acquirer obtains full 
ownership unburdened by the rights of third parties.400 Ownership of a movable thing 
is not acquired if the thing was stolen from the owner, was lost by him or went 
missing in any other way.401 The principle behind this exception to the general rule is 
that the owner only loses ownership where he, through voluntarily providing another 
with possession of the object, creates the impression that the other is the owner. 
Where the loss of possession is involuntary, therefore, the rule does not apply.402 
Because the objective of circulation is prioritised in the case of shares, the exception 
does not apply to shares and other “Inhaberpapiere”. 
8 4 3 Negotiability and the protection of bona fide purchasers in US law 
According to the general rules applicable to transfers of property at common law, a 
transferor cannot transfer more rights than he himself has. This is known as the 
nemo plus iuris or nemo dat rule. Classifying shares as tangibles to place them under 
the purview of property rules would therefore not be as attractive a solution as in 
German law. On the other hand, the commercial need for certainty and finality of 
transfers lead to the development of the negotiable instrument. Negotiability allows 
intangibles to be transferred like tangibles. Negotiability is not only aimed at 
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 § 52 [3]. 
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 These are cases where securities certificates are held by a third party. The seller (and owner) has 
the right to claim the certificates from the third party and assigns this right to the purchaser. No 
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enhancing the ease with which shares can be transferred; it also ensures that the 
transferor takes the transferred instrument without any defects in title, provided that 
he acted in good faith. Negotiability therefore achieves the same result as the 
classification of shares as tangibles in German law. 
The nemo plus iuris rule rule was long regarded unsuitable for the transfer of 
shares and other securities.403 The rule, it was widely believed, would lead to a lack 
of certainty and significantly increase the transaction costs for potential purchasers, 
who have to investigate the title of their seller before entering into an agreement to 
purchase. This, so the thrust of the familiar argument, would significantly decrease 
the marketability and mobility of shares.404 A finality principle was therefore applied to 
such transfers. Provided that the correct formal mechanism was followed, the transfer 
was final.405 To the transfer of shares and other securities, the finality principles was 
applied as follows: A purchaser “who takes delivery of a security certificate in proper 
form for value and without notice qualifies as a bona fide purchaser who takes the 
certificate free from any adverse claim”.406  
Inherent in the thrust of the argument in favour of negotiability is therefore the 
prioritisation of the acquirers’ interests over the interests of ownership. This balancing 
of interests is based not only on the interests of the acquirer. His concerns are rather 
representative of the interest that the entire legal (and commercial) community has in 
an efficient circulation of goods and the ease with which commercial operations take 
place.407 This idea, aptly summed up in the German term “Verkehrsschutz”,408 is of 
equal relevance in negotiable instruments law. 
8 4 4 Estoppel and the protection of bona fide purchasers in English law 
Häcker writes: “Broadly speaking, the proprietary protection thus afforded to third 
party purchasers could be said to be too broad in German law and, by comparison, 
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too narrow in English law.”409 Protection of the purchaser is, however, far from absent 
in English law; it is just achieved in different, more roundabout ways. 
Under English law, the risk of transfer of a defective title is generally placed on the 
buyer of the shares. In principle, a transferee cannot obtain a better title to the shares 
than the transferor had. This hardship is alleviated by shifting responsibility under 
some circumstances to the issuer. The share certificate, even if not fully mobile, 
nonetheless provides prima facie evidence of tile to the shares.410 It thus provides 
information on which a purchaser of shares can rely. If a company issues a share 
certificate, it makes certain representations, namely that the shares are paid up and 
that the person named on the certificate holds title to the shares. A transferee who 
relies on these representations can henceforth estop the company from denying the 
title of the transferor or from proving that the shares have not been paid up.411 The 
purchaser cannot, however, compel the company to make an entry on the register in 
his favour or to rectify the register. The claim is solely one for damages.412 If a 
company issues a share certificate pursuant to receiving a request for registration 
based on a forged certificate or transfer document, that certificate is therefore prima 
facie proof of title and any third party relying on it can claim an indemnity from the 
issuer.413 The issuer can in turn claim the costs of this indemnity from the buyer of 
the forged certificate or his agent who initially presented the forged certificate for 
registration.414 If a third party reaches his decision based on a forged certificate, the 
issuer has made no representation and cannot be estopped.415 
As a general rule, the legal owner therefore retains the title to the shares, unless 
she has authorised a transfer or has created the impression that an agent had 
authority to transfer shares when he in fact did not. In the latter case, the buyer may 
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exercise an estoppel against the owner preventing him from denying that the agent 
lacked authority to sell the shares.416  
Micheler concludes that “[t]he rules on estoppel achieve a result comparable to the 
result achieved by the rules governing negotiable instruments. They transform shares 
into an asset that exists largely independently of the rules by which it was created.”417 
8 4 5 Estoppel and the protection of bona fide purchasers in South African law 
A cession is a true transfer - the cessionary “steps into the shoes of the cedent”.418 
The rights of the cessionary are the same as those the cedent had. It therefore 
follows that the cessionary cannot obtain a better title to the shares than that which 
the cedent had.419 A cession does not protect bona fide purchasers of shares. 
The protection of bona fide purchasers of certificated shares was analysed 
extensively in Project 62 of the South African Law Commission.420 The position in 
South African law is similar to that in English law. Both English and South African law 
assign the task of protecting bona fide purchasers of shares to the doctrine of 
estoppel. 
That the concept of estoppel functions to temper the rights of the owner in favour 
of the rights of other parties appears from the judgement of Holmes JA in Oakland 
Nominees v Gelria Mining:  
“Our law jealously protects the right of ownership and the correlative right of the owner in 
regard to his property, unless, of course, the possessor has some enforceable right 
against the owner. Consistent with this, it has been authoritatively laid down by this Court 
that an owner is estopped from asserting his rights to his property…”.421  
The law of estoppel promotes the free flow of goods and services by providing a 
level of transactional security. In the words of Rumpff JA: “the demands of 
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commerce, as such, can have a restrictive influence on the application of the rei 
vindicatio…”.422 
Share certificates, even if not negotiable, do contain certain statements about 
ownership and entitlement.423 They circulate in the market and are readily accepted 
as proof of ownership. The doctrine of estoppel latches onto these representations 
contained on the face of the certificate and conveyed by the fact of possession 
thereof. In terms of this doctrine, a purchaser can preclude the transferor “from 
denying the truth of a representation previously made by him [the transferor] to 
another person [the transferee] if the latter, believing in the truth of the 
representation, acted thereupon to his or her prejudice”.424  
Traditionally, many cases of wrongful transfer in South Africa have arisen where a 
third party, such as a broker or a nominee, was in possession of the share certificates 
and transferred these without proper authority. In United South African Association 
Ltd v Cohn,425 the court held that by endorsing a share certificate in blank and by 
entrusting that certificate to a third party for safe custody, the owner of the shares 
conveys to outside parties that the share is intended to circulate and that the third 
party has the authority to deal with it as owner.426 In actual fact the owner of shares, 
by such conduct or other verbal or written representation, has given his “agent” 
ostensible authority. This is authority which never existed, but the purchaser can 
estop the true owner from denying that he gave the third party authority to sell the 
shares.427 In Oakland Nominees, however, the court made it clear that where the 
owner does not put the shares in transferable form and does not create the 
impression that the third party has the authority to transfer them, the purchaser 
cannot rely on an estoppel.428 Whether a purchaser must prove negligence on the 
part of the owner, in addition to the normal requirements for estoppel, to succeed with 
a claim based on estoppel has proven to be a contentious point.429 Malan is of the 
opinion that “[d]eprivation of the shareholder of his rights, … is not based on fault, or 
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on some fiction that the shareholder is negligent. It is rather a question of finding 
suitable and equitable criteria for attributing responsibility for the loss…”.430  
Instances of an estoppel raised against the company for representations made on 
the share certificate, common in England,431 are rare in South Africa. Nonetheless, 
the principles enunciated by English courts in this regard were upheld by a South 
African court in Albatross Fishing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Ramsay.432  
8 5 Taking stock 
The legal systems surveyed provide for nominees that hold securities for and on 
behalf of others. Functionally, a distinction can therefore be drawn between the ability 
to enforce and receive performance from the company and the entitlement to the 
benefits of performance. In the context of traditional paper-based systems, company 
laws facilitate such intermediation with the aid of a certificate, a register entry or a 
combination of both. Conceptually and from the perspective of private law, this 
distinction is mapped in different ways. The English legal system conceives of this 
distinction as a division of ownership into legal and beneficial ownership subject to 
the rules on trust law. The legal owner appears from the register and is in a position 
to receive performance from the issuer. The beneficial owner is entitled to the 
benefits of such performance. US law and German law traditionally understand the 
distinction on the basis of a relationship of deposit, US law through its classification of 
shares as negotiable instruments and German law by categorising shares as 
tangibles. The possessor of the physical token – the share certificate – has the ability 
to demand performance from the issuer. Such performance must be delivered to the 
depositor – the owner. South African law, on the other hand, considers the split to be 
the result of an agency relationship. References to concepts such as legal and 
beneficial ownership are misplaced in South African law. Registration places a 
shareholder in a position to demand and receive performance from the issuer. This 
must not detract from the fact that the shareholder does not become the owner of 
shares and must pass on the benefits to the owner. Functionally, all of these methods 
achieve the same result.  
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To acommodate this functional distinction legal systems have devised 
mechanisms which enable the company to render performance, namely either 
registration or possession. These mechanisms must not be viewed in isolation. 
Possession of a share certificate may for example be an important indicator of the 
right to be on the register. 
A distinction must therefore be drawn between the holding and “ownership” of 
shares. While the former is associated with the ability to enforce performance, the 
latter, where these functions are split, relates to the right to receive benefits. The 
establishment of a structure of holding, be it by trust, deposit or agency, creates 
lasting, vertical relationships. The value of a share lies in the relationship with an 
issuer; holding, on the other hand “is concerned with attributing the issuer-holder 
relationship” to a particular person.433 
What differs between the conceptual design of these holding systems, is the 
direction of disbursement of powers or rights. Picture holding structures as pyramids 
with an issuing company located at the apex and investors and ultimate beneficiaries 
at the base. Trusts are top-down structures. Enforcement rights vest in the legal 
owner and any equitable rights are conceptually construed to flow from the legal 
ones.434 Deposit is bottom-up in that it is the entitlement-holder that is thought to 
confer certain rights of enforcement on another person through a transfer of 
possession. In South Africa, agency relationships also confer the power to hold, and 
therefore the ability to effect registration, from the bottom up. 
In all legal systems, a change in holding must be distinguished from a transfer of 
ownership of the shares.435 The change in holding can stand independently from a 
transfer of ownership and is subject to its own transfer mechanisms. A change in 
holding may for example be brought about by a change in registration or the delivery 
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of possession. A transfer of ownership on the other hand is brought about by 
mechanisms which have in common that they require the intention to transfer rights 
(and obligations). Both a change in holding and a transfer of ownership differ from the 
creation of holding structures in that these are essentially once-off transactions, not 
lasting relationships.  
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Chapter 9: The progression towards systemic intermediation 
9 1 General remarks 
When an increase in trading speed and volume ushered in an electronically-based 
system of holding and transferring shares, the need to accommodate the functions 
previously performed by share certificates, share registers and legal institutions such 
as possession, ownership, trusts, deposit and agency shaped the legal design of 
holding systems and transfer mechanisms in substantial, but different ways. 
The use of physical certificates, initially aimed at enhancing transferability,1 has 
the opposite effect in high-volume, high-speed and globalised modern trading 
environments. It has become impossible to move large volumes of certificates around 
the world and to do so timeously.2 The importance of the certificate as “the proper 
(and, indeed, the only) documentary evidence of title in the possession of a 
shareholder”3 continuously diminished with the rise of uncertificated securities.  
The historic development of each legal system sketched above, illustrates that, 
despite the functional similarities, each system developed at its own pace. Thus, 
systems built on the possession of share certificates, notably the US and German 
legal systems, progressed towards more sophisticated nets of intermediaries 
considerably earlier. These systems, developing in a path-dependent manner, did not 
get rid of certificates completely. They rather accommodated them within their 
existing conceptual framework. The decisive progression present across all legal 
systems was therefore neither from certificated to uncertificated securities nor from 
systems of direct holding to indirect holding systems. Early networks of 
intermediaries exhibit few of the characteristics present today. The key progression 
was facilitated by the introduction of pervasive electronic technologies that enabled 
the creation of complex structures of intermediaries. 
                                            
1
 See above, 8 1 The functions of the share certificate. 
2
 M Vermaas “The Reform of the Law of Uncertificated Securities in South African Companies Law” 
(2010) Acta Juridica 87 93. 
3
 Société Générale de Paris v Walker (1885) App Cas 20 (HL) 29 as quoted in JT Pretorius, PA 
Delport, M Havenga & M Vermaas (eds) Hahlo’s South African Company Law through the Cases 6 ed 
(1999) 169; Delport Henochsberg 209. 
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9 2 Immobilisation and Dematerialisation 
Following the crises caused by paper-based systems, electronic settlement systems 
were introduced. Electronic settlement necessitated the abandonment of paper 
certificates. The form that shares were issued in as paper-based instruments, 
determined the approach to electronic settlement. In 1989 the Group of 30 published 
an influential report on “Clearance and Settlement in the World’s Securities 
Markets”, 4  which identified two models to facilitate electronic settlement – 
immobilisation and dematerialisation.5 
Systems which traditionally issued shares in bearer form or as negotiable 
instruments have frequently opted for the immobilisation of securities. Immobilisation 
is the “storage of securities certificates in a vault in order to eliminate physical 
movement of certificates/documents on transfer of ownership”.6 Due to the risk of 
theft and fraud associated with bearer shares, “Wertpapiere” and negotiable 
instruments, systems for the deposit and safekeeping of certificates developed. 
Although physical certificates continue to exist, often in the form of global or jumbo 
certificates, 7  they are stored in a depository and no longer circulate. Deposit, 
however, did not only eliminate the movement of paper. Initially only aimed at 
safekeeping, depositories also turned into settlement agents so that shares are also 
transferred by book entries made by depositories.  
An alternative approach is dematerialisation. Dematerialisation is the “elimination 
of physical certificates or documents of title which represent ownership of securities 
so that securities exist only as computer records”.8 Certificates are no longer issued, 
resulting in the complete elimination of paper. Title to shares is recorded and 
transferred by electronic book entries. 
Both, dematerialisation and immobilisation convert paper certificates into 
electronic account entries. In immobilised systems the certificate is retained as a 
                                            
4
 Group of Thirty Clearance and Settlement Systems in the World’s Securities Markets (1989). 
5
 55-56; also see Recommendation 3 at 7-8. 
6
 Group of Thirty Clearance and Settlement Systems in the World’s Securities Markets (1989) 83; See 
also S Schwarz “Intermediated Securities” in J Basedow, KJ Hopt, R Zimmermann & A Stier (eds) The 
Max Planck Encyclopaedia of European Private Law (2012) 950 950; R Goode “The Nature and 
Transfer of Rights in Dematerialised and Immobilised Securities” (1996) JIBFL 167 168. 
7
 Both, global and jumbo certificates, are a single certificate representing an entire issue. Whereas a 
jumbo certificate can however be divided into individual certificates, the division of a global certificate 
is impossible. 
8
 Group of Thirty Clearance and Settlement Systems in the World’s Securities Markets (1989) 82; See 
also Schwarz “Intermediated Securities” in Max Planck Encyclopaedia 951; Goode (1996) JIBFL 168. 
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conceptual token. Whereas an account entry replaces the paper certificate when 
dematerialised, it merely represents the paper certificate when immobilised.9 
As a result of the concept of storing share certificates centrally, immobilisation 
automatically severs the direct relationship between the issuer and the investor. A 
depository or custodian typically acts as a holder of the shares. At least one 
intermediary is positioned between the investor and the issuer and the investor must 
exercise her rights through the intermediary. The same is not true for dematerialised 
shares. Dematerialisation by itself has no impact on the relationship between the 
issuer and investor.10 Yet, even where the system permits investors to hold shares 
directly, in practice many investors will make use of custodians who hold investor’s 
shares in pooled accounts maintained in their own (the custodian’s) name. Such 
intermediation had already developed prior to the introduction of electronic 
systems.11 The reality is therefore that a great number of demterialised shares are 
today held by intermediaries. It therefore appears that the modus operandi of 
classifying holding systems as direct or indirect is unhelpful and probably 
redundant.12 
Although both immobilisation and dematerialisation are aimed at eliminating the 
circulation of paper and replacing it with electronic entries, this aim is achieved in 
different ways. These differences can mostly be traced back to legal rules and 
structures that were prevalent before electronic processes changed the landscape of 
securities holding and trading. 
                                            
9
 L Thévenoz “Intermediated Securities, Legal Risk, and the International Harmonization of 
Commercial Law” (2008) 13 Stan JL Bus & Fin 384 386. 
10
 Goode (1996) JIBFL 168. M Dubovec The Law of Securities, Commodities and Bank Accounts: The 
Rights of Account Holders (2014) 34. 
11
 See above, 8 3 2 6 Equity and trusts and 8 3 5 4 Agency. 
12
 Much of the early research into securities systems focused on the distinction between direct and 
indirect systems. Yet, as Phillip Paech points out, it is unclear what is meant by a direct system – it is 
the complete absence of intermediaries or the fact that investors have “property” rights in the 
securities? P Paech “Market Needs as Paradigm – Breaking up the Thinking on EU Securities Law” in 
P-H Conac, U Segna & L Thévenoz (eds) Intermediated Securities: The Impact of the Geneva 
Securities Convention and the Future European Legislation (2013) 22 50-51. 
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9 3 Intermediation and the creation of new assets 
9 3 1 The economic theory of intermediation 
Intermediation is a central feature of modern economic systems.13 One of the primary 
functions of financial markets is to allocate capital by collecting funds from those 
market participants who have a surplus of funds and directing them to those 
participants that are in need of funds to finance operations and growth. To match the 
supply and demand of capital may sound easy in theory, but is difficult to achieve in 
practice. Two factors serve to ameliorate the discrepancy between the supply and the 
demand of capital: financial instruments and financial intermediaries.  
It is trite to state that financial instruments play a key role in financial 
transactions.14 Moore describes the effect of financial instruments as two-fold: they 
have an intermediation effect and a transmutation effect. Financial instruments 
facilitate an exchange between market participants because they are a generally 
accepted means of payment (comparable to money).15 As a result, the exchange is 
not dependent on a simultaneous concomitance of needs and wants as would be the 
case in transactions of barter. The (mostly) free circulation of financial instruments 
adds the possibility of a time-discrepancy to the supply and demand of capital. In this 
way, financial instruments intermediate between market participants to such an 
extent that Moore terms the exchange an indirect one.16 
In addition, financial instruments, according to Moore, have a transmutation effect. 
They have the effect of transforming real wealth (in the form of tangible assets) into 
financial wealth from the perspective of the supplier of capital and vice versa from the 
perspective of the user of capital. 17  The transformation aims to transform the 
                                            
13
 G Gorton & R Winton “Financial Intermediation” in GM Constantinides, M Harris & R Stulz (eds) 
Handbook of the Economics of Finance IA (2003) 431 433: “Financial intermediation is a pervasive 
feature of all the world’s economies”; TCW Lin “Infinite Financial Intermediation” (2015) 50 Wake 
Forest LR 643 643: “Intermediation is a fundamental fact of finance” and “form[s] the fabric of modern 
fianance”. 
14
 For a description of the term, see previous chapter. 
15
 BJ Moore An Introduction to the Theory of Finance: Assetholder Behaviour under Uncertainty (1968) 
16. 
16
 Indirect exchange in this instance does not imply that an intermediary institution is positioned 
between the market participants, but merely that the financial instrument itself is the “intermediary”. 
17
 Moore Theory of Finance 17. Linking the financial capital supplied to the tangible assets they are 
ultimately used to purchase does not give the holders of the financial instruments any direct claim to 
these assets. This would be in conflict with the principle of separate juristic personality (see above, 
4 2 1 The development of the doctrine of juristic personality and 4 2 2 The consequences of juristic 
personality). It is suggested that the proposition by Moore has more descriptive value. It is for example 
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characteristics of the financial assets to better meet the needs and demands of the 
potential borrowers of capital, such as building the characteristic of limited liability into 
equity securities. 
The “intermediation” function of financial instruments alone is insufficient to solve 
the demand and supply conundrum of capital. In addition, institutions that act as 
“financial intermediaries” position themselves between the suppliers and users of 
capital. A comprehensive economic model of financial intermediation was first 
formulated by Gurley and Shaw.18 Traditionally, financial intermediaries are defined 
as financial institutions that “purchase primary securities from ultimate borrowers and 
[to] issue indirect debt for the portfolios of ultimate lenders”.19  The archetype of 
financial intermediaries according to this definition, are banks. Banks accept short-
term deposits (indirect securities) and convert these to long-term loans advanced to 
companies (primary securities). In this process, they channel capital from their 
deposit customers to their loan customers. In addition, they transform the 
characteristics of the financial assets, effecting a change of maturity (from short-term 
to long-term loans), liquidity (from demand deposits to mortgages) and risk profile 
(investing insured deposits in risky assets). In the traditional model, all intermediaries 
therefore create financial assets,20 in particular financial assets with characteristics 
that differ from those exhibited by the primary securities. From an examination of the 
reasons for the existence of intermediaries as well as a description of the functions 
they perform, it will emerge that this definition of financial intermediaries is too narrow 
in a modern context. 
Following Gurley and Shaw, most of the economic literature on financial 
intermediaries was an examination of why market participants transact indirectly 
                                                                                                                                        
impossible to link the value of the financial instrument to the value of the underlying assets. It may, at 
most be one of numerous factors that determine the value of a financial instrument.  
18
 JC Gurley & ES Shaw Money in a Theory of Finance (1960). 
19
 Gurley & Shaw Money in a Theory of Finance 192. Similar Moore Theory of Finance 95-96: 
Financial intermediaries are financial institutions “whose principal economic activity is the purchase 
and sale of financial assets”; HE Leland & DH Pyle “Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, 
and Financial Intermediation” (1977) 32 Jnl of Finance 371 382: Financial intermediaries are “firms 
which hold one class of securities and sell securities of other types”. In the definition, Gurley and Shaw 
distinguish between primary securities and indirect securities. Whereas primary securities are claims 
against market participants (typically companies) “whose principal economic activity is to buy and sell 
productive factors and current output”, indirect securities are “claims against financial institutions 
whose principal economic activity is the purchase and sale of financial assets”. – see Moore Theory of 
Finance 95-96. 
20
 Gurley & Shaw Money in a Theory of Finance 198. 
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through intermediaries rather than directly.21 The early answers involve transaction 
costs and information asymmetries. Specialised intermediaries reduce the costs of 
exchanging capital. It takes time and effort for a borrower to find a suitable lender and 
vice versa. Intermediaries reduce search and information costs by facilitating contact 
between lenders and borrowers. 22  Transactions costs are reduced further by 
aggregating the interests of a large group of investors and thereby avoiding the 
wasteful duplication of costs. 23 Intermediaries reduce transaction costs by obtaining 
information about the company and the quality of the investment, by negotiating the 
exchange and concluding contracts favourable to investors and by monitoring the 
fulfilment of contractual duties on behalf of investors.24 
Markets are not perfect. Situations frequently arise in which one market participant 
has information that is superior to that of another in an exchange transaction. The 
informational asymmetry can be of an ex ante or an ex post nature.25 Typically, the 
lender or user of capital possesses information about the investment not available to 
the investors or suppliers of capital. This information may not be publicly available 
and costs have to be incurred by the investor to obtain it. Alternatively, the credibility 
of the information available to the investor may be difficult to evaluate. The problem 
can be overcome by financial intermediaries who serve to close information gaps 
between the transacting parties by specialising in obtaining information on behalf of 
their clients. 
More recently the continued exclusivity and even relevance of these reasons as 
explanations for the existence of intermediaries has been questioned.26 Despite a 
                                            
21
 This is similar to the question as to why market participants transact through firms instead of through 
the market (see, 4 3 The nexus theory) and in fact the reasons provided in answer to this question are 
very similar to the reasons advanced here. 
22
 N Galpin & H Park “The Roles of Financial Intermediaries in Raising Capital” in BH Kent & GS 
Martin (eds) Capital Structure and Corporate Financing Decisions: Theory, Evidence, and Practice 
(2011) 263 265. 
23
 RTS Ramakrishnan & AV Thakor “Information Reliability and a Theory of Intermediation” (1984) 51 
RESTUD 415 416. 
24
 See for example GJ Benston & CW Smith “A Transactions Cost Approach to the Theory of Financial 
Intermediation” (1976) 31 Jnl of Finance 215; DW Diamond “Financial Intermediation and Delegated 
Monitoring” (1984) 51 RESTUD 393; K Judge “Fee Effects” (2013) 98 Iowa LR 1517 1538-1541. 
25
 For ex ante informational asymmetries, see Leland & Pyle (1977) Jnl of Finance. In general see 
B Scholtens & D van Wensveen “The Theory of Financial Intermediation: An Essay on What it (Does) 
Not Explain” (2003) Discussion Paper: SUERF – The European Money and Finance forum Vienna 
2003. 
26
 See for example F Allen & AM Santomero “The Theory of Financial Intermediation” (1998) 21 JBF 
1461; B Scholtens & B van Wensveen “A Critique on the Theory of Financial Intermediation” (2000) 24 
JBF 1243; F Allen & AM Santomero “What do Financial Intermediaries Do?” (2001) 25 JBF 271. 
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marked decrease in transaction costs and informational asymmetries, intermediaries 
continue to flourish.27 Many authors therefore highlight the ability of intermediaries to 
manage and redistribute risk at minimal cost as an additional factor.28 Furthermore, 
intermediaries are said to reduce the costs of participating in financial markets.29 
Scholtens and Van Wensveen conclude that the primary focus of intermediary theory 
should be the value-addition undertaken by intermediaries in financial markets.30 
Frankly, it is difficult to separate the question of why intermediaries exist from an 
analysis of their functions. In fact, the newer additions to financial theory set out 
above explicitly advocate a functional- instead of the traditional institutional 
perspective. 31  A core function of financial intermediaries remains that of capital 
aggregation i.e. collecting capital from market participants with a surplus and 
redistributing it to those with capital demands.32 Some intermediaries are market-
makers, matching suppliers and users of capital. 33  Stock exchanges are classic 
facilitators of exchanges. Other more traditional functions of intermediaries are those 
already mentioned above, namely risk management and the provision and clearing of 
information. 34  To achieve the overarching goal of efficient capital flows, an 
increasingly large and sophisticated brigade of intermediaries has emerged offering 
either a range of innovative, highly specialised intermediary services or a new take 
on the traditional functions described above. Advances in technology have had a 
particularly large impact on the growth and transformation of intermediaries.35 Many 
of these intermediaries neither purchase nor create financial assets as analysed by 
                                            
27
 Allen & Santomero (1998) JBF 1464-1466; Scholtens & Van Wensveen (2000) JBF 1245; Allen & 
Santomero (2001) JBF 272. 
28
 See Allen & Santomero (1998) JBF 1465, Allen & Santomero (2001) JBF 288-289. Scholtens & Van 
Wensveen (2000) JBF 1247, 1247-1248 agree with Allen & Santomero but point out that risk-
management is not a new phenomenon in intermediation. Also see Lin (2015) Wake Forest LR 648-
649. 
29
 Allen & Santomero (1998) JBF 1480-1482, but see the critical analysis of Scholtens & Van 
Wensveen (2000) JBF 1248-1249. 
30
 Scholtens & Van Wensveen (2000) JBF 1250-1251. Also see PC Leyens “Financial Intermediaries” 
in J Basedow, KJ Hopt, R Zimmermann & A Stier (eds) The Max Planck Encyclopaedia of European 
Private Law I (2012) 701 701, who writes that financial intermediaries are “all institutions supporting 
the congruence of supply and demand in financial markets”. 
31
 See the references in n 26 above. 
32
 Lin (2015) Wake Forest LR 646; Judge (2013) Iowa LR 1539; Allen & Santomero (2001) JBF 273; 
Diamond (1984) RESTUD 398-399. 
33
 Lin (2015) Wake Forest LR 648; Judge (2013) Iowa LR 1539; Allen & Santomero (2001) JBF 273. 
34
 See Lin (2015) Wake Forest LR 648-650 and the references in n 28 above. 
35
 H Genberg “The Changing Nature of Financial Intermediation and its Implications for Monetary 
Policy” in Bank for International Stettlements (BIS) Financial Market Developments and Their 
Implications for Monetary Policy (2008) 100 101; Lin (2015) Wake Forest LR 652. 
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Gurley and Shaw and others.36 While some intermediaries provide the technology, 
for example the electronic settlement and clearing system, others, such as 
depositories and designated participants of the settlement and clearing system 
provide access to the system. Indeed, the function of providing access to structures 
or systems is becoming increasingly important, bolstered by legal regulation. Kathryn 
Judge writes: “There are also many settings where market structures are so firmly 
entrenched, by law or otherwise, that a party seeking to consummate a particular 
type of transaction has little choice but to work with the intermediary controlling the 
relevant structure.” 37  Financial markets further exhibit an increase in complexity, 
whether brought about by technology or otherwise. Intermediaries play an important 
role in simplifying complexities on behalf of their clients. 38  Scholtens & Van 
Wensveen conclude that the role of intermediaries is that of active participants in 
financial markets.39 They do not merely passively intermediate between two market 
participants; they add value to the exchange.40 Intermediaries must be recognised as 
independent players in the financial markets. 41  The principal mechanism through 
which they add value remains the transformation of financial assets. The 
transformation may not be from one type of financial asset to another with vastly 
different characteristics, such as short- and long-term maturity (from a deposit to a 
long-term loan, for example). It is in fact frequently a more subtle transformation of, 
for example, liquidity, maturity, risk, location or complexity. 42  In addition, it is 
                                            
36
 Some, however, still do – see the example of securitisation to create new financial instruments such 
as asset-backed securities or mortgage-backed securities. 
37
 Judge (2013) Iowa LR 1540. While stock exchanges have long become gatekeepers to markets in 
traditional debt and equity trading, the new breed of intermediaries specifically controls access to 
electronic structures. On the original “gatekeeper” literature see the references in Judge (2013) Iowa 
LR 1519 n 6.  
38
 Allen & Santomero (2001) JBF 289. J Sommer posits that complexities are simplified by the 
compartmentalisation of functions so that comple nets of relationships are reduced to pairwise 
relations; JH Sommer “International Securities Holding and Transfer Law” (2001) 18 Ariz J Int & Com L 
685 700. Also see below, 16 2 2 Joseph Sommer. 
39
 Scholtens & Van Wensveen (2000) JBF 1250. 
40
 Scholtens & Van Wensveen (2000) JBF 1250; Genberg “Changing Nature of Financial 
Intermediation” in BIS Financial Market Developments 101. 
41
 Scholtens & Van Wensveen (2000) JBF 1250-1251: “His [the intermediaries’] business is selling 
financial services to customers and making a profit on it. Reducing costs and informational 
asymmetries may be part of this process, but it occurs as a by-effect.”  
42
 Scholtens & Van Wensveen (2000) JBF 1250; Genberg “Changing Nature of Financial 
Intermediation” in BIS Financial Market Developments 101. 
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necessary to recognise that intermediaries increasingly also serve the purpose of 
transaction handling, information intermediation and access.43 
The proliferation, increased specialisation and the transformative function of 
intermediaries become apparent when considering a few examples from the financial 
securities markets. Typically, the more sophisticated a settlement and clearing 
system becomes and the larger the volume of transactions processed by such 
system, the more specialisation takes place, increasing the number of intermediaries. 
A central securities despository (CSD) may for example provide the infrastructure for 
the settlement of securities transactions. The registered participants provide access 
to this settlement system, whereas settlement banks provide access to the payment 
system. A range of custodians further down the line in turn provide access to the 
system to end-investors, they can offer cost reductions by pooling securities and they 
simplify the complexity of the settlement process by concluding the exchange on 
behalf of clients. Intermediaries may undertake the netting of transactions for the 
settlement of funds, thereby expediting the exchange. They may provide clearing 
functions such as the matching of trade data (regularly undertaken by stock 
exchanges) or the reduction of counter-party risk through becoming guarantors of a 
trade (this is a function performed in sophisticated systems by intermediaries known 
as central counterparties); or they may facilitate the “transfer of ownership” by 
maintaining a system of ledgers and accounts. Custodians manage securities on 
behalf of clients, providing a service of simplification and convenience. The credit 
ratings supplied by rating agencies have an effect on the liquidity of securities and 
the services offered by international depositories promote trading on a global scale. 
9 3 2 Relationship-based and systemic intermediation 
In theory, a definition or description of intermediaries is therefore so wide that it 
includes any entity or institution that provides value-adding services in financial 
markets. For purposes of this analysis, the descriptor “intermediary” can be 
significantly narrowed by focusing exclusively on those intermediaries that are 
positioned between an issuer and an investor in relation to holding, “ownership”, and 
the flow of benefits. Of interest are therefore the relationship-based intermediaries, 
not those that provide a once-off service in the process of transacting with shares 
                                            
43
 The first two are named by Leyens “Financial Intermediaries” in Max Planck Encyclopaedia of 
European Private Law I 701 as functions in addition to transformation. 
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and other securities. Relationship-based intermediaries create vertical structures. 
Transaction-based intermediaries facilitate horizontal movement. The former type of 
intermediation creates a relationship between an investor and an intermediary. This 
relationship does not eliminate the issuer-investor relationship, but it may transform it. 
A vertical layering of relationships takes place. 
The business of intermediation has evolved dramatically, particularly in the sphere 
of financial markets, from the custody and safekeeping of physical things to the 
custody of intangible investments.44 Modern custody of investments is concerned 
with monetary value, not the physical integrity of the deposited thing. It is 
accompanied by a number of accessory services, such as settlement and clearing, 
which may indeed be the primary reason for appointing an intermediary.45 This is true 
for all systems, regardless of whether they ever made use of the concept of deposit 
in relation to shares. Changes are primarily driven by the emergence of more, and 
particularly more specialised and sophisticated intermediaries. When referring to 
“intermediation”, two situations therefore need to be distinguished; for convenience, I 
will label them “simple intermediation” and “systemic intermediation”.  
Nominee holdings of shares surfaced quite early in all of the legal systems 
surveyed. Although nominees do intermediate the relationship between the issuer 
and the investor, this intermediation is optional and the structure of the relationship 
between the investor and the use of a nominee is subject to their own determination. 
This is not what one usually has in mind when considering “intermediation” in a 
modern context. “Systemic intermediation” rather describes a form of intermediation 
that is frequently neither optional, particularly in the context of listed shares, nor can 
the framework, rules and structures of intermediation be negotiated by the parties. 
Essential system structures, such as settlement and clearing can regularly not be 
accessed without the assistance of certain intermediaries.46 The same is true of the 
payment side of securities transactions – most investors are neither permitted nor do 
                                            
44
 AO Austen-Peters Custody of Investments: Law and Practice (2000) 2. 
45
 3. 
46
 These intermediaries act as “gatekeepers” in that they provide access to markets and systems, see 
above, 9 3 1 The economic theory of intermediation. Also see CW Mooney “Beyond Negotiability: A 
New Model for Transfer and Pledge of Interests in Securities Controlled by Intermediaries” (1990) 12 
Cardozo LR 305 316: “However, this intermediary control phenomenon reflects more than mere 
convenience for active investors; it is an essential element of their participation in the market.” 
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they desire to maintain accounts directly with a central bank.47 Legal regulation is an 
enabler of systemic intermediation; in fact, for truly systemic structures of 
intermediation to exist, legislation is a prerequisite.  
Systemic intermediation is shaped significantly by the electronic environment. 
Long past is the time when investors would receive aesthetically appealing 
certificates to evidence their shareholding and would have their name entered onto 
the company’s share register or present the company with coupons to claim 
dividends or other performance by the company. In modern, indirect holding systems, 
one or more persons are typically positioned between the issuer and the investor. 
These persons perform an assortment of tasks, ranging from settlement and clearing, 
exercising voting rights, receiving income and capital distributions, maintaining 
customer accounts and making book entries, amongst others. A great preponderance 
of these tasks have an exclusive existence in the virtual world. This is the 
phenomenon of systemic intermediation.  
Structures of intermediation now consist of various “tiers of intermediaries”. At the 
top tier is the direct holder, registered as such on, either the records of an issuer or 
those maintained by a central securities depository. This is typically a depository or a 
similar central agency or system participant. At the bottom is the final investor. 
Sandwiched between them are one or more tiers of intermediaries. They maintain 
accounts on behalf of investors or lower-tier intermediaries and some of them access 
the central register. It is intermediaries that facilitate trading and settlement as well as 
the transfer of shares.48 Intermediation therefore inevitably has an effect on how we 
hold shares, how we transfer shares, how we pay for the transfer and how we 
generally transact with shares. More specifically, the central feature is intermediation 
in an electronic setting. It is account structures and book entries that populate the 
spaces and define the relationships between the various intermediaries and parties in 
the pyramid. When selling a share, a seller’s account with his intermediary is debited 
to reflect the decrease in shares and a buyer’s account with her intermediary is 
credited to reflect an increase. The same is true of the accounts cascading up. The 
pyramid is an accounts-based construct. 
                                            
47
 RD Guynn Modernizing Securities Ownership, Transfer and Pledging Laws: A Discussion Paper on 
the Need for International Harmonization (1996) 17. On the use of central bank money, see below, 
9 4 3 Payment. 
48
 For a more comprehensive list of the functions performed by intermediaries, see Dubovec 
Securities, Commodities and Bank Accounts 10.  
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How does systemic intermediation influence the primary relationship between the 
issuer and the investor? A company is traditionally entitled, in fact mandated, to 
perform only towards persons registered as shareholders on the register maintained 
by the company for that purpose, or alternatively, depending on the design of the 
system, towards those persons in possession of a valid share certificate. 
Intermediaries are positioned between an issuer and an investor with the implication 
that some of them will become shareholders directly entitled to receive performance 
from the company. A relationship will come into existence between an issuer and an 
intermediary. In addition, an intermediary will enter into a relationship with its client, 
which may be another intermediary or an investor. An investor is ultimately entitled to 
the benefits by virtue of being the “owner” of the shares, even if he is not registered 
as such in the records of a company. The comparative analysis will show that there 
are various ways in which structures of intermediation, through which benefits will 
flow from the company to the investor, can be conceptualised. The “object” of the 
relationship between the investor and his intermediary and therefore the basis for his 
claim of the benefits may be a “share”, or it may be a different asset altogether, 
although one that is derived from a “share”. Succinctly stated, the question is how 
and in which form the benefits that flow from shares are passed down a chain of 
intermediaries from one tier to another. The question is also one of the quality and 
scope of the transformation undertaken by the intermediaries. The transformation will 
determine whether a new asset is created. It will furthermore determine the 
relationship between the intermediary and the share and the newly created asset. 
Lastly, it will define the relationship between the intermediary and its client. 
The intermediation between a company and an investor in relation to the flow of 
benefits must be carefully distinguished from the relationship between a seller and 
purchaser of shares. The former is a vertical movement along structures of 
intermediation, the latter a horizontal movement from one investor to another that 
may simultaneously result in a rearrangement of the vertical structure of 
intermediaries. 
Systemic intermediation, for all the value it adds to transactions on financial 
markets is also inherently risky. The accounts-based structure connects numerous 
participants, intermediaries, custodians and central agencies. While enabling faster 
and more efficient settlement and clearing, it creates a dangerous interdependence. 
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If one participant fails there is a very real possibility that the failure will cascade along 
the chain of intermediaries to other participants, compromising the stability of the 
entire system – a threat known as systemic risk.49 What makes this risk particularly 
potent are the additional links between the securities settlement system, markets and 
securities exchanges and other accounts based systems, most importantly the 
banking system.50 
Every investor of shares is exposed to issuer risk – that is the risk of the failure or 
poor performance of the issuer of securities. 51  Over and above the issuer risk, 
investors holding through intermediaries carry intermediary risk. This is the risk that 
the intermediary will fail, experience financial distress or may experience a shortfall.52 
In addition, structures of systemic intermediation generally exhibit great 
complexity. The credit risks associated with complexity become particularly 
pronounced during exchange transactions. Credit risk is “the risk that a counterparty 
will not settle an obligation in full, either when due or at any time thereafter”.53 Credit 
risk can be subdivided into principal risk, replacement cost risk and liquidity risk. 
While principal risk is the risk of loss of the full value of funds or securities, liquidity 
risk is the risk that a counterparty does not perform in full on the agreed date of 
settlement but on an unspecified future date. 54  Parties are further exposed to 
replacement cost risk, which describes the unrealised gain from a failed transaction, 
                                            
49
 This is also known as the domino effect. See J Benjamin Interests in Securities: A Proprietary 
Analysis of the International Securities Markets (2000) 197; S Rambure & A Nacamuli Payment 
Systems: From the Salt Mines to the Board Room (2008) 151. In the report, Bank for International 
Settlement Delivery Versus Payment in Securities Settlement Systems (1992) 14, systemic risk is 
defined as “the risk that the inability of one institution to meet its obligations when due will cause other 
institutions to fail to meet their obligations when due”. 
50
 Dubovec Securities, Commodities and Bank Accounts 7-8. 
51
 CW Mooney “Law and Systems for Intermediated Securities and the Relationship of Private 
Property Law to Securities Clearance and Settlement: United States, Japan, and the UNIDROIT Draft 
Convention” in Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan Discussion Paper Series 
2008-E-7 (2008) 2-3. 
52
 2-3. 
53
 The Giovannini Group Second Report on EU Clearing and Settlement Arrangements (April 2003) 
53. 
54
 The Giovannini Group Cross-Border Clearing and Settlement Arrangements in the European Union 
(2001) 18; The Giovannini Group Second Report on EU Clearing and Settlement Arrangements (April 
2003) 54, 55; Bank for International Settlement Delivery Versus Payment in Securities Settlement 
Systems (1992) 13; Rambure & Nacamuli Payment Systems 150-151. 
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leaving the party to replace the transaction at a current market price that is lower than 
the contract price initially agreed to.55 
9 3 3 A brief overview of important intermediaries 
9 3 3 1 Custodians 
Custody is a commercial, not a legal term.56 On the one hand a custodian is the 
equivalent of a traditional depositee, but for intangibles – a custodian takes 
responsibility for the safekeeping of securities. To this end, custodians maintain 
securities or cash accounts or both for their clients. The safekeeping of securities has 
mutated to a function of record-keeping. Transfers must be meticulously recorded, 
balances must be reconciled with central registers and client assets must be properly 
segregated from own assets.57 All these actions are exclusive to electronic records 
and have no equivalent in the physical world. Custodians facilitate access to a 
securities settlement system, a payment system and to other non-custody 
intermediaries, such as central counterparties.58 In addition, custodians in modern 
financial systems perform a variety of tasks, most notably the administration of 
assets.59 This includes servicing corporate actions such as the payment of dividends 
and voting.60 Custodians may also offer a range of value-adding services to generate 
additional revenue, including cash management, collateral management, foreign 
exchange, tax support, reporting and securities lending.61 Global custodians perform 
these tasks across national borders. 62  While local custodians may also offer 
brokerage services, the brokerage and custodial functions should be viewed 
separately. The same is true for the additional services offered by custodians. 
                                            
55
 The Giovannini Group Cross-Border Clearing and Settlement Arrangements in the European Union 
(2001) 18; Bank for International Settlement Delivery Versus Payment in Securities Settlement 
Systems (1992) 13. 
56
 Benjamin Interests in Securities 226. 
57
 The Clearing House The Custody Services of Banks (2016) 5. 
58
 11-12, iii. 
59
 Benjamin Interests in Securities 223-224. 
60
 224. 
61
 M Yates & G Montagu The Law of Global Custody: Legal Risk Management in Securities 
Investment and Collateral 4 ed (2013) 4 [1.10]. Also see The Clearing House Custody Services of 
Banks 7-9. 
62
 See AW Beaves “Global Custody – A Tentative Analysis of Property and Contract” in N Palmer & E 
McKendrick (eds) Interests in Goods 2 ed (1998) 117. 
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9 3 3 2 Brokers 
Brokers conclude transactions in securities (typically buying and selling transactions) 
for others.63 In addition, they may provide investment advice.64 Whether a broker has 
a discretion in the buying and selling of securities on behalf of a client depends on 
the terms of the agreement concluded between a broker and its client.65 The term 
brokerage, Rogers notes, is frequently used to denote three functions, namely the 
investment-advice function, the trading (buying and selling) function as well as the 
custodial function.66 He cautions that the custodial function must be distinguished 
from the other functions. 67  It is at issue only where intermediaries are used to 
“maintain continued control” over securities belonging to another.68  
9 3 3 3 Depository Institutions 
Depository institutions initially emerged in Germany and the US for the safekeeping 
of certificated shares and securities.69  Deposit is a concept traditionally used in 
relation to physical objects.  
In the US, physical custody continues to play an important role. At the apex of a 
pyramid of depositories is a central securities depository (“CSD”). Applying the 
principles of bailment to intermediary relationships would, however, fall short of the 
far-reaching changes brought about by the introduction of concepts such as 
securities accounts and security entitlement. 
In German law the physical share certificate remains the basis of the relationships 
formed in a securities holding chain structured in line with the traditional concept of 
deposit. Its principles and rules have, however, been adapted to meet the specific 
demands of the securities industry.70 
The descriptor “CSD” is now used widely across many legal systems. Except in 
systems where physical custody of certificates continues to have conceptual force, it 
                                            
63
 See for example the definition in the US Securities Exchange Act of 1934 s 3(4). A “dealer”, on the 
other hand, is defined as a person who buys and sells securities for his own account – s 3(5)(A). 
64
 Reviewing the Regulation of Financial Markets in South Africa: Policy Document Explaining the 
Financial Markets Bill, 2011 (2011) 16. 
65
 16-17. 
66
 JS Rogers “Policy Perspectives on Revised U.C.C Article 8” (1996) 48 UCLA LR 1431 1494. 
67
 1495. 
68
 Mooney (1990) Cardozo LR 316. 
69
 Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012, definition of “deposit” in s 1(1). For a more detailed discussion see 
below, 13 1 Overview of the commercial structures. 
70
 The framework of a deposit of securities is set out in the Depotgesetz. 
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is, however, largely unrelated to the physical custody traditionally associated with a 
deposit. In England, legislation refers to “depositories” only in relation to foreign 
associations.71 The documentation of CREST uses the terms “CSD” and “deposit”, 
but without defining them. It becomes clear that a deposit only relates to the initial 
dematerialisation of shares held in certificated form.72 As such, deposit denotes not a 
lasting relationship, but a once-off event. Mechanisms of deposit do not apply to 
shares already issued in dematerialised form.73 The mechanism of deposit does not 
make CREST (“Certificateless Registry for Electronic Share Transfer”) a holder of 
securities. CREST is merely an operator.74 It does not stand in the chain of holding 
between the issuer and the investor.75 
In South Africa, the definition of a “central securities depository” follows the 
English model of the CSD as an operator rather than a holder. A CSD is defined as 
“a person who constitutes, maintains and provides an infrastructure for holding 
uncertificated securities which enables the making of entries in respect of 
uncertificated securities, and which infrastructure includes a securities settlement 
system”.76  
Whether a CSD therefore physically holds securities certificates or underlying 
assets or only regulates and provides access to a system designed to facilitate the 
settlement of securities differs across legal systems. 
9 4 Trade, settlement and clearing 
9 4 1 Trade 
Whereas the issuing of shares takes place on the primary market, should the initial 
holder of the shares decide to realise his investment, he will do so on the secondary 
market. The sale of shares, through contractual agreement, is known as trading. In 
other words, the trade encompasses the process of contract formation. In the context 
                                            
71
 See for example the Uncertificated Securities Regulations 2001 Schedule 5(7). 
72
 See Euroclear CREST Reference Manual Chapter (October 2018) ch 3. 
73
 Ch 3. 
74
 See below, 10 1 Overview of the commercial structures. See Benjamin Interests in Securities 205 
[9.53]. Also see the definition of a CSD in art 2(1)(1) of Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on improving securities settlement in the European 
Union and on central securities depositories (“Central Securities Depositories Regulation”), being “a 
legal person that operates a securities settlement system”. 
75
 See Department for Business Innovation and Skills BIS Research Paper 261: Exploring the 
Intermediated Shareholding Model (2016) 25. 
76
 Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 s 1(1). Also see s 30(2)(a)-(b). 
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of listed shares, trading takes place through the stock exchange and is facilitated by 
electronic trading systems. Trading is also known as a front-end function.77 Trading 
today is synonymous with remote exchanges between market participants. 
9 4 2 Clearing and settlement 
Trades concluded in the front-end segment of the market must be settled in the back-
end. Once shares have been sold, the seller must deliver the title to shares in 
exchange for the payment contractually agreed upon. This performance of the 
contract is known as settlement, facilitated by electronic settlement systems.78 More 
specifically, settlement concerns itself with the technical performance of the contract 
within the bounds of a given legal framework. The settlement infrastructure, largely 
hidden from sight, is essential for the proper functioning of financial systems.79  
Settlement involves two legs – a transfer of the shares and the corresponding 
transfer of the funds – and therefore necessitates the interaction between a securities 
settlement system and a payment system. The aim is that these two legs should 
occur simultaneously or as close as possible to each other to achieve what is known 
as delivery-versus-payment (“DVP”). This minimises credit risk, particularly principal 
risk. In 1989 the Group of Thirty recommended that Delivery versus Payment should 
be the method for settling all securities.80 Various Delivery versus Payment models 
have been identified. 81  DVP Model 1 refers to the settlement of both securities 
(delivery) and funds (payment) on a gross basis as every transaction occurs. Both 
the final transfer of securities and funds takes place intra-day and simultaneously.82 
DVP model 2 is the settlement of securities (delivery) on a gross basis as the 
transaction takes place and the corresponding settlement of funds (payment) on a 
net basis at the end of the settlement cycle or settlement day. The final transfer of 
securities takes place intra-day, whereas the final transfer of funds takes place at the 
                                            
77
 Dubovec Securities, Commodities and Bank Accounts 3. 
78
 Yates & Montagu The Law of Global Custody 9 [1.27]. 
79
 The settlement infrastructure has been compared to the plumbing of a building – see Rogers (1996) 
UCLA LR 1448; Benjamin Interests in Securities 19-22, [1.65]-[1.74]; in general see M Haentjens “The 
Law Applicable to Indirectly Held Securities: the Plumbing of International Securities Transactions” in 
S van Erp, A Salomons & B Akkermans (eds) The Future of European Property Law (2006) 165. 
80
 Group of Thirty Clearance and Settlement Systems in the World’s Securities Markets (1989) 11 
(Recommendation 5). 
81
 See Bank for International Settlement Delivery Versus Payment in Securities Settlement Systems 
(1992). 
82
 16, 17-19. 
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end of the day.83  DVP Model 3 describes a settlement system that settles both 
securities (delivery) and funds (payment) on a net basis at the end of a settlement 
cycle. Both the final transfer of securities and funds takes place at the end of the 
settlement day.84 
Traditionally, settlement involved the movement of paper.85 Electronic settlement 
takes place by a book transfer of shares. Book entry transfers are implemented 
through the debiting and corresponding crediting of securities accounts held by 
participants upon the receipt of an electronic instruction to that effect. 
Although the electronic settlement system significantly reduces the delay between 
trade and settlement, known as the settlement interval, a few days usually elapse 
before the trade is finally settled.86 This delay creates risks for the parties, most 
notably the risk that the buyer or seller may become insolvent before settlement 
takes place.87 The management of these post-trade, pre-settlement credit risks is 
known as clearing.88 The clearing function, together with settlement, custody and 
account management comprise the back-end system. Clearing is largely an 
administrative process.89 Stated very briefly, during clearing the contractual rights 
and obligations agreed to during trade are modified to enable settlement. 90  An 
important clearing function is the matching or confirmation of trade data. If A, for 
example, sends an instruction to buy 100 shares in company X for 20 per share, this 
instruction is matched with the instruction of B to sell 100 shares in company X for 20 
per share. Matching takes place before a transaction can proceed to be settled. On 
settlement day, clearing includes calculating the positions of the counterparties, 
which may be facilitated by central counterparties. To reduce the risk that the 
counterparty to a transaction may default, a central counterparty (CCP) may be 
interposed, provided such a facility is made available by the clearing organisation. A 
                                            
83
 16, 20-21. 
84
 16, 21-24. 
85
 With regard to bearer shares, only the delivery of paper certificates is required, whereas registered 
shares usually involve the delivery of an instrument of transfer (a transfer form in English law), the 
share certificate and registration (in English law). 
86
 The Group of Thirty Clearance and Settlement Systems in the World’s Securities Markets (1989) 
has recommended a settlement interval of T+3 (see Recommendation 7). In South Africa the 
settlement interval has been reduced to T+3 during 2016.  
87
 Yates & Montagu The Law of Global Custody 208 [8.22]. For a brief exposition of risks, see 208-
211. 
88
 9 [1.26]. 
89
 Dubovec Securities, Commodities and Bank Accounts 9. 
90
 Benjamin Interests in Securities (2000) 22-23; also see Group of Thirty Global Clearing and 
Settlement: A Plan of Action (1990) 13. 
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CCP can be defined as “[a]n entity that is the buyer to every seller and the seller to 
every buyer of a specified set of contracts”.91 In this construction the CCP becomes 
the legal counterparty to every trade. Typically this can be achieved in two ways: By 
replacing the existing contract between, for example A and B, with a set of contracts 
between A and the CCP and B and the CCP.92 This model amounts to a novation. In 
legal terms, the original bilateral contract marks the point of contract formation. 
Another approach is an “open offer” by the CCP to act as a counterparty; the CCP is 
interposed between the market participants when the trade is executed, thus there is 
no obligation between the market participants that must be extinguished.93 As soon 
as matching takes place, the CCP is interposed and makes an “open offer” to the 
relevant parties, whereby two contracts are concluded – one between each party and 
the CCP. In legal terms, these contracts mark the point of contract formation and no 
obligations ever arise between the parties. While CCP’s act as guarantors of the 
trade and therefore mitigate the risk that one of the parties fails to perform, they are 
themselves exposed to significant risk94 and in turn expose the entire system to risk 
should one or more CCP fail.95 To manage the credit risk that the CCP is exposed to, 
membership, and particularly capital requirements of clearing members must be 
carefully set. 96  In addition, clearing members are usually required to provide 
collateral, and a CCP maintains sufficient financial resources of its own, in the form of 
a default fund, to cover uncollateralised losses and to provide sufficient liquidity. 97  
                                            
91
 Group of Thirty Global Clearing and Settlement: A Plan of Action (1990) 22; Bank for International 
Settlement Recommendations for Central Counterparties: Consultative Report (2004) 1 para 1.1; Bank 
for International Settlements, Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) & Technical 
Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Recommendations 
for Securities Settlement Systems: Report of the CPSS-IOSCO Joint Task Force on Securities 
Settlement Systems (January 2001) 44. 
92
 For more detail on central counterparties see European Central Bank & Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago The Role of Central Counterparties (2007). 
93
 Bank for International Settlement Recommendations for Central Counterparties: Consultative Report 
(2004) 5 para 2.1. 
94
 Bank for International Settlement Recommendations for Central Counterparties: Consultative Report 
(2004). 
95
 This is known as systemic risk. 
96
 Bank for International Settlement Recommendations for Central Counterparties: Consultative Report 
(2004) 7-8; European Central Bank & Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago The Role of Central 
Counterparties (2007) 6. 
97
 Bank for International Settlement Recommendations for Central Counterparties: Consultative Report 
(2004) 8-9; European Central Bank & Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago The Role of Central 
Counterparties (2007) 6. 
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Netting has become an important clearing function. Netting is the offsetting of the 
positions of multiples parties in order to reach a single value.98 Whereas bilateral 
netting is the netting of all transactions between two parties, multilateral netting 
achieves the netting of all transactions of one party as against all other parties.99 
Netting greatly enhances the speed and efficiency of securities settlement. Yet, it has 
as a consequence that particular deliveries can no longer be linked to particular 
trades or contractual arrangements from which they emanate.100  
9 4 3 Payment 
The interaction between securities settlement systems and payment systems has the 
potential to be particularly marred by risk. Central banks play a vital role in mitigating 
these risks. Central bank money refers to money that can only be created by a 
central bank, usually in the form of cash (coins and banknotes) or central bank 
deposits, which include mandatory deposits and deposits used to settle 
transactions. 101  Each system participant must nominate a settlement bank with 
central bank access to ensure payment of its securities transactions.  
                                            
98
 Group of Thirty Clearance and Settlement Systems in the World’s Securities Markets (1989) 37 
99
 Rogers (1996) UCLA LR 1442. 
100
 JS Rogers “An Essay on Horseless Carriages and Paperless Negotiable Instruments: Some 
Lessons from the Article 8 Revision” (1995) 31 Idaho LR 694. 
101
 In general, see Bank for International Settlements The Role of Central Bank Money in Payment 
Systems (August 2003); European Central Bank The Use of Central Bank Money for Settling 
Securities Transactions (May 2004). 
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Chapter 10: The effect of systemic intermediation in England 
10 1 Overview of the commercial structures 
The key provisions enabling the issue of shares without a written instrument are 
found in Chapter 2, Part 21 of the Companies Act 2006. These do not include any 
substantive rules on the regulation of uncertificated securities, but merely enable 
regulations to be made to that effect. Section 785(1) provides that “[p]rovision may be 
made by regulations for enabling title to securities to be evidenced and transferred 
without a written instrument”. The Uncertificated Securities Regulations 2001 
completely eliminate physical securities certificates, enabling securities to be issued 
in dematerialised form.1  
The electronic settlement of securities takes place through CREST, an electronic 
settlement system operated by Euroclear UK & Ireland. In addition to providing 
settlement services through CREST, Euroclear offers custody services and issuer 
services, amongst others. In the context of UK shares and securities, CREST does 
not act as a depository in the traditional, relationship-based sense.2 Nonetheless, it is 
often referred to as a central securities depository. 3 The Uncertificated Securities 
Regulations 2001 rather label CREST as a “relevant system”, being “a computer-
based system, and procedures, which enable title to the units of a security to be 
evidenced and transferred without a written instrument, and which facilitate 
supplementary and incidental matters”. 4  Deposit or bailment, as historically 
conceived, may have ownership implications. 5  The fact that CREST is not a 
depository is significant, because it means that CREST does not hold title to the 
securities and therefore does not stand between the issuers and the investors.6 
                                            
1
 See for example s 2 of the Uncertificted Securities Regulations 2001. 
2
 See above, 9 3 3 A brief overview of important intermediaries. 
3
 See for example D French, SW Mayson & CL Ryan Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law 31
 
ed 
(2014-2015) 221. The website of Euroclear UK & Ireland also refers to a CSD, but rather determines 
Euroclear UK & Ireland, as the operator of CREST, to be the CSD. 
4
 Uncertificated Securities Regulations s 2(1). 
5
 See above, 8 3 3 4 Deposit and bailment. 
6
 J Benjamin Interests in Securities: A Proprietary Analysis of the International Securities Markets 
(2000) 205 [9.53] and [9.54]. Compare this to the position in US law set out below at 11 2 Overview of 
the commercial structures. 
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All publicly traded shares and securities must be held electronically, 7  which 
requires that the operator admit these shares to the electronic system and that the 
company provide for electronic shares in its articles of association. 8  A share or 
security admitted by the operator to be transferred by means of the electronic system 
is known as a “participating security” and an issuer of such a security is known as a 
“participating issuer”.9  
To sell or otherwise transfer securities via this system, to put up securities as 
collateral or to undertake other acts in relation to the securities, the parties involved 
(the buyer and the seller in case of a sale) must have member accounts10 and 
therefore be members of CREST.11 While some members are “system-participants” 
and as such have the requisite hardware and software to send dematerialised 
instructions concerning shares and securities held by themselves, other members are 
“sponsored members” and must use the services of a “sponsored system-participant” 
to send a properly authenticated dematerialised instruction on their behalf.12 CREST 
segregates the function of transferring shares and being a party to a transaction from 
the function of inputting instructions. While all system members are parties to a 
transaction, not all of them will be able to generate properly authenticated 
dematerialised instructions themselves. 13  Only certain parties are approved to 
connect to the CREST system.  
CREST members can also act as custodians (or nominees) for their clients.14 
Generally, custodians which are CREST participants hold client shares and securities 
in pooled accounts, the custodian therefore opening only one CREST member 
account. Both the CREST and issuer’s register will reflect the custodian as the 
shareholder. Alternatively, custodians can hold the securities of clients in designated 
accounts, being separate member accounts, which are nonetheless opened in the 
                                            
7
 See London Stock Exchange Rules of the London Stock Exchange: Rule Book (18 June 2018) 
Section 5: Settlement, Clearing and Benefit Rules, Rule 5025; also see the definition of “electronic 
form”. 
8
 Uncertificated Securities Regulations 2001 ss 14 and 15. 
9
 For the definitions see Uncertificated Securities Regulations 2001 s 3(1). 
10
 See Euroclear CREST Glossary (October 2018) “member account”. 
11
 Also see the definition of “system member” in Uncertificated Securities Regulations 2001 s 3(1). 
12
 See the definition of “sponsored member” in Euroclear CREST Glossary. Also see the definition of 
“sponsoring system-participant” in s 3(1) of the Uncertificated Securities Regulations 2001. 
13
 Note that the terminology employed by CREST in their own documentation deviates from that in the 
Uncertificated Securities Regulations. CREST describes a “user” as a person that communicates 
directly with the CREST system; see Euroclear CREST Glossary. 
14
 Generally on the different types of custody arrangements see M Yates & G Montagu The Law of 
Global Custody: Legal Risk Management in Securities Investment and Collateral 4 ed (2013) 253-256. 
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name of the custodian.15 As a final option, custodians can act as sponsors for their 
clients, who open their own CREST member accounts, but rely on the custodian to 
communicate with the system on their behalf.16 In this model the custodian does not 
act as an intermediary. In theory at least, CREST therefore makes provision for a 
direct holding of shares and other securities; yet, in practice, most securities are held 
indirectly in pooled accounts. 
In addition to the member accounts in which shares (and other securities) are 
held, each member also has a cash memorandum account in which the cash balance 
of a member is recorded.17 To implement the payment leg of a transaction, each 
member must nominate a “settlement bank”.18 An agreement between a member and 
his settlement bank makes credit available to the client for purchases of shares and 
other securities. The settlement bank’s exposure to risk can be limited by imposing a 
cap on the amount of credit granted, known as a debit cap.19 Additionally, the credit 
may be secured by a charge over the securities held in the member account.20 
10 2 Intermediation – a legal perspective 
The moment an entry is made in the investor’s account with his intermediary, the 
investor has certain rights he can exercise against his intermediary. Widely discussed 
in recent years has been the question whether these rights comprise an asset that is 
separate from the shares themselves. 
The notion of a separate asset being created through intermediation originated in 
US law, but has found its proponents in English law. Benjamin terms the asset 
“interests in securities”, defined as “the assets of a client for whom an intermediary 
holds securities (or interests in securities) on an unallocated basis, commingled with 
the interests in securities of other clients”. 21  The implication is that “interests in 
securities” are conceptually separate from the underlying securities. She does 
                                            
15
 Yates & Montagu The Law of Global Custody 208 254 [9.34]; Benjamin Interests in Securities 207 
[9.60]. 
16
 Yates & Montagu The Law of Global Custody 208 175 [9.36]; Benjamin Interests in Securities 207-
208 [9.61]. 
17
 See definitions of “member account” and “cash memorandum account” in Euroclear CREST 
Glossary; See also Euroclear CREST Reference Manual Chapter (October 2018) ch 2, s 5. A member 
may have more than one member account. 
18
 See definition in Uncertificated Securities Regulations 2001 s 3(1). 
19
 Euroclear CREST Reference Manual ch 6 s 3. 
20
 Ch 6 s 7. 
21
 Benjamin Interests in Securities 5 [1.04]. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
172 
 
recognise, however, that “interests in securities” derive from “securities”, particularly 
their economic value and the economic risks and rewards usually associated with 
ownership of the underlying securities. 22  The same terminology is used in the 
Uncertificated Securities Regulations 200123 as well as the Financial Markets Law 
Committee.24  
Austen-Peters similarly recognises that the interests of the parties must be 
separated. Analogous to a structure of trusts and sub-trusts, the depository or first-
tier custodian has the legal title to shares, a sub-custodian has the right to benefit 
from shares held by the first-tier custodian for the sub-custodian, and an investor, in 
turn, has the right to benefit from the equitable interest held by the sub-custodian.25 
His terminology neatly elucidates the different tiers of holding securities, but is 
somewhat cumbersome.  
Pretto-Sakmann dedicates a portion of her enquiry to finding the most suitable 
terminology for these newly created assets.26 She prefers the term of sub-securities, 
more specifically sub-shares, which is easy to augment in the case of multi-tiered 
holdings to illustrate the various levels of intermediation. A sub-share can therefore 
become a sub-sub-share and so forth.27  
In fact, the terminology employed is often reminiscent of the vocabulary of trusts 
and sub-trusts. Leaving aside the question of nomenclature for the time being, the 
principles of the law of trusts are frequently brought to bear on intermediated 
structures of holding shares. Trust law, as depicted above,28 is traditionally used to 
explain intermediated holdings of shares, either where such a holding is expressly 
desired or where fairness demands it. Through intermediation, there is at once a 
distinction between a registered holder and an investor. The question is how the 
benefit derived from shares can be passed down multiple tiers of intermediaries to a 
                                            
22
 29, 30. 
23
 See the definition of “interest in a security” in s 3(1) of the Uncertificated Securities Regulations 
2001. Interestingly, the definition includes, not only interests or rights created when a security is held 
by a custodian or trustee, but also “an absolute or contingent right to acquire a security created, 
allotted or issued or to be created, allotted or issued”. 
24
 Financial Markets Law Committee Property Interests in Investment Securities: Analysis of the Need 
for and Nature of Legislation Relating to Property Interests in Indirectly Held Investment Securities, 
with a Statement of Principles for an Investment Securities Statute (July 2004) Principle 2 (Part 8). 
25
 AO Austen-Peters Custody of Investments: Law and Practice (2000) 70 [4.40]. 
26
 See A Pretto-Sakmann Boundaries of Personal Property: Shares and Sub-Shares (2005) 49-59. 
27
 57. 
28
 See above, 8 3 2 6 Equity and trusts. 
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final investor. Trust law, by enabling a distinction between legal and beneficial 
ownership, lends itself to facilitating such structures of intermediation. Furthermore, 
trust law provides the beneficial owner with some kind of proprietary interest.29 Trust 
law therefore allays the fears that a client’s rights in relation to shares held by an 
intermediary are merely contractual claims.30  
The intricacies of trust law cannot be applied seamlessly to multi-tiered constructs 
of intermediaries.31 Intermediation today is systemic; it permeates the entire structure 
of securities holdings. What would be required is a pyramid of trusts. Traditional 
principles of trust law do make provision for multi-tiered trusts, commonly known as 
sub-trusts. Maitland has written of “the use” (which is the beneficial interest) being 
turned into an incorporeal thing.32 This appears even more clearly from the writings of 
Langdell. He distinguishes between the trust property, which is the subject (res) of 
the equitable obligation and the equitable obligation, which can be a res itself.33 
Therefore, “the equitable obligation itself is as much the subject of ownership as is a 
legal obligation”,34 and further, “it follows that such a right [the equitable obligation] 
may be the subject of a purchase and sale, or of a new equitable obligation”.35 These 
statements at once illustrate the creation of separate assets and the possibility of 
creating sub-trusts over such assets. The beneficial obligation, although being an 
asset in itself, is derived from the trust asset, as well as dependent on it.36  
Yet, sub-trusts are not without their problems. If we assume that a trustee holds 
property on trust for X and X subsequently declares that he holds his equitable 
interest on trust for Y absolutely, it is not entirely clear whether the sub-trust will 
effectively collapse, thus removing X from the construction. The courts in some cases 
contemplate that the sub-trustee “disappears from the picture”,37 the rationale being 
                                            
29
 See the debate above on the nature of such an interest, above 8 3 2 6 Equity and trusts. 
30
 Some authors argue that bailment may be an alternative or complementary solution; AW Beaves 
“Global Custody – A Tentative Analysis of Property and Contract” in N Palmer & E McKendrick (eds) 
Interests in Goods 2 ed (1998) 117. 
31
 See R Goode “Security Entitlements as Collateral and the Conflict of Laws” (1998) 7 JIBFL 22 23-
24, who cautions that the reference to trusts should be avoided. 
32
 FW Maitland Selected Essays (1936) (edited by HD Hazeltine, G Lapsley & PH Winfield) 164-165. 
33
 CC Langdell A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction 2 ed (1908) 6 n 1. 
34
 5 n 1. 
35
 6 n 1. 
36
 5. 
37
 See for example Grey v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1958] Ch 375 (ChD) at 382, which was set 
aside on appeal; also see the dissenting judgement of Lord Evershed in the appeal case of Grey v 
Inland Revenue Commissioners [1958] Ch 690 (HL) at 715. The dispute in this case concerned the 
question whether a declaration of sub-trust is a disposition in the form of an assignment, which 
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that the sub-trustee divests himself of his entire interest and no longer holds any 
property; he becomes but a superfluous bare trustee. Elsewhere, the courts have 
stated that, even though “the practical effect would seem to amount to or be capable 
of amounting to the ‘getting rid’ of the trust of the equitable interest then subsisting, it 
is not the same as saying that as a matter of law it does get rid of the intermediate 
trust”.38 Austen-Peters similarly refutes the “bare trustee” argument by finding that the 
sub-trustee does precisely what he is intended to do, namely fulfilling the functions of 
a repository of a benefit received from an upper-tier trustee.39 Despite remaining 
uncertainties, the creation of multi-tiered sub-trusts without collapse therefore must 
be taken to be possible. The structure envisaged for shares and other securities 
would be one of a series or hierarchy of sub-shares or sub-securities that is stable 
and not susceptible to collapse, each sub-share being a separate and different asset, 
though being derivative.40 
Nonetheless, Goode cautions that the sub-trust construction is not completely 
analogous of the intermediation of securities. 41  Combined with the distinctive 
characteristics of securities intermediation, Goode argues, that the focus should be 
on the formation of an entirely different asset and therefore on the creation of an 
original trust rather than a derivative sub-trust.42 In the same vein, Austen-Peters, in 
his analysis of sub-trusts, highlights the fact that a sub-trust leads to the creation of 
an entirely new equitable interest that must be understood to be different from the 
original equitable interest.43 
Most commonly, an investor acquires a proportionate interest in a pool of like 
securities administered by an intermediary. The investor has no rights in specific 
shares or securities, but rather an interest in the pool of securities. If there are 
multiple tiers of intermediaries, the intermediary in the top tier will be registered and 
therefore be the legal owner, but will (mostly) pool like shares together. The next 
                                                                                                                                        
requires writing in terms of s 53 (1)(c) of the Law of Property Act 1925, or a transfer of equitable title 
by declaration of trust. Of interest for the time being is merely the question whether a multi-tiered trust 
is possible at all or whether it inevitably collapses. 
38
 David Nelson v Greening & Sykes (Builders) Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 1358 (CA) at para 57, per Lord 
Collins.  
39
 Austen-Peters Custody of Investments 66-67 [4.29]. 
40
 Pretto-Sakmann Boundaries of Personal Property 58. 
41
 See the warning expressed by Goode (1998) JIBFL, as quoted in Pretto-Sakmann Boundaries of 
Personal Property 58. 
42
 Goode (1998) JIBFL 25. 
43
 Austen-Peters Custody of Investments 66-67 [4.29]. 
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level intermediary will have an interest in the pool of shares and will most likely pool 
like interests together. The investor will therefore have an interest in the pool of 
security interests maintained by his immediate intermediate. The interest derives 
from the securities account maintained by the intermediary and the account becomes 
the source of the investor’s entitlement.44 This total disconnect between the investor 
and any higher-tier intermediaries, or in fact the issuer, the pooling of assets held on 
trust, as well as the absolute inability to “leap frog” tiers, all serve as distinguishing 
factors from the ordinary principles of sub-trusts.45 
The same requirements as described in relation to trusts above apply; most 
notably certainty as to intention, subject matter and beneficiaries.46 Considering that 
an intermediary will typically conclude an agreement with a client to demarcate the 
boundaries of their relationship, intention is not problematic. 47  Neither are the 
beneficiaries, who will be clearly identified as part of such an agreement. Concerning 
the requirement of writing, an issue discussed with some frequency is whether the 
creation of a trust over a beneficial interest (such as a sub-trust) is a disposition and 
therefore required to be in writing.48 It is clear that the intermediary, as the client’s 
trustee, would not merely be a bare trustee, whose role can be filled out by his own 
trustee, as illustrated in relation to the collapsing of sub-trusts above. 49  Indeed 
collapsing is neither envisaged nor desired. Again the changed nature of the asset 
merits emphasis. The intermediary is not only a conduit for the shareholder’s rights, 
but plays a vital role in ensuring that the benefits of shareholding reach the investor. 
Furthermore, the intermediary, as a nominee, acts as a repository of title – a role that 
may not demand active intervention, but that nonetheless realises exactly what was 
intended by the parties.50  As set out in the economic analysis of intermediation 
above, intermediation has changed to such an extent that factors such as 
convenience, risk reduction and the facilitation of system access can be subsumed 
                                            
44
 Goode (1998) JIBFL 23. 
45
 25. 
46
 See above, 8 3 2 Transfer and holding in English law, n 129. 
47
 Note that the use of the word “trust” is not mandatory to establish a trust relationship. Rather the 
consequences of a trust must be intended. This applies even in cases of express trusts. See In Re 
Kayford Ltd (in liquidation) [1975] 1 WLR 279 at 281.  
48
 If it is a disposition s 53(1)(c) of the Law of Property Act would apply. For more detail on the section 
see below at 10 3 Electronic settlement and transfer. 
49
 See the cases cited above in nn 37 and 38. 
50
 Austen-Peters Custody of Investments 67 [4.29]. 
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under the intermediary function.51 Against this background writing is not required.. 
Nonetheless, agreements between intermediaries and their clients will customarily be 
put into writing.  
Lengthy and important discussions have been dedicated to determining whether 
the subject matter in a pool of securities is certain. For the purposes of this 
discussion, it suffices to summarise the major findings of the debate. To give effect to 
the requirement of certainty of subject matter, the trust property must be 
identifiable. 52  In a pool of intangible, dematerialised securities, the interests in 
securities of a client are commingled with the interests in securities of other clients. 
Interests in securities are unallocated as they do not attach to specific assets,53 they 
are fungible and have no distinguishing designations. The identifiability of trust 
property becomes problematic when mixing takes place. Roman law distinguished 
commixtio from confusio. 54  In the former case, the individual units retain their 
physical identity after mixing.55 Subsequent to a confusio, on the other hand, the 
units lose their physical integrity and it becomes impossible to separate the mixture.56 
The commingling of both registered shares as well as interests in shares are 
examples of confusio.57 Interests in shares have no unique designation and are by 
their nature undivided.58 Following a confusio, the prior owners become the owners in 
common of the unallocated whole in proportion to the value of their contribution to the 
whole.59 English law has developed to recognise that an undivided share of a whole 
is sufficiently identifiable without there being segregation or appropriation of specific 
property.60 The subject matter is certain if the interest is expressed as a proportion of 
the pool and not as a definite number of units in a pool. Applied to commingled 
interests in securities, it has been suggested that a single trust is established over the 
entire pool of interests with the clients as beneficiaries. 61  Clients will own an 
undivided fraction of the entire pool and therefore will be co-owners of the pool, the 
                                            
51
 See above, 9 3 1 The economic theory of intermediation. 
52
 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669 at 705E. 
53
 Benjamin Interests in Securities 53 [2.72]. 
54
 Justinian Institutes 2.1.27-28; P Birks “Mixtures” in N Palmer & E McKendrick (eds) Interests in 
Goods 2 ed (1998) 227 233.  
55
 Birks “Mixtures” in Interests in Goods 233. 
56
 233-234. 
57
 Benjamin Interests in Securities 55 [2.78]. 
58
 34-35. 
59
 P Stein “Roman Law in the Commercial Court” (1987) 46 Cambridge LJ 369 369. 
60
 See Re London Wine Co (Shippers) [1986] PCC 121 at 135-137; Pretto-Sakmann Boundaries of 
Personal Property 150-151. 
61
 Benjamin Interests in Securities 56 [2.82]-[2.84]. 
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subject matter of the trust being certain. 62  It is commonly suggested, that co-
ownership in relation to an unallocated pool of assets is in effect co-ownership of 
every single unit in the pool.63 This type of co-ownership may cause problems in 
relation to the disposal and burdening of an interest from the pool, possibly requiring 
the consent of every beneficiary, who each owns a fraction of every unit. Additionally, 
a shortfall may result in claims against units previously disposed of.64 
In a widely debated and controversial decision, the court in Hunter v Moss65 has 
embarked on a different route. In the case, the defendant declared himself a trustee 
for 5% of the share capital of the company consisting of 1000 identical shares. The 
defendant was the registered holder of 950 of these shares. Had a valid trust been 
established over the 50 shares without the separation of these shares from the 950 
shares? The court finds, that the determination of the certainty of intangibles cannot 
be based on the same principles as that of tangible assets.66 Specifically, the subject 
matter of the trust is certain, so the court finds, “if immediately after the declaration of 
trust … there would not have been any difficulty in ordering the trust to be carried into 
execution”.67 In these cases identification or segregation would be “unnecessary and 
irrelevant”.68 The decision was followed as binding in Re Harvard Securities Ltd (in 
liquidation).69 Criticised for being without basis in the law of trusts,70 the decision of 
the court was aimed at pragmatism and the recognition of commercial realities.71  
The two approaches yield different results in terms of the design of the trust 
structure: whereas the first approach results in a single trust over an entire pool of 
interests in shares, the second approach creates separate trusts for the interests in 
shares of each client and therefore sanctions the creation of a trust consisting of a 
definite number of unallocated units from a pool. 
                                            
62
 56. 
63
 Jackson v Anderson (1811) 128 ER 235 at 238; Birks “Mixtures” in Interests in Goods 248. But see 
the suggestion by Austen-Peters Custody of Investments 49-50, that the contributors to a pool of 
unallocated assets are rather co-owners of a number of whole units of the pool in proportion to the 
size or value of their contribution. 
64
 Austen-Peters Custody of Investments 48 [3.45]. 
65
 [1993] 1 WLR 934; [1994] 1 WLR 452. 
66
 Hunter v Moss [1993] 1 WLR 934 at 940. 
67
 946. 
68
 946. 
69
 [1998] BCC 567. 
70
 Benjamin Interests in Securities 58 [2.88]. 
71
 Petto-Sakmann Boundaries of Personal Property 152. Also see E McKendrick (ed) Goode on 
Commercial Law 4 ed (2010) 64. 
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Assuming that a valid trust can be created over a pool of interests in shares, the 
last remaining issue to be addressed is whether interests in shares confer proprietary 
rights and whether these rights relate to the underlying shares held in the top-tier. 
Despite some ambiguity, we have seen above, that trusts vest in their beneficiaries a 
combination of proprietary rights in the trust property itself and personal rights against 
the trustees. The principles of multi-tiered trusts dictate, that an investor enjoys 
personal rights against his intermediary as well as proprietary rights in his 
intermediary’s interest, which constitutes the trust property of the sub-trust, which is 
in turn made up of the personal and proprietary rights enjoyed that intermediary 
against and in the interests of his own intermediary.72 The investor will neither have 
rights against the issuer, nor direct proprietary rights in the underlying shares. His 
proprietary rights therefore attach to the beneficial interest of his intermediary over 
which the sub-trust is created and not the underlying shares.73  
A number of uncertainties remain in the English legal landscape of intermediation. 
Widely accepted, however, is the view that intermediation creates new assets and 
that trust law is the primary vehicle facilitating intermediated holdings of shares. The 
interests conferred under such pyramids of trusts are said to take the form of a 
combination of personal and proprietary rights, but only in relation to the immediate 
intermediary, with no look-through permitted to higher-tiers or the issuer. 
10 3 Electronic settlement and transfer 
The transfer of uncertificated shares follows the same steps as the transfer of 
certificated shares, namely an agreement to sell, the completion of the agreement 
and registration.74 These legal steps are taken within an electronic environment of 
trading, clearing and settlement. The electronic transfer of shares has a dual 
existence in commerce and law.  
                                            
72
 Austen-Peters Custody of Investments 77-78 [5.18]-[5.19]. 
73
 Austen-Peters Custody of Investments 78 [5.21]; also see Financial Markets Law Committee 
Property Interests in Investment Securities: Analysis of the Need for and Nature of Legislation Relating 
to Property Interests in Indirectly Held Investment Securities 12-13, Part 6.5, which discusses the “no-
look through principle” and 14, Part 7, which refers to “co-proprietary interests in the pool”. 
74
 See PL Davies Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 7 ed (2003) 699. In PL 
Davies & S Worthington Gower & Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 9 ed (2012), these 
steps are no longer mentioned in relation to transfers of uncertificated shares. The focus is placed on 
instructions and account entries. This does not mean that the parties do not have to agree, but it does 
reflect that the importance of the agreement and the intentions of the parties has decreased relative to 
the procedural aspects of instructions and account entries. This is also the conclusion reached on the 
basis of South African law; see below, 13 2 5 2 Legal framework. Also see, 17 2 A law of accounts. 
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After reaching an agreement to sell, respectively to buy, through the process of 
trading, the transaction proceeds to settlement. Both parties to the agreement must 
send “dematerialised instructions” through the electronic settlement system.75 The 
seller will send the instruction to deliver the shares to the buyer and the buyer will 
instruct payment to be made to the seller.  
As described above, a sales transaction will only be possible if both parties have 
member accounts as well as cash accounts. After instructions are sent, CREST 
matches the instructions and verifies that they correspond. If they match and there 
are sufficient shares in the seller’s member account and sufficient credit (or 
headroom)76 in the buyer’s cash memorandum account, the transfer is processed or 
settled on a pre-determined settlement day. The seller’s member account is debited 
and the buyer’s member account is credited. Likewise, the buyer’s cash 
memorandum account is debited and the seller’s cash memorandum account is 
credited. Through the debiting and crediting of the relevant accounts, CREST 
amends its register. Simultaneously, CREST sends instructions to issuers to amend 
their registers and to the settlement banks to pay the purchase price. This delivery-
versus-payment constitutes settlement.77 
The payment leg of the settlement transaction takes place in central bank money 
on a real-time gross settlement basis (RTGS). 78  Each settlement bank opens a 
settlement account at the Bank of England in which it deposits funds for CREST 
settlement. At the beginning of a settlement cycle, funds in the settlement account 
are earmarked or frozen to ensure the availability of funds during the settlement 
process.79 CREST then proceeds to make the relevant entries, after which the Bank 
of England is notified of the use of earmarked funds and the remainder of the funds 
are released for use during the next settlement cycle.80 The Bank of England “gives 
an unconditional and irrevocable undertaking to each CREST settlement bank to 
                                            
75
 See the definition in Uncertificated Securities Regulations 2001 s 3(1). 
76
 Headroom is the unused credit still available to the member; see Benjamin Interests in Securities 
206 [9.57]. 
77
 See above, 9 4 2 Clearing and settlement. 
78
 This is true for transactions in pound sterling and Euro. Transactions in US dollars are settled 
according to the “assured payments mechanism“; see Euroclear CREST Reference Manual Chapter 6 
Section 6. 
79
 Euroclear CREST Reference Manual ch 6 s 6; Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems 
(CPSS) “CPSS Red Book - Payment, Clearing and Settlement Systems in the United Kingdom” in 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Payment Clearing and Settlement Systems in the CPSS 
Countries (2012) 467. 
80
 Euroclear CREST Reference Manual ch 6 s 6; CPSS “CPSS Red Book – United Kingdom” in 
Payment, Clearing and Settlement Systems 467. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
180 
 
complete payment”, 81  and therefore provides the necessary liquidity to finalise 
settlement. This enables the simultaneous transfer of securities and funds and, 
importantly, the transfer of direct, irrevocable title. Upon being notified, the Bank of 
England debits and credits the relevant settlement accounts at the end of each 
settlement cycle.82 Settlement therefore takes place as each transaction occurs in 
accordance with DVP model 1. 
To facilitate the clearing function, central counterparty (CCP) facilities can be 
utilised in conjunction with CREST.83 Central counterparty clearing of equities traded 
on the London Stock Exchange typically takes place by “open offer” and therefore 
through the conclusion of single contracts between the CCP and the parties and 
without any obligation between the parties themselves.84 This is followed by optional 
netting. 85  Central counterparty clearing moreover ensures the anonymity of the 
trading parties so that the trader will not be aware of the buyer and vice versa.86  
In theory, the CREST system allows investors to hold shares directly and is 
therefore classified as a direct holding system. From a practical perspective, shares 
are held by CREST members as custodians (nominees) on behalf of investors in 
pooled accounts. As a result of this intermediation, investors will not have a direct 
relationship with the issuers of shares. Investors and lower-tier intermediaries will not 
hold a share, but rather a different asset – an interest in a share. A transfer of shares 
from a seller to a buyer will therefore simultaneously need to achieve a transfer of 
shares as well as interests in shares.  
10 4 Registration and the passing of legal title 
The system that developed to accommodate the dematerialisation of shares was 
modelled on existing structures and concepts, most notably the mechanism of 
registration. In addition to the issuer’s register, records are maintained by CREST 
and by intermediaries administering securities accounts on behalf of clients. This is 
the essence of a book-entry system. It is crucial to distinguish the issuer’s- and 
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 Euroclear CREST Reference Manual ch 6 s 1; ch 6 s 6. 
82
Euroclear CREST Reference Manual ch 6 s 6; CPSS “CPSS Red Book – United Kingdom” in 
Payment, Clearing and Settlement Systems 467. 
83
 Euroclear UK & Ireland (CREST) provides central counterparty services, such as netting, but does 
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Exchange are LCH.Clearnet, SIX x-clear or EuroCCP. 
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 See above, 9 4 2 Clearing and settlement. Benjamin et al Law of Global Custody 190 [9.38]. 
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 See Euroclear CREST Reference Manual 87-91. 
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operator’s registers, on the one hand, from the records maintained by intermediaries 
on the other.  
Initially, the records maintained by CREST were intended for internal use only and 
did not constitute the share register or register of members.87 Every transaction was 
recorded by CREST in its internal records and thereafter instructions were sent to the 
issuer to amend the register and to the settlement bank to pay the purchase price. 
The only change from the paper-based system was therefore that instructions were 
sent and processed electronically and the transferee was identified electronically.88 
Legal title to the shares transferred when the name of a transferee was entered on 
the register maintained by an issuer. With the elimination of certificates, the issuer’s 
register also became the sole source of evidence of title to the shares. 
This system was reformed by the Uncertificated Securities Regulations 2001. The 
regulations introduced a dual register. One register, termed the “issuer register of 
members” must be maintained by the participating issuer and another register, the 
“operator register of members”, must be maintained by the operator.89 In addition to 
the issuer register of members, each participating issuer must also compile a record 
of the entries made in the operator register of members.90 This record is known as 
the “record of uncertificated shares”.91 The record of uncertificated shares must be 
regularly reconciled with the operator register of members.92 The information that 
each of these registers must contain is set out in Schedule 4 to the regulations. As 
determined by the Companies Act, any trusts are not entered on operator registers.93  
A register of members is defined as either the issuer or operator register of 
members or both.94 In terms of Regulation 24(1) the register of members is prima 
facie evidence of any matters inserted in it as directed or authorised by the 
regulations. Since the register of members, per definition, includes both issuer and 
operator registers, both are prima facie evidence of membership and of legal title to 
shares. Where there are inconsistencies between the two registers, the operator 
register takes preference. Thus, the issuer register of members is not regarded as 
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 See Uncertificated Securities Regulations 1995 No. 3272 s 20. 
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 E Micheler Property in Securities: A Comparative Study (2007) 70. 
89
 Uncertificated Securities Regulations 2001 s 20(1). 
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 S 20(6)(a). 
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 S 20(6)(a). 
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 S 20(6)(b) and Schedule 4 Item 5(2). 
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prima facie evidence of the matters recorded therein if it is inconsistent with the 
operator register of members. 95  Micheler points out that the legislator did not 
determine the point in time at which legal title vests, but rather changed the legal 
significance of the operator register, which had the desired effect on the time of 
vesting of legal title.96 The dual register only applies to uncertificated shares.97  
10 5 Equity and trusts 
In principle, the position on uncertificated shares does not differ from the one on 
certificated shares. Only through registration is legal title to the shares transferred 
and functionally, such legal title determines who the company must render 
performance to.98 The main difference is that the operator register takes preference. 
As a result, registration takes place at an earlier stage than was the case when 
CREST was first launched.  
Beneficial interests in shares are created by way of trust. It will be recalled from 
the discussion above that constructive trusts can arise in three situations.99 Due to 
the limited application of specific performance in English law, the second and third 
grounds are of particular relevance, namely where the seller has done everything in 
his power to divest himself of the shares and secondly, where the shares have been 
identified and paid for. Traditionally, a beneficial interest under a trust was created 
either with the execution and delivery of the documents of transfer to the buyer or 
with the identification of the number and quantity of shares in conjunction with 
payment of the purchase price. These rules were intended for paper-based systems. 
In electronic systems it is no longer possible to determine this point in time without 
the assistance of third parties beyond the seller and the buyer. The mechanisms of 
trading, clearing and settlement are required to identity the quantity and type of 
shares and to assist the seller in fully divesting himself of the shares. Electronic 
systems therefore have a significant impact on the vesting of equitable title. This 
illustrates the full extent of systemic intermediation. 
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 S 24(2). 
96
 Micheler Property in Securities 74-76. For an overview of the considerations behind the change, see 
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 See also schedule 4(5) of the Uncertificated Securities Regulations 2001, in terms of which the 
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As a result, legislative intervention was required to provide certainty on the time of 
vesting of equitable title. The Regulations of 1995 provided that equitable title is 
acquired when the operator sends an instruction to the issuer to register a transfer.100 
A constructive trust would therefore arise between the point in time at which the 
instruction was sent and the time of registration by the issuer. Constructive trusts 
could no longer arise after trade but before the issuance of the operator instruction. 
The significant decrease in time between trade and settlement brought about by 
electronic settlement and payment systems served to limit the exposure of the buyer 
to the risk of insolvency of the seller.101  
Under the 2001 Regulations, the point in time at which legal ownership vests was 
brought forward by making the operator register the legally significant record. Legal 
ownership now passes when the electronic accounts held with CREST are amended. 
Thus, there is no longer a lapse of time between the point at which one of the 
grounds for equitable title arise and the point at which the change in title is 
registered.102 The 2001 Regulations now expressly provide for equitable title only in 
the case where shares are converted from uncertificated form in the hands of the 
transferor to certificated form in the hands of the transferee.103 In this case the entry 
of the uncertificated securities is deleted and the certificated securities must be 
recorded on the issuer register. This will result in a time lag during which the 
transferor will retain legal title and the transferee will be regarded as the equitable 
owner of the shares.104 
This conclusion does not imply that the concept of trusts becomes irrelevant; quite 
to the contrary. The scope for the creation of constructive trusts between transferor 
and transferee may have diminished, yet the law of trusts provides the legal and 
explanatory basis for the many intermediary relationships that define the electronic 
landscape. Making an entry on an intermediary’s records, in modern securities’ 
holding systems, is the declaration of a sub-trust. The aim of the act of recording is to 
formalise the relationship – to the intermediary it makes known who must receive 
performance, to the client it reveals from whom he may claim. No look-through is 
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 Uncertificated Securities Regulations 1995 s 25. 
101
 Micheler Property in Securities 72. 
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permitted beyond the confines of this relationship. By making an entry, an 
intermediary declares that he is holding for the benefit of another. 
On the basis that the records kept by the intermediaries are analogous to a 
securities register, Benjamin puts forward the argument that interests in securities 
can likewise be said to pass by novation.105 On the basis of account debits and 
credits in the books of intermediaries, a transfer of interests in securities amounts to 
an extinction (on the seller’s side) and creation (on the buyer’s side) of an equitable 
interest. Micheler, on the other hand, argues that an application of the rules of 
novation of contractual rights in the context of intermediated, dematerialised 
securities amounts to nothing more than a fiction.106 She suggests that securities 
today have a “special transfer regime” that is determined by their nature as highly 
mobile, circulating assets.107  
The pertinent question is whether the benefits that flow from interests in shares 
can be said to pass before the formal declaration of the sub-trust effected by entry in 
the intermediary’s records? To conceive of benefits to pass only by an update of the 
relevant intermediary’s records could result in a lack of protection of the ultimate 
beneficiary where an intermediary further up the chain takes its time to make an entry 
or fails to make an entry at all. In US law, by comparison, the UCC provides two 
alternative methods to acquire a security entitlement other than by entry in an 
account.108 
10 6 Protection of bona fide purchasers of shares 
The protection of bona fide purchasers of shares traditionally hinged on the share 
certificate. It was the misrepresentation originating from a share certificate in 
conjunction with transfer forms that provided a basis for estoppel.109 The electronic 
system no longer requires share certificates and transfer forms for the transfer of 
shares. Although the common law rules are not abolished, they are supplemented by 
the Uncertificated Securities Regulations 2001 and seem to have become partly 
                                            
105
 Benjamin Interests in Securities 70 [3.27]. 
106
 Micheler Property in Securities 96-97; also see 93-96. 
107
 E Micheler “The Legal Nature of Securities: Inspirations from Comparative Law” in L Gullifer & J 
Payne (eds) Intermediated Securities: Legal Problems and Practical Issues (2010) 131 147. On 
Micheler’s views, also see 16 1 3 Eva Micheler. 
108
 See the text to 11 5 2 Legal framework, nn 114-121. 
109
 See above, 8 4 4 Estoppel and the protection of bona fide purchasers in English law. 
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redundant due to the significant changes in the mechanisms of transfer.110 English 
law traditionally solved the conflict between an owner of securities and a purchaser 
thereof by shifting some of the risk to the issuer through estoppel. The issuer is, 
however, no longer involved in the registration and transfer procedure. Some of the 
risk of unauthorised transfers is therefore imposed on the system operator (Crest), 
but most of it inevitably settles on the legal owner. 
Section 35 of the Regulations determines that 1. Where a properly authenticated 
dematerialised instruction was sent by a sponsor or an operator on behalf of a 
member, such member cannot deny that the instruction was sent with his authority 
and cannot deny its correctness;111 2. Likewise, the sponsoring-participant or the 
operator cannot deny authority to send the instruction and that the instruction was 
sent;112 and 3. A person sending the instruction himself can neither deny that he sent 
the instruction nor dispute its correctness.113 The flipside is, that the addressee of 
such an instruction may accept that the information contained therein is correct, the 
instruction was actually sent and it was sent with the requisite authority (where 
relevant), 114  unless she had actual notice of the incorrectness of any of these 
assertions.115 
The effect of the regulation is therefore similar to that of estoppel. If the person 
who has sent such an instruction or has caused it to be sent, demands rectification of 
the register to have his name reinstated, he cannot deny that the instruction was in 
fact sent and that the information contained therein is correct. A claim for rectification 
will therefore fail.  
In a system of certificated shares, the risk was primarily on the buyer. Estoppel 
provided an exception to the rule. Where a transfer was effected by an agent without 
the requisite authority, the true owner could only be successfully estopped where it 
could be shown that he had made some representation on which the buyer acted to 
his detriment.116 The new regulations shift the focus, and in fact the risk, to the legal 
                                            
110
 See Micheler Property in Securities 108-109. 
111
 Uncertificated Securities Regulations 2001 s 35(2)(a). 
112
 S 35(2)(b). 
113
 S 35(3). 
114
 S 35(4). 
115
 S 35(5)(a)-(b). Also see the exceptions in s 35(5)(c)-d). In addition, see s 35(6), which stipulates 
that the assertion may be accepted “if at the time that he received the actual notice it was not 
practicable for him to halt the processing of the instruction”. 
116
 See above, 8 4 4 Estoppel and the protection of bona fide purchasers in English law. 
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owner, who is now bound by any instruction sent from his computer 117  or the 
computer of his broker.118 Nonetheless, the requirement that the buyer must be in 
good faith does not fall away. Overall, the shift in focus can be considered a 
strengthening of the certainty of transfer and transactional security. Micheler 
welcomes this change as it places the risk on that party best suited to control it i.e. 
the legal owner, who is in the best position to restrict access to his network 
connection point from which instructions are sent.119 
The regulations also place liability for forged instructions on the operator of the 
system (CREST).120 An instruction is forged if it was not sent from a participant’s 
computer or a computer of the operator system121 or if it was sent from a network 
computer, but was manipulated.122 CREST will be liable for any loss suffered as a 
result of the forged instruction, 123  unless it can prove that another person was 
responsible.124 
Lastly, the liability of the issuer based on the share certificate is no longer 
applicable in an electronic system as the company no longer issues share 
certificates.125 In addition, issuers have no control over clearing and settlement. 
                                            
117
 Uncertificated Securities Regulations 2001 s 35(3). 
118
 S 35(2). In the context of brokers also see schedule 1, para 15. 
119
 Micheler Property in Securities 116. 
120
 Uncertificated Securities Regulations 2001 s 36. 
121
 S 36(1)(a)(i). 
122
 S 36(1)(a)(ii). 
123
 S 36(2). Crest only bears the loss up to a certain statutory limit. 
124
 S 36(4). 
125
 See Micheler Property in Securities 111-114 on the question whether there could be liability of the 
issuer based on the register. This is unlikely, however. 
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Chapter 11: The effect of systemic intermediation in the United States 
11 1 Opening remarks 
Historically, shares may have originated in Europe. Shares and other securities have, 
however, played a lead role in the tale of the American industrialisation, the advent of 
the big corporation and the rise and fall of financial giants. America is also the stage 
for one of the most important innovations in the re-conceptualisation of shares and 
securities, namely the Uniform Commercial Code. 
The main distinction established by the UCC is not between certificated and 
uncertificated shares, but rather between a direct holding system and an indirect 
holding system.1 Although the UCC does make provision for dematerialised shares,2 
the main trend in the US has been to immobilise shares. This means that the share 
certificate, adapted to the electronic environment, continues to play an important part 
in the construction of electronic share transactions. 
In the following passage Aronstein captures the essence of shares and securities 
before the advent of the electronic age: 
“In an environment in which the rights represented by a security were embodied in a 
unique piece of paper and that piece of paper was typically in the possession of the 
owner, the concept of transfer by delivery was a blissfully simple and totally effective 
approach. In the case of an outright transfer, the transferor was instantly deprived of all 
indicia of ownership and the transferee received something he could keep, sell, or pledge 
to another, and, if the security was in registered form, present to the issuer in exchange 
for a like security in his name.” 3 
Aronstein calls the share certificate a “truly marvellous invention which responded 
to the needs of the market”. 4  The share certificate “embod[ied] the rights of a 
corporate shareholder in a piece of paper” and “ultimately acquired almost all the 
                                            
1
 JS Rogers “An Essay on Horseless Carriages and Paperless Negotiable Instruments: Some Lessons 
from the Article 8 Revision” (1995) 31 Idaho LR 691. 
2
 Both a “certificated security” and an “uncertificated security” are defined by the UCC – see UCC § 8-
102 (4) and (18). Furthermore, an issuer of certificated securities is distinguished from an issuer of 
uncertificated securities – see UCC § 8-201 (a)(1) and (a)(2). Also, part 3 of the UCC is titled the 
“Transfer of Certificated and Uncertificated Securities” – see UCC § 8-301(a) and (b). The same 
distinction can be seen in Part 4 on Registration – see for example § 8-401(a).  
3
 MJ Aronstein “The New/Old Law of Securities Transfer: Calling a ‘Spade’ a ‘Heart, Diamond, Club or 
the Like’” (1990) 12 Cardozo LR 429 429. 
4
 MJ Aronstein “The Decline and Fall of the Stock Certificate in America” (1978) 1 J Comp Corp L & 
Sec Reg 273 273. 
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other attributes of negotiable instruments”. 5  Shares were not considered to be 
movable property, but were rather clothed as negotiable instruments. In fact, US 
shares have been regarded as negotiable instruments at least since the promulgation 
of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act in 1910. 6  Share certificates were therefore 
considerably more prominent than merely aiding the visualisation of rights. This 
markedly altered the position in relation to English law. Registration in the books of 
the issuer remained a shared feature. 
At the same time, the market environment underwent radical changes. The 
increasing rift between market needs and market infrastructure culminated in the 
“paper crunch”. Settlement by physical delivery of share certificates could no longer 
keep up with exponentially increasing trading volumes. The share certificate, once 
heralded as “the paradigm of simplicity”7 forced the entire system to a halt. 
The aftermath of the crisis was marked by a scurry for sustainable solutions. One 
envisaged solution was to completely abandon physical share certificates: 
“We had a commercial system based on paper and a law written in terms of paper. The 
paper was being replaced by modern media, so the law had to be revised to reflect that 
change. How do you do that? Simple; you just take the paper part out.”8 
The 1978 amendment of Article 8 of the UCC therefore simply added parallel 
provisions for “uncertificated securities”.9 Likewise, a basis allowing companies to 
issue shares in uncertificated form can still be found in state company laws. Both the 
Delaware Code and the Model Business Corporation Act authorise a company to 
issue “some or all of the shares of any or all of its classes or series without 
certificates”.10  Both the immobilisation and dematerialisation of shares and other 
securities follow from section 17A of the Securities Exchange Act, which stipulates 
that ‘[t]he Commission shall use its authority to end the physical movement of 
                                            
5
 273. 
6
 For a brief overview of the development of negotiability in the context of shares see JS Rogers 
“Negotiability, Property, and Identity” (1991) 12 Cardozo LR 471. 
7
 Aronstein (1978) J Comp Corp L & Sec Reg 273. 
8
 Rogers (1995) Idaho LR 690. Also see the call for the elimination of the share certificate by the 
Commissioner of the Securities and exchange Commission at the time of the paper crunch; RB Smith 
“A Piece of Paper” (April 1970) 25 Bus L 923; RB Smith “A Piece of Paper Revisited” (July 1971) 26 
Bus L 1769. 
9
 For a brief overview of the development, see Rogers (1995) Idaho LR 690-691. 
10
 Model Business Corporation Act § 6.26; Delaware Code § 158. UCC Article 8 is also neutral and 
provides for both immobilisation and dematerialisation. 
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securities certificates in connection with the settlement among brokers and 
dealers”.11 The issue of uncertificated shares is, however, not compulsory. 
Today, shares in the United States are usually immobilised.12 Developing in a 
path-dependent fashion, share certificates have not lost their relevance in modern, 
electronic settlement systems. Americans went on to immobilise rather than 
dematerialise shares. Share certificates had seemingly become essential, not only to 
the day-to-day functioning of the system, but also as the conceptual underpinning of 
an entire legal construct. 
11 2 Overview of the commercial structures 
The central body in immobilised systems is a depository. In the United States, the 
central securities depository is the Depository Trust Company (DTC), which is a 
subsidiary of the Depository Trust and Clearing Company (DTCC) and the world’s 
largest securities depository. Shares are deposited with the DTC. The definition of a 
“deposit” in the DTC Rules includes: 1. the delivery of the share certificate to the DTC 
and the crediting of the account of a participant for certificated shares; and 2. 
registration of the DTC or its nominee company in the books of an issuer and the 
crediting of the account of a participant for uncertificated shares.13 The effect of the 
deposit is therefore that the DTC, or more accurately its nominee company,14 will 
physically hold the share certificates and will become the holder of the shares 
through registration. Thus, a direct relationship exists only between the issuer and 
the DTC. 
The DTC only allows the deposit of “eligible securities”. 15  Amongst other 
requirements, eligible securities need to be freely tradeable.16 Although issuers may 
therefore want to ensure that shares are eligible, they do not need to issue them in a 
                                            
11
 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 17A(e). 
12
 PR Woods Set-off and Netting, Derivatives, Clearing Systems 2 ed (2007) 325. Chun uses the 
description of a “de facto system of immobilisation” because the system provides for both 
immobilisation and dematerialisation, whereas the German system, for example, does not cater for 
dematerialisation at all; see C Chun Cross-border Transactions of Intermediated Securities: A 
Comparative Analysis in Substantive Law and Private International Law (2012) 212. 
13
 See the definition of “deposit” in Depository Trust Company (DTC) Rules, By-Laws and Organization 
Certificate of the Depository Trust Company (August 2018) rule 1. 
14
 The nominee company is Cede&Co; see the Depository Trust Company (DTC) Deposits Service 
Guide. 
15
 See DTC Rules rule 1 s 1 (definition), read in conjunction with rule 5 s 1. 
16
 See Depository Trust Company (DTC) Operational Arrangements (Necessary for Securities to 
Become and Remain Eligible for DTC Services) (June 2018) 2-3. 
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form different from the usual physical form – shares deposited with the DTC are not 
dematerialised. A request to make a security eligible does not come from an issuer, 
but must instead be made by a participant.17  
Once they have been identified as “eligible”, shares can be deposited with the 
DTC by participants.18 This means that only participants can open accounts with the 
DTC. The rank of “participant” is only open to certain entities, typically clearing and 
settlement organisations, banks and trust companies, insurance and investment 
companies as well as pension funds, amongst others.19 A participant opens both a 
“securities account” and a “settlement account” with the DTC.20 The securities side of 
the transaction is booked to the securities account, whereas the money side of the 
transaction is booked to the settlement account. Essentially, there are three ways of 
holding shares through a securities account maintained by the DTC. Most commonly, 
it is the DTC or their nominee that is recorded on the issuer’s books, not the investor. 
This is referred to as street-name registration. Through the Direct Registration 
System (DRS), an investor can also hold shares directly. The investor will be the 
registered holder, but will receive an electronic statement in lieu of a stock certificate. 
Should an investor wish to hold physical share certificates, the share will be 
withdrawn from its broker’s DTC account and re-registered directly in the name of the 
investor. In addition, participants have the option of using the DTC for custody 
services only. Even though this may include the deposit of securities for safekeeping, 
the securities are not registered in the name of the DTC’s nominee.21 As a result, the 
participant retains control of the securities, but does not have to handle and secure 
the physical certificates.22 
The clearing of share transfers, which will be discussed in more detail below, is 
outsourced to the National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC), which is also a 
subsidiary of the DTCC. The NSCC also acts as a central counterparty (CCP) for 
share trades settled.  
                                            
17
 1-2. 
18
 See DTC Rules rule 6. 
19
 See DTC Rules rule 3 for participants’ qualifications; also see rule 2. 
20
 See the definitions in DTC Rules rule 1 section 1. 
21
 Depository Trust Company (DTC) Custody Service Guide 4. 
22
 DTC Custody Service Guide 4. 
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11 3 Intermediation – a legal perspective 
After the “paper crunch”, the securities solved the problems associated with 
certificated shares not by getting rid of the certificates, but by immobilising them in a 
central securities depository.23 While the certificates therefore migrated to a CSD, the 
CSD maintained accounts for its participants, which in turn opened accounts for their 
own clients and so forth. Recorded on those accounts were electronic entries called 
“book entries”, more specifically account credits. This solution predated the legislative 
changes that followed and legitimated it.24 The problem: “No one could know, what, 
exactly, was created by a credit to a securities account. By any conventional 
definition of ‘security’, a credit entry in a securities account was certainly not a 
security.”25 
The terminology of “bailment” was initially taken up by the code, but Aronstein 
states that held in bulk and in account structures, “the analogy to a ‘bailment’ 
becomes, at best, strained”.26 Roughly two decades later, the old “bailment” cloak 
had not been shrugged off completely; not recognising the profound changes brought 
about by systematic intermediation, relationships between investors and 
intermediaries, as well as relationships amongst intermediaries, continued to be 
analysed in terms of bailment.27 The traditional bailment idea was finally cast-off in 
the 1994 revision of Article 8 of the UCC. The current system makes provision for a 
depository at the top of the pyramid which continues to take the physical certificates, 
whether as individual or global certificates, into deposit. Yet, the relationships 
between intermediaries positioned below a central depository are no longer subject to 
the rules on deposit or bailment. 
The idea that multi-tiered structures of intermediation change not only the way in 
which shares are held, but also the type of asset being held, the relationships with 
intermediaries and the way in which we assert rights and perform duties that flow 
from this relationship, was pioneered by American legal scholars, most notably 
                                            
23
 See above, 11 1 Opening remarks. 
24
 For a brief overview of the chronological development of the intermediated system in the US, see 
CR Reitz “Reflections on the Drafting of the 1994 Revision of Article 8 of the US Uniform Commercial 
Code” (2005) 10 Uniform LR 357. 
25
 359. 
26
 Aronstein (1990) Cardozo LR 431. 
27
 JL Schroeder “Is Article 8 Finally Ready This Time? The Radical Reform of Secured Lending on 
Wall Street” (1994) Columbia Bus LR 291 328-329. 
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Charles Mooney in a seminal article published in 1990,28 and found its way into 
Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code.  
Mooney argued that the continued reliance on traditional negotiable instruments 
and property law constructs is unworkable in the context of intermediated holdings of 
securities.29 He proposed a new model, based not on a property construct, but rather 
on the relationships between clients and their intermediaries.30 His difficulty with a 
property law construct lies with principles such as tracing, bona fide purchasers and 
the nemo dat principle.31 In terms of his proposition of upper-tier priority, a client can 
only look towards his own intermediary in claiming the benefits that flow from 
shares.32 The no-look-through approach is not novel. The abstract from Roman law 
cited above, features not only tiered deposits, but also determines that, in case of 
fraud or loss in the second tier, only the first-tier depository had a claim and had to 
assign this claim to the depositor.33 
This approach prohibits any look-through from lower tiers to higher tiers. At the top 
of a pyramid of intermediaries is the central securities depository. Only the CSD has 
rights against the issuer resulting from the entry on the register. Lower-tier 
intermediaries or investors have a package of rights against their own intermediaries 
flowing from an account credit. This package consists of the right to demand that 
payments or distributions originating from the underlying shares will be passed on to 
them and that other rights, such as voting rights, will be exercised by their 
intermediary according to their instructions. Included in the package are rights that 
protect the assets held by the intermediary for its clients from the intermediary’s own 
creditors.34 This package is named a “security entitlement” by Article 8 of the UCC. It 
is the security entitlement that is recorded by book-entry in the securities accounts 
maintained for that purpose by intermediaries.  
                                            
28
 CW Mooney, Jr “Beyond Negotiability: A New Model for Transfer and Pledge of Interests in 
Securities Controlled by Intermediaries” (1990) 12 Cardozo LR 305. Also see the contributions by JS 
Rogers “Policy Perspectives on Revised U.C.C Article 8” (1996) 48 UCLA LR 1431 and RD Guynn 
Modernizing Securities Ownership, Transfer and Pledging Laws: A Discussion Paper on the Need for 
International Harmonization (1996). 
29
 Mooney (1990) Cardozo LR, see especially the Introduction, 307-316. 
30
 312. 
31
 379. 
32
 379-380. 
33
 See above, 8 3 3 4 Deposit and bailment, particularly the text to n 231. 
34
 For a list of rights, see Rogers (1996) UCLA LR 1450-1451 and below at 11 5 Electronic settlement 
and transfer. 
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The model envisages the security entitlement as a separate asset that is derived 
from the underlying asset, but also distinct from it. 35  The underlying asset (the 
security) remains unchanged – it constitutes the obligation of the issuer and 
presupposes a direct link with the issuer. Any interests in the underlying asset are, 
while also defined as financial assets, assets in their own right. The security 
entitlement has a market value identical to that of the underlying security because the 
intermediaries are required to maintain financial assets “corresponding to the 
aggregate of all security entitlements it has established”.36  
The US approach is a functional one.37 It focuses on finding pragmatic solutions 
rather than enquiring into the general nature and classification of rights as proprietary 
or contractual.38 The details of the functional approach will be further disseminated in 
Part 3. Mooney therefore concluded that “its details [of the upper-tier priority model 
proposed by him] are less important than moving the legal regime toward a more 
precise vision of the sui generis characteristics of the relationship that results when 
interests in fungible bulks of securities are transferred on the books of 
intermediaries”.39 
11 4 Registration 
The rules for registration of transfers are in principle the same as outlined above.40 
The legally relevant register remains the record prepared by the issuer. In a system 
constructed around immobilised shares deposited with a central securities depository 
and entered on the register in the name of the depository or that of its nominee, the 
relevance of the register dissipates. The system is designed to function in such a way 
that a change of registration will rarely be necessary. 
                                            
35
 For a critical view on the statement that security entitlements are separate assets, see M Khimji 
“The Role of Legal Concepts in Commercial Law: Comments on Spink, Rogers and Scavone” (2007) 
45 Can Bus LJ 94 97; MF Khimji “The Securities Transfer Act – The Radical Reconceptualization of 
Property Rights in Investment Securities” (2007) 45 Alberta LR 137 151. 
36
 UCC § 8-504(a); Reitz (2005) Uniform LR 362. 
37
 Rogers (1996) UCLA LR 1450. 
38
 Rogers (1996) UCLA LR 1452. English law, as was illustrated above at 10 2 Intermediation – a legal 
perspective, also recognises that intermediation results in the creation of interests in shares that are 
different from the underlying shares, but derives any rules of transfer from the law of trusts. 
39
 Mooney (1990) Cardozo LR 413; also see Guynn Modernizing Securities Ownership 9-10, 34-35. 
40
 See above, 8 3 3 3 The change in registration. 
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11 5 Electronic settlement and transfer 
11 5 1 Commercial mechanisms 
Once the trade has been completed, most likely through an exchange, the details of 
the trade are transmitted via the electronic system of the exchange to the NSCC. The 
NSCC performs clearing and risk-management functions for the DTC. The 
transaction will be settled by the NSCC three days after trade i.e. on T+3.41 Clearing 
commences on the day after trade (T+1) and is aimed at ensuring that sufficient 
securities are held by the seller and includes multilateral netting of the positions of all 
participants in the system. The processing of the transaction for settlement starts on 
the afternoon of the day before settlement (T+2). Settlement consists of a securities 
leg and a money settlement leg. 
The settlement of securities, in our example shares, takes place through the 
Continuous Net Settlement System (“CNS”) of the NSCC. The NSCC nets each 
participant’s position to a net receive (known as a long position) or a net deliver (a 
short position) per type of security and per settlement day.42 Thereafter, the short 
positions are compared to the relevant participant’s DTC account43  to determine 
whether sufficient shares are available for settlement. Thereafter, the NSCC will 
instruct the DTC to “deliver” the number of shares, as calculated, from the account of 
the participant with a short position to the NSCC’s DTC account.44 This step is known 
as short cover. It is followed by the allocation of shares from the NSCC’s DTC 
account to the account of the participant with a long position, known as long 
allocation.45 In this process, the NSCC acts as a central counterparty. At the point of 
short cover, the NSCC assumes the obligations of the selling participant to “deliver” 
the shares and simultaneously assigns the related rights to receive the shares to the 
receiving participant.46 It is specifically provided that ownership rights pass to the 
                                            
41
 Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) “CPSS Red Book - Payment, Clearing and 
Settlement Systems in the United States” in Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Payment, 
Clearing and Settlement Systems in the CPSS Countries (2012) 495. 
42
 National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC) Rules & Procedures (September 2018) rule 11 s 
1(a). 
43
 The DTC is used here, as the majority of shares are deposited with the DTC. A participant may 
however make use of another depository, known as a “Designated Depository” within the CNS system. 
44
 NSCC Rules rule 11 s 3. 
45
 Rule 11 s 3. 
46
 Rule 11 s 1(b). 
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NSCC.47 This construct is aimed at guaranteeing each trade and thereby reducing 
the risk of non-settlement.48 This leg of the transaction is processed free of payment. 
Therefore, it is provisional intra-day until payment has been made.49 After the long 
allocation, which takes place in the books of the DTC, the participants and other 
lower tier intermediaries must make corresponding changes in their own books. 
The payment side of the settlement process only takes place at the end of the 
settlement day. The DTC-NSCC therefore operates a DVP2 settlement model. Each 
participant must nominate a settlement bank. The settlement bank is also a 
participant of the DTC and may settle its own transactions or transactions for other 
participants, including other bank participants. 50  The settlement bank must have 
access to the National Settlement System (“NSS”) operated by the Federal Reserve 
Banks as well as the Fedwire system.51 Money settlement therefore takes place in 
central bank money. Each settlement bank’s debits and credits at both the DTC and 
the NSCC are netted. Thereafter, cross-endorsement takes place between the DTC 
and the NSCC positions resulting in a single net-net debit or credit per settlement 
bank. 52  This is known as multilateral netting. Netting arrangements significantly 
enhance the speed, efficiency and volume of processing. The DTC may also 
establish a net debit cap, which is the maximum debit that a participant may incur at 
any point during the day.53 Towards the end of the settlement day, the DTC will post 
final figures, which must be acknowledged by the settlement bank.54 The settlement 
bank must further ensure that sufficient funds are available for settlement in its 
                                            
47
 Rule 11 s 1(e). 
48
 See Rule 11 s 1(c). 
49
 CPSS “CPSS Red Book – United States” in Payment, Clearing and Settlement Systems 495; See 
also NSCC Rules Rule 12 s 2(a) and (c). These rules provide that any book-entries made on the 
accounts of the depository are not appropriate entries until the effective time. The effective time is the 
earlier of i) the time it is determined that the participant’s gross credit balance exceeds his gross debit 
balance; ii) if this is not the case and the participant settles through a settlement bank, the time it is 
determined that the settlement bank has a net-net credit balance or iii) if i) and ii) are not applicable, at 
the time when the participant pays his debit balance or if the settlement bank pays its net-net debit 
balance. See below for the completion of the money settlement side. 
50
 Depository Trust Company (DTC) Settlement Service Guide 18. 
51
 DTC Settlement Service Guide 18; The Fedwire system is operated by the Federal Reserve Banks 
and allows for the electronic transfer of funds on a real-time gross settlement basis. This is equivalent 
to a DVP1 settlement system. 
52
 DTC Settlement Service Guide 18, 29-31; NSCC Rules Procedure VIII, D3. 
53
 DTC Settlement Service Guide 5. This is aimed at managing risk. In addition, all net debits are 
collaterised. See CPSS “CPSS Red Book – United States” in Payment, Clearing and Settlement 
Systems 508; The settlement bank may limit the debit cap of a participant to an amount less than the 
debit cap calculated by the DTC; see DTC Settlement Service Guide 19. 
54
 DTC Settlement Service Guide 19; NSCC Rules Procedure VIII, D1. 
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account at the Federal Reserve Bank.55 The DTC then processes a single NSS file 
with the Federal Reserve Bank to debit or credit each settlement bank’s NSS 
account.56 
11 5 2 Legal framework 
Recent years have seen an increasing disenchantment with the principles underlying 
negotiability. The substantial revision of Article 8 was aimed at, amongst others, 
moving away from the concept of negotiability and its limitations. Nonetheless, the 
idea of negotiability is the still discernible basis from which the current law developed. 
The US securities holding system is characterised by a clear distinction between a 
direct and an indirect holding system, which is equivalent to holding shares versus 
holding a security entitlement. Even in complex structures of intermediaries, both 
direct and indirect holding continue to exist alongside each other. In the top tier, the 
holding is direct and most commonly in the name of a depository (or its nominee). All 
lower tiers hold indirectly. While the former relates to a physical certificate, the latter 
is purely conceptual. 
Certificated shares are transferred by delivery of the share certificate as well as 
indorsement.57 Delivery is the first leg on which the transfer of shares rests. Before 
the certificate can be delivered, it must be indorsed. Indorsement is the second leg of 
an effective transfer of shares. Usually there is an assignment form printed on the 
back of the certificate that allows for indorsement. The indorsement can also be 
made on a separate stock assignment form. Indorsement is “a signature that alone or 
accompanied by other words is made on a security certificate in registered form or on 
a separate document for the purpose of assigning, transferring, or redeeming the 
security or granting a power to assign, transfer, or redeem it”.58 If a seller of shares 
merely signs his name at the back of the certificate, he makes a blank indorsement. 
Alternatively, he can specify who has the power to transfer the share.59 This is known 
as a special indorsement. It is important that the indorsement made by the seller is 
                                            
55
 DTC Settlement Service Guide 19; NSCC Rules Procedure VIII, D1. 
56
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effective. This will be the case if the seller is an appropriate person,60 being “the 
person specified by a security certificate or by an effective special indorsement to be 
entitled to the security”.61 The signature of the indorser can further be verified.62 In 
practice, this is done by a so-called medallion signature guarantee, which can be 
obtained from a host of financial institutions.  
A transfer cannot stand on one leg – only when both, an indorsement has been 
made, and the indorsed share certificate has been delivered to the purchaser, is the 
transfer complete.63 In its simplest construction, delivery of a certificated share simply 
means that the purchaser acquires physical possession of the share certificate.64 
Alternatively, the purchaser can determine that a third person, who is not a securities 
intermediary, acquires possession of the certificate on his behalf.65 The third party 
would act as the purchaser’s nominee. If the third party is at the same time also the 
nominee of the seller, she has previously acquired possession of the certificate and 
may therefore merely acknowledge that she now holds for the purchaser.66 Delivery 
therefore does not have to be physical, but can instead be constructive i.e. without a 
change in possession. Delivery can also occur if “a securities intermediary, acting on 
behalf of the purchaser acquires possession of the certificate” and the share is in 
registered form and is (i) registered in the name of the purchaser, (ii) payable to the 
order of the purchaser, or (iii) specially endorsed to the purchaser by an effective 
indorsement and has not been indorsed to the securities intermediary or in blank”. 67 
Upon indorsement and delivery, the transfer of the shares will be complete. This is 
followed by registration. Registration is, however, not required to transfer the rights. 
If the seller delivers the shares to the purchaser without the necessary 
indorsement, the UCC determines that the transaction will be complete as between 
the parties, provided that the transferor had the intention to transfer title to the 
shares.68 The purchaser may also compel the seller to supply the indorsement.69 
                                            
60
 UCC § 8-107(b)(1); Alternatively an indorsement is also effective if it is made by an agent, who has 
the power to transfer or if the appropriate person ratifies the indorsement “or is otherwise precluded 
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Without the indorsement, the purchaser will not be a “protected purchaser” and will 
therefore not purchase the shares free of any adverse claims.70 Furthermore, an 
issuer is only obliged to register the transfer if an indorsement has been made by an 
appropriate person.71 The company will therefore continue to render performance to 
the seller of the shares. 
If, on the other hand, the indorsement has been made, but there has been no 
delivery (either of the indorsed certificate or of the certificate and document of 
indorsement, if separate), the transfer is not complete72 and there is no equivalent 
right to compel the purchaser to deliver. 73  Decisive for an effective transfer is 
therefore that the seller relinquishes control through actual or constructive delivery, 
with the intention to transfer.74 
In modern holding structures, a change in direct holding will be infrequent. The 
holding of shares typically remains with the DTC and actual delivery of the physical 
share certificates will only take place if there is a change in the direct holding i.e. a 
change of depositories or a withdrawal of certificates from deposit. It is far more 
important therefore to map a change in indirect holding. 
If a seller’s shares are held directly by the DTC through its nominee Cede & Co, 
the register of the issuer will reflect Cede & Co as the holder of the shares. As the 
shares are immobilised, the seller cannot physically deliver the share certificate to the 
purchaser. The mechanism of delivery must therefore be amended to cater for 
immobilised shares and securities. This overhaul of existing concepts and 
mechanisms was undertaken by the drafters of Article 8 of the UCC of 1994. Article 8 
introduced novel rules, reconceptualised the law of securities transfers and combined 
empirical market practice with legal theory – described by Schroeder as a legal realist 
approach.75 Its focus is no longer a physical object but rather the relationship with an 
intermediary. The central concepts of an immobilised and intermediated system are: 
1. a securities account; 2. a securities intermediary; 3. a financial asset; and 4. a 
                                                                                                                                        
69
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security entitlement (held by an entitlement holder). These concepts will be 
considered in turn. 
A securities account is an account “to which a financial asset is or may be credited 
in accordance with an agreement under which the person maintaining the account 
undertakes to treat the person for whom the account is maintained as entitled to 
exercise the rights that comprise the financial asset”.76 The definition features three 
important elements: 1. A securities account is established by consensual agreement. 
In line with the definition of an agreement in article 1-2-1(3) this requirement must be 
interpreted broadly and does not require writing or other formalities.77 2. A financial 
asset is credited to the account. 3. The account holder is entitled to the rights 
comprising the financial asset. The crux of the agreement is therefore that an 
intermediary undertakes to treat the account holder as entitled to exercise all the 
rights that comprise his interests in the shares.78 Whether such an undertaking is 
agreed to, must be interpreted with regard to the underlying purpose of Article 8 and 
the expectations of the parties.79 A securities account does not establish a trust 
relationship.80 Whereas the DTC holds the securities, an investor holds a credit in the 
securities account maintained by his immediate intermediary. 
A repetition of this construction takes place at every level or tier of intermediaries, 
creating a chain of cascading securities accounts. The act of creating and 
maintaining a securities account is central to the definition of a securities 
intermediary. A securities intermediary is either a clearing corporation or “a person 
including a bank or broker, that in the ordinary course of its business maintains 
securities accounts for others and is acting in that capacity”.81  
At the core of the securities account is the financial asset. Before directing the 
focus to security entitlements, it is useful to obtain a clear understanding of financial 
assets. A financial asset includes 1. securities; 2. obligations or a share, participation 
or interest in property or an enterprise which is dealt with on financial markets or as a 
medium for investment and 3. property held in a securities account if it was expressly 
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 UCC § 8-501(a). 
77
 UCC Official Comments – Article 8 § 8-501 para 1. 
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 UCC Official Comments – Article 8 § 8-501 para 1, para 3. 
79
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agreed that this property should be treated as a financial asset.82 Under the second 
category, options and similar obligations qualify as financial assets. 83  The third 
category catches any property, provided it is held in a securities account. Thus, 
negotiable instruments held in a securities account are financial assets.84 The term 
“financial asset” can be taken to refer either to the underlying asset or to the means 
by which ownership of the underlying asset is evidenced.85 To illustrate this: at the 
top tier, a financial asset is either the obligation of an issuer i.e. the bundle of rights 
flowing from a security in the case of a directly held certificated security or the 
certificate itself that evidences ownership of those rights.86 In the case of indirectly 
held securities, the term may refer to the underlying asset or to a security entitlement, 
which is the means by which ownership of the underlying asset is evidenced.87 
In a securities account, assets are created that must be conceptualised separately 
from the assets underlying them. These are security entitlements. Nonetheless, 
security entitlements can never exist independently of their underlying financial 
assets. The concept “security entitlement” encompasses “the rights or property 
interest of an entitlement holder with respect to a financial asset”.88 A person is an 
entitlement holder if he is “identified in the records of a securities intermediary as the 
person having a security entitlement against the securities intermediary”. 89  An 
entitlement holder holds a security entitlement, not a security. The security, such as a 
share, is held by the DTC (through Cede & Co). A direct relationship exists between 
the issuer and the DTC through registration and the issuer is entitled to perform 
towards the DTC only.90 What rights does the entitlement holder have? The construct 
of securities intermediaries maintaining securities accounts encompassing security 
entitlements for entitlement holders is aimed at ensuring that each intermediary 
exercises the rights comprising the assets for its respective customer. An investor, as 
the ultimate entitlement holder receives and exercises the rights comprising his 
shares indirectly through his intermediary, who may again make use of an 
intermediary and so forth. In fact, a security entitlement only gives each party in the 
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chain rights against its own intermediary, never against the issuer. It is made clear in 
§ 8-503(c) that the interest of an entitlement holder may be enforced against the 
securities intermediary only and only in terms of the rules set out in the Uniform 
Commercial Code. 
A security entitlement is frequently described as a package of rights against the 
intermediary. 91  Included in the package are the following rights: First, the 
intermediary must obtain payments and distributions made by the issuer and 
disburse these to its entitlement holder.92 Second, an intermediary must exercise any 
rights that an entitlement holder has in respect of the financial asset if the entitlement 
holder directs it to do so.93 This includes exercising voting rights as directed by the 
entitlement holder. Third, the intermediary must comply with an entitlement order.94 
An entitlement order is “a notification communicated to a securities intermediary 
directing transfer or redemption of a financial asset to which the entitlement holder 
has a security entitlement”.95 Furthermore, the intermediary has a duty to change a 
security entitlement to another form of holding or to transfer the security entitlement 
to a securities account held with another intermediary.96 Last, the intermediary must 
match the quantity of financial assets it maintains to the quantity of security 
entitlements it establishes97 and may not grant security interests in financial assets 
maintained for such a purpose.98  Additionally, an entitlement holder is protected 
against the creditors of the intermediary. Interests in financial assets held for 
entitlement holders do not become the property of the intermediary and are not 
subject to claims by creditors of the intermediary.99 The entitlement holder will have a 
pro-rata property interest in the pool of all financial assets of that type held by the 
intermediary.100  
Rather than changing the underlying nature of the financial asset (the share or 
security) the UCC creates a new asset, the security entitlement. This asset is not an 
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identifiable object, but rather a collection of rights.101 These rights are designed to be 
exercised against the intermediary only. No provision is made for claims against 
upper-tier intermediaries or against the issuer. The legal status of the investor is that 
of an entitlement holder, not a securities holder.102  
The personal nature of the intermediary-investor relationship leads to the 
conclusion that a security entitlement consists of rights in personam.103 From the 
definition of a security entitlement it appears, however, that the package of rights 
includes property rights,104 a position confirmed by commentators and authors.105 
The Prefatory Note states that “a security entitlement is itself a form of property 
interest not merely an in personam claim against the intermediary”.106 Instead of only 
having rights against an intermediary, an entitlement holder also has rights in the 
property of an intermediary.107 It is an interest in the property or financial assets held 
by the intermediary that is less than ownership of that property. 108 The property 
interest is pro rata without a claim to a specific item of property or financial asset.109 
Chun finds that “[a] security entitlement has the nature of a property right, but the 
property nature is reshaped in a restricted way into a proportional interest”.110 The 
property rights are a creation of Article 8; they are not common law property rights.111 
Property rights can usually be exercised against the world. Despite their proprietary 
nature, these property rights can only be enforced against third parties in exceptional 
and strictly limited cases. 112  The relationship between an intermediary and an 
entitlement holder is hence frequently labelled sui generis rather than being 
categorised in accordance with the legal concepts from a bygone era.113  
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According to the UCC, a purchaser will acquire the shares or an interest in the 
shares if he acquires the security entitlement to those shares.114 The code sets out 
three ways in which a security entitlement can arise. First, if a securities intermediary 
“indicates by book entry that a financial asset has been credited to the person’s 
securities account”.115  In other words, the intermediary acknowledges, through a 
credit in a securities account, that he is holding an interest in a financial asset for its 
customer. 116  Second, a person acquires a security entitlement if a securities 
intermediary “receives a financial asset from the person or acquires a financial asset 
for the person and, in either case, accepts it for credit to the person’s security 
account”.117 This typically takes place where a customer delivers a share certificate in 
physical form to his bank or broker to be held in his account.118 The third option is a 
residual test and determines that a security entitlement arises if a securities 
intermediary “becomes obligated under other law, regulation, or rule to credit a 
financial asset to the person’s securities account”. 119  This test applies if the 
intermediary fails to make the required entries to the securities account of a 
customer. Ordinary cases should be covered by the first test.120 What is clear is that 
the matter is not so much a transfer of rights, but rather, as the Official Commentary 
to the UCC emphasises “the significant fact is that the securities intermediary has 
undertaken to treat the customer as entitled to the financial asset”.121 
What appears from both the legal rules as well as the commercial procedures is 
that, unlike shares, security entitlements are not transferred. This is highlighted by 
the Official Comment to the UCC:  
“Securities, in the Article 8 sense, are fungible interests or obligations that are intended to 
be tradable. The concept of security entitlement under Part 5 is quite different. A security 
entitlement is the package of rights that a person has against the person's own 
intermediary with respect to the positions carried in the person's securities account. That 
package of rights is not, as such, something that is traded. When a customer sells a 
security that she had held through a securities account, her security entitlement is 
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terminated; when she buys a security that she will hold through her securities account, 
she acquires a security entitlement. In most cases, settlement of a securities trade will 
involve termination of one person's security entitlement and acquisition of a security 
entitlement by another person. That transaction, however, is not a "transfer" of the same 
entitlement from one person to another.”122 
Share certificates, delivery and transfer in the traditional sense only play a role in 
the top tier, and even at this level, the paper exists only to provide a fit with a legal 
regime it has long outgrown. At lower tiers there is no object of transfer, only a credit 
entry and with it the termination and creation of a relationship with an intermediary.123 
Thus it has been said that it is no longer negotiability, but rather novation that forms 
the basis of share transfers.124 This conclusion is dictated not only by the absence of 
paper in account-based structures, but also by mechanisms such as the use of 
central counterparties and netting facilities. Abstract rights that can only be enforced 
against a specific intermediary, “pass” from a seller to a buyer. Where one party sells 
these rights, they are extinguished and created anew in relation to the buyer and the 
buyer’s intermediary. The buyer does not have the same package of rights that the 
seller had. Even if the newly created rights may be economically equivalent to those 
extinguished, it does not follow that they are the same.125  
To conclude the discussion, dematerialised shares must be briefly considered. 
The UCC makes provision for dematerialised shares. The distinction between 
certificated and uncertificated shares is, however, only relevant at the level of direct 
holding. Uncertificated shares are transferred by an instruction (which replaces the 
indorsement) and delivery. The instruction is a “notification communicated to the 
issuer…which directs that the transfer of a security be registered”.126 Delivery will 
take place when the issuer registers the purchaser127 or when another person, not 
being a securities intermediary, becomes the registered owner on behalf of the 
purchaser or acknowledges that he holds for the purchaser.128 This constitutes the 
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transfer of a security. If uncertificated shares are held through securities 
intermediaries, the ultimate investor holds a security entitlement not a security and a 
sale will result in the extinction and acquisition of the security entitlement in the same 
manner as illustrated above. For this reason the distinction between certificated and 
uncertificated shares is not relevant at the indirect holding level. The real difference 
between certificated and uncertificated shares lies in the way in which ownership of 
the shares is evidenced.129 Whereas the share certificate is central to evidencing 
ownership of certificated shares, the issuer’s register takes over this evidentiary role 
for uncertificated shares. 
11 6 Protection of bona fide purchasers 
The concept of a protected purchaser in the Uniform Commercial Code gives a 
statutory basis to the negotiability principle. Due to confusion in case law about the 
precise meaning of good faith, the terminology of “good faith” and “bad faith” was 
abandoned in revised Article 8 of the UCC.130 As a general point of departure, a 
purchaser acquires only those rights that the seller had.131 The only exception is 
made for a “protected purchaser”, referring to “a purchaser of a certificated or 
uncertificated security, or of an interest therein, who: (1) gives value;132 (2) does not 
have notice of any adverse claim to the security; and (3) obtains control of the 
certificated or uncertificated security”.133 A protected purchaser acquires the security 
or interest in the security free from any adverse claims.134 An adverse claim is “a 
claim that a claimant has a property interest in a financial asset and that it is a 
violation of the rights of the claimant for another person to hold, transfer, or deal with 
the financial asset”.135 If a purchaser is not a protected purchaser, he “acquires all 
rights in the security that the transferor had or had power to transfer”.136 A person has 
knowledge of an adverse claim if he knows about it,137 if he is aware of sufficient 
facts that establish a significant probability of an adverse claim and he avoids any 
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information regarding the claim,138 or if he has a statutory duty to investigate the 
existence of an adverse claim.139 The third requirement of a protected purchaser, 
namely “control” of a certificated share in registered form, is present if the certificate 
is delivered and indorsed to the purchaser140 or if it is delivered to and registered in 
the name of the purchaser upon original issue thereof.141 The control requirement 
speaks to the form of the transfer. To qualify as a protected purchaser all three 
requirements must be met at the same time. 142  If the purchaser, for example, 
receives notice of an adverse claim before he gives value or obtains control, he will 
not be a protected purchaser.143  
The drafters of Article 8 have opted not to apply the concept of a “protected 
purchaser” to indirect holdings. They have rather provided for three unique 
circumstances which merit purchaser protection. First, the purchaser of a security 
entitlement is protected from adverse claims to a financial asset, provided that he has 
given value and has had no notice of the adverse claim. 144  Compared to the 
“protected purchaser” rules, control is not required. Hakes points out that the rule 
protects an adverse claim to an underlying financial asset, over which an entitlement 
holder can never exercise control.145 Second, the purchaser of a security entitlement 
or an interest therein is protected from an adverse claim to a financial asset or a 
security entitlement, provided she has given value, has received no notice and 
exercises control.146 This rule covers claims to both financial assets and security 
entitlements.147 It covers cases in which the purchaser does exercise control, but 
does not become an entitlement holder, typically being a person taking a security 
interest.148 The third rule protects the purchaser of a financial asset transferred by a 
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securities intermediary in violation of its duties, provided the purchaser has given 
value, exercises control and has not colluded with the securities intermediary.149 
These rules serve to strengthen transactional security. Dubovec, for example, 
recognises that the finality and irrevocability of transfers reign paramount.150 Hakes 
argues, however, that the strongest protection against adverse claims is not laid 
down by any rules in Article 8, but is built into the structure of the indirect holding 
system. The netting of trades during the settlement process renders the tracing of a 
financial asset through the process almost impossible.151 While the protection of bona 
fide purchasers from adverse claims is a distinctive property of negotiability, Mooney 
and Rogers argue that in modern, intermediated systems, certainty of transfer is not 
warranted by negotiability, but rather by the trust- and creditworthiness of 
intermediaries and systems.152  
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Chapter 12: The effect of systematic intermediation in Germany 
12 1 Introduction 
According to Micheler, the classification of shares and securities as tangibles also 
has normative force; “the existence of paper certificates is essential; if paper 
certificates cease to exist, securities transfers would be subject to the rules on 
assignment”.1 German law has therefore developed to immobilise shares and other 
securities to retain the conceptual basis provided by the law of things. The concepts 
of property and deposit therefore remain acutely relevant. 
12 2 Overview of the commercial structures 
The origin of the current structures facilitating the deposit, custody and transfer of 
securities can be found in the Berliner Kassenverein, as briefly set out above.2 The 
business of the safekeeping and custody (“Depotgeschäft”) of securities is regulated 
by the Depotgesetz of 1937. The “Depotgeschäft” is simply defined with reference to 
its function of deposit and custody of securities for others.3 It further falls under the 
rubric of banking business (“Bankgeschäft”). A bank is in turn a financial institution 
(“Kreditinstitut”) and is therefore subject to banking and financial regulation. While the 
securities are deposited by a depositor known as a “Hinterleger”, the Depotgesetz 
further distinguishes between a depository or custodian (“Verwahrer”) and a 
collective securities depository (“Wertpapiersammelbank”/CSD). The latter is 
empowered by the provisions permitting third-party custody.4 A collective securities 
depository is simultaneously a custodian as defined; the investor and holder of 
physical securities certificates deposits securities with a custodian, who becomes a 
so-called “Zwischenverwahrer”, and who in turn deposits securities centrally with a 
collective, third-party custodian.5 Whereas a depository is an entity that accepts the 
deposit of unsealed securities (“offenes Depot”) in the course of its business,6 a 
collective depository is simply defined as an entity recognised as such by legislation.7  
                                            
1
 E Micheler Property in Securities: A Comparative Study (2007) 184. 
2
 See above, 8 3 4 4 Deposit. 
3
 See §1(1) 5 of the Kreditwesengesetz. 
4
 See below, 12 3 Intermediation – a legal perspective. 
5
 T Heinsius, A Horn & J Than Depotgesetz (1975) 22. 
6
 Depotgesetz § 1(2). A depository (custodian) must be a merchant (“Kaufmann”) as defined by § 1 
Handelsgesetzbuch. 
7
 Depotgesetz § 1(3). 
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The Berliner Kassenverein was followed by the establishment of a number of 
collective depositories, frequently founded exclusively for the purpose of accepting 
deposits of securities in particular states and affiliated with state-based stock 
exchanges.8 In 1989, the existing seven collective depositories merged to form the 
Deutscher Kassenverein AG, the only shareholder being the Deutsche Börse AG.9 
After several mergers and substantial restructuring, the only collective depository in 
Germany today is Clearstream Banking AG, whose holding company is a wholly 
owned subsidiary of the Deutsche Börse AG.10 Participants of the CSD are known as 
customers or clearing members and are the only entities allowed to open accounts 
with Clearstream. In general, all customers are juristic persons, specifically regulated 
banks or other financial institutions. 11  Investors that are natural persons cannot 
become direct customers of the CSD. They rather make use of financial institutions 
that act as intermediaries and accept deposits and perform custodial functions on 
their behalf. There may be more than one such intermediary positioned between the 
investor and the CSD. Settlement and clearing of securities takes place through an 
electronic system known as CASCADE, operated by Clearstream Banking. 
Customers open securities accounts with Clearstream Banking. They do not maintain 
cash accounts, but instead merely open internal cash accounts which reflect the 
amount of the transactions settled. These accounts are in turn netted and conveyed 
to the central bank for payment. Cash settlement takes place in central bank money. 
Customers therefore need to open a cash account in TARGET2, the RTGS payment 
platform operated by, amongst other European central banks, the Deutsche 
Bundesbank, or contract with a settlement bank which maintains such an account 
with the central bank. 
                                            
8
 For a list, see for example Heinsius et al Depotgesetz 28; H Delorme Die Wertpapiersammelbanken 
(1970) 13. 
9
 For a history of the Deutsche Börse AG see <http://deutsche-boerse.com/dbg-de/ueber-uns/gruppe-
deutsche-boerse/unternehmensgeschichte/text-collection/2552990?frag=2552994> (accessed 29-09-
2018); Clearstream Kundenhandbuch (August 2018) 1.1, 1-1. 
10
 In 1997, Deutscher Kassenverein AG merged with Auslandskassenverein and was restructured as 
the Deutsche Börse Clearing AG, which in turn merged with Cedel International in 2000 and was later 
renamed. See L Böttcher Depotgesetz (2012) § 1 [5]; Clearstream Kundenhandbuch 1.1, 1-1. 
11
 See Clearstream Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen der Clearstream Banking AG (25 September 
2017) II(1). A financial institution is one as defined in § 1 Kreditwesengestz and permitted to operate 
as such in terms of § 32. 
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12 3 Intermediation – a legal perspective 
Despite commonly taking securities into deposit and at times even holding them 
collectively,12 the common practice of the banks lacked a legal basis. The turning 
point for the development of modern and pervasive collective securities custody was 
an opinion written by Hans Schultz and Georg Opitz outlining the legal and practical 
requirements of collective custody and forming the basis of the Depotgesetz.13 The 
Act, which is still in force today, provides a statutory basis for collective custody 
(“Sammelverwahrung”) by determining in § 5 that a depository may transfer fungible 
securities to collective custody, unless the depositor specifically requests a separate 
custody (“Sonderverwahrung”) provided for in § 2. While the Act initially determined 
that a separate deposit should be the default position, this is no longer the case.14  
Furthermore, the Act makes provision in § 3 for third-party custody 
(“Drittverwahrung”), enabling a depository to deposit client certificates with a third 
party under its own name either in the form of separate or collective custody. The 
consent of the depositor is not required for third-party custody. 
The relationship between the owner and the intermediaries (and between 
intermediaries inter se) continues to be one of deposit, regulated in first instance by 
the contract of deposit and subjected, secondly, to special rules as set out in the 
Depotgesetz. A deposit of securities is a regular deposit,15 even if securities are 
fungible and held collectively. It follows, that ownership does not pass to the 
depository.16 Instead, a depository becomes a co-possessor of the securities.17 A 
depositor of securities held in collective deposit can, in principle, demand re-delivery 
of certificates of equal value or number.18 This entitlement falls away if securities are 
held as a permanent global certificate.19 Depositors can claim only from their own, 
                                            
12
 See above, 8 3 4 4 Deposit. 
13
 H Schultz & G Opitz “Sammeldepots beim Kassenverein: Gutachten, erstattet namens der 
Rechtsabteilung der Deutschen Bank, Berlin“ in G Opitz Fünfzig depotrechtliche Abhandlungen (1954) 
1 (original publication in 1926, 16 Sonderbeilage Bank-Archiv). 
14
 The change was only introduced in 1994 by the Zweites Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz vom 
26.7.1994, art 7 (1), (3) and (4). On the old position see Heinsius et al Depotgesetz 31, 46, 94. On the 
change see J Than “Wertpapierrecht ohne Wertpapiere?” in N Horn, H-J Lwowski & G Nobbe (eds) 
Bankrecht - Schwerpunkte und Perspektiven: Festschrift für Herbert Schimansky (1999) 821 827. 
15
 U Brink Rechtsbeziehungen und Rechtsübertragung im nationalen und internationelen 
Effektengiroverkehr (1976) 51. 
16
 See below, 12 4 2 Legal framework. 
17
 See below, 12 4 2 Legal framework. 
18
 Depotgesetz § 7(1). Their entitlement does not extend to a re-delivery of the original certificates. 
19
 Micheler Property in Securities 198 n 13. 
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immediate intermediary.20 The legislation introduces special rules for shortfalls.21 In 
the case of an insolvency of an intermediary, the securities held by the intermediary 
on behalf of clients are out of reach of the intermediary’s general creditors, 
regardless of whether these have actually been credited to client accounts.22 
12 4 Electronic settlement and transfer 
12 4 1 Commercial mechanisms 
In Germany, trading takes place on electronic trading systems, such as XETRA, 
operated by the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Matched transactions are automatically 
forwarded. As a rule, the clearing of equities transactions and central counterparty 
services are provided by a clearing institution and central counterparty in the case of 
stock exchange transactions, notably Eurex Clearing AG. Information on trades, 
including trade confirmations, is conveyed directly to the central counterparty 
(“CCP”), which provides clearing and netting services. Settlement can only 
commence if there are sufficient securities in the CASCADE account of the clearing 
member on the selling side and sufficient funds in the central bank account of the 
clearing member on the buying side.23 
Following clearing, delivery instructions are conveyed to Clearstream. Any 
instructions to Clearstream are provided by the CCP and not directly by the 
transacting parties or their custodians or clearing members.24 As part of settlement, 
securities are, in the interim, booked to the account of the CCP.25 In acting as a 
counterparty to the trade, the CCP does not become the owner of the securities.26 It 
merely acts to intermediate possession.27 It becomes the contracting party to both 
the selling clearing member and the buying clearing member, thereby shouldering the 
risk of late performance or non-performance. 28  Delivery of securities to the 
                                            
20
 198. 
21
 199-200. 
22
 Depotgesetz § 32. 
23
 See Clearstream Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen der Clearstream Banking AG (25 September 
2017) B XX(2). 
24
 In terms of EUREX Clearing AG Clearing Bedingungen: Allgemeine Bedingungen (January 2018) 
1.4.2 (3) participants or customers of the clearing agency must provide a power of attorney to that 
effect to EUREX. 
25
 N Horn “Die Erfüllung von Wertpapiergeschäften unter Einbezug eines Zentralen Kontrahenten an 
der Börse: Sachenrechtliche Aspekte” (2002) 20 WM 1 4. 
26
 EUREX Allgemeine Bedingungen 1.4.2 (4)(a); Horn (2002) WM 19. 
27
 EUREX Allgemeine Bedingungen 1.4.2 (4)(a). 
28
 Horn (2002) WM 4. 
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purchaser’s clearing member will therefore always come from the account of the 
CCP.  
On settlement day, delivery instructions (for value) are sent by the CCP to 
Clearstream. Trades are settled on T+2 on a DVP basis and in batches. Before 
settlement can take place, the internal central bank accounts must be funded by 
customers or their settlement banks. A reservation of sufficient liquidity takes place in 
the internal cash settlement accounts maintained by Clearstream.29 This reservation 
is forwarded to TARGET2, which transfers the reserved funds into an RTGS sub-
account and notifies Clearstream that sufficient funds are available. 30  Once the 
settlement cycle begins, funds are settled through an entry in the internal cash 
settlement accounts, the balances of which are subsequently offset against the 
central bank accounts.31  
At the same time, securities are delivered through book entries in the relevant 
accounts of the clearing members (intermediated by entries in the CCP’s account). 
The delivery in the top-tier consists of the netted transactions and amounts. This tier 
therefore sees far fewer account entries and transfers than the lower tiers. Following 
successful settlement, Clearstream provides a list of settled transactions 
(“Regulierungsliste”) to Eurex, which in turn provides that information to clearing 
members in a settled delivery report (“Ist-Lieferreport”). 32  Based on this report, 
clearing members will make entries in their own accounts.33 The volume of these 
entries will be significantly larger, as clearing members hold either directly for 
investors or for other custodians.34 
12 4 2 Legal framework 
According to the general terms and conditions of Eurex Clearing, the transfer of 
ownership takes place when three requirements are met: 1. The CSD has made all 
relevant book-entries; 2. The relevant payment has been made; and 3. The clearing 
                                            
29
 Clearstream Kundenhandbuch 4.3, 4-6. 
30
 4.3, 4-6. 
31
 4.3, 4-6. 
32
See Eurex Clearing AG Glossary <http://www.eurexclearing.com/clearing-en/resources/glossary> 
(accessed 29-09-2018). 
33
 In practice, these entries are frequently made upon receipt of the pending delivery report (“Soll-
Lieferreport”) issued before settlement; Horn (2002) WM 21. Also see Eurex Clearing AG Glossary 
<http://www.eurexclearing.com/clearing-en/resources/glossary> (accessed 29-09-2018). 
34
 Horn (2002) WM 18. 
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members (or other customers of the CCP) have received access to the list of all 
settled transactions compiled by the CSD.35 These requirements do not replace the 
legal requirements for transferring securities. Instead, legal commentators have 
reconciled the statutory position with established legal requirements for transfer. 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to determine whether shares and securities can 
still be classified as things (“Sachen”). As described above, the entire system, 
including the notion of immobilisation, is constructed on the theory of securities as 
movable things – a classification which makes possible the application of the law of 
things in the first place. What influence does the immobilistion of certificates have on 
their proprietary classification?  
Certificates continue to exist, albeit not in individual form. In addition, certificates 
are ordinarily held collectively by a custodian. Securities viable for collective deposit 
are always fungible. 36  When such fungible securities are mixed, it becomes 
impossible to connect the individual certificates to their owners. When held as a 
global certificate, individualisation is similarly impossible.  
The question of the continued classification of shares and other securities as 
tangibles surfaced in tandem with the development of collective deposit. Only after 
the legal uncertainties had been untangled in a satisfactory fashion was the way 
cleared for large-scale collective deposits. A significant contribution to the clarification 
endeavor was made by Schultz and Opitz in an opinion that also served as the 
catalyst for the new Depotgesetz.37 They insisted that a system of collective deposit 
can be reconciled with principles of the law of things and strongly rejected 
constructions based solely on the basis of personal claims.38 Instead of having a 
property interest in an individual share certificate, the owner has a co-ownership 
interest in a pool of securities (“Miteigentum am Sammelbestand”). 39  This 
construction simultaneously means that custodians do not have any ownership 
                                            
35
 EUREX Allgemeine Bedingungen ch 1 s 1, 1.4.2 (4)(b)(aa)-(cc). 
36
 Depotgesetz § 1(1) and BGB § 91. 
37
 Schultz & Opitz “Sammeldepots beim Kassenverein” in Opitz Fünfzig Deptrechtliche Abhandlungen 
1. 
38
 Schultz & Opitz “Sammeldepots beim Kassenverein” in Opitz Fünfzig Deptrechtliche Abhandlungen 
1, 1-2 write: “Den Depotinhaber nur auf einen persönlichen Anspruch zu verweisen, unterliegt den 
schwersten Bedenken. Das Eigentumsrecht des Depotinhabers an seiner Aktie ist ein so 
grundsätzliches, daß es ihm zwangsweise nicht genommen werden kann”. 
39
 Depotgesetz § 6(1); BGB §§ 741, 1008. Schultz & Opitz “Sammeldepots beim Kassenverein” in 
Opitz Fünfzig Deptrechtliche Abhandlungen 2; G Opitz Depotgesetz: Gesetz über die Verwahrung und 
Anschaffung von Wertpapieren vom 4. Februar 1937 2 ed (1955) 151. 
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interests in deposited securities. The relationship between custodians and their 
customers is therefore one of regular deposit. 40  The co-ownership interest is 
expressed as a fraction of the entire bulk (“Sachgesamtheit”) of securities of the 
same type, being the face value of the certificates deposited 
(“Wertpapiernennbetrag”), or alternatively of the number of certificates deposited 
(“Stückzahl”).41 Co-ownership interests are created as soon as the certificates are 
deposited and received to form part of collective custody, irrespective of the will of 
the owner or depositor, and depend neither on the actual commingling in terms of §§ 
947 and 948 BGB, nor on contractual agreement to that effect between the parties.42 
Should a security be designated for third-party, collective custody, the co-ownership 
interest will be established once the certificates are delivered to, and received by the 
collective depository.43 Once certificates have been admitted to a collective deposit, 
the co-owner cannot demand the same certificates back.44 Instead, the depositor (co-
owner) can demand that his depository release securities amounting to his 
appropriate fraction of the bulk.45 Ordinarily, any rights that the owner had in the 
separate thing are extinguished;46 should the separate thing have been burdened 
with rights in favour of third parties, however, these continue to exist in relation to the 
co-ownership interest.47 The co-ownership rights always vest in the former owner; 
even if securities are deposited by a third party and her name is entered on the 
records of the depository, she will not become co-owner.48  
The mechanisms of transferring movable property dictate that possession is of 
utmost importance. In addition to a co-ownership interest, the previous owner is said 
to have conceptual co-possession (“Mitbesitz”) of the commingled certificates. Unlike 
co-ownership, which always exclusively accrues to the previous owner (the owner of 
                                            
40
 Brink Effektengiroverkehr 51. 
41
 Depotgesetz § 6(1) trumps BGB § 742. 
42
 Depotgesetz § 6(1): “so entsteht mit dem Zeitpunkt des Eingangs bei dem Sammelverwahrer für die 
bisherigen Eigentümer Miteigentum”; D Einsele Wertpapierrecht als Schuldrecht: Funktionsverlust von 
Effektenurkunden im internationalen Rechtsverkehr (1995) 24; Heinsius et al Depotgesetz 134 [3]; 
Opitz Depotgesetz 152. 
43
 Einsele Wertpapierrecht als Schuldrecht 25; Heinsius et al Depotgesetz 137 [7]; Opitz Depotgesetz 
149 clarifies that the decisive factor is the ability of the collective depository to admit the securities to 
collective deposit and not the actual admission. 
44
 Depotgesetz § 7(1). This provision deviates from the default position in BGB § 749. 
45
 Read BGB § 985 with Depotgesetz § 7(1). This demand can only be directed at the immediate 
depository, who can in turn direct it at his intermediary and so forth. 
46
 § 949 BGB. 
47
 § 949 BGB; Heinsius et al Depotgesetz 139 [10]. 
48
 Heinsius et al Depotgesetz 141-142 [15]; Einsele Wertpapierrecht als Schuldrecht 29. A 
presumption of ownership in § 1006 BGB is however created in favour of the depositor; Einsele 
Wertpapierrecht als Schuldrecht 29. 
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the individual certificate before it is deposited), possession diverges: Direct 
possession (“unmittelbarer Besitz”) vests in the CSD, primary indirect possession 
(“erststufiger mittelbarer Besitzer”) settles in the intermediary depository, while the 
depositor becomes the secondary indirect possessor (“zweistufiger mittelbarer 
Besitzer”),49 provided there is only one intermediary positioned between the final 
investor and the CSD. 50  Every custodian intermediates possession to the same 
object (the share), just in relation to different persons. 51  The possession of the 
intermediary depositories as well as the depositor is no longer physical in nature but 
is instead derived from the physical possession of the certificate or global certificate 
by the CSD. The CSD, and every other intermediary in the chain, intermediate 
possession (“Besitzmittlung”). Possession is therefore merely abstract and 
conceptual (“begrifflich”). 
Although the German system of co-ownership and co-possession therefore 
eliminates any individualised property right in a specific, identifiable asset,52 it does 
not sever the link between the rights of the investor and the shares deposited at the 
top tier. The investor does not hold a new and separate asset (an interest in a share), 
but rather continues to have ownership rights in the shares themselves, even if these 
rights are intermediated. The difference is best illustrated by way of example:53 
Company A issues 1000 shares all deposited with a CSD. If an intermediary holds 
100 of these shares, it would amount to a 10 percent undivided share of the 
Company A shares issued. If a client of the intermediary holds 50 of the 100 shares 
of the intermediary, he does not hold a 50 percent undivided share of the 
intermediary’s undivided portion, but rather a 5 percent interest in the shares held by 
the CSD. 
                                            
49
 Heinsius et al Depotgesetz 125 [68]; A Will “Depotgeschäft” in S Kümpel & A Wittig Bank- und 
Kapitalmarktrecht 4 ed (2011) 2323 2347 [18.101]; Brink Effektengiroverkehr 53. For definitions of 
“mittelbarer Besitz” and “mehrstufiger mittelbarer Besitz” see § 868 BGB and § 871 BGB respectively. 
In German there is usually talk of “Vermittlung des Mitbesitzes” by the CSD and other intermediaries 
and these are also referred to as “Besitzmittler”. 
50
 If there are several intermediaries between the depositor and the CSD, there may be more levels of 
indirect possession. 
51
 Horn (2002) WM 10. 
52
 M Dubovec The Law of Securities, Commodities and Bank Accounts: The Rights of Account Holders 
(2014) 63. 
53
 The example is adapted from Dubovec Securities, Commodities and Bank Accounts 64. Also see 
Horn (2002) WM 8. 
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Ordinarily, ownership in securities certificates as movable tangibles is transferred 
through delivery and an agreement to transfer; 54  this practice remains largely 
unchanged, but is modified to accommodate the alteration of ownership and 
particularly possession.  
To satisfy the requirement of delivery, the transfer of actual physical possession 
from the seller to the buyer is ordinarily required.55 An alternative to the transfer of 
possession was mentioned above, namely the assignment of the right to demand the 
release of the share certificates from a third party in terms of § 931 BGB. This is not 
the construction favoured by leading authors.56 Instead, possession is still said to be 
transferred through the default mechanism described in BGB § 929, sentence 1, but 
an instruction (“Weisung”) takes the place of delivery.57 To exemplify with the aid of a 
simple two-step construction in which the intermediary of the seller is simultaneously 
the final depository: The seller instructs his intermediary, as the direct possessor, to 
no longer hold in his favour and instead possess for the depository of the buyer.58 
Decisive is that the direct possessor adjusts his intention to intermediate possession 
for the buyer. Two situations need to be distinguished where a CSD is the direct 
possessor: 1. where the buyer and seller make use of the same clearing member or 
custodian; and 2. where they make use of different clearing members or custodians. 
In the first case, only a shifting of intention of the clearing member or custodian is 
decisive in bringing about a change in possession; the CSD continues to hold for the 
same financial institution.59 The second case requires a shifting of intention of both 
the CSD and the clearing member or custodian.60 It is important to note that each 
intermediary only intermediates possession for its respective client (for example the 
                                            
54
 BGB § 929; see above, 8 3 4 3 The transfer of shares. 
55
 See above, 8 3 4 3 The transfer of shares. 
56
 Will “Depotgesetz” in Bank- und Kapitalmarktrecht 2364-2365 [18.193]. Although this method of 
transfer is possible, it does not provide adequate protection to good faith purchasers. 
57
 Clearstream Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen XXI(1); Will “Depotgesetz” in Bank- und 
Kapitalmarktrecht 2365 [18.193]; Heinsius et al Depotgesetz 149 [35], 169 [71]; Horn (2002) WM 9; 
Opitz Depotgesetz 169; BGH (1959) NJW 35, 1536, 1539; BGH (1971) NJW 1608, 1609; BGH (1985) 
NJW 376, 378. 
58
 Will “Depotgesetz” in Bank- und Kapitalmarktrecht 2365 [18.193]; Horn (2002) WM 9; Clearstream 
Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen XXI(1); Opitz Depotgesetz 169; Einsele Wertpapierrecht als 
Schuldrecht 96. Also see BGH (2004) NJW 3340, 3341; BGH (1971) NJW 1608, 1609 on the transfer 
of indirect possession (not in the context of shares): “Richtig ist allerdings, daß dem 
Übergabeefordernis i.S dieser Vorschrift [BGB § 929] auch dadurch genügt werden kann, daß der 
unmittelbare Besitzer der Sache … das bisher bestehende Besitzmittlungsverhältnis zum Eigentümer 
der Sache auf dessen Weisung hin aufgibt und künftig nur noch dem neuen Erwerber den Besitz an 
der Sache mittelt”. 
59
 Horn (2002) WM 9; Opitz Depotgesetz 170. 
60
 Horn (2002) WM 9. 
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CSD for the clearing member and the clearing member for the custodian bank and so 
forth), thus each intermediary will have to adjust its intention individually.61 Each 
intermediary knows only the identity of its own clients. In addition, the quantitative 
scope of its intention does not equal that of other intermediaries. For these reasons 
the CSD, for example, cannot be said to shift its intention to possess for the clients 
below its own clearing members.62 
Following clearing and settlement, the CSD will make corresponding book entries 
– the shares sold will be removed from the account of the selling clearing member 
and will be entered on the account of the buying clearing member.63 The book entry 
serves to signal the shift in intention.64 The result is the termination of the indirect 
possessory relationship with the previous member and in its place the establishment 
of a possessory relationship with the current member.65 Similar entries are made by 
members and other custodians in their own accounts. It is argued that the book 
entries provide for sufficient publicity as required by BGB § 929.66  
Coupled with the transfer of possession is the agreement to transfer co-ownership, 
which stands separate from the obligationary agreement. For the agreement to be 
effective, the parties need to identify the exact objects to be transferred. 67 
Individualisation is no longer possible; the requirement of certainty is hence modified 
in the case of co-ownership interests, so that it is met if the fraction of the bulk has 
been specified.68 In a system typified by an indirect holding and indirect exchange 
facilitated by a stock exchange, the depositor depends on the intermediaries at 
various levels for an agreement to come into being. The intermediaries act as 
representatives for the buyer and seller.69 The instruction by the seller (the depositor) 
to his intermediary to cease holding for him and instead hold in favour of the buyer is 
at the same time an offer for purposes of the real agreement.70 Subsequently, the 
instruction is conveyed to the direct intermediary of the buyer, who, as her 
                                            
61
 9-10. 
62
 18. 
63
 Also see § 14 Depotgesetz. 
64
 BGH (2004) NJW 3340, 3341; Horn (2002) WM 9. 
65
 Heinsius et al Depotgesetz 149 [35]. 
66
 Brink Effektengiroverkehr 82-83, 97; Heinsius et al Depotgesetz 149 [35]. 
67
 See above,8 3 4 3 The transfer of shares n 302. 
68
 Opitz Depotgesetz 155 [13]; Einsele Wertpapierrecht als Schuldrecht 40; Micheler Property in 
Securities 201; S Kümpel “Der Bestimmtheitsgrundsatz bei Verfügungen über Sammeldepotguthaben 
– zur Theorie des Bruchteilseigentums sui generis” (1980) 16 WM 422, 425-426. 
69
 Heinsius et al Depotgesetz 148 [35].  
70
 Heinsius et al Depotgesetz 148 [35]; Horn (2002) WM 4 11. 
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representative, ordinarily has the power to accept the shares for deposit and with it, 
to accept the offer, which concludes the real agreement.71 If a CSD is involved, the 
offer is conveyed by the seller’s intermediary to the CSD and is immediately regarded 
to have been transmitted to the buyer’s intermediary. 72  The offer to transfer co-
ownership (“Übereignungsofferte”) is deemed to be accepted once the buyer’s 
intermediary has unconditionally accepted to act as indirect possessor for the 
buyer.73  The transfer of co-ownership therefore takes place directly between the 
buyer and the seller. At no time do the intermediaries acquire ownership or co-
ownership. It is only possession, but not ownership, that is intermediated. Chun 
therefore writes that “there is no legal intermediation of ownership, but mere 
conceptual intermediation of possession”.74  
In transactions concluded on the stock exchange via a CCP, the settled delivery 
report issued by the CCP is essential to found both, agreement and delivery. As the 
processing of transactions takes place directly between the CCP and the CSD, the 
settled delivery report is construed as either the acceptance of the offer by the CCP 
as representative of the purchaser,75 or as the receipt of the offer by the CCP as 
messenger receiving delivery on behalf of the purchaser. 76  Furthermore, it 
communicates to the clearing members the shifting of intention of the CSD and as 
such forms the basis of the shifting of intention of the clearing members 
themselves. 77  In terms of this construction, co-ownership (brought about by 
agreement and delivery) and control at the top tier (dependent only on delivery, 
specifically on possession) pass at the same time namely when the settled delivery 
report is made available.  
There is some debate on whether a book entry is required for a valid transfer of 
co-ownership. In terms of § 24 Depotgesetz, if an intermediary buys securities either 
                                            
71
 Heinsius et al Depotgesetz 148 [35]. 
72
 Will “Depotgesetz” in Bank- und Kapitalmarktrecht 2367 [18.201]. 
73
 Will “Depotgesetz” in Bank- und Kapitalmarktrecht 2367 [18.201]; Horn (2002) WM 11. 
74
 Chun Cross-border Transactions 158. 
75
 D Einsele Bank-und Kapitalmarktrecht: nationale und internationale Bankgeschäfte 3 ed (2014) 513-
514, [27]. 
76
 Horn (2002) WM 21. 
77
 Horn (2002) WM 21, 23. There is disagreement on whether an entry based on the pending delivery 
report issued before settlement takes place is legally valid to found possession – see S Schwarz 
Globaler Effektenhandel: Eine rechtsstaatliche und rechtsvergleichende Studie zu Risiken, Dogmatik 
und Einzelfragen des Trading, Clearing und Settlement bei nationalen und internationalen 
Wertpapiertransaktionen (2016) 205-307. Even if this is so, the fact that the offer is only conveyed to 
the clearing member when the settled delivery report is issued means that ownership does not transfer 
at an earlier point in time – Schwarz Globaler Effektenhandel 307. 
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as commission agent or in its own name on behalf of a client, co-ownership transfers 
to the client if the agent makes an account entry, provided that it has not transferred 
at an earlier point in time in terms of the civil law.78 Micheler argues that the section 
provides a basis for determining the acquisition of an ownership interest outside the 
rules of possession.79 Yet, it is also flexible enough to accommodate the rules on 
possession if co-ownership passes by these at an earlier point in time. This raises the 
question whether an entry by an intermediary is required for a transfer of co-
ownership? According to the general terms and conditions of the CCP, co-ownership 
passes once: 1. The central depository has made account entries; 2. The payment 
has been finalised; and 3. The settled delivery report has been made available to the 
clearing members.80 According to Einsele this means that account entries alone are 
not sufficient.81  Due to netting, book entries at CSD level are also few and far-
between. The decisive factor for the transfer of co-ownership, Einsele finds, is 
therefore the settled delivery report, not the actual book entries made by the 
custodians. 82  The report sets out the detailed transactions. Co-ownership can 
therefore pass before account entries have been made or even without them.83 
Micheler, however, indicates that account entries are decisive for the transfer of co-
ownership84 and Lehmann argues that account entries should be the deciding legal 
factor.85 He finds that the alleged intention to possess and therefore a construction 
based on a shifting of intentions is a fiction.86 Such a change, he argues, can only be 
effected with legislative intervention.87 
12 5 Protection of bona fide purchasers of shares 
The possibility of acquiring deposited shares and securities in good faith is not 
addressed by the Depotgesetz, but must instead be resolved with reference to the 
                                            
78
 Depotgesetz § 24(2). The section does not apply if investors purchases securities in their own name 
and without the use of intermediaries. 
79
 Micheler Property in Securities 205. 
80
 EUREX Allgemeine Bedingungen ch 1, s 1, 1.4.2(4)(b)(aa)-(cc). Also see Einsele Bank- und 
Kapitalmarktrecht 513, [27]. 
81
 Einsele Bank- und Kapitalmarktrecht 513, [27]. 
82
 513, [27]. 
83
 513, [27]. 
84
 Micheler Property in Securities 208-209. 
85
 M Lehmann Finanzinstrumente: Vom Wertpapier- und Sachenrecht zum Recht der unkörperlichen 
Vermögensgegenstände (2009) 416-417. Micheler Property in Securities 205-206, also regards the 
account credits as decisive. 
86
 Lehmann Finanzinstrumente 416-417. 
87
 417. 
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general rules set out in the BGB.88 As illustrated above, the protection of bona fide 
purchasers was a central motivation for advocating for the application of the law of 
things to securities in the first place. Traditionally, a purchaser is protected if he acts 
in good faith and if he has possession of the thing to be transferred. Possession 
creates an impression of ownership. Co-ownership and co-possession of securities 
held collectively, circumscribed as a fraction of the bulk, are, however, incapable of 
physical recognition.89 A lack of good faith acquisition, it is feared, will erode the trust 
in, and impede the functioning of the system.90 Where securities are held in collective 
deposit therefore, the book entry is seen by many academic authors as a viable 
alternative medium for publicity. An account entry is considered to create a legally 
relevant impression (“Rechtsschein”) that is the basis of a purchaser’s good faith and 
thus performs a function normally assumed by physical possession.91 Other authors 
dispute that account entries create a sufficient impression on which a good faith 
acquisition can stand.92 Despite the academic debate on this question, the decision 
in favour of good faith acquisition of collectively held securities is, at least in part, a 
policy choice. 
                                            
88
 The Depotgesetz only contains a provision in § 4(1), stipulating that a third-party depositor (i.e. a 
collective depository) is presumed to know that the securities do not belong to the intermediary. See 
Einsele Wertpapierrecht als Schuldrecht 98-99. 
89
 I Koller “Der gutgläubige Erwerb von Sammeldepotanteile an Wertpapieren am Effektengiroverkehr, 
1. Teil” (1972) Der Betrieb 1857 1860; A Hueck & C-W Canaris Recht der Wertpapiere 12 ed (1986) 
16. 
90
 See for example Than “Wertpapierrecht ohne Wertpapiere” in Festschrift Schimansky 832-833; 
Horn (2002) WM 12. 
91
 Heinsius et al Depotgesetz 180-181 [91]; Hueck & Canaris Wertpapiere 16; Brink 
Effektengiroverkehr 102-103; F Fabricius “Zur Theorie des stückelosen Effektengiroverkehrs mit 
Wertrechten aus Staatsanleihen” (1963) 162 AcP 456 482; Horn (2002) WM 11-12, 13-14; Micheler 
Property in Securities 213. 
92
 Einsele Bank-und Kapitalmarktrecht 518 [35]. Einsele criticises that the book entries cannot be 
accessed by the public and therefore do not create the publicity necessary to create an impression of 
ownership; see also W Zöllner “Zurückdrängung des Verkörperungselements bei den Wertpapieren” in 
L Raiser & F Baur (eds) Funktionswandel der Privatrechtsinstitutionen: Festschrift für Ludwig Raiser 
zum 70. Geburtstag (1974) 249 261-267. 
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Chapter 13: The effect of systemic intermediation in South Africa 
13 1 Overview of the commercial structures 
South African law continues to make provision for certificated and uncertificated 
securities.1 Nonetheless, the majority of securities are issued in uncertificated form.2 
Unless the Companies Act provides otherwise, the same provisions apply to both 
certificated and uncertificated securities. 3  Likewise, the rights and obligations of 
holders of securities do not differ.4 
Uncertificated securities are defined in s 1 of the Financial Markets Act as: 
“securities that are not evidenced by a certificate or written instrument; or certificated 
securities that are held in collective custody by a central securities depository or its 
nominee in a separate central securities account, and are transferable by entry without a 
certificate or written instrument”. 
Although the definition makes provision for dematerialisation (part (a)) and 
immobilisation (part (b)), South Africa has migrated towards the dematerialisation of 
shares and other securities. 
At the apex of the pyramid of securities holding is the central securities depository 
(CSD). A CSD is defined as “a person who constitutes, maintains and provides an 
infrastructure for holding uncertificated securities which enables the making of entries 
in respect of uncertificated securities, and which infrastructure includes a securities 
settlement system”.5 Strate is the only CSD in South Africa. Strate was established in 
1999 by the JSE and four major commercial banks. During 2003 it merged with 
UNEXCor, a settlement system servicing the bonds market and operated by the 
Bond Exchange of South Africa (BESA), and Central Depository Limited to become 
Strate Limited.6 The JSE continues to be the biggest shareholder of Strate Limited. 
                                            
1
 See s 49(2) and ss 51-53 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
2
 M Vermaas “The Reform of the Law of Uncertificated Securities in South African Companies Law” 
(2010) Acta Juridica 87 87-88. Also see s 33(2) of the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 in terms of 
which new issues of listed securities must be in uncertificated form. 
3
 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 49(3)(b); In s 49(4) it is expressly stated that ss 52-55 only apply to 
uncertificated securities. 
4
 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 49(3)(a); Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 s 33(4). 
5
 Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 s 1. 
6
 See, L Swart & VA Lawack-Davids “Understanding the South African Financial Markets: An 
Overview of the Regulators” (2010) Obiter 619 632. 
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Below the CSD are a number of central securities depository participants 
(“CSDP’s” or “participants”), being “person[s] authorised by a licensed central 
securities depository to perform custody and administration services or both, in terms 
of the central securities depository rules”.7 The participants are mainly large financial 
institutions such as banks.8 Investors cannot open accounts directly with the CSD.9 
Rather participants hold securities for their clients, who may be final investors or their 
nominees.10  
Strate may only open and manage central securities accounts for participants.11 A 
“central securities account” is defined as: 
“an account that reflects the number or nominal value of securities of each kind deposited 
and all entries made in respect of such securities, held by the licensed central securities 
depository for a participant or external central securities depository in the name of— 
(a) a participant;  
(b) an external central securities depository; or 
(c) any other persons as determined in the depository rules”.12 
Participants must distinguish own securities from client’s securities and deposit 
them in separate central securities accounts.13 Client securities may be held either 
collectively or individually.14 In collective deposit, securities of the same kind become 
comingled and identifying and allocating securities to specific clients becomes 
impossible.15 
Clients, in turn, open securities accounts with participants.16 Participants may open 
and keep securities accounts in their own name, in the name of clients, including own 
name clients and in the name of nominees.17 Own name clients are strictly end 
                                            
7
 S 1. 
8
 See Strate <http://www.strate.co.za/strate/supervision/participants> (accessed 29-09-2018) for a full 
list of participants. 
9
 Strate Rules of Strate Pty (Ltd) (September 2017) 6.2.2.1. 
10
 This appears from the definition of “client” in s 1 of the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012: “any 
person to whom a regulated person provides securities services, and includes a person that acts as an 
agent for another person in relation to those services”. Many investors hold securities in long chains of 
brokers and nominees. 
11
 Strate Rules 6.2.2.1. 
12
 Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 s 1(1). 
13
 Strate Rules 5.1.5-5.1.8; 6.2.2.3. 
14
 5.1.5. 
15
 Vermaas (2010) Acta Juridica 94. 
16
 See the definition of “Securities Account” in rule 1.2 of the Strate Rules. See further rule 6.2.2. 
17
 See the definition of “Securities Account” in rule 1.2 of the Strate Rules. 
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investors and therefore maintain a direct relationship with an issuer of securities.18 
The identity of the investor will be recorded at participant level, but the investor will 
not have a segregated securities account.19 
In addition, client accounts may also be held on an individual basis at central 
securities account level in the form of segregated depository accounts. Such 
accounts are opened by the CSD upon the request of a participant. 20  They are 
opened in the name of a client, but must be operated through a participant.21  
As a result of the above holding structure, the South African securities holding 
system is classified as a mixed system providing for a combination of transparent and 
non-transparent holdings. 22  The holding mechanisms provide investors with the 
option of maintaining a direct relationship with the issuer. More frequently, however, 
shares are held indirectly and in a non-transparent fashion. 
The central legislative instrument for regulating the custody and administration of 
securities is the Financial Markets Act. The Act focuses on the top tiers – central 
securities depositories and participants. Lower-tier intermediaries are, however, 
caught in the net of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002. 
By definition they are “financial services provider[s]”23 that render an intermediary 
service (with or without furnishing advice) by “buying, selling or otherwise dealing in 
…, managing, administering, keeping in safe custody, maintaining or servicing a 
financial product purchaser by a client from a product supplier or in which the client 
has invested”.24 “Financial product[s]” include shares, debentures and all securities 
as defined in s 1 of the Financial Markets Act.25 The Act provides a mechanism for 
the authorisation and licensing of intermediaries and provides guidelines for a code of 
conduct. 
                                            
18
 See Strate Directive SA.4: Requirements for Own Name Clients Special Gazette No S1-2018 of 15-
05-2018; Also see UNIDROIT Study LXXVIII – Doc. 44: Working Paper Regarding So Called 
“Transparent Systems” (October 2006) 8. 
19
 All securities of the same kind held by a participant are therefore pooled and recorded together in 
the account held by the participant with the CSD. 
20
 See the definition of “Segregated Depository Account” in rule 1.2 of the Strate Rules. Generally, see 
rule 6.2.1. 
21
 See the definition of “Segregated Depository Account” in rule 1.2 of the Strate Rules. 
22
 Vermaas (2010) Acta Juridica 96-97 and n 55; UNIDROIT Study LXXVIII – Doc. 44 7-8. 
23
 See the definition in the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002 s 1. 
24
 See the definition of intermediary service in s 1 of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services 
Act 37 of 2002. Only the relevant part of the definition [(b)(i)] has been quoted. 
25
 See the definition in the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002 s 1. 
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13 2 Intermediation – a legal perspective 
13 2 1 Framework for the analysis 
Inquiries into the legal characterisation- and impact of systemic intermediation on 
securities transfer and holding mechanisms have thus far received scant attention 
from South African legislators, regulators and legal academics.  
Pragmatism and functionality drive markets. Conceptual and doctrinal foundations, 
on the other hand, are the domain of the law. The sphere of shares and securities is 
shaped by a constant compromise between functionality, doctrine and conceptual 
soundness. As a response to the systemic intermediation of securities holding 
systems, two main approaches to legal design have emerged, a predominantly 
functional one and a doctrinal approach.26 
The US approach is said to be primarily a functional one. Traditional principles of 
deposit, bailment and negotiability27 were jettisoned in favour of a legal structure 
designed to give legal recognition to commercial realities. A functional approach 
addresses legal questions and uncertainties by providing tailor-made solutions.28 
Certainty and predictability of legal rules are paramount. 
A doctrinal approach, on the other hand, can be found in the solutions developed 
in England and Germany. By their reliance on general law and existing legal 
concepts, such as equity and trusts, or alternatively deposit, both countries have 
attempted to find legal solutions grounded in existing doctrinal structures. This 
approach offers more flexibility and continuity by facilitating not only the resolution of 
current problems, but also the development of adequate laws for future commercial 
practices.29 The doctrinal approach depends heavily on robust academic debate. It 
also holds the risk that existing legal concepts may become stretched. 
It is almost impossible, however, to view functional and doctrinal approaches in 
isolation. Functionalism must not be confused with formalism. The UCC, for example 
                                            
26
 Also see below, 17 1 A functional approach and 17 3 Models of Intermediation. 
27
 Negotiable instruments law was itself a functional solution to the demands of commercial practice 
that developed from the middle ages well into the sixteenth century before receiving legal recognition. 
On the history of negotiable instruments law, see WS Holdsworth “The Origins and Early History of 
Negotiable Instruments, Part 1” (1915) 121 LQR 12. 
28
 M Khimji “The Role of Legal Concepts in Commercial Law: Comments on Spink, Rogers and 
Scavone” (2007) 45 Can Bus LJ 94 95. 
29
 95. 
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states in functional, not categorical terms what it means to hold securities through an 
intermediary, by setting out the package of rights that constitute a security 
entitlement.30 An enquiry into whether a transaction is covered by article 8 depends 
not on its categorisation by the parties themselves, but on what it seeks to 
accomplish. So perceived, functionalism incorporates a certain measure of flexibility 
meant to catch transactions not specifically defined or not even thought of yet.31 Even 
functionally designed pieces of legislation include conceptual reasoning to counter 
the impossibility of comprehensive regulation.32 A conceptual basis will also develop 
through case law and academic debate. 
In the same vein, the scale of the changes brought about by commercial practice 
almost always necessitates some functional legislative intervention. In Germany, the 
principles of deposit applicable to securities transactions are, for example, contained 
in specific legislation. General law and existing legal concepts can only be stretched 
so far. English law, while having retained the concept of the trust, recognises that 
transfer mechanisms can no longer be sought in the traditional rules on 
assignment.33 
Whether designing functional or doctrinal legal rules, it is useful to formulate the 
objectives of a model of holding. The overarching, functional aim remains the ability 
to split control of shares from ownership thereof, or more specifically, the ability to 
enforce performance from the entitlement to enjoy its benefits.34 To achieve this split 
in an environment of systemic intermediation, clarity on the certainty- and protection 
of rights of investors must be gained. A holding model must address: 1. How a 
company will perform; 2. From whom the investor may claim performance; 3. Its 
impact on both the holding and ownership of shares; 4. The protection of the 
investor’s rights from the creditors of the intermediary; 5. The protection of investors 
when an intermediary becomes insolvent; and 6. The impact of the model on transfer 
mechanisms. 
                                            
30
 See JS Rogers “Policy Perspectives on Revised U.C.C Article 8” (1996) 48 UCLA LR 1431 1450. 
31
 The prefatory note to the 1994 revision of UCC § 8 clearly states that “[o]ne of the objectives of the 
revision … is to devise a structure of commercial law rules for investment securities that will be 
sufficiently flexible to respond to changes in practice over the next few decades”; UCC § 8 Prefatory 
Note – 1994 Revision II A. 
32
 Khimji (2007) Can Bus LJ 95. 
33
 See for example E Micheler “The Legal Nature of Securities: Inspirations from Comparative Law” in 
L Gullifer & J Payne (eds) Intermediated Securities: Legal Problems and Practical Issues (2010) 
131 147; M Smith & N Leslie The Law of Assignment 2 ed (2013).  
34
 See above, 8 5 Taking stock. 
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13 2 2 Asset transformation 
The economic theory of intermediation reveals that the involvement of intermediaries 
regularly results in a transformation of the assets being intermediated. 35  This 
transformation can differ in nature and scope depending on the type of intermediaries 
involved. The main functions of relationship-based intermediaries in the securities 
holding chain include the provision of access to securities holding, clearing and 
settlement systems as well as a reduction in costs through pooling.36  
A transformation of the share must be distinguished from the creation of new 
assets in the holding chain. The presence of relationship-based intermediaries 
necessarily transforms securities. The pertinent question is whether this 
transformation is accompanied by the creation of new assets. 
Lastly, it must be assessed how the transformation impacts on the nature of 
intermediary relationships. Do the intermediaries become owners of assets, 
possessors thereof or do they hold them as a result of contractual ordering? 
13 2 3 The South African indirect holding system 
13 2 3 1 Opening remarks 
The Financial Markets Act was promulgated to “regulate and control … the custody 
and administration of securities”, 37  amongst other objectives and functions. To 
achieve this, it does not follow a comprehensively functional approach comparable to 
article 8 of the UCC. Rather, it regulates certain aspects of the relationship between 
investors, custodians (authorised users, participants or their nominees) and a central 
securities depository. A plain reading of the provisions leaves several questions 
unanswered and calls for further analysis and interpretation. The provisions of the Act 
must be scrutinised to determine the nature of the intermediation undertaken i.e. 
whether intermediaries become owners, possessors or contractual intermediaries. 
Concepts such as deposit, agency and co-ownership all feature in the provisions of 
the Act. The traditional basis of shares has been examined above.38 It must be 
determined whether this framework is still conceptually sound or in need of revision. 
                                            
35
 See above, 9 3 1 The economic theory of intermediation. 
36
 On the functions, see above, 9 3 1 The economic theory of intermediation as well as 
9 3 2 Relationship-based and systemic intermediation. 
37
 Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 preamble. 
38
 8 3 5 Transfer and holding in South African law. 
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Furthermore, any functional additions and amendments to the traditional construct 
must be identified. 
13 2 3 2 Deposit 
The terminology of deposit occurs repeatedly in the Financial Markets Act. 
Depositories are a typical feature of systems in which securities are immobilised. In 
such systems depositories physically hold the immobilised securities certificates and 
are traditionally responsible for their safekeeping. The relationship between a client 
and his intermediary follows the legal rules of deposit. 
The origin of the concept of deposit in the Financial Markets Act can be traced 
back to the Custody and Administration of Securities Act 85 of 1992 (as read with the 
Safe Deposit of Securities Amendment Act 38 of 1998). The introduction of a 
depository system was encouraged by Malan and other academic writers, who were 
inspired by the developments in Germany and the US. The South African share 
certificate traditionally fulfils certain functions, such as serving as prima facie 
evidence of the shareholder’s rights and facilitating the ease of transfer.39 It never 
embodied these rights, but possession thereof by a non-owner could be sufficient to 
found an estoppel.40 Therefore, shareholders had some interest in the safekeeping of 
their certificates to protect them from being stolen, misplaced, falsified, destroyed or 
lost. To manage these risks, it became customary to deposit share certificates with 
banks, brokers and other financial institutions.41 In addition, the depositors offered a 
variety of administration services in respect of the certificates deposited.42  
This existing system of deposit was latched onto to devise solutions for the 
development of a securities holding system. To this end, Malan found that “[a] 
securities nominee company … is very similar to a depository”,43 and further that 
“[t]here is clearly a need to consolidate the vast safe custody holdings of banks, 
brokers and other nominees into a central securities nominee or depository 
system”. 44  Malan went on to outline the main features of a system of deposit: 
                                            
39
 See above, 8 1 The functions of the share certificate. 
40
 See above, 8 4 5 Estoppel and the protection of bona fide purchasers in South African law. 
41
 See MR Vermaas Aspekte van die Dematerialisasie van Genoteerde Aandele in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Reg LLD thesis University of South Africa (1995) 313-314. 
42
 314. 
43
 FR Malan “Depositories, Nominees and the Uncertificated Security” (1987) Moderne Besigheidsreg 
73 78. 
44
 79. 
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Deposited securities would be reflected on accounts and the transfer of securities 
would be evidenced by account entries; the system would be able to accommodate 
uncertificated securities; the securities would continue to be in registered form; bona 
fide purchasers should be protected; depositories should be able to hold securities 
collectively and to re-deposit them with another depository and a legislative 
framework should be designed to implement these changes.45  
Malan and Oosthuizen recognised that the terminology of deposit was not without 
its problems in the context of shares and securities.46 Securities, being incorporeal, 
are not susceptible to a deposit.47 Only the share certificate is in actual fact placed 
into deposit. The certificate, they found, must not deter from the fact that the 
relationship between a depositor and a depository continued to be governed by a 
contract of mandate.48  They regarded the terms “deposit” and “safe custody” as 
practically convenient only.49 
The Safe Deposit of Securities Act (later known as the Custody and Administration 
of Securities Act) provided legislative force to a system of collective deposit proposed 
by Malan and others. Some of the definitions and provisions of the Act continue to 
exist in almost unchanged form in the Financial Markets Act. The Financial Markets 
Act defines a “deposit” as “a deposit of securities, and includes a deposit by means of 
an entry in a securities account or a central securities account”.50 The definition of 
deposit encompasses both the deposit of physical share certificates for purposes of 
dematerialisation, as also seen in English law, and the deposit of securities issued in 
dematerialised form by way of account entries. Whereas the former relates to a once-
off event (dematerialisation) which involves a physical object (the share certificate), 
the latter is usually associated with defining lasting relationships through a 
mechanism that does not have any existence in the physical world (account entries). 
                                            
45
 Malan (1987) Moderne Besigheidsreg 78-81. Also see FR Malan & MJ Oosthuizen “The Safe 
Deposit of Securities” (1989) 4 TSAR 502; FR Malan Collective Securities Depositories and the 
Transfer of Securities (1984) 217-239. 
46
 Malan & Oosthuizen (1989) TSAR 503; Malan Collective Securities Depositories 219. 
47
 Malan & Oosthuizen (1989) TSAR 503-504; Malan Collective Securities Depositories 219. 
48
 Malan & Oosthuizen (1989) TSAR 504; Malan Collective Securities Depositories 219. 
49
 Malan & Oosthuizen (1989) TSAR 504; Malan Collective Securities Depositories 219. Also see 
Vermaas Dematerialisasie van Genoteerde Aandele 313 n 3, who argues that the terminology of 
deposit encourages legal certainty. 
50
 Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 s 1(1). Apart from the omission of the words “for custody and 
administration”, the definition is identical to the one in the Custody and Administration of Securities Act 
85 of 1992, which reads: “‘deposit’ mans a deposit of securities for custody and administration and 
includes a deposit by menas of an entry in a securities account or a central securities account” (own 
emphasis). 
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Depositories of dematerialised securities are not depositories in the traditional sense. 
They do not take deposit of a corporeal, movable thing, but rather of an entry in a 
securities account or a central securities account.  
The Act further provides that participants and central securities depositories must 
“administer and maintain a record of uncertificated securities deposited with 
[them]”.51 The Act does not extend this duty to lower-tier custodians, who fall within 
the scope of the definition of deposit by virtue of maintaining and making entries in 
securities accounts. The system of deposit envisaged by the Act is multi-tiered and 
allows for the collective holding of securities deposited. A participant must, after 
receiving a deposit of securities, deposit them with a central securities depository.52 
The mandatory language of the provision is a clear change from the language 
employed in the Custody and Administration of Securities Act, which provided that “a 
depositary institution … may, unless the client expressly directs otherwise in writing, 
deposit them with another depositary institution …”53 The Financial Markets Act again 
restricts itself to regulating the top tiers consisting of participants and a central 
securities depository. 
The interaction between the concepts of deposit and holding is far from clear. 
Terming Strate a depository does not make it an institution positioned in the holding 
chain between an investor and an issuer of securities as is the case in Germany. The 
main functions of Strate can be gleaned from the definition of a “central securities 
depository” in the Financial Markets Act, being primarily the provision of infrastructure 
for holding uncertificated shares and securities, including a settlement system and a 
system for “making entries in respect of uncertificated securities”. 54  This makes 
Strate mainly a system operator, similar to Crest, its UK counterpart. 
The same is true of participants. The fact that participants maintain the legally 
relevant securities registers means that they are (mostly) not entered on such 
registers. The fact that they are depositories therefore does not mean that they also 
                                            
51
 Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 s 30(2)(o) and s 32(2)(d) (own emphasis). This provision 
corresponds to s 2(2)(b) of the Custody and Administration of Securities Act 85 of 1992.  
52
 Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 s 32(2)(a). 
53
 Custody and Administration of Securities Act 85 of 1992 s 2(2)(a). Of interest is that the original act 
used the word “shall”, which was changed to “may” only by the 1998 amendment. Note also that the 
ambit of the Act was wider than can be seen in the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012. The Act does not 
provide for a duty of lower tiers to “redeposit”. 
54
 See the definition of “central securities depository” in s 1(1) of the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012. 
Also see s 30(2)(a) and (b). 
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stand in the holding chain between an issuer and an investor. As long as the entry on 
the securities register determines the relationship with the issuer, deposit cannot 
simultaneously be construed to do so. The concept of deposit is therefore largely 
irrelevant for determining holding, control and the ability to enforce rights. 
Based on the legislative history and the writings of Malan, it is clear that the 
intention of the legislature was not to bring the principles of the law of deposit to bear 
on the holding of securities though accounts. This development would be neither 
historically linear, nor would it address the difficulties posed by electronic holding 
systems. Nominee holdings of registered, certificated shares were never based on a 
contract of deposit, but were rather considered in terms of a relationship of principal 
and agent.55 Deposit is a concept traditionally used in relation to physical objects. 
Furthermore, the concept of deposit, especially in relation to fungibles, may have 
“ownership” implications.56 For these reasons it may have been more preferable to 
avoid the terminology of deposit altogether in the context of uncertificated, 
dematerialised shares. The terminology of deposit, rather than promoting legal 
certainty, obscures the legal relationships that underlie the collective holding of 
securities.57 Malan recognised that the structure of deposit that he designed could 
facilitate the immobilisation of securities. But he cautioned that “[l]awyers should 
anticipate the gradual dematerialization of securities and structure the legal 
framework to accommodate change”.58 The necessary terminological changes have 
not been put forward by the Financial Markets Act, which, in many respects, harks 
back to a piece of legislation that Vermaas found should have rather been titled the 
“Act on the Immobilisation of Securities”,59 clearly designed for a different age and 
different challenges. 
                                            
55
 See for example Holmes JA in Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & Investment Co (Pty) 
Ltd 1976 1 SA 441 (A) 453: “A nominee is an agent with limited authority: he holds shares in name 
only” (own emphasis). 
56
 A deposit of an incorporeal constitutes a depositum irregulare and upon deposit of the incorporeal, 
ownership passes. 
57
 The term “deposit” also continues to be used in the context of banking transactions, even if these 
are today more correctly classified as contracts of mutuum. In the case of banking however, the 
practice has developed out of common law contracts of deposit (depositum). See WG Schulze 
“Depositum, Deposit and Deposit-taking Institutions – Birds of a Feather? Not Quite” (2001) 13 SA 
Merc LJ 78. 
58
 Malan (1987) Moderne Besigheidsreg 81.  
59
 Vermaas Dematerialisasie van Genoteerde Aandele 313 n 3. 
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13 2 3 3 Agency and mandate 
The relationship between a nominee and its client is traditionally thought to be in the 
nature of agency or mandate.60 A core feature of agency is that the agent performs 
certain tasks on behalf of his principal, such as the receipt of dividends and 
distributions paid by the issuer and the exercise of voting rights. These have to be 
passed on or managed in compliance with the authority granted by the investor. The 
term “agency” is not defined in the Financial Markets Act and features only in the 
definition of “client”, suggesting that clients may act as agents for others.61  
Agency is adaptable to multi-tiered holdings through the appointment of sub-
agents. A principal (mandatory) can expressly authorise his agent (mandatary) to 
appoint and empower a sub-agent (sub-mandatary).62 There is some dissent on the 
governing rule in the absence of such authorisation.63 Some authorities postulate the 
general rule that an agent is not entitled to appoint a sub-agent without the requisite 
authorisation or consent, subject to exceptions.64 Others suggest that the agent may 
as a general rule do so, but again subject to exceptions,65 most notably where “the 
identity and personal attributes of the performer of the act are of material 
importance”. 66  This exception can hardly be said to apply to securities holding 
systems. There should be almost no difference between these approaches, however, 
as the first one prohibits the appointment of sub-agents subject to certain exceptions 
and the second one permits it subject to similar or equal limitations.67 The authority to 
appoint a sub-agent can also be implied in certain circumstances.68 Authority may, 
for example, be implied “[w]here it is the custom or usage in the ordinary course of 
the type of business to employ a sub-agent”,69 or “[w]here it becomes necessary to 
delegate in order to execute the mandate”.70 Both of these can be said to apply to 
                                            
60
 See above, 8 3 5 4 Agency. 
61
 Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 s 1(1). 
62
 AJ Kerr The Law of Agency 4 ed (2006) 189. 
63
 In general, see Kerr Agency 190. 
64
 Belonje v African Electric Co (Pty) Ltd 1949 1 SA 592 (E). Also see G Bradfield “Agency” in 
F Du Bois Wille’s Principles of South African Law 9 ed (2007) 983 993; JM Silke The Law of Agency in 
South Africa 3 ed (1981) 307, 311; DJ Joubert & DH van Zyl “Mandate and Negotiorum Gestio” in 
WA Joubert & JA Faris LAWSA 17(1) 2 ed (2009) para 9. 
65
 Strydom v Roodewal Management Committee 1958 1 SA 272 (O) 273. 
66
 273. 
67
 Silke Agency 306. 
68
 Kerr Agency 189; Silke Agency 311. 
69
 Silke Agency 311. Also see Kennedy v Loynes (1909) 26 SC 271 at 280; Gertenbach & Bellow v 
Mosenthal (1876) 6 Buch 88 at 91. 
70
 Silke Agency 311. Also see Turkstra v Kaplan 1953 2 SA 300 (T). 
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modern securities holdings systems, the first because multi-tiered holding structures 
are customary in modern securities holding systems, and the second one because 
participants act as gatekeepers to the CSD, making necessary a delegation of 
authority until the participant is reached.  
An alternative to the express or implied consent of the principal is a statutory basis 
for the appointment of sub-agents. This can be found in § 3 of the German 
Depotgesetz. Section 32(2)(a) of the Financial Markets Act similarly addresses the 
duty of participants to redeposit securities with a central securities depository, but is 
silent on lower-tier custodians.71 The definition of “client” in the Financial Markets Act 
indicates that “clients” may also be “agent[s] for another person” and receive benefits 
and services on behalf of such a person. 72  What is envisaged is therefore the 
possibility of agency, even multi-tiered, “if the contractual arrangement between the 
parties indicates this to be the intention”.73 It does not provide a basis on which an 
agent may appoint a sub-agent without agreement to that effect. 
Much has been written on the relationships between a principal, an agent and a 
sub-agent. The question whether there is “full privity of contract” between the 
principal and the sub-agent is particularly contentious. In other words, does a direct 
relationship come about between the principal and the sub-agent in terms of which 
the sub-agent would be obliged to account directly to the principal or the principal 
able to directly sue the sub-agent for a breach of mandate? The answer must be to 
the negative. In Turkstra v Kaplan, Steyn, J categorically finds that the mere fact that 
a principal has authorised an agent to appoint a sub-agent, whether expressly or by 
implication, is not sufficient to bring about a contractual relationship between the 
principal and the sub-agent. 74  Whether or not such a relationship comes into 
existence depends on the mutual intention of both the principal and the sub-agent 
that must be determined from the terms of both mandates and the surrounding 
circumstances.75 In the absence of such an intention, the sub-agent is accountable to 
the agent only for proper performance of the mandate and the agent to the principal. 
Thus, even if the authority of the sub-agent is derived from the authority that the 
                                            
71
 Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 s 32(2) reads: “A participant— (a) must, if securities are deposited 
with the participant, deposit them with a licensed central securities depository”. 
72
 See the definition of client in s 1(1) of the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012. 
73
 Definition of “client” in s 1(1). 
74
 Turkstra v Kaplan 1953 2 SA 300 (T) 304. Also see Watson v Sachs 1994 3 SA 655 (A) 661; 
Karaolias v Sulam t/a Jack’s Garage 1975 3 SA 873 (R) 875G. 
75
 Turkstra v Kaplan 1953 2 SA 300 (T) 304; Watson v Sachs 1994 3 SA 655 (A) 662. 
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agent himself has received from the principal, the relationship between the sub-agent 
and the agent stands separate from the relationship between the agent and the 
principal. There is a strong argument to be made that the structure of modern, 
indirect securities holding systems creates an environment in which there should not 
be full privity between the principal and the sub-agent. It is probable that the parties 
will also expressly provide for this no-look-through approach. The Financial Markets 
Act does not specifically provide for such an effect. 76 
The internal relationship between an investor and an intermediary or between 
intermediaries is governed by the rules of mandate. Due to the historical 
development of the concept of agency out of contracts of mandate in South African 
law,77 the rights and duties that define agency relationships are largely the same as 
those that form the basis of contracts of mandate. A mandatary must carry out the 
mandate and do so in compliance with and within the limits imposed by the 
contract.78 In securities holdings the proper performance of the mandate includes the 
receipt of distributions and the payment thereof to the mandator in the manner 
agreed to.79 Secondly, a mandatary must exercise the mandate diligently and with 
reasonable care. 80  The duty of a mandatary “to perform his functions faithfully, 
honestly, and with care and diligence”81 is said to be one of the naturalia of a contract 
of mandate.82 An undertaking by a mandatary to act with the requisite care and 
diligence of a reasonable person in the specific circumstances is said to be “implied” 
into every contract of mandate.83 The degree of care and diligence required depends 
                                            
76
 But see Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 s 32(2)(j), which reads: “A participant— (j) must exercise 
the rights in respect of securities deposited by it with a licenses central securities depository in its own 
name on behalf of a client when so instructed by the client” (own emphasis). Also see Custody and 
Administration of Securities Act 85 of 1992 s 10(2). 
77
 See Kerr Agency 11 n 80. 
78
 Joubert & Van Zyl “Mandate and Negotiorum Gestio” in LAWSA 17(1) paras 7-8; Kerr Agency 136. 
79
 Note that the exercise of voting rights is subject to specific rules aimed at establishing a direct link 
between investors and issuers for purposes of voting. In terms of s 58(3)(a) of the Companies Act 71 
of 2008, a shareholder may appoint two proxies to exercise voting rights. In terms of s 58(3)(b) a proxy 
may delegate his authority to act on behalf of the shareholder. This section therefore provides for the 
authority to be delegated through the holding chain until it reaches the investor. Also see A Henderson 
& K van der Linde “Uncertificated shares: A Comparative Look at the Voting Rights of Shareholders II” 
(2014) TSAR 724. 
80
 Joubert & Van Zyl “Mandate and Negotiorum Gestio” in LAWSA 17(1) para 10; Kerr Agency 136-
139. 
81
 David Trust v Aegis Insurance Co Ltd 2000 3 SA 289 (SCA) 298 para 20. 
82
 298 para 20. 
83
 Bloom’s Woollens (Pty) Ltd v Taylor 1961 3 SA 248 (N) 253-254; David Trust v Aegis Insurance Co 
Ltd 2000 3 SA 289 (SCA) 298 para 21. Also see the authorities cited by Joubert & Van Zyl “Mandate 
and Negotiorum Gestio” in LAWSA 17(1) para 10 n 11 and Kerr Agency 137 n 25. 
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on the agreement between the parties, the circumstances of the case, trade usage 
and custom as well as statute.84  
The duty of the mandatary to act in good faith is closely related to the duty to 
perform the mandate with reasonable care and diligence.85 This duty encompasses 
that “the mandatary must act honestly and properly, in the interests of the mandatory, 
and must refrain from intentionally causing him or her any harm or injury”.86 In its 
most general terms, the duty of good faith therefore establishes a fiduciary 
relationship between an agent and his principal. 87  The nature of the fiduciary 
relationship was aptly described in the Canadian decision of Hodgkinson v Simms88 
quoted with approval by Heher JA in the case of Phillips v Fieldstone Africa (Pty) 
Ltd89: 
“Finally, I note that the existence of a contract does not necessarily preclude the existence 
of fiduciary obligations between the parties. On the contrary, the legal incidents of many 
contractual agreements are such as to give rise to a fiduciary duty. The paradigm example 
of this class of contract is the agency agreement, in which the allocation of rights and 
responsibilities in the contract itself gives rise to fiduciary expectations”.90 
Heher JA continued: 
“There is no magic in the term ‘fiduciary duty’. The existence of such a duty and its nature 
and extent are questions of fact to be adduced from a thorough consideration of the 
substance of the relationship and any relevant circumstances which affect the operation of 
that relationship.”91 
The fiduciary relationship that exists between custodians and their clients also 
receives recognition in the Financial Markets Act as read with the Financial 
Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28 of 2001 and the Financial Advisory and 
                                            
84
 See the authorities cited in 83 above. In general, also see Corbett, JA in Alfred McAlpine & Son 
(Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974 3 SA 506 (A) 531; Silke Agency 326-327. Also 
see the passages from Pothier cited by Kerr Agency 137 n 28, 30 on agreement to vary the degree of 
care and diligence required. 
85
 On the duty of good faith, see in general Kerr Agency 141-153; Joubert & Van Zyl “Mandate and 
Negotiorum Gestio” in LAWSA 17(1) para 11. Also see Ulpianus D 17.1.10pr. 
86
 Joubert & Van Zyl “Mandate and Negotiorum Gestio” in LAWSA 17(1) para 11. 
87
 Kerr Agency 141. 
88
 [1994] 3 SCR 377 (SCC). 
89
 2004 3 SA 465 (SCA). 
90
 Hodgkinson v Simms [1994] 3 SCR 377 (SCC) as quoted in Phillips v Fieldstone Africa (Pty) Ltd 
2004 3 SA 465 (SCA) 477 para 27. 
91
 Phillips v Fieldstone Africa (Pty) Ltd 2004 3 SA 465 (SCA) 477 para 27. 
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Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002. The legislation strengthens the focus on the 
fiduciary nature of the relationship. Fiduciary duties, existing in private law, have 
been statutorily reinforced and subjected to a regulatory regime.92 
The Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act calls for a code of conduct 
to be established for financial service providers.93 The code sets out general-, as well 
as more specific duties for custodians of financial products and funds. In general it 
provides that: 
“A provider must at all times render financial services honestly, fairly, with due skill, care 
and diligence, and in the interests of clients and the integrity of the financial services 
industry”.94 
Some of the more specific duties that are traditionally categorised under the duty 
of good faith include: 1. The duty of the agent to act solely in the interest of his 
principal.95 2. This includes a disclosure of any conflicts of interest that may arise out 
of the performance of the mandate. The agent must also disclose any personal 
interest he may have in the performance of the mandate.96 3. The agent is prohibited 
from making a secret profit out of the performance of the mandate. He is prohibited 
                                            
92
 See, General Code of Conduct for Authorised Financial Services Providers and their 
Representatives Notice 80 GG 25299 of 08-08-2003 s 3(1)(d): “the service must be rendered in 
accordance with the contractual relationship and reasonable requests or instructions of the client”. 
Also see s 10(1)(e)(i). 
93
 General Code of Conduct for Authorised Financial Services Providers and their Representatives 
Notice 80 GG 25299 of 08-08-2003. Also see Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 
2002 s 16(1)(a). 
94
 General Code of Conduct for Authorised Financial Services Providers and their Representatives 
Notice 80 GG 25299 of 08-08-2003 s 2. 
95
 On the common law position, see S v Heller 1971 2 SA 29 (AD) 43H-44C; R v Heroldt 1957 3 SA 
236 (A) 258D-G; R v Milne & Erleigh (7) 1951 1 SA 791 (A) 828D; Mallison v Tanner 1947 4 SA 681 
(T) 684. Also see Silke Agency 337-339. On the statutory position, see General Code of Conduct for 
Authorised Financial Services Providers and their Representatives Notice 80 GG 25299 of 08-08-2003 
s 3(1)(d): “the service must be rendered … with due regard of the interests of the client which must be 
accorded appropriate priority over any interests of the provider”. Also see the provisions quoted in n 96 
and 97 below. 
96
 On the common law position, see Mallison v Tanner 1947 4 SA 681 (T) 684. On the statutory 
position, see Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002 s 16(2)(a): “A code of 
conduct must in particular contain provisions relating to- (a) the making of adequate disclosures of 
relevant material information, including disclosures of actual or potential own interests”; General Code 
of Conduct for Authorised Financial Services Providers and their Representatives Notice 80 GG 25299 
of 08-08-2003 s 3(1)(b): “the provider must disclose to the client the existence of any personal interest 
in the relevant service, or of any circumstance which gives rise to an actual or potential conflict of 
interest in relation to such service”. 
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from using or disclosing information, including confidential information, received in 
the performance of the mandate for his personal benefit. 97 
Section 37(5) of the Financial Markets Act reads: “Any securities held by a central 
securities depository, participant or nominee for or on behalf of another person, must 
be segregated and identifiable as belonging to a specific person and are considered 
to be trust property as defined in the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) 
Act… ”. The provisions of the Act apply to “financial institutions” as defined in the 
Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017.98 The definition has been simplified and 
streamlined as compared to the one provided by the now repealed Financial Services 
Board Act 97 of 1990. Included within its ambit are financial product providers, 
financial service providers, market infrastructures, holding companies of financial 
conglomerates and persons licensed or required to be licensed under a financial 
sector law. Even if securities held in custody or administered for, or on behalf of, 
other persons fall within the scope of the definition of “trust property” in the Financial 
Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act,99 they have little to do with the legal concept of 
the trust. The Act applies the concept of “trust property” to both, trusts and agency 
constructs.100 The purpose of the Act must therefore be understood to create and 
strengthen fiduciary duties of the agent.  
                                            
97
 On the common law position, see Peacock v Marley 1934 AD 1 at 5; Robinson v Randfontein 
Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168 at 229; Transvaal Cold Storage Co Ltd v Palmer 1904 TS 4 
at 33; Evans and Jones v Johnston 1904 TH 238 at 244-245; Jones v East Rand Extension Gold 
Mining Co Ltd 1903 TH 325 at 335. Also see Kerr Agency 143-153; Silke Agency 339-343. On the 
statutory position, see General Code of Conduct for Authorised Financial Services Providers and their 
Representatives Notice 80 GG 25299 of 08-08-2003 s 3(c): “non-cash incentives offered and/or other 
indirect consideration payable by another provider, a product supplier or any other person to the 
provider could be viewed as a potential conflict of interest”; also see s 3(f): “the provider involved must 
not deal with any financial product for own benefit, account or interest where the dealing is based upon 
advance knowledge of pending transactions for or with clients, or on any non-public information the 
disclosure of which would be expected to affect the prices of such product.” In addition, s 3(3): “A 
provider may not disclose any confidential information acquired or obtained from a client or, … a 
product supplier in regard to such client or supplier, unless the written consent of the client or product 
supplier, as the case may be, has been obtained beforehand or disclosure of the information is 
required in the public interest or under any law.” On confidentiality, also see Strate Rules 4.2-4.4. 
98
 Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017 s 1. 
99
 “Trust property” is defined as “any corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable asset invested, 
held, kept in safe custody, controlled, administered or alienated by any person, partnership, company 
or trust for, or on behalf of, another person, partnership, company or trust, and such other person, 
partnership, company or trust is hereinafter referred to as the principal”; Financial Institutions 
(Protection of Funds) Act 28 of 2001 s 1.  
100
 Section 2(b), for example, refers to “the instrument or agreement by which the trust or agency in 
question has been created” (own emphasis). Likewise, the definition of “trust property” in s 1 indicates 
that it not only encompasses property administered by a trust, but also such property controlled or 
administered by a person, partnership or company. This interpretation is in line with the historic use of 
the term “trust” as inherited from English law and reflected in the Companies Act 61 of 1973. In terms 
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An agent is furthermore obliged to account to his principal (or a sub-agent to the 
agent). This includes the duty to maintain accounts and to keep them up-to-date.101 
The form and manner in which the accounts are to be drawn up and maintained can 
be determined by the contract of mandate, by trade usage or by statute. 102  In 
addition, an agent must allow the books so maintained to be inspected.103 According 
to Schreiner J, “the obligation to permit inspection is a continuing one resting on an 
agent throughout the agency and even thereafter”;104 and further, “[n]o doubt the 
corresponding right must be exercised reasonably and at convenient seasons”.105 
The duty to maintain accounts is particularly important in the context of 
dematerialised securities, as the account entries have an impact on establishing 
holding, on transferring ownership and, in the absence of certificates, provide 
evidence as to both of the above. In this context the account is more than a mere 
summary of the transactions undertaken by an agent. It is only consistent therefore, 
that legislation places a strong emphasis on the duty to maintain accounts. The 
duties of central securities depositories and participants in respect of accounting are 
primarily set out in the Financial Markets Act and the rules of Strate. A central 
securities depository and a participant are obliged to maintain accounts.106 The CSD 
must notify a participant and the participant must notify its client of any entries made 
in an account.107 Participants are obliged to furnish their clients with statements in 
respect of securities accounts at least twice per annum.108 A CSD must balance and 
reconcile the total number and nominal value of uncertificated securities with the 
                                                                                                                                        
of s 104 of that Act, a company was not bound to take notice of any trust. The reference to trust was 
interpreted to mean “nominees” [see the reference to case law in MS Blackman, RD Jooste, CK 
Everingham, JL Yeats, FHI Cassim & R De La Harpe Commentary on the Companies Act (2002) (RS 
9 2012) 5-299] and Blackman et al make it clear that a nominee was an agent, not a trustee, 5-299, 5-
171. Blackman et al 5-171 and 5-172-1 also explain that “[t]he term ‘beneficial owner’ is derived from 
the ‘owner’ being regarded as the beneficiary of a fiduciary arrangement with the nominee generally 
arising out of a constructive trust out of English law” and further “in our law, the nominee as such is not 
the trustee, but is the agent of the ‘beneficial owner’”. In this context, any reference to the trust concept 
must therefore be interpreted to reflect the fiduciary nature of the arrangement rather than being in the 
nature of a formal trust. 
101
 See Krige v Van Dijk’s Executors 1918 AD 110 at 113; Hansa v Dinbro Trust (Pty) Ltd 1949 2 SA 
513 (T) 517. Also see Silke Agency 331-332. 
102
 Joubert & Van Zyl “Mandate and Negotiorum Gestio” in LAWSA 17(1) para 12. 
103
 Hansa v Dinbro Trust (Pty) Ltd 1949 2 SA 513 (T) 514; Jacobsohn v Simon & Pienaar 1938 TPD 
116 at 120; Mead v Clarke 1922 EDL 49 at 51. 
104
 Jacobsohn v Simon & Pienaar 1938 TPD 116 at 120. 
105
 120. 
106
 See Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 s 30(2)(k) and s 32(2)(b) respectively. For further details on 
the duty of record-keeping, see Strate Rules 5.2. 
107
 Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 s 30(2)(m) and s 32(2)(g) respectively. 
108
 Strate Rules 5.8.5. Also see Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 52(4). 
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records of the issuer109 and a participant must do the same with the records of the 
CSD. 110  Participants and central securities depositories must also, upon being 
requested to do so, provide information contained in accounts to the registrar and 
issuer.111 In addition, they must properly disclose their fees and charges.112 Lower-
tier intermediaries are subject to similar legislative rules on record-keeping.113 
Part and parcel of the duty to account is the duty of the agent to keep any money 
or property belonging to the principal separate from own money or property.114 The 
principle of separation of property is a cornerstone of modern securities holding 
systems and is affirmed by legislation. It is given expression by obliging participants 
to keep own securities and client securities in separate accounts.115 Client securities 
must furthermore be segregated and identifiable as belonging to a specific person.116 
The same duty applies by statute to lower-tier custodians.117 What is unclear from the 
provisions of the Act and Rules is whether securities must be segregated in such a 
way that specific securities can be allocated to specific clients or whether it is 
sufficient if a custodian separates own securities from a pool of collectively held client 
securities.118 The wording of the provisions points towards the former interpretation, 
but this would effectively bar any pooling or collective holdings of securities. 
Considering the purpose of the duty, which is to prevent the mixing of client property 
with an agent’s property, it can be argued that the latter interpretation can find 
application as long as client accounts record the holding of each client in relation to 
the pool. 
                                            
109
 Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 s 30(2)(n). 
110
 Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 s 32(2)(k). Also see the corresponding right of the CSD to access 
the records of participants – s 30(2)(p). Also see Strate Rules 5.3 
111
 Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 s 32(2)(h) and s 30(2)(s) respectively. Also see Strate Rules 
6.3.4-6.3.7. Also see Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 52(1)-(3), which determine that any request for 
information must be made via the company. 
112
 Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 s 30(2)(r) and s 32(2)(f). 
113
 See Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002 s 16(20(b) as read with General 
Code of Conduct for Authorised Financial Services Providers and their Representatives Notice 80 GG 
25299 of 08-08-2003 s 3(1)(a), 3(2)(a). 
114
 Pretorius v Van Beeck 1926 OPD 197 at 198-199. 
115
 Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 s 32(2)(m) and s 37(5); Strate Rules 6.2.2.3. 
116
 Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 s 32(2)(m) and s 37(5); Strate Rules 6.2.2.3. 
117
 General Code of Conduct for Authorised Financial Services Providers and their Representatives 
Notice 80 GG 25299 of 08-08-2003 s 10(1)(e)(ii): A provider must take reasonable steps to ensure– 
“(ii) that client financial products or funds are readily discernible from private assets or funds of the 
provider”. 
118
 See also RA de la Harpe “Securities Registration and Transfer (ss 49-56)” in JL Yeats (ed) 
Commentary on the Companies Act of 2008 (OS 2018) 2-506 2-1019. 
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 In the common law, the failure by the agent to separate the principal’s property or 
proceeds from own property results in the allocation of the property of the agent to 
the principal unless and until the agent properly distinguishes it.119 It is submitted that 
this rule stands. Legislation firstly demands that participants hold sufficient securities; 
that is securities of the same kind equal to the total number or nominal value of own 
and client securities.120 Secondly, where there are insufficient securities in the event 
of an insolvency of a participant, the loss sharing rules state that the shortfall must in 
the first place be made up by the participant’s own securities.121 
Lastly, the duty to account encompasses a duty to deliver to the principal any 
property or monetary or non-monetary benefits received in the performance of the 
mandate.122 This rule applies not only upon the termination of the relationship, but 
also continuously as a transaction is completed or as funds and benefits are 
received.123 The rules of Strate therefore provide that “all interest, dividend, capital 
redemption payments and all other entitlements” received by a participant from an 
issuer, must be paid to a client. 124  Likewise, “all notices, reports and circulars 
regarding rights and other benefits” received from an issuer must be conveyed to 
clients within a reasonable time.125  
Where commercial changes are far-reaching, the question arises whether existing 
legal rules and concepts continue to be apposite? The scrutiny of agency principles 
shows that the principles of agency and contracts of mandate provide a 
comprehensive, flexible and convenient framework for the indirect holding of 
securities in accounts. Furthermore, the legislative framework neglects to regulate 
lower-tier holdings. There is clear evidence that the doctrinal framework has been 
modified and supplemented by legislation. It may be appropriate to conclude that the 
relationship has become one of “statutory agency”. Yet, this should not detract from 
the fact that, in practice, contracts still form the basis of custody relationships and 
that the parties continue to have significant scope to shape their contractual relations. 
                                            
119
 Pretorius v Van Beeck 1926 OPD 197 at 198-199. Also see Silke Agency 333 and the cases cited 
there. 
120
 Strate Rules 5.1.1. 
121
 5.1.2 and 16.5.2.1. 
122
 Krige v Van Dijk’s Executors 1918 AD 110 at 113. 
123
 Kerr Agency 155. 
124
 Strate Rules 5.8.3. Also see General Code of Conduct for Authorised Financial Services Providers 
and their Representatives Notice 80 GG 25299 of 08-08-2003 s 10(1). 
125
 Strate Rules 5.8.4. 
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Contracts, it was argued at the end of Part 1 are sufficiently flexible to accommodate 
statutory requirements. 126  The same argument can be advanced here. To deny 
therefore that the common law principles of the law of agency continue to play a role 
would not only be a negation of reality but would also deprive the parties of additional 
protection provided by the common law. At the same time, it will be argued in Part 3 
that it is important to recognise that the legislative provisions require us to 
reconceptualise the agency construct as a dynamic management and administration 
function.127 This includes taking cognisance of the fact that agents administer the 
same type of asset for a large client base and that it is more efficient and cost 
effective therefore, to manage these assets together in a pool. Traditional agency 
rules, aimed at more individualised principal-agent relationships, must be adapted to 
accommodate such practices. 
13 2 3 4 Ownership and holding 
Ownership is a legal concept. The term has been used liberally in this thesis thus far 
and without explanation. Technically ownership is a real right that confers 
comprehensive control over a thing.128 More specifically, ownership expresses the 
legal ability to exercise control over a thing.129 Colloquially it is also used in relation to 
incorporeal legal objects (patrimonial objects). For lack of better terminology a person 
who has comprehensive control over an incorporeal is said to be the owner thereof. 
In Oakland Nominees Holmes, JA found that “[a]lthough ‘ownership’ may, juristically, 
not be accurate in relation to the rights of the person in whom the shares vest, for 
convenience the descriptive labels of ‘owner’ and ‘ownership’ will be retained in this 
judgment”.130 This thesis purports to use ownership in the same sense i.e. in relation 
to the holding of personal rights as opposed to corporeal things. 
Where the person that is entitled to the benefits flowing from shares at the same 
time exercises the ability to enforce and receive performance of such benefits, it is of 
little importance to analyse ownership. Where the entitlement to benefits and the 
ability to enforce them diverge, the situation becomes somewhat more complicated. 
                                            
126
 See above, 6 3 The obligationary realms of shares and some conclusions. 
127
 Also see below, Part 3, 3 4 4. 
128
 See PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 5 ed 
(2006) 91 and the authorities cited there. 
129
 Badenhorst et al Silberberg & Schoeman’s Property 3. Also see Blackman et al Commentary on 
the Companies Act 5-172-1 n 1. 
130
 Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & Investment Co (Pty) Ltd 1976 1 SA 441 (A) 447H. 
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An additional level of complexity is added if there are several persons positioned 
between the person taking receipt of benefits and the person ultimately entitled to 
them. In these situations it is of utmost importance to determine the meaning and 
scope of ownership with care and precision.  
Thévenoz identifies two possible “ownership” models of intermediated systems: 
One where the investor is the full owner (he uses the terminology legal owner)131 of 
the securities held by the top-tier custodian; and the other where the investor holds 
only a derivate interest in the holding of his own intermediary and the top-tier 
custodian is the legal owner thereof.132 He terms the first model “direct ownership” 
and the second one “multi-tiered entitlements”. German law provides an example of 
the first model and English and US law are examples of the second. In the “direct 
ownership” model Thévenoz finds that investors maintain “direct” relationships with 
issuers, but depend on intermediaries in the exercise of their rights.133 This applies 
regardless whether the holding systems are transparent or intransparent. 134  He 
describes intermediaries in this model as “book-keepers or agents for investors” and 
as “mere instrumentalities in the investor’s ownership of and control over his 
securities”.135 The “direct ownership” model may “modif[y] the form of ownership, but 
does not change the identity of the owners”.136  
Thévenoz links the development of “multi-tiered entitlements” to the existence of 
registered shares as opposed to bearer shares and to the ability of a legal system to 
accommodate a split between legal and beneficial tile. In this sense, South African 
law is a hybrid. Its shares are predominantly in registered form. A dual conception of 
ownership is foreign to South African law.137 Even if registration does establish a 
direct relationship between the issuer and the custodian-shareholder, the shareholder 
acts as a mere conduit for the exercise of rights and the benefits received. South 
African law cannot and does not therefore accommodate a split between legal and 
                                            
131
 L Thévenoz “Intermediated Securities, Legal Risk, and the International Harmonization of 
Commercial Law” (2008) 13 Stan JL Bus & Fin 384 404. 
132
 404. 
133
 406. 
134
 406. 
135
 405. 
136
 405. 
137
 Any reference to “legal ownership” in the Strate rules is therefore misplaced. 
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beneficial title. That the South African model is therefore one of “direct ownership” as 
opposed to “multi-tiered entitlements” will be shown below.138  
In conceptualising a system of deposit for South Africa, Malan and Oosthuizen 
categorically state that a collective securities depository does not become the 
“owner” of securities deposited with it or registered in its name.139 Investors become 
co-owners of the certificates held in collective deposit as well as joint holders of the 
body of securities held collectively.140 The concept of co-ownership initially developed 
in relation to share certificates and draws on the law of things, based on which former 
owners of units mixed subsequent to a confusio become co-owners of the mixture, 
whether they have consented to their mixing or not. 141  This result has been 
approximated in statute.142 
Regarding the incidence of ownership and co-ownership, it is provided in section 
36 of the Financial Markets Act that: 
“(2) (a) No central securities depository or participant may become the owner, co-owner, 
holder, pledgee or cessionary for the purpose of securing a debt, of securities merely 
because of— 
(i) a deposit of securities; or 
(ii) the registration in its name of— 
(aa) securities;  
(bb)-(ee) …”143  
 
It is further provided in section 37(1): 
“Where securities of any kind are deposited with a participant or with a central securities 
depository, or accrue to the owner of securities of the same kind held collectively by a 
participant, authorised user, nominee or external securities depository in a securities 
account or by a central securities depository in a central securities account, the person 
                                            
138
 Vermaas (2010) Acta Juridica 93 n 104 comes to the same conclusion. 
139
 Malan & Oosthuizen (1989) TSAR 505-506; Malan (1987) Moderne Besigheidsreg 79. 
140
 Malan & Oosthuizen (1989) TSAR 505-506; Malan (1987) Moderne Besigheidsreg 79. Also see 
Vermaas Dematerialisasie van Genoteerde Aandele 385. 
141
 See Vermaas Dematerialisasie van Genoteerde Aandele 385-386 and the sources cited in n 21.  
142
 Vermaas Dematerialisasie van Genoteerde Aandele points out that the rules of the law of things do 
not apply because shares do not fall within the numerus clasus of rights that are acknowledged to be 
property. 
143
 This section is virtually identical to s 10(4)(a) of the Custody and Administration of Securities Act 85 
of 1992. 
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who was the owner of the securities at the time of deposit or accrual becomes entitled to 
an interest as co-owner of all the securities of the same kind comprised in the securities 
account or central securities account, as the case may be.”144 
Section 36(2)(a) is not confined to ownership; it indicates that neither registration 
nor deposit are sufficient to found ownership, co-ownership or holding.145 From the 
perspective of relevant company law provisions, this is not entirely accurate – 
registration does found holding. What the section does imply, however, is that for 
such ownership, co-ownership or holding to come into existence, something more is 
required between the parties to give effect to holding arrangements, such as a 
contractual agreement between the parties. That is the one important take-away of 
the section; that the Act does not purport to be the only instrument regulating the 
relationship between the parties. Private law must continue to play a role. This is also 
particularly true for structuring lower-tier holdings. The Strate Rules used to give 
recognition to this principle by obliging participants to obtain client mandates, which 
governed the relationship between participants and their clients.146 This requirement 
has fallen away. The other important take-away from section 36(2)(a) is that that 
ownership remains in the investor. 
Section 37(1) confirms this by stating that only the person who was the owner of 
securities at the time of deposit, not the CSD, particpants or other intermediaries, 
becomes co-owner thereof. Other than that, the section addresses the question as to 
how co-ownership is structured in the case of collective holdings of securities. The 
co-ownership interest is calculated by determining the proportion that the number or 
nominal value of securities deposited bears to the total number or nominal value of 
securities of the same kind held by a custodian.147 The co-ownership interest is 
therefore determined to be the undivided fraction of an entire bulk. The section 
clearly displays the influence of the German conception of securities deposit that 
probably made its way into the Act via writers such as Malan. While ownership 
remains in the investor, the collective holding of securities at intermediary level, 
coupled with the elimination of share certificates and the resulting evidentiary void, 
                                            
144
 Own emphasis in italics. This section is very similar to s 4(1) of the Custody and Administration of 
Securities Act 85 of 1992. The section however expressly does not apply to uncertificated securities – 
see s 4(3A). 
145
 The instances or pledge and cession are ignored for the time being. 
146
 See Strate Rules of Strate Pty (Ltd) (February 2014) 5.7.1-5.7.4. 
147
 Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 s 37(3). 
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make it impossible to allocate specific securities to specific investors. The ownership 
of specific securities is therefore replaced by a co-ownership in a pool of securities of 
the same kind held by an intermediary. The Financial Markets Act does not clarify at 
which level of intermediation this co-ownership interest must be determined, referring 
only to co-ownership “of all the securities of the same kind comprised in the securities 
account or central securities account, as the case may be”. 148  The definition of 
“securities accounts” includes accounts kept by nominees for their clients and is 
therefore so wide that its ambit appears to found a co-ownership interest at every tier 
of intermediation. This would result in a duplication of co-ownership interests. The 
principles of property law do not, however, permit more than one person to be owner 
of the same asset at the same time. Rather, the co-ownership interest should be 
calculated with reference to the positions recorded in the records that constitute the 
uncertificated securities register.149 This position is supported by a reading of the 
Strate Rules, which clearly intend the transfer of ownership to take place through a 
debiting and crediting of the accounts in the uncertificated securities register.150  
Even if the determination of co-ownership takes place at the level of uncertificated 
securities registers, co-ownership vests in the investors, not in the shareholders 
acting as nominees. The entry at register-level determines both the numerical 
proportion of an investor’s interest and facilitates a transfer thereof, but without 
necessitating that the entry be made in the name of the co-owner. It therefore retains 
its status of evidencing ownership. 
Ownership continues to vest in the investor and mutates to a co-ownership interest 
in the total number or nominal value of securities held in collective custody by a 
participant or central securities depository. The uncertificated securities register 
continues to found holding. This makes the shareholder the direct holder of securities 
and all other custodians, including the investor, indirect co-holders. Holding or co-
holding is therefore a combination of the entitlement to receive benefits on behalf of 
the owner and a package of duties owed by the holder to its client. These duties flow 
from agency relationships and were examined above. 
                                            
148
 S 37(1). 
149
 See below, 13 2 4 Registration. 
150
 Strate Rules 7.3.3.1, 7.3.3.2. The subregisters and SDA register, which are the uncertificated 
securities register, are also defined as registers of ownership, indicating that ownership passes at this 
tier. 
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The status of lower-tier intermediaries in the holding chain is not addressed 
conclusively in the Financial Markets Act. Its determination must, therefore, fall back 
on private law. The rules of agency dictate that agents do not become owners of the 
incorporeals they manage and administer. The Act’s position on ownership is 
therefore consistent with the common law position – ownership does not pass to 
intermediaries. To interpret the “register of ownership” phrase used in the definitions 
of “SDA register” and “subregister” of the CSD Rules as meaning to confer ownership 
on custodians would run counter to the private law principles of agency and mandate 
as well as to the relevant provisions in the Financial Markets Act. Such a model is 
conceivable, as the US example shows, but would require, particularly in the South 
African context, far more significant and pervasive legislative intervention. 
13 2 3 5 New assets? 
In early South African law, a conflation of shares with share certificates was strictly 
avoided. The holding and transfer of shares never had any property, or ownership 
implications. Shares were not transferred as movable property. Neither did ownership 
pass to a holder of shares. Multi-tiered structures change the way in which shares 
are held, or formulated differently, how we perceive and exercise the personal 
relationship between an issuer and an investor. The indirect manner of holding 
shares introduces the concept of account credits. An account credit is not a share or 
security. It rather represents all the duties of an agent, or stated inversely, all the 
rights that a client has against his custodian. It is also a numerical representation of 
the proportion of higher-tier holdings. This numerical value, at the same time, gives 
an indication of the client’s proportion of dividends or monetary contributions received 
by the custodian in bulk. At the same time, some rights against third parties are built 
into this relationship, such as protective measures against a custodian’s creditors. 
The law of accounts151 is a law of relationships. To conceive of account credits as 
assets in their own right may be a helpful fiction, but it would lead to the same 
conceptual fault that was perpetuated by the conflation of the share with the share 
certificate. The transformation of assets and the creation of new assets will be 
considered from a theoretical angle in Part 3.152 
                                            
151
 On the “law of accounts”, see 17 2 A law of accounts. 
152
 See below, 17 3 4 Transformation of assets and the creation of new assets and rights. 
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This conclusion does not imply that shares themselves are not transformed. On 
the obligation side, shares are held indirectly, the holding of which is recorded in 
accounts. On the asset side of shares, intermediation affects how shares are 
transferred, burdened for purposes of providing security or otherwise dealt with in 
relation to third parties and the world at large. Furthermore, the concept of 
“ownership” of a share is replaced by co-ownership of a notional unit of a pool of 
shares of the same type.  
13 2 4 Registration 
The duties of record-keeping are spread amongst several parties – the CSD, 
participants, issuers and clients. The status of the numerous records must be 
determined with reference to legislation and the rules of Strate. The logical point of 
departure is the definition of the “uncertificated securities register”, being “the record 
of uncertificated securities administered and maintained by a participant or central 
securities depository, as determined in accordance with the rules of a central 
securities depository, and which forms part of the relevant company’s securities 
register”.153 It follows, that the Companies Act and the Financial Markets Act make 
provision for two alternatives; the records compiled by the CSD or the records 
maintained by the participants.154 Both pieces of legislation do not determine with 
finality which one of these records is the legally relevant uncertificated securities 
register. Similarly, the term “records” is too widely defined to be of assistance.155  
Section 30(2)(o) of the Financial Markets Act demands that a CSD “administer and 
maintain a record of uncertificated securities deposited with it”. At the same time, it is 
“entitled to access the records of the uncertificated securities administered and 
maintained by its participants”,156 while also having to “balance and reconcile … its 
uncertificated securities register with the records of the issuer”.157 In addition to the 
record maintained by the CSD, each participant must “administer and maintain a 
                                            
153
 See Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 1, also see ss 50(3) and 50(3)(a); Financial Markets Act 19 of 
2012 s 1(1); Strate Rules 1.2. 
154
 Refer particularly also to the definition of “uncertificated securities register” in s 1 of the Companies 
Act 71 of 2008 and s 1 (1) of the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 and the wording of section 50(3) of 
the Companies Act. 
155
 Strate Rules 1.2 Definitions: “‘Records’ means those records of the CSD, Participants, Issuers and 
Clients which relate to the Business of the CSD or Participants in terms of the Act”. 
156
 Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 s 30(2)(p). 
157
 S 30(2)(n). For the corresponding obligation of the issuer, see s 34(d). 
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record of all securities deposited with it”158 and must furthermore “record all securities 
of the same kind deposited with it in an uncertificated securities register if so required 
by the depository rules”.159 To ensure uniformity across the fragmented records, the 
participants are in turn obliged to reconcile the totals of their own securities accounts 
with those of the central securities accounts on a daily basis.160 
The decisive record is clearly not the one maintained by the issuing company. In 
terms of the Companies Act, the issuer is merely obliged to record the total number 
of uncertificated securities issued. 161 The Financial Markets Act similarly requires 
only “the total number and, where applicable, the nominal value of each kind of 
uncertificated securities issued”162 to be recorded. These details must be regularly 
reconciled with the records compiled by the CSD.163 The company does not record 
any details of its shareholders. 
Of critical importance in determining the legal relevance of the records maintained 
by the CSD and participants are the definitions of “SDA Register” and “Subregister” in 
the CSD Rules: 
“‘SDA Register’ means the record of Uncertificated Securities held in a Segregated 
Depository Account kept by the Strate in terms of the Strate Rules, which is the register of 
ownership for the equity Securities deposited therein, and is deemed to be the 
Uncertificated Securities Register, where applicable”164 
 
“‘Subregister’ means the record of equity Uncertificated Securities held in a Securities 
Account kept by a Participant in terms of the Strate Rules, which is the register of 
ownership for the Securities Deposited therein, and is deemed to be the Uncertificated 
Securities Register, where applicable”165 
This means that, in relation to segregated depository accounts,166 the SDA register 
administered and maintained by Strate is the uncertificated securities register and 
therefore the decisive legal record. In relation to all other securities, it is the various 
                                            
158
 S 32(2)(d). 
159
 S 32(2)(e). 
160
 S 32(2)(k); also see Strate Rules 5.3. 
161
 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 50(2)(a). 
162
 Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 s 34(a). 
163
 S 34(d). 
164
 (own emphasis). 
165
 (own emphasis). 
166
 See above, 13 1 Overview of the commercial structures, as well as the definition of “Segregated 
Depository Account” in the Strate Rules 1.2. 
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subregisters kept by the participants that comprise the uncertificated securities 
register. The process of registration of uncertificated securities takes place in a 
fragmented fashion and is not undertaken centrally by a CSD or system operator.167 
In principle, these fragmented records, which together make up the uncertificated 
securities register, must contain the same details as the securities register 
maintained by the issuing company for its certificated securities.168  
The shareholders are therefore those persons recorded on participant-, or CSD 
level. They meet the definition of a “shareholder”169 as they are firstly entered as such 
on the uncertificated securities register and secondly, they are holders.170 Dividends 
and other payments can be made by the company directly to shareholders based on 
the information provided in the uncertificated securities register. Strate also offers a 
corporate action service in terms of which the distribution of benefits and other 
corporate actions will be administered by Strate. Shareholders who receive payments 
on behalf of their own clients must ensure that they forward the payments. The same 
is true for information issued by a company.171 
The uncertificated securities register becomes part of the securities register of the 
company. The company obtains access to the uncertificated securities register 
through the CSD.172 
The evidentiary value of the uncertificated securities register is the same as in 
relation to certificated shares – the register is “sufficient proof of the facts recorded in 
it” and can be rebutted.173  
In South Africa and elsewhere an increasing trend to require beneficial interest 
disclosures in the context of non-transparent holding patterns can be observed. The 
statutory definition of “beneficial interest” extends beyond the common usage of the 
term and includes persons who are deemed to be beneficial interest holders in terms 
                                            
167
 See Vermaas (2010) Acta Juridica 95.  
168
 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 50(3)(b) as read with s 50(2)(b). The Strate Rules may determine that 
additional information has to be recorded – see s 50(3)(b)(ii) and Strate Rules 6.3.3 and 5.2. 
169
 See the definition of a shareholder as discussed above, 8 2 4 Registration in South African law. 
170
 On holding, see above, Chapter 7: Introduction and a prospect of the discussion. 
171
 In terms of information issued by companies, the JSE Limited Listing Requirements 3.44 require 
that all prescribed information be made available directly to all holders. But also see JSE Listing 
Requirements 3.49, in terms of which circulars and pre-listing statements must be distributed directly 
to all “beneficial holders” who have selected the direct service. Also see above, 13 2 3 3 Agency and 
mandate. 
172
 Strate Rules 6.8.4. 
173
 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 50(4). Also see Strate Rules 6.11.6 and 6.13.8.8 
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of the Act.174 It has been criticised that the definition is too wide and that it includes in 
its ambit even those shareholders that act merely as nominees.175 The disclosure 
requirements set out in sections 56(3) to 56(7) are aimed at enhancing the 
transparency of nominee holdings. If a registered shareholder is not simultaneously 
the beneficial interest holder of the securities, the registered holder must disclose the 
identity of the person on whose behalf she holds the securities as well as the identity 
of all beneficial interest holders in respect of that security and the extent of the 
beneficial interest.176 The company must establish and maintain a register of these 
disclosures.177 These disclosure requirements are not novel.178 The real novelty lies 
in the fact that, by regulation, any disclosures are determined to become part of the 
securities register.179 Nonetheless, these duties of disclosure are said not to change 
the system to a transparent one.180 The duties of disclosure should also not have an 
impact on the default rules of privity in the case of sub-agency.181 The disclosure, 
however, makes known to the issuer that the shareholder acts as a nominee.182 
Disclosure can also be said to strengthen the conclusion that the investor retains 
ownership, or more accurately becomes the co-owner of shares, and that such co-
ownership is determined at the level of registration, even if the owner is not entered 
on the register.183 
                                            
174
 See the definition of “beneficial interest” in s 1 as well as the deeming provisions in s 56(2) of the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
175
 R Rachlitz “Disclosure of Ownership in South African Company Law” (2013) 3 Stell LR 406 412-
413; FHI Cassim, MF Cassim, R Cassim, R Jooste, J Shev & J Yeats Contemporary Company Law 2 
ed (2012) 252. If this is indeed the case, even nominees would not be obliged to make disclosures in 
terms of s 56(2) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, effectively rendering the provision redundant. 
According to Rachlitz the provision should therefore be interpreted to require disclosure where the 
person registered is not the only holder of a beneficial interest, see Rachlitz (2013) Stell LR 418. 
176
 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 56(3); For a critical analysis of this provision see Rachlitz (2013) Stell 
LR 417-418. 
177
 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 56(7)(a). 
178
 See s 140 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 for similar provisions. 
179
 See Companies Regulations, 2011 GN R 619 in GG 36759 of 20-08-2013 reg 32(3); See also 
Rachlitz (2013) Stell LR 418-419 who argues that the Act itself does not make provision for the 
inclusion of such disclosures in the securities register except in the context of the issue of securities 
other than shares; see Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 50(2)(b)(iv)(bb). 
180
 UNIDROIT Study LXXVIII – Doc. 44 8. 
181
 See above, 13 2 3 3 Agency and mandate. 
182
 Also see above, 8 3 5 4 Agency, representation and mandate, the text to n 375. 
183
 Also see below, 13 2 5 2 2 Account entries. 
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13 2 5 Electronic settlement and transfer 
13 2 5 1 Commercial mechanisms 
In the secondary market, buying and selling positions are matched anonymously 
during the trading process. The matched trade then passes from the trading platform 
and clearing system of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) to SAFIRES (South 
African Financial Instruments Real-time Electronic Settlement), the electronic 
settlement processing system of Strate. The JSE sends settlement orders (known as 
broker nett settlement orders) to SAFIRES in batch. Simultaneously the buyer and 
seller will send settlement instructions to their respective custodians, who may be 
participants. The buyer will instruct his custodian to settle his purchase of shares and 
the seller will instruct her custodian to settle her sale of shares. The settlement may 
only proceed if a participant has a valid instruction from its client. Client instructions 
may be in the form of an authorising instruction, a standing or general instruction, a 
BEE instruction or any other valid instruction.184 An authorising instruction is given by 
the client in respect of every individual transaction. A BEE instruction is a client 
instruction also given by a client in respect of every individual transaction, but in 
terms of a BEE contract concluded in terms of the rules of the JSE. BEE instructions 
are required in the context of BEE Securities or BEE Ownership Schemes, both of 
which are intended to encourage broad-based black economic empowerment 
through the participation of “black persons” in securities ownership. A standing 
instruction is a general or blanket instruction that covers any transaction. All 
instructions need to be in writing or otherwise recorded. The CSD will send the 
corresponding broker nett settlement orders (originating from the JSE) to the 
participants in bulk.185 The participants will match the instructions received from their 
clients to the settlement orders received from the CSD. The participant of the seller 
will also verify the availability of sufficient shares in the securities account of the 
seller. SAFIRES will then require the participant to commit to settlement orders.186 
Commitment is a conditional undertaking by the participant that the transaction will 
                                            
184
 See the definition of “Client Instruction” in Strate Rules 1.2. 
185
 Strate Directive SC.1: Operational Market Windows – On-market – Equities – JSE Special Gazette 
No S14-2016 of 25-11-2016 3.1.7, 3.1.8, 3.3.1.4. 
186
 Strate Directive SC.1: Operational Market Windows – On-market – Equities – JSE Special Gazette 
No S14-2016 of 25-11-2016 3.3.1.3. See also Strate Rules 7.3.2. For a brief overview of the clearing 
and settlement process in South Africa, see Z Botha “Financial Market Terminology, Technicalities and 
Theories” in K Van Wyk, Z Botha & I Goodspeed (eds) Understanding South African Financial Markets 
5 ed (2015) 199 216-217. 
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settle on settlement day i.e. that sufficient securities or funds are available to settle. 
On settlement day, SAFIRES seeks confirmation from the participant about the 
availability of securities. This process is known as reservation. Upon receiving such 
confirmation, SAFIRES sends a payment order to the South African Reserve Bank 
(SARB). Verification, confirmation and reservation are part of the process of clearing. 
Payment is facilitated by SAMOS (South African Multiple Organ Settlement), the 
SARB’s electronic settlement system, using central bank money.187 Each participant 
makes use of a settlement bank, which has an account in SAMOS. The SARB 
through the SAMOS system serves as an intermediary facilitating the transfer of 
funds from one settlement bank to another. 188  As soon as the SAMOS window 
opens, a payment advice is sent to the participants.189 The participant must, within 30 
minutes of receiving the payment advice from the CSD, instruct its settlement bank to 
fund its SAMOS account with the amount in question.190 Equity securities are settled 
at pre-determined times of the day (known as payment runs or payment windows) on 
the basis of multilateral netting. This means that the interbank obligations between 
the various settlement banks are calculated by SAFIRES and submitted for 
settlement to SAMOS.191 The account of the settlement bank on the buyer’s side (the 
“paying bank”) will be debited with the stipulated amount in Rand and the account of 
the settlement bank on the seller’s side (the “receiving bank”) will be credited with the 
same amount. Once settlement through SAMOS is complete, a payment confirmation 
is sent from SAMOS to SAFIRES.  
Strate will then make the relevant entries in its records. Thereafter, a participant 
must, upon receipt of an authenticated instruction from Strate advising it of the 
completion of the transaction, complete a corresponding entry in its records.192 An 
                                            
187
 Central bank money is money that has been completely dematerialised and takes the form of 
“credits to electronic demand deposit accounts at central banks”. If the credit is to the demand deposit 
account at a commercial bank it is known as commercial money. See RD Guynn “Modernizing 
Securities Ownership, Transfer and Pledging Laws” 17; See generally on the structure of payment 
systems PR Woods Set-off and Netting, Derivatives, Clearing Systems 2 ed (2007) 265-283. 
188
 For a brief overview of the role of central banks in payment systems see Bank for International 
Settlements The Role of Central Bank Money in Payment Systems (August 2003) 2-3, 9-11. 
189
 Strate Directive SC.1: Operational Market Windows – On-market – Equities – JSE Special Gazette 
No S14-2016 of 25-11-2016 3.1.5. 
190
 Strate Directive SC.1: Operational Market Windows – On-market – Equities – JSE Special Gazette 
No S14-2016 of 25-11-2016 3.4.3. 
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 Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) “CPSS Red Book - Payment, Clearing 
and Settlement Systems in South Africa” in Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Payment Clearing 
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“authenticated instruction” is defined as “any instruction sent or received through the 
SAFIRES system”.193 
13 2 5 2 Legal framework 
13 2 5 2 1 Legislative provisions 
In the context of certificated shares, shares are traditionally transferred by cession,194 
while the statutory provisions are concerned with a change in holding as evidenced 
by registration.195 A change in registration, even if not completely divorced from a 
transfer of shares, nonetheless stands separately from it. At the same time, the 
introduction of tiered, decentralised systems of registers and the concept of account 
entries makes it increasingly difficult to neatly separate a change in holding from a 
transfer of ownership.196 
The impression of a sweeping change of the status quo is created by a plain 
reading of the relevant statutory provisions. Where shares are in dematerialised form, 
s 53(2) of the Companies Act states that ownership of shares is transferred by:197 
“(a) debiting the account in the uncertificated securities register from which the transfer is 
effected; and 
(b) crediting the account in the uncertificated securities register to which the transfer is 
effected, 
in accordance with the rules of a central securities depository.” 
The Companies Act, however, variably refers to the “[r]egistration of uncertificated 
securities” in section 52, the “transfer of uncertificated securities in an uncertificated 
securities register” in s 53(1) and the “[t]ransfer of ownership in any uncertificated 
securities” in section 53(2) (own emphasis). Nowhere is the difference elucidated. 
The CSD Rules similarly refer to the “transfer of ownership” 198  and go on to 
emphasise that “[a] transferee becomes the owner of the Securities upon the 
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crediting of the transferee’s Securities Account or Central Securities Account”.199 In 
addition, both the definitions of the “subregister” and the “SDA register” describe 
these records as the “register of ownership”.200 
The Financial Markets Act, likewise, does not paint a picture of clarity. In contrast 
to the Companies Act and the CSD Rules, however, the Financial Markets Act omits 
any reference to “ownership” in connection with the transfer of securities and instead 
refers simply to “[t]he transfer of uncertificated securities or of an interest in 
uncertificated securities on the uncertificated securities register”. 201  This transfer 
takes place through a debiting and crediting of securities accounts or central 
securities accounts.202 
The legislative provisions introduce the mechanism of account entries. In the 
context of registration, account entries are not novel. The legislation, however, 
indicates that they also pertain to ownership. This is where unfamiliar territory is 
entered. These legislative provisions firstly raise the question whether these concepts 
can be distinguished at all,203 and secondly, if they can be separated, how a transfer 
of ownership takes place against the backdrop of the requirement of account entries. 
Regarding the first question, it has been set out above, 204  that ownership 
continues to vest in the ultimate investor. Not only is this model consistent with the 
legislative provisions, it is also path dependent. Suggestions that the person entered 
on the uncertificated securities register is automatically the owner of securities are 
consequently rejected.205 
The emphasis will therefore fall on the second question. According to Vermaas, 
the effect of the legislative provisions is that the transfer of shares no longer takes 
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place by cession.206 Van Huyssteen et al also indicate that “[t]he dematerialisation of 
shares and the immobilisation of share certificates have profound implications for the 
cession of shares in companies listed on the stock exchange”.207 On the other hand, 
de la Harpe continually refers to a cession of ownership, but without reconciling the 
transfer mechanisms with the traditional principles of cession.  
In analysing the transfer of shares and securities, it is necessary to take 
congnisance of the fact that existing legal mechanisms may no longer be apposite. It 
must therefore be tested whether and how the changed circumstances can be 
accommodated within the framework of cession and also whether the concept of a 
cession can be said to apply at all. 
13 2 5 2 2 Account entries  
Legislation unequivocally determines that a transfer of ownership in uncertificated 
securities takes effect through the debiting and crediting of the accounts in the 
uncertificated securities register.208 That the same book entries also transfer holding 
(registered title) does not mean that the relevant provisions pertain only to such 
registered transfers; the wording of the sections leaves little doubt that a transfer of 
ownership interests is intended to be caught within its net.  
The introduction of provisions regulating the making of book-entries represents a 
harmonisation with international best practice. A model of this kind was proposed by 
the UNIDROIT Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities. South 
Africa is a member of UNIDROIT and has recognised the principles of the convention 
in preparation of the Financial Markets Act.209 The convention is said “to promote 
uniformity and predictability of laws across Member countries to ensure legal 
certainty of book entries in securities accounts”. 210  Article 11 (Acquisition and 
disposition by debit and credit)) of the convention reads: 
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“1. Subject to Article 16, intermediated securities are acquired by an account holder by the 
credit of securities to that account holder’s securities account. 
2. No further step is necessary, or may be required by the non-Convention law or any 
other rule of law applicable in an insolvency proceeding, to render the acquisition of 
intermediated securities effective against third parties. 
3. Subject to Articles 15 and 16, intermediated securities are disposed of by an account 
holder by the debit of securities to that account holder’s securities account.”211 
It is important to note that the article refers to account holders, who, per definition, 
are not equal to “owners” in South African law. An account holder is defined as “a 
person in whose name an intermediary maintains a securities account, whether that 
person is acting for its own account or for others”.212 The section therefore pertains to 
both, holding and ownership. A credit in a securities account is, at once, an entry on 
the securities register that establishes holding, as well as a mechanism to transfer 
(beneficial) ownership. Article 9 of the Convention recognises that “the credit of 
securities to a securities account confers on the account holder … the right to receive 
and exercise any rights attached to the securities” only “if the account holder is not an 
intermediary or is an intermediary acting for its own account”. 213  The provision 
therefore evidences the same tension between account entries as mechanisms for 
registration and as formalities for transfer that is also evident from South African law. 
Moreover, the Convention, in an attempt to harmonise the laws on securities 
follows a predominantly functional approach. This stems from the impossibility of 
accommodating the wide range of substantive, doctrinal rules of different legal 
systems. The solution, according to Gullifer is therefore one which stipulates a 
desired result, but not the legal reasoning required to get there.214 The approach is 
doctrinally neutral and there is a general understanding that it requires jurisdictions to 
apply it within their own conceptual context.215 The South African policy document 
also recognises that the convention does not purport to be a comprehensive code, 
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but rather aims to set out key provisions that member states should incorporate into 
their existing legal framework. 216 
The attributes of South African law that must be acknowledged are the unitary 
conception of ownership and the resulting distinction between holders of shares and 
owners thereof, which distinguishes South African law from English law, as well as 
the fact that it is not customary that ownership is transferred to a holder or custodian 
of securities, which differentiates the South African legal position from that 
predominant in US and German law. These differences have to be taken into account 
in interpreting the operation and effect of book entries.  
As a result of the account-entry requirement, the transfer of ownership and 
registration take place simultaneously and by account entry. This achieves the aim of 
simultaneous settlement,217 and represents a significant change from the traditional 
position, in terms of which ownership transferred by cession without, and therefore 
significantly earlier, than registration. 218  Despite this conflation, conceptually, a 
transfer of ownership must still be distinguished from registration. Registration founds 
holding and it does so in the name of the person registered. Account entries are the 
final step to effect a transfer of uncertificated shares and the names against which 
the entries are made entered on the accounts are irrelevant for the transfer. The 
entry requirement can therefore at most be, that an account entry must be made, not 
that it has to be made in the name of the owner.219 Only this construction would lead 
to an adequate distinction between shareholding and ownership and accommodate 
the continued recognition of nominees. 220  In this manner the requirement of an 
account entry can also be reconciled with the fact that the register remains a record 
that is only prima facie, not conclusive proof of ownership. 
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At first glance, legislation requires a debit and a credit entry. Yet, the rules of 
Strate make it clear that a transferee becomes owner upon the crediting of her 
account.221 Where the debit entry is delayed, the decisive factor is the credit entry. 
Furthermore, the risk that a participant may neglect to make an entry at all is 
eliminated by the requirement that participants reconcile their balances with the CSD 
on a daily basis. 
Furthermore, the validity of the account entry hinges on an instruction that a 
participant has received from its client.222 The Rules state that a participant may only 
make an entry in accordance with such an instruction. For the account entry to be 
valid, the instruction does not have to be valid, but the participant must have made 
the entry in accordance with that instruction. Thus, if a participant makes an entry 
without an instruction or in a manner contrary to it, the entry is not valid. If, on the 
other hand, a participant makes an entry based on an instruction tainted by fraud or 
illegality, the entry is valid, provided the purchaser acted in good faith.223 This is also 
the logical result of the warranty of correctness and the indemnity given by a client in 
respect of an instruction.224 Where a custodian therefore issues an instruction to 
transfer without having been instructed by its principal to do so, the resulting 
transaction will be valid and irreversible. The requirement of account entries is 
therefore remarkably formalistic, particularly evident from two features: 1. the almost 
immutable nature of instructions; and 2. the fact that the identity of the transacting 
parties is irrelevant for the transfer of ownership. 
13 2 5 2 3 Account entries as a formality for cession 
The traditional foundation for a transfer of ownership in securities in South African 
law can be found in the mechanism of cession.225 To reconcile the requirement of 
account entries with cession, the provisions can be interpreted as establishing 
account entries as a formality for a valid cession. 
An account entry provides evidence of the transfer of uncertificated securities by 
publicising it to the world at large.226 This publicity was previously provided by the 
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register entry in conjunction with the delivery of the share certificate. Neither the entry 
on the register, nor the delivery of the share certificate, however, are traditionally 
formalities for a valid cession. In Botha v Fick the court found that where a right of 
action is evidenced in a document but exists independently of it, the delivery of the 
document is not a requirement for a valid cession of the right of action.227 While both 
registration and delivery provided some level of publicity, they never constituted 
legally binding publicity mechanisms comparable to delivery when movables are 
transferred. 
Legislation may prescribe additional requirements or formalities for a valid 
cession.228 Account entries signal to the world at large that transacting parties have 
adjusted their intentions in relation to the ownership of an incorporeal asset. Perhaps, 
by incorporating a “property-like” principle of publicity, the requirement of account 
entries gives some recognition to the fact that shares and securities are incorporeal 
units that are highly mobile and circulate in the market like corporeal things. In 
addition, account entries may serve to fill a part of the void left by the elimination of 
certificates.229  
The interpretation of account entries as an “ownership formality” for cession is also 
preferred by De la Harpe.230 He therefore rightly posits, that the requisite entries are 
a mandatory formality for a transfer of ownership in securities.231 What he does not 
examine is whether, in addition to accommodating formalities, the principles of 
cession continue to be a suitable interpretative framework for the transfer of 
ownership in securities. 
13 2 5 2 4 A cession construction 
Cession, particularly if unburdened by formalities, is a flexible mechanism by which 
personal rights or ownership of incorporeal assets can be transferred. The 
cornerstones of cession are: 1. consensus, formed by the corresponding intentions of 
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the transacting parties;232 2. the fact that the transfer takes place independently of the 
causa, or underlying obligationary agreement; 3. the certainty or determinability of the 
parties to the transaction;233 and 4. the certainty or determinability of the object to be 
transferred.234 All of these characteristic features of cession pose some problems in 
the context of uncertificated securities. 
In effect, the latter two characteristics demanding that the parties and the object of 
cession are certain or sufficiently determinable, are part and parcel of reaching 
consensus. Consensus requires an actual meeting of the minds. Coinciding 
intentions are therefore not sufficient – the parties must learn of each other’s 
expressions of will.235 Expressed in the offer and acceptance paradigm, a meeting of 
minds only takes place once the offeror becomes aware of the acceptance of the 
other party. Even if offer and acceptance are not the only method by which a meeting 
of minds can be achieved, they provide a convenient tool by which the parties’ 
intentions can be ascertained. 
It is considerably more difficult to reach consensus where firstly, the contracting 
parties remain anonymous and do not contract directly; and secondly, where the 
settlement system and the specific rules aimed at achieving the transfer of securities 
are designed in such a way that the identity of the parties is irrelevant. German 
authors have grappled with similar interpretive difficulties because intention is 
likewise of central importance to the German mechanism of transfer (even if it is a 
property-based mechanism as opposed to cession or assignment).236 The German 
model shows that the intentions of the parties can be formed, communicated and 
ascertained in a different manner. The following model is inspired by the solutions 
suggested in German law, while accommodating the differences that exist between 
German and South African law. 
Following the completion of the trade, the seller (or her broker) will send an 
instruction to her custodian, instructing the custodian 1. to transfer ownership of the 
incorporeal unit; and 2. to cease holding the share for her. This instruction can be 
construed as an offer or an expression of the intention of the seller to bring about a 
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transfer of rights. Legislation dictates that the instruction must be in a particular 
form.237 This must be regarded as a formality with which the offer should comply in 
order to be valid.238 The law furthermore requires that an offer be brought to the 
attention of the other contracting party to enable her to accept it.239 In securities 
settlement systems, the instruction is transmitted via a custodian or a chain of 
custodians to the CSD. In German law, the receipt of the instruction by the CSD is 
automatically construed as the receipt thereof by the buyer.240 There is merit in this 
construction as the CSD upon the receipt of both instructions from the seller and the 
buyer can commence with the process of clearing. The importance of the seller’s 
instruction is underscored by section 55(2) of the Companies Act. The section 
provides that “[a] person who gives an instruction to transfer uncertificated securities 
must- (a) warrant the legality and correctness of that instruction”. In addition, that 
person must indemnify the company, participant or CSD against any claim, direct 
loss or damage that arises out of a transfer effected on the basis of such an 
instruction.241 
The instruction sent by the buyer via his custodians can, on the other hand, not be 
construed as acceptance of the offer for a number of reasons: 1. It is probable that 
the instruction is sent at or around the same time as the seller’s instruction, after both 
parties or their custodians are informed of the trade, and therefore before the buyer 
learns of the offer; and 2. Such an acceptance would not be irrevocable as the 
process of clearing, aimed at establishing the positions of the contracting parties, has 
not yet commenced. The CSD Rules set out the point at which instructions become 
final, that is the point in time at which the instructions become irrevocable and 
unconditional and the transaction will go forth. This is known as settlement finality. 
Settlement finality serves mainly to provide a cut-off point for revocability in the case 
of insolvency of one of the contracting parties.242 Finality also encourages netting 
because netted orders cannot be unwound after the point of settlement finality is 
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reached.243 Rules on finality do not determine when a transfer of securities is final in 
the full legal sense of the word, but they can reveal when offer and an acceptance 
become unconditional and irrevocable. 
During clearing, the respective positions of the parties are established in relation to 
either securities or funds. Clearing serves an important function by identifying the 
object to be transferred. Personal rights as incorporeals are by their nature not easy 
to identify. Share certificates contained a certificate number as a unique designator. 
This designator has fallen away.244 Furthermore, it is probable that shares are held 
collectively by custodians on behalf of investors. In England and Germany the object 
to be transferred is said to be certain once the fraction of the bulk is specified. 
Although the abstract nature of the personal rights are determinable before this point, 
the scope of the rights is not, because per legislation, the co-ownership interest of 
collectively held securities must be determined as a proportion of the total number or 
value of securities held and administered by a custodian at the level of the 
uncertificated securities register.245 The object of the cession can therefore only be 
said to be determined or determinable when reservation takes place.246 
Following settlement, the CSD makes the relevant entries in its books, following 
which it sends an authenticated instruction to the participants advising them that the 
transaction has been completed. The authenticated instruction represents the point in 
time at which acceptance is communicated to the offeror through his custodian(s). 
Were it not for the formality of account entries, this would appear to be the point in 
time at which the parties reach consensus. 
While above model is a theoretical possibility, it is nonetheless difficult to reconcile 
the commercial and legislative mechanisms with the principles of cession. The 
formalistic nature of the account-entry formality has been remarked on above. Its 
implications are that, not only is an agreement to cede independent of the underlying 
obligationary agreement, but in fact no such underlying agreement would be required 
at all.247 In the same vein, the corresponding intentions of the parties to transfer and 
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to receive transfer have become redundant.248 Account entries are conclusive for the 
transfer of ownership regardless of the underlying intentions of the parties and as 
long as account entries have been made in accordance with an instruction, the 
transfer is valid even without intention.249 
Furthermore, the process of matching orders by algorithms is based on the 
premise that buying and selling positions are certain even without the identity of the 
parties being discernible. In contrast to a cession, the process of clearing and 
settlement that culminates in account entries therefore does not hinge on the identity 
of the parties.  
On the other hand, it remains of utmost importance to be able to identify the 
subject matter of the transfer. It must be recognised, however, that collectively held 
securities are not identifiable in the same way as corporeal movables. This has 
ignited significant debate, particularly in English law. 250  It is suggested that the 
position in terms of South African law is that firstly, the co-ownership interest is 
determined with reference to the uncertificated securities register, not the lower-tier 
registers as maintained by custodians.251 Secondly, the interest constitutes a pro-rata 
interest of all securities of the same type held in an account that forms part of the 
uncertificated securities register. 252  Thirdly, the pro-rata interest is an undivided 
fraction of the entire pool of securities of the same type as recorded in the 
uncertificated securities register.253 Lastly, the fluctuating nature of the pool makes it 
difficult to determine the fraction. Yet, it can be argued that at the point of reservation 
this interest is sufficiently identifiable in relation to the pool as a whole to enable 
transfer. 
Against the background of this analysis, it must be concluded that there are 
indications that the principles of cession would be stretched too far in accommodating 
the transfer of ownership in securities held through tiered accounts. It would require a 
fictional construction of consensus imputed to the transacting parties through a 
complex web of representatives and a reliance on the identity of transacting parties 
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that is not supported by the commercial realities. Furthermore, account entries do not 
reflect the identities of the transacting parties and individual transaction become 
untraceable where netting takes place. This may stretch the notions of intention and 
consensus too far. In addition, it is doubtful whether the concept of cession still has a 
useful analytical role to play. The aims of a cession construction are threefold: It 
reveals how a transfer is to take place; it indicates when ownership transfers and it 
determines who ownership is transferred to. The how and when are now simply 
dictated by the account-entry requirement. The value of the account entry lies in the 
fact that it enables a determination of the point in time at which ownership is 
transferred without having to refer to the rules on cession. What the account entry 
alone cannot do, however, is disclose who the ownership has been transferred to. An 
account entry does not provide sufficient context to the transaction. Yet, it must be 
doubted whether the analytical framework of cession can be of much assistance in 
this regard. The who-question must rather be determined with reference to the chain 
of instructions, intermediaries and agency relationships. A cession analysis as 
undertaken above, adds no value to the determination of these three states. The 
clear and formalistic nature of the provisions in the legislation that determine that 
ownership passes by account entries, makes it unnecessary to perform a cession 
analysis. 
13 2 5 2 5 Some problematic aspects of the transfer of securities by account entry 
A transfer of ownership takes place by account entries. It is best to describe this 
transfer mechanism as a statutory transfer rather than couching it in the familiar 
terms of cession. The mandatory nature of the account entries raises some 
challenges. 
In the first place, not every account entry corresponds to an intention to transfer 
ownership. At times, the intention may simply be to transfer registered holding from 
one nominee to another or from an “own name” holding to a nominee. The account 
entry, viewed in isolation, will not indicate that a transfer of ownership has not taken 
place. This scenario indicates that intention continues to be relevant. The rules and 
directives of Strate also highlight the importance of intention by distinguishing 
“account transfers” from ownership transfers.254 The term “account transfers” catches 
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those account entries that involve no change in (beneficial) ownership. 255  Such 
transfers are processed through the system, but pursuant to special procedures that 
allow the transfers to be distinguishable. The same is true for portfolio movements.256 
It is also conceivable that no entries are made on the level of the uncertificated 
securities register despite the parties’ intentions to transfer ownership, because the 
nominee that has held the securities for the transferor continues to hold them for the 
transferee. This scenario raises the question whether such a transaction can be valid 
without account entries being made. It has been set out that the account entry has a 
dual purpose; it records holding and transfers ownership. Where the entry is not 
required to achieve the former, it might still be necessary to bring about the latter. 
The legislative provisions are couched in mandatory terms and indicate that account 
entries are required for every transfer of ownership. Entries recorded on the accounts 
of lower-tier intermediaries are therefore insufficient. 
The relevant legislative instruments set out a clear rule for the transfer of securities 
by crediting them to an account. On the basis of a strict interpretation of the relevant 
provisions, the question whether a transfer of ownership can still take place by 
cession without account entries, must be to the negative. The inconsistencies in the 
wording of the legislative provisions have been pointed out above. 257  Whereas 
section 53(1) of the Companies Act refers only to a “transfer … in an uncertificated 
securities register”,258 s 53(2) specifically refers to a “transfer of ownership”. Vermaas 
similarly points out that the legislation is silent on lower-tier transfers.259 She seems 
to suggest, however, that the Act concerns itself with a transfer of “legal”, as opposed 
to “beneficial” ownership.260 This would mean that transfers in the lower tiers are 
effective even without an entry on the uncertificated securities register. The stronger 
worded s 53(2) as read with the rules of Strate suggests otherwise. The rules of 
Strate, however, provide that Strate may “effect Transfer to a person to whom the 
right to any Securities has been transmitted by operation of law or by agreement, or 
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 5.3. 
256
 7.3. 
257
 See the text to nn 196-201 above. 
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 Similar, s 52 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 and s 38 of the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012. 
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 Vermaas (2010) Acta Juridica 103-104. 
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 109: “The transfer that takes place on settlement date (DvP) on the participant level is transfer of 
legal title (ownership) in termsof the Act.” 
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pursuant to a court order” (own emphasis in italics).261 Corresponding provisions in 
the Companies Act262 and Financial Markets Act263 provide only for the power of 
Strate to effect a transfer pursuant to a transmission by “operation of law”. The 
“operation of law” requirement is uncontroversial; it encompasses, for example, the 
transfer of securities passed by inheritance, during the course of insolvency or 
pursuant to a corporate action. More unusual is the reference to transfers by 
agreement. Section 53(6) of the Companies Act evidences a clear departure from s 
91A(5)(c) of its predecessor, which still included the power of a participant to effect a 
transfer of a right transmitted by agreement. The Strate rules do not reflect this 
change. The rules may be intended to simply catch off-market transactions. Off-
market transactions are those where parties intend to transfer ownership in 
securities, but they reach an agreement to transfer privately and without the 
facilitation of an exchange. Strate provides that such transactions must be processed 
through the electronic settlement system by mandating that transacting parties report 
such transactions to their participants.264 In addition, a participant that settles both 
legs of a transaction must report this to Strate.265 Settlement must therefore take 
place through Strate and provision is made for payments to be effected via the 
payment system.266 Where the parties have not reported an off-market transaction or 
have failed to do so timeously, it is doubtful, however, whether Strate has the power 
to effect such a transfer. 
Whereas Strate therefore almost certainly does not have this power, the question 
arises whether the courts have the power to recognise as valid, cessions of rights 
entered into without the requisite account entries having been made or to unwind 
transactions by ordering that the register should be rectified. The requirement that 
ownership passes by account entry is very formalistic. This trait will be identified in 
Part 3 as a defining feature of the “law of accounts”. Agreement is reached by a 
series of specific communications and culminates in entry. This formalism can be 
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 Strate Rules 7.3.3.5. Also see Companies Act s 53(6), which however refers only to an order of 
court, not an agreement. 
262
 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 53(6). 
263
 S 38(1)(c). 
264
 Strate Directive SC.2 Operational Market Windows – Off-market – Equity Securities – JSE and A2X 
Special Gazette No S10-2017 of 05-10-2017 3.3. Also see JSE Limited Equities Rules (26 January 
2018) 6.30, 6.40, 6.10.2 and 6.10.3. 
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 Strate Directive SC.2 Operational Market Windows – Off-market – Equity Securities – JSE and A2X 
Special Gazette No S10-2017 of 05-10-2017 3.11. 
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 3.18. 
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explained with reference to the impossibility of unwinding transactions on fast-paced 
securities markets. Furthermore, netting of transactions makes unwinding impossible. 
Ownership transfers must therefore, subject to only few exceptions, be final. This 
strengthens transactional security. From this perspective, the power of courts to 
unwind completed transfers must be limited. This is reflected in s 53(5) of the 
Companies Act, in terms of which “[a] court may not order the name of a transferee 
contemplated in this section to be removed from an uncertificated securities register, 
unless that person was a party to or had knowledge of a fraud or illegality …”267 
While a court may still order a rectification of the register, 268  its powers are 
circumscribed.269 
Section 53(1)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act provides that a participant or CSD may 
also transfer uncertificated securities upon receipt of a court order. While this 
provision may simply be aimed at giving the CSD or participants the power to 
recognise court orders pertaining to the rectification of a register, it raises the 
possibility that courts may recognise cessions of rights effected without account 
entries. The rules and principles governing cession may play its part in this 
determination. These cases must be distinguished from those described above 
where a recorded transfer is disputed. They involve at most, the recognition of 
transfers not previously recorded by account entry270 and therefore necessitate no 
unwinding of transactions. The same policy grounds that limit the power of courts to 
reverse transfers therefore do not apply here. At the same time, other grounds 
indicate that, as a general rule account entries are required for valid ownership 
transfers and the discretion of courts to find otherwise should be restrained. These 
include the strong mandatory language of the legislative provisions requiring account 
entries, 271  the objective of achieving simultaneous settlement and payment of 
transactions and the undermining of the publicity and transparency function of the 
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 The reference to the “name of the transferee … [on] an uncertificated securities register”, is 
confusing because it blurs the distinction between holding and ownership. 
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 Although the Companies Act 71 of 2008 does not expressly provide for rectification, such an order 
may be made in terms of the common law or s 161 of the Act. 
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 Also see De la Harpe “SS 49-56” in Commentary on the Companies Act 2-1025 n 2 (n 104). 
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 Note, however, that Strate Directive SC.2 Operational Market Windows – Off-market – Equity 
Securities – JSE and A2X Special Gazette No S10-2017 of 05-10-2017 requires sellers and 
purchasers of securities, as well as their participants, to report off-market transactions – see 3.3, 3.4 
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account entries.272 It must be noted that, even if a court can recognise transmissions 
without entry, the default rule remains that an entry must be made. Thus, before such 
an entry is made, following a court order to that effect, a transfer has not been 
completed. Decisive for determining the timing of the transfer therefore appears to be 
the account entry, as also set out above. It appears, therefore, that such a court order 
does not have retrospective effect. 
In addition to the scenarios sketched above, the netting of transactions may cause 
problems. In terms of s 35(2)(y) of the Financial Markets Act, depository rules “must 
provide for netting arrangements if transactions in one or more categories of 
securities settled through the central securities depository settle on a net basis”. 
Accordingly, the Strate Rules provide for multilateral securities and cash netting on 
participant level.273 Netting significantly reduces the number of account entries and 
makes it impossible to correlate account entries and specific transactions. If the 
account entry requirement is interpreted strictly to require individual account entries 
for every single transaction, netting becomes impossible.274 The legislation does not 
provide a clear solution to this conundrum. De la Harpe therefore finds that “netting of 
aggregate trades would only effect a transfer of the ownership interest in respect of 
the net number of securities between the approved nominee ‘A’ and approved 
nominee ‘B’ and would not give effect to the multiple transfers of beneficial ownership 
interests at the investor level”.275  
On the other hand it was concluded above that, taking into account the dual 
purpose of account entries, the entry requirement in relation to transfers of ownership 
is only procedural.276 It requires that entries be made, but without regulating that they 
be made in the name of the (beneficial) owners. Account entries determine how and 
when transfers of ownership takes place, but they do not reveal or regulate the 
consequences and substantive aspects of such transfers, including the identity of 
owners. The mere fact of entry on an uncertificated securities register is constitutive 
for a transfer of ownership, while the actual content of such an entry is merely 
evidentiary for determining the right of ownership. From this perspective, to conclude 
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 2-1072. 
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 Strate Rules 7.5. Also see JSE Equities Rules 10.30.1.4: “All transactions in equities securities 
must be settled … on a net basis per member, per trade type and per equity security”.  
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 2-1052. 
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 De la Harpe “SS 49-56” in Commentary on the Companies Act 2-1053. 
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 This is consistent with the nature of a “law of accounts”, which will be considered below, 17 2 A law 
of accounts. 
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that netted account entries can represent several transactions, does not require such 
a great leap. For every transaction in pooled securities held through nominees, 
whether netted or not, the substantive aspects of ownership, including the identities 
of the transacting parties will be obscured at the level of the uncertificated securities 
register and will have to be investigated by looking into underlying accounts and 
client mandates.277 
13 2 6 Protection of bona fide purchasers of shares 
Through cession, a transferor cannot confer on the transferee more rights than he 
himself has. This is the core maxim in South African law that governs both the 
transfer of incorporeal assets by cession as well as the transfer of corporeal things by 
the mechanisms provided by the law of things. South African law knows no doctrine 
of good faith acquisition. The South African approach is said to prioritise the interests 
of the owner, balanced only by the application of the doctrine of estoppel. 278 If a 
transfer of ownership in securities is construed to be a statutory transfer mechanism 
rather than in the nature of cession, any deviation from this maxim can be understood 
to be an inherent part of the statutory transfer mechanism rather than being 
construed as an exception to the principles of cession. 
Section 53(4) of the Companies Act provides:279 
“A transfer of ownership [of uncertificated securities] in accordance with this section 
occurs despite any fraud, illegality or insolvency that may-  
(a) affect the relevant uncertificated securities; or  
(b) have resulted in the transfer being effected, 
but a transferee who was a party to or had knowledge of the fraud or illegality, or had 
knowledge of the insolvency, as the case may be, may not rely on this subsection.” 
This provision introduces the concept of good faith acquisition of shares and other 
securities to the South African legal landscape. It signifies a shift from the dominance 
of ownership towards greater transactional security. The change is in line with 
international developments and gives greater recognition to the characterisation of 
shares and securities as incorporeal units that are designed to circulate in the 
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 Also see text to nn 219-220. 
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law. 
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market. The provision in the first place provides for a higher level of certainty of 
transfer. While the usefulness of this rule may be debatable from a buyer-centered 
transaction cost perspective,280  a constant stream of transaction reversals would 
certainly hamper the efficient operation of any settlement system. At the same time, 
the provision balances the ideal of transactional security with the interests of the 
owner by disallowing parties who act in bad faith from relying on the subsection. This 
is a necessary and important qualification. A court may therefore not order the 
unwinding of the transfer unless the buyer acted in bad faith.281 
In addition, the Companies Act provides detailed rules for determining who carries 
any losses and is liable for damages that may result from unlawful acts. A person 
who interferes in the uncertificated securities register by changing either the names 
of shareholders, the number of securities held or the description thereof, is liable to 
the person who suffered direct loss. 282  Secondly, a person who instructs that 
uncertificated securities be transferred,283 warrants the legality and correctness of the 
instruction and indemnifies the issuer and participant or CSD from any damage or 
loss that may flow from effecting a transfer pursuant to such an instruction.284 Lastly, 
the participants and CSD must indemnify the issuer or any other person for direct 
loss or damage caused by effecting a transfer without an instruction, in accordance 
with an instruction that was not properly sent and authenticated or in a manner 
inconsistent with a properly authenticated instruction.285 
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Chapter 14: Concluding remarks 
The first electronic settlement of shares in South Africa took place in 1999. 1  In 
England, the change to electronic transfer and holding systems was similarly late; all 
transactions were processed with the aid of physical certificates until 1996. 2  By 
comparison, in Germany, the need to eliminate the movement of paper arose 
considerably earlier in the 1930’s,3 followed by the US in the 1970’s.4 Complexes of 
factors, including economic and political developments, have caused this variation in 
timing. Also integral were the legal design and the doctrinal tools available to effect a 
transfer of shares and securities. These included share certificates and registers, but 
with different legal characterisation and functions attached to them in different legal 
systems. 5  In addition to influencing the timing of the change, the conceptual 
foundations of securities therefore also determined the direction of change. In South 
Africa and England, certificates never embodied the rights that flow from shares; they 
were documents of evidence only.6 This explains why South Africa and England have 
opted for the dematerialisation of shares, while Germany and the US embarked on 
the route of immobilisation.  
Thus, the fact that shares have always been conceptualised in South African law 
as personal rights, abstract and intangible in nature has firstly, made it less pressing 
to eliminate the movement of certificates; secondly, has led to the complete 
abandonment of certificates in the form of a dematerialisation of securities; and 
thirdly, affects the way in which systems, structures and mechanisms are conceived 
and legally characterised in a dematerialised environment. 
The overarching theme of this thesis is an analysis of the legal nature of shares. 
Inseparable from such an enquiry is an investigation into the legal nature of transfers 
of shares as well as into the legal nature of holdings of shares. To chart the 
progression from paper-based to electronic systems illustrates the influence of legal 
doctrine. It also makes it possible to identify where legal doctrinal rules have been 
modified or are in need of modification. The assertion that the law develops in a path-
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 Strate Equities Handbook (2014) 16. 
2
 E Micheler Property in Securities: A Comparative Study (2007) 85. 
3
 See above, 8 3 4 4 Deposit and 12 1 Introduction. 
4
 See above, 8 3 3 4 Deposit and bailment. 
5
 See above, 8 1 The functions of the share certificate and 8 2 Registration. 
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 See above, 8 1 The functions of the share certificate. 
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dependent fashion is therefore not a suggestion that the law is static and that 
doctrine is immutable. It indicates, rather, that when the law changes, it does so 
within the context of an existing legal framework.7 
Part 2 illustrates both the path-dependent and dynamic nature of legal change. It 
appears from the comparative analysis that the question of the legal nature of 
securities holdings is largely resolved and evidences significant path-dependence, 
particularly in English, German and South African law. The legal holding of shares 
and securities in English law proceeded from the historical origin of the trust and 
there is agreement amongst leading authors that the principles of trust law continue 
to apply in the context of dematerialised shares.8 German law continues to apply a 
modified form of deposit to securities 9  and it has been argued above, that the 
principles of the law of agency, as modified and supplemented by legislation, 
continue to shape the holding of securities in South Africa.10 In the US, a new holding 
system was introduced by a fundamental reform of article 8 of the UCC. It introduces 
a new conceptual basis constructed on the notion of “security entitlements”.11 That 
this development is also path-dependent is evident from the election of 
immobilisation instead of dematerialisation, which reflects the concepts of 
negotiability and bailment. 
The legal nature of transfer mechanisms is far more difficult to canvas. The 
prevalence of account entries, in combination with electronic instructions and 
communications that shape the landscape of securities transfers, is difficult to 
reconcile with existing doctrinal concepts. Writing on English law, leading authors are 
at odds about the continued application of an assignment-, or novation-based 
analysis of securities transfers. 12  In German law, property-based transfer 
mechanisms have similarly come under fire for being based on mere fictions of 
tangibility and intention.13 One of the principal objectives of the reform of US law was 
an overhaul of the transfer mechanisms from negotiation-based delivery mechanisms 
to transfers by book entries. Although delivery continues to survive in transfers of 
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 On legal path dependence in the context of securities and the advantages of path-dependent legal 
development, see Micheler Property in Securities 225-230. 
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 See above, 10 2 Intermediation – a legal perspective. 
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 See above, 12 3 Intermediation – a legal perspective. 
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 See above, 13 2 3 3 Agency and mandate. 
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direct holding, it has been completely replaced by account entries where indirect 
holding passes from one person to another. 14  In South Africa, shares have 
traditionally passed from transferor to transferee by cession based solely on 
consensus and without delivery of the share certificate or registration of the 
transfer.15 The introduction of account-entry transfers has thrown a cession-based 
analysis into jeopardy. It challenges the formality-free nature of cessions. In addition, 
if the rules of cession are to apply, it necessitates that consensus be inferred from the 
actions or communications of intermediaries and imputed to the transferring parties. 
Theoretically, such a cession construction is possible, but would be based on a legal 
fiction of consensus. Until there is clarity on the powers of courts to pronounce on 
transfers of securities and the legal doctrinal tools they will utilise to do so, cession 
must, however, be seen as an alternative analytical tool.  
An examination of transfer mechanisms therefore shows that legal concepts can 
be modified and can even be replaced. Micheler posits that such changes cause 
legal systems to functionally converge.16 A similar convergence can be observed in 
the context of certainty of transfers. The jurisdictions surveyed evidence a clear 
development towards transactional security by protecting buyers of securities that 
have acted in good faith during the acquisition process. As transfer mechanisms are 
embedded in a wider legal system, systems do not doctrinally converge, however. 
Property- and contract rules, rules on deposit, agency, bailment or trusts all shape 
the way in which securities are held, how transfers take place and the consequences 
of such transfers. Modified rules and mechanisms couched in functional terms must 
therefore be placed in their proper context. A functional approach, furthermore, is not 
synonymous with a lack of conceptual underpinning. The idea, expressed in the 
notion of a “law of accounts”, that a number of formalistic mechanisms are 
superimposed on a conceptual basis and are in constant dialogue with legal 
concepts, will be developed further in Part 3. 
It remains imperative to reflect on the conceptual basis of legal rules, whether it is 
functional or doctrinal. This process can reveal continuity and discontinuity in law, 
can aid an understanding of why the law develops in certain ways and can show how 
discontinuity plays out within existing legal frameworks. 
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Chapter 15: Introduction and a prospect of the discussion 
15 1 Context 
The preceding chapters have outlined not only the dual nature of shares within the 
internal sphere, but also the complex net of relationships within which transactions in 
securities take place in the external sphere. These relationships and foremost the 
phenomenon of systemic intermediation, compel us to reconsider the legal 
foundations on which the holding and transfer of shares are premised. Part 2 has 
shown that such an evaluation cannot take place in a conceptual vacuum. The same 
can be said of a determination of the legal nature of shares. 
The law finds it useful and necessary to classify and compartmentalise the many 
relationships that may arise in any given context. Issuer relationships are commonly 
labelled to fall within the purview of company law; in contradistinction, relationships 
between investors and third parties are said to be governed by private law rules.1 
Such a distinction may seem useful at times, at least on a practical level for 
determining the set of rules that must be applied, but is nearly impossible on a more 
abstract, theoretical level. The content and nature of the rights that make up an 
issuer-investor or issuer-intermediary relationship must and do inform a private law 
analysis of the nature of shares.  
Much of Part 1 was aimed at illustrating the dual nature of shares as a set of 
personal relationships as well as an asset or incorporeal object. These “internal” 
aspects of shares, it will be illustrated in this part, are indispensable for determining 
the effect of shares in the “external” sphere.  
The objective of Part 2 was to describe and analyse the commercial and legal 
rules and mechanisms that must be applied when shares are transacted with. Some 
of these rules can be found in company law, others in financial markets legislation 
and yet others are premised on private law concepts. While it is usually the nature of 
a right that determines transfer rules and mechanisms, a reverse enquiry is possible 
and can reveal something about the legal nature of a right. At the same time, Part 2 
has illustrated that transfer rules have been modified by phenomena such as 
systemic intermediation, the electronic environment and the introduction of book-
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 M Haentjens “Between Property Law and Contract Law: The Case of Securities” in S van Erp, A 
Salomons & B Akkermans (eds) The Future of European Property Law (2012) 165 167. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
275 
 
entry systems. The developments regarding transfer rules may therefore also require 
a revision of notions regarding the conceptual underpinning of shares. Even if the 
focus of Part 2 is necessarily transaction-driven, it has value for an enquiry into the 
legal nature of shares. 
If the legal nature of a right or object is examined, the analysis is one that takes 
place within the realm of private law. Private law is characterised by a pervasive 
classification, namely that between iura in rem (commonly referred to as property 
rights) and iura in personam (commonly referred to as obligations). This distinction 
continues to exert its influence on both civilian and common law legal systems.2 
While a description of rules and mechanisms in Parts 1 and 2 is not aimed at 
analysing the legal nature of shares, inevitably terminology has been used that 
points in one direction or another, or, as is frequently the case with shares, in all 
directions at once. This chapter aims to direct the focus more specifically to the legal 
nature of shares, particularly the tension between shares as property and shares as 
obligations. 
A share is defined in the South African Companies Act as “one of the units into 
which the proprietary interest in a profit company is divided.” 3  This definition, 
although widely used and accepted,4 reveals very little about the legal nature of a 
share. The reference to a “proprietary interest” certainly does not refer to an interest 
of the shareholder in the assets of the company, 5  and even the assertion that 
shareholders are owners of the company, if not its assets, has proved to be 
precarious.6 Describing shares as property may serve two purposes: First, it aims to 
distinguish shares from debts or debt instruments by asserting that shareholders 
have more than a mere claim against the company, but rather an interest in the 
company. 7  Any references to “property” in a company law context must be 
understood in this sense.8 Secondly, the use of the term “proprietary” implies a 
                                            
2
 But, on the common law and taxonomy, see below, 17 4 1 Drawing the boundary between property 
and obligations, particularly the text to n 80 to n 84. 
3
 Companies Act 71 of 2008 s 1; The Companies Act 61 of 1973 simply defined a share as “a share in 
the share capital of that company”. 
4
 A similar definition can for example be found in the US Model Business Corporation Act 1.40 (22). 
5
 See above, 4 2 The entity theory. 
6
 See above, 4 3 The nexus theory. 
7
 PL Davies & S Worthington Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 9 ed (2012) 
860-861 [23-2]. 
8
 The proprietary undertones also appear from section 35 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. In 
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classification of shares as property-as-opposed-to-obligations within a private law 
context. The property-as-opposed-to-obligations analysis has been extended beyond 
shares to interests in shares where these are said to be separate assets. Whether 
and to what extent the second implication is accurate, both in relation to shares and 
interests in shares, will be examined in this Part. 
15 2 Why the issue of property arises 
Before the legal nature of shares can be considered in any detail, it is useful to 
ascertain why the “property question” arises in the context of shares in the first place. 
The issue of property in relation to shares arises in an “internal” and “external” 
context. Internally, as between the company and its shareholders and investors, the 
concept of “property” raises the issue of property rights in the assets of the company 
as well as ownership of the company. A closer look at the internal realm reveals 
what shares are not – they are not an interest in company assets and they do not 
confer on its holders ownership of the company. These issues have been adequately 
canvassed in Part 1. These developments, flowing, at least in the common law 
realm, from decisions such as Bligh v Brent9 and Salomon v A Salomon and Co 
Ltd,10 had two important implications: First, they resulted in the re-classification of 
shares as choses in action;11 and secondly, they established shares as autonomous 
units. On the one hand, great emphasis is therefore placed on the personal rights 
that make up shares; on the other hand, the picture of the share as “a separate right 
of property”12 emerged.  
It is undisputed that shares are obligations. This classification is uniform across all 
jurisdictions surveyed. At the same time, scholars and courts in these jurisdictions 
recognise the unique characteristics of shares. In Germany, the rights of which 
shares are comprised are recognised to be more than mere claims and are classified 
                                                                                                                                       
company is movable property, transferable in any manner provided for or recognised by this Act or 
other legislation”. Blackman argues that shares are only described as “movable property” so that 
shares in a company that holds immovable property are not characterised as immovable themselves. 
See MS Blackman, RD Jooste, CK Everingham, JL Yeats, FHI Cassim & R De La Harpe Commentary 
on the Companies Act (2002) (RS 9 2012) 5-168. The origin of the section can be traced back to 
decisions such as Bligh v Brent 1837 2 Y & C Ex 268. Also see RD Jooste “Capitalisation of Profit 
Companies (ss 35-48)” in JL Yeats (ed) Commentary on the Companies Act of 2008 (OS 2018) 2-274 
- 2-276. 
9
 1837 2 Y & C Ex 268. 
10
 [1897] AC 22. 
11
 See above, 8 3 2 2 Choses in action. 
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 Bradbury v English Sewing Cotton Company Ltd 1923 AC 744 767. 
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as “Mitgliedschaftsrechte” instead.13 In the common law, shares are classified as 
choses in action, but according to Davies and Worthington, give its holder “rights in 
the company” as opposed to merely “rights against the company”.14 Pennington also 
recognises the “peculiar nature” of the rights of which a share is composed.15 He 
concludes his attempt at defining shares by describing them as “a collection of rights 
and obligations relating to an interest in a company of an economic and proprietary 
character, but not constituting a debt”. 16  Likewise, in South Africa, shares are 
variably described as personal rights and rights of action. Malan, however, 
emphasises that they “involve[s] more than a claim for repayment of a loan.17 He 
argues these personal rights create more than “a legally recognized relationship 
between a creditor and a debtor entitling the former to a performance by the latter”.18 
In other words, a share is not simply a debt. The exceptional nature of the personal 
rights that make up shares creates some of the difficulties experienced by courts and 
scholars alike in demarcating the legal nature of shares. 
Another element that creates tensions between obligationary and proprietary legal 
concepts is the classification of shares as incorporeal units. The law struggles with 
incorporeals because, in many ways, they behave like corporeal objects of property, 
but lack the element of corporeality. Conceived of as independent assets, many 
scholars describe shares as “property”. The dual or “exceptional” nature of 
securities, therefore frequently leads to conclusions like the one drawn by Khimji: 
“As between the holder and the issuer, the legal relationship is contractual or personal as 
securities represent obligations owed by the latter to the former. … As between the holder 
and the world in general, the relationship is proprietary or real as securities are assets 
subject to property rights.”19 
Writing on English law, Gower formulated a passage that has been cited 
frequently in South African cases and textbooks: 
                                            
13
 See above, 6 3 The obligationary realms of shares and some conclusions, the text to nn 81-86. 
14
 See n 7 above. 
15
 R Pennington Pennington’s Company Law 6 ed (1990) 57. 
16
 R Pennington “Can Shares in Companies be Defined?” (1989) 10 Company Lawyer 140 144. 
17
 FR Malan Collective Securities Depositories and the Transfer of Securities (1984) 147. 
18
 192. 
19
 MF Khimji “The Securities Transfer Act – The Radical Reconceptualization of Property Rights in 
Investment Securities” (2007) 45 Alberta LR 137 147. 
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“One thing at least is clear: shares are recognised in law, as well as in fact, as objects of 
property which are bought, sold, mortgaged and bequeathed. They are indeed the typical 
items of property of the modern commercial era and particularly suited to its demands 
because of their exceptional liquidity. To deny that they are “owned” would be as unreal 
as to deny, on the basis of feudal theory, that land is owned”.20 
Shares are classified as property rather than obligations, Worthington argues, 
because shares are transferable and their rights are enforceable against third parties 
to meet the demands of modern commerce.21 It is therefore commerce, not legal 
doctrine that shapes and has shaped the nature of shares as items of intangible 
property. In the context of shares and securities, functional and pragmatic arguments 
abound. Some of these will be analysed in more detail below. Worthington further 
observes that the idea of shares as property, despite generally accepted by courts, 
seems to continue to trouble textbook writers.22 Nonetheless, she finds that “it would 
seem that this aspect of shares is now well settled”.23 Some of these troubles may 
be traced back to the perceived conceptual void of functional arguments.  
The above passages reveal firstly, that authors use the concept of property in 
different senses. The idea of property and the various guises that it may assume are 
considered below. Secondly, the external context necessitates the classification of 
shares as “property”. Shares are considered to behave as “property” because, as 
incorporeal units, they are easily alienated, can be vindicated and attract proprietary 
remedies in a range of situations. In addition, the use of “property terminology” in the 
context of shares is rife, including concepts such as “ownership”, “possession” and 
“pledge”. 
In some jurisdictions, most notably Germany and the United States, the issue of 
property also surfaces because of the conflation of the share with the share 
certificate. The reification of the share has led to the adoption of proprietary 
mechanisms, for example in transferring shares, which makes it difficult to 
conceptualise shares outside of this proprietary realm. 
                                            
20
 Davies & Worthington Modern Company Law 862 [23-3]. 
21
 S Worthington “Shares and Shareholders: Property, Power and Entitlement” (2001) 22 Company 
Lawyer 258 260. 
22
 258, 261. 
23
 258. 
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One of the most pertinent reasons why the property issue arises in the context of 
shares must be sought in the theoretical legal framework within which concepts such 
as property and obligations, specifically contract, operate. Both property and contract 
lie at the heart of private law. Both institutions perform an important enabling 
function.24 They stimulate economic activity and allocate resources. The institutions 
of property law and contract, however, provide different frameworks of rules to 
accomplish this task. Both sets of rules aim to increase legal certainty by providing 
convenient frameworks for ascertaining legal outcomes. Yet, it is frequently difficult 
to determine with precision where the one ends and the other starts. In addition, 
Merril and Smith note, there has been a lot of “repackaging and relabeling” as of 
late.25 Apart from the ambiguity this suggests about the boundaries between property 
and contract, such practices highlight that the distinction is legally relevant. 26 
Contract law provides default rules rather than mandatory ones and parties can 
generally vary these rules to tailor their contracts to their liking. Contract law 
therefore offers a convenient and flexible framework for structuring legal 
relationships. Property, however, is an equally powerful concept. Its rules have force 
beyond the holder of the property. The concept of property is perceived to give its 
holders greater legal protection than contract law. The normative implications of 
property are said to advance far beyond those of contract law.27 In certain respects, 
it is therefore favourable to classify certain objects or relations as property. Most 
notable is insolvency – during insolvency, property-owners enjoy considerably 
stronger protection than parties to a contract.28 
The classification question in the context of shares is certainly not novel. In the 
1770 English case of Nightingale v Devisme,29 Lord Mansfield, to name just one 
example, rejected the classification of shares as money, finding instead that they are 
“new species of property”.30 The property-contract debate in relation to shares has 
resurfaced with a vengeance following the introduction of systemic intermediation. 
                                            
24
 FB Cross & RA Prentice Law and Corporate Finance (2007) 1. 
25
 TW Merril & HE Smith “The Property/Contract Interface” (2001) 101 Columbia LR 773 775. 
26
 775. 
27
 RB Grantham “The Doctrinal Basis of the Rights of Company Shareholders” (1998) 57 Cambridge 
LJ 554 583. 
28
 On the importance of the distinction between property and personal rights in the context of 
insolvency, see especially RM Goode “Ownership and Obligation in Commercial Transactions” (1987) 
LQR 433. 
29
 98 ER 361, (1770) 5 Burrow 2589 (KB). 
30
 363. 
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The changed holding structures raise the question as to the nature of an investor’s 
rights in dematerialised or immobilised shares held through intermediaries. An 
answer to this question becomes particularly acute should an intermediary become 
insolvent.  
15 3 A prospect of the discussion 
A consideration of the legal nature of shares is not an easy task. For one, it raises 
issues that go to the core of the taxonomy of private law, which finds itself in a state 
of flux. A re-ordering of private law cannot be the aim of this thesis. Yet, it is 
necessary to reflect on the conceptual legal basis of shares. An analysis of the 
literature shows that this conceptual basis can be found in the legal categories of 
property and obligations. Alternatively, developments in financial and capital markets 
have brought to the fore notions of functionally construed concepts and a 
procedurally oriented “law of accounts”.  
The answer to the question whether shares are property depends on whom you 
ask. If you ask property theorists, the answer will more likely than not be yes. In fact, 
many property scholars treat shares as property in such a routine fashion, that one 
may well expect the response that the question is redundant. Part of the problem in 
answering the question is that property itself is an elusive concept. I will therefore 
include a brief description of the different meanings of property. This account 
exemplifies how contested the boundary between property and contract is.  
If you pose the same question to scholars specifically considering the matter from 
the vantage point of shares, the answer may well be very different. The question, 
even if considered by some to be settled, has given rise to extensive debate, which 
has produced a variety of carefully crafted opinions taking into account the particular 
environment of shares and securities. Some of these perspectives from English-, 
US- and German law will be examined to establish how other legal systems deal with 
shares through the prism of private law. The selected literature does not provide a 
comprehensive account of all the arguments and opinions that have been advanced 
by academic commentators regarding the legal nature of shares and securities. 
Views have been selected firstly, on the basis of their impact and reception in 
secondary literature and secondly, to reflect the breadth of the debate and that 
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exemplify different approaches. Included are responses that highlight the proprietary 
nature of shares; those that assert that shares are obligations; yet others that argue 
that shares are either conceptually located somewhere between the law of property 
and the law of obligations or are conceptually unique; as well as views that focus on 
the procedural, rather than the conceptual aspects of shares. Naturally, it must be 
understood that these propositions are made within the particular legislative- and 
wider legal context sketched in Parts 1 and 2. South Africa has not seen much 
academic debate on this question. While the term “property” is at times encountered 
in company law texts on shares, the authors neither explain what conception of 
property they have in mind, nor do they substantiate why shares can be considered 
to be property. The courts have avoided a description of shares as “property”, yet the 
cases evidence a tension between obligationary and proprietary aspects of shares. 
In addition, many cases illustrate the use of proprietary language and remedies in 
the context of shares. 
Drawing on the range of perspectives from comparative law some of the dominant 
themes that emerge from the literature will be highlighted. These include, in the first 
place, an examination of functionalism, which is an alternative approach to 
conceptualising securities uncoupled from traditional doctrinal concepts. The 
functional approach focuses on market practices and translates these into new 
concepts. Closely related to functionalism is the notion of a “law of accounts”. A law 
of accounts is also transaction-based, but, in contrast to functionalism, it focuses 
almost exclusively on the procedural aspects of transactions. It will be shown that a 
law of accounts today permeates our legal framework on securities transactions by 
providing convenient rules by which securities can be said to pass from one person 
to another – much like the rules on negotiable instruments were once construed to 
operate. Unlike functionalism, the law of accounts does not propose an alternative 
conceptual explanation for the legal nature of shares and securities.  
In addition, systemic intermediation requires a re-conceptualisation of the dynamic 
amalgamation of relationships that underlie a holding of shares. The way in which 
intermediary holding is construed is therefore examined next. Two theoretical models 
of intermediation are proposed: the proposition that intermediaries derive their 
entitlement from the core right held by investors and therefore from a burdening of 
investors’ rights, as opposed to the construction in terms of which investors derive 
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their rights from intermediaries and therefore hold rights against the rights of their 
intermediaries. These models will be used to answer the question, also addressed in 
Part 2, whether and to what extent securities as assets are transformed by systemic 
intermediation and whether new assets are created in the process. To conclude the 
analysis of models of intermediation, the idea of management rights will be 
considered. 
While themes such as functionalism, a “law of accounts” and theoretical models of 
intermediation all feature in the literature, traditional concepts such as property and 
obligations continue to be prominent. Even the functional approach uses them as an 
anchor when asserting that shares are sui generis in the sense of being located 
somewhere between the doctrinal categories of property and obligations. Against the 
backdrop of functionalism and the new or renewed emphasis on the procedural 
aspects of securities transactions, the legal nature of shares from the angle of 
traditional doctrinal categories and reasoning is considered. This includes an 
examination of the property-obligations boundary and the tensions inherent therein, 
a critical analysis of the contributions that the literature on shares and securities 
makes to this debate and culminates in the proposal of an explanatory model. This 
model can be used to distinguish between the internal and external spheres of 
shares, while at the same time illustrating how the characterisation of shares in the 
internal sphere (considered in Part 1) has an impact on the question whether shares 
can have an absolute, “proprietary” effect in the external sphere.  
Finally, the discussion will conclude with a brief prospect of future developments 
by considering the impact that new disruptive technologies may have on the legal 
nature of shares and securities. 
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Chapter 16: The legal nature of shares: selected views 
16 1 Perspectives from English law 
16 1 1 Joanna Benjamin 
Benjamin asserts that property rights exist, not only in relation to shares, but 
specifically also in relation to what she terms interests in shares. This much can be 
gathered from the sub-title of her book. She rejects the corporeality element of 
property and, looking back at Roman law and early English commentaries,1 outlines 
that, not only did the Romans recognise the existence of incorporeal things,2 but also 
that a real action can arise in relation to such intangibles.3  
Benjamin further argues that in the context of intangible assets, a real action 
operates only against third parties. 4  As between the debtor and creditor, the 
obligation persists and only personal rights can be asserted. 5  Benjamin then 
specifies that property rights in intangibles are rights under a trust.6 Consequently, 
she argues that the rights of a trust beneficiary are personal in relation to the trustee 
and proprietary against the creditors of the trustee and other third parties.7  
At the core of Benjamin’s proposition lies a rejection of the physical model of 
property. She traces the origins of English law back to actions, which dominated 
English law until the nineteenth century, and argues that English law has never 
reached a level of abstraction by which substantive law, such as property rules, were 
induced from procedural actions. 8  These empirical and pragmatic tendencies of 
English courts and jurists explain why property rights in relation to obligations can be 
relative:  
“Personal and proprietary status is not unchangeably inherent in the asset, but depends 
upon whom one is suing. In other words, property is a function of particular actions, not of 
particular assets. Because the in personam/in rem distinction applies to actions (and the 
                                            
1
 She specifically considers the works of Bracton and Blackstone; see J Benjamin Interests in 
Securities: A Proprietary Analysis of the International Securities Markets (2000) ch 13. 
2
 See on the Gaian tripartite distinction, below n 118. 
3
 Benjamin Interests in Securities 304-305 [13.06]-[13.09]. 
4
 305 [13.10]. 
5
 305 [13.10]. 
6
 306 [13.11]. 
7
 306 [13.12]. 
8
 315 [13.48]. 
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rights that are extrapolated from actions) and not to assets, it follows that both tangible 
and intangible assets may be subject to both personal and property rights.”
9
 
She cautions that if one proceeds from drawing a distinction between real and 
personal rights and subsequently categorises assets accordingly, personal or 
proprietary status becomes a “quality of certain assets”.10 Thus, obligations will be 
personal in all respects.11 This, she finds, is the trap into which civil lawyers have 
fallen. 
Benjamin concludes that the traditional framework of English property law is 
capable of meeting the demands of a radically changed environment: 
“The impression that they are not, and that the law of property is the law of tangible 
things, involves conflating legal rights of property with the tangible things to which they 
relate, and further conflating things with tangible things.”12 
16 1 2 Arianna Pretto-Sakmann 
Central to Pretto-Sakmann’s thesis is the importance of drawing and maintaining a 
clear boundary between the law of property and the law of obligations. For this 
purpose she rejects the wide notion of property as wealth. She engages in an 
outward-looking inquiry to personal property to determine first, the outward 
boundaries of personal property and second, whether shares can be said to fall 
within it. Pretto-Sakmann’s focus therefore lies with “property-as-opposed-to-
obligations”.13 Her approach relies heavily on a taxonomy influenced by the work of 
Peter Birks, often said to be more closely related to civilian rational science than 
common law empiricism. 14  She starts her enquiry by examining the traditional 
boundary, namely the limitation of rights in rem to things which have a physical 
existence. She enlarges the category to include all things that are in some way 
locatable in space. In other words, she includes a dimension of spatiality to replace 
the requirement or corporeality. 15  Nonetheless she concludes that, even on this 
                                            
9
 316 [13.51]-[13.52]. 
10
 317 [13.53]. 
11
 317 [13.53]. 
12
 318-319 [13.60]. 
13
 A Pretto-Sakmann Boundaries of Personal Property: Shares and Sub-Shares (2005) 16. 
14
 See the general criticism against civilian rational thinking by Benjamin Interests in Securities 315-
316. 
15
 To develop her argument, she draws on the notion of “ideational things” developed by J Harris 
Property and Justice (1996) and considers developments in intellectual property law, arguing that 
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basis, shares, as bundles of personal rights exercisable either against an issuer (in 
the case of certificated shares) or against an intermediary (where shares exist in 
dematerialised form), are not spatially locatable in this way and therefore cannot fall 
within the boundary of property. 16  Pretto-Sakmann then proceeds by exploring 
alternative ways in which the boundary between property and obligations could be 
drawn, namely on the basis of alienability or vindicability. Both alternatives, she 
finds, must fail. While shares are both clearly alienable and vindicable, they share 
these characteristics not only with rights in rem, but also with rights in personam. 
Obligations, such as contractual rights have become as alienable as movable 
goods.17 In addition, not all rights in rem are alienable.18 In the light of these findings, 
Pretto-Sakmann explains that alienability is frequently associated with property 
because of the mistaken focus on benefit instead of burden.19 What distinguishes 
property from obligations, she argues is the “behaviour of the burden” i.e. for rights in 
rem, the burden follows a thing; for rights in personam, the liability fixes itself onto a 
person.20 The criterion of vindicability, she finds, is often said to hold much promise 
as “obligations are typically asserted rather than vindicated”. 21  Pretto-Sakmann 
identifies vindicability as the core of Benjamin’s thesis.22 Her criticism of Benjamin’s 
propositions cannot be elaborated upon here23 and it must suffice to point out that 
Pretto-Sakmann argues that contractual obligations can be vindicated in a manner 
comparable to property by protecting them from unlawful interference by third 
parties. This, she finds, “makes a contract a vindicable thing”, but not property in the 
narrow sense.24 Pretto-Sakmann therefore concludes that “[w]hen the law of property 
                                                                                                                                       
patented ideas or designs are “ideational entities” that “materialize in all things which manifest the 
same idea”. See Pretto-Sakmann Boundaries of Personal Property 103-106. 
16
 Pretto-Sakmann Boundaries of Personal Property 106. 
17
 158-163. 
18
 163-165. 
19
 165. 
20
 166. 
21
 218. 
22
 She also identifies alienability and vindicability as the main drivers of the classification of shares 
and securities as property in the works of AO Austen-Peters Custody of Investments: Law and 
Practice (2000) and S Worthington “Shares and Shareholders: Property, Power and Entitlement” 
(2001) 22 Company Lawyer 258. The former will not be discussed for the author does not develop 
theoretical arguments for his assertion that shares are property. The latter has been quoted above, 
15 2 Why the issue of property arises, n 21. 
23
 Pretto-Sakmann Boundaries of Personal Property 202-207. 
24
 206. 
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is contrasted with the law of obligations, there is no way of drawing the boundary in a 
way which allows shares to stay within it [the law of property]”.25 
16 1 3 Eva Micheler 
Eva Micheler uses her civil law background to consider securities from a 
comparative perspective. The comparative exercise is today dominated by a 
functional approach.26 While the legal systems that are the subject of her comparison 
utilise vastly different legal mechanisms and concepts, Micheler also considers the 
functional effect of the legal rules. The functional, comparative perspective shapes 
her conclusions.  
She identifies that both in English and German law, the rules on securities, driven 
by the functions these instruments are expected to perform in a commercial setup, 
behave in unexpected ways. Micheler identifies shares as rights that are specifically 
created to circulate freely in financial markets.27 She draws on an article written by 
Ewart, 28  who describes negotiable instruments and other choses in action as 
“ambulatory rights”, because their defining feature is not mere transferability, but 
“ambulatory intent”, that is they are intended to circulate and, propped by estoppel, 
do so in favour of innocent purchasers. 29  In addition, Micheler considers the 
“Wertrechte” (negotiable rights) debate in German scholarship, which similarly 
recognises that certain rights not embodied in paper instruments, are nonetheless 
negotiable. 30  She therefore classifies securities as “circulating rights”. 31  Micheler 
finds that English registered, paper-based shares can be considered to be “quasi-
negotiable”, made so by a contract-based novation analysis of their transfer in 
conjunction with the application of the rules on estoppel.32 In addition, the centrality 
of the trust concept in the context of shares is said to point towards a classification 
                                            
25
 13. 
26
 On functional comparison, see K Zweigert & H Kötz Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung 3 ed 
(1996); R Michaels “The Functional Method of Comparative Law” in R Zimmermann & M Reimann 
(eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (2006). 
27
 E Micheler “Farewell Quasi-Negotiability? Legal Title and Transfer of Shares in a Paperless World” 
(2002) J Bus L 358 365. 
28
 JS Ewart “Negotiability and Estoppel” (1900) 16 LQR 135. 
29
 143, 155, 159. 
30
 See Micheler (2002) J Bus L 365. Also see the debate on “Wertrechte” below, 16 3 1 Securities as 
“Wertrechte”. 
31
 E Micheler “The Legal Nature of Securities: Inspirations from Comparative Law” in L Gullifer & J 
Payne (eds) Intermediated Securities: Legal Problems and Practical Issues (2010) 131 131. 
32
 See Micheler (2002) J Bus L; Micheler “Legal Nature of Securities” in Intermediated Securities 134-
135. 
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outside the common boundaries of obligations.33 These rules provide the foundation 
for property rights in securities, usually recognised simply as intangible choses in 
action and therefore as obligations. She therefore concludes that securities occupy a 
special position between property and obligations.34 They can be grasped completely 
neither through the prism of property nor through the looking glass of obligations.35 
Micheler applies this analysis to both German and English law. While she finds that 
English law traditionally classifies shares as obligations and German law assigns 
them to the law of things, both legal systems need to make exceptions, to 
accommodate the special features of securities, including their fungibility, liquidity 
and the need for clear and efficient transfer rules.36 Therefore, securities in both 
systems evidence features of both property and obligations and functionally, if not 
doctrinally, achieve surprisingly similar results.37 “The rules governing securities”, 
Micheler finds “are designed to facilitate this purpose [circulation] and to make the 
circulation of them cost efficient”.38  
Dematerialisation and immobilisation have significantly changed the environment 
within which shares are held and traded. A company is no longer involved in the 
transfer process – neither does it receive transfer documents nor does it verify their 
accuracy. 39  Hence, it becomes untenable to describe the transfer process as a 
novation.40 In addition, the rules on estoppel, even if not abolished, have become 
partly redundant.41 Nonetheless, Micheler finds that “quasi-negotiability” continues to 
be desirable, in fact more so than ever.42 She explains that such quasi-negotiable 
status does not hinge on the application of novation- or estoppel-rules. Instead, she 
justifies the classification of securities as circulating rights with reference to the 
functions they are expected to perform. In particular, “[t]hese instruments [securities] 
are created with a view to circulate in secondary securities markets”.43 It is primarily 
                                            
33
 E Micheler Wertpapierrecht zwischen Schuld- und Sachenrecht: Zu einer kapitalmarktrechtlichen 
Theorie des Wertpapierrechts. Effekten nach österreichischem, deutschem, englischem und 
russischem Recht (2004) 383. 
34
 382-383. 
35
 383. 
36
 383-384. 
37
 384. 
38
 Micheler “Legal Nature of Securities” in Intermediated Securities 131. 
39
 Micheler (2002) J Bus L 362. 
40
 363. 
41
 Micheler (2002) J Bus L 376. Also see, 10 6 Protection of bona fide purchasers of shares. 
42
 Micheler (2002) J Bus L 378. 
43
 Micheler “Legal Nature of Securities” in Intermediated Securities 145. 
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this purpose that explains the special transfer rules,44 regardless of whether they are 
certificated or not. 45  Specifically on the question of property-rights in pooled, 
intermediated securities, Micheler writes: 
“The mechanism [pooling and intermediation] is intended to create property rights for the 
benefit of investors. The law should recognise this”.
46
 
Micheler therefore elevates the purposes for which securities have been 
conceived and the functions they are expected to perform within a commercial 
setting to a legal justification for introducing a category positioned somewhere 
between the known categories of property and obligations. 
16 2 Perspectives from US law 
16 2 1 Rogers and Mooney 
The analysis in Part 2 has shown that securities under US law were not always 
negotiable. Rather, the law only gradually migrated towards negotiability and 
bailment. It is this development that placed securities within the reach of property. 
The question of property versus obligations must still be understood in this context 
today. As Rogers notes:  
“Had that practice [the reification of intangible rights] not developed, there would have 
been no need for a body of law like Article 8; questions about transfer of ownership of 
securities would have remained part of the general contract law of assignment or part of 
the law of membership in corporation”.
47
 
Securities were therefore regularly referred to as forms of property. Negotiability, 
even if it technically-speaking does not transform personal rights to real rights, reifies 
them to such an extent that they may be dealt with as property in the same sense as 
tangible objects.48  That shares and securities constituted property has therefore 
been undisputed for many years, even if this “property-status” derives from the 
conflation of the rights with the certificate. More recently the focus has been directed 
to security entitlements; but not so much to the question whether they can constitute 
                                            
44
 145. 
45
 148. 
46
 149. 
47
 JS Rogers “Policy Perspectives on Revised U.C.C Article 8” (1996) 48 UCLA LR 1431 1453. 
48
 See, 8 3 3 2 Negotiation, assignment and the transfer of shares. 
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property in the more traditional sense of this concept, but rather asking what kind of 
property they may be.49 No effort is therefore dedicated to the threshold question of 
whether securities are property in a sense that distinguishes them from obligations. 
The concept of “property” is used to refer to both the security entitlement as well 
as the “object” to which it relates. In this sense the concept does not reveal much 
more than that “property” constitutes assets. Rogers describes the property that is 
the security entitlement not as “a claim to a specific identifiable thing”, but 
nonetheless as being “located” at a custodian. 50  He puts the term “located” in 
inverted commas, probably for the element of tangibility that it bears and for lack of a 
better term. On the issue of “locatability”, Mooney adds that under the new approach 
locating property is frequently neither “useful nor necessary”.51 The importance of 
these statements lies not therein that they convey that property, even if not related to 
a tangible object, is nevertheless connected to an object external to itself. Rather the 
opposite – the object decreases in importance while the rules about how the object is 
held take centre stage. 52  Where mention is made of the “property” of the 
intermediary to which a security entitlement relates, such property consists, in the 
usual course, of security entitlements that an intermediary holds against his own 
custodian. This use of the concept of property is unsuitable for drawing clear 
boundaries between traditional private law categories. 
Indeed, such a doctrinal exercise is not the aim of article 8 of the UCC, which 
demarcates its scope in more functional terms. In fact, Mooney viewed, with 
scepticism, “the analytical traps and slippery slopes of conclusory doctrinal 
reasoning”.53 Much of the legal scholarship advocating for a new approach was 
therefore focused on overcoming the straightjacket of property. Mooney, before the 
1994 revision of article 8, wrote that where securities “are cut from the familiar fabric 
of property law … we shall see, traditional legal garments fit poorly on the frame of 
                                            
49
 Rogers (1996) UCLA LR 1468 refers to the “attributes of that property interest”. 
50
 1456. 
51
 CW Mooney “Law and Systems for Intermediated Securities and the Relationship of Private 
Property Law to Securities Clearance and Settlement: United States, Japan, and the UNIDROIT Draft 
Convention” in Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan Discussion Paper Series 
2008-E-7 (2008) 9. 
52
 JS Rogers “The Revision of Canadian Law on Securities Holdings through Intermediaries: Who, 
What, When, Where, How and Why?” (2007) 45 Can Bus LJ 49 55. The “objects” covered by article 8 
UCC are intentionally defined broadly, being “financial assets”, see 11 5 2 Legal framework. 
53
 Mooney “Law and Systems for Intermediated Securities” in Discussion Paper Series 5. 
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current practice”.54 Mooney therefore finds that any construct based on property law 
is “fundamentally flawed”,55 and Rogers explains: 
“In this setting … the movement from a paper to an electronic environment has not simply 
been a matter of changing predicates of unchanging legal objects; the significant objects 
themselves have changed. In the traditional securities holding system, the key 
relationship for commercial law was that between the investor and the issuer, and that 
relationship could be analysed by application of property concepts to a physical 
embodiment of the underlying rights. In the modern indirect holding system, it remains 
just as true that for most purposes the key relationship is that between the investor and 
the issuer, but for purposes of the commercial law rules concerning the mechanisms of 
settlement the key relationship is that between an investor and its securities intermediary. 
That relationship is neither represented by any physical or metaphysical object, nor 
capable of analysis in terms drawn from the property law of physical objects.”
56
 
“Property”, where the term is used in the context of revised article 8, is therefore 
hardly reminiscent of its doctrinal namesake, nor is it meant to “invoke the entire 
panoply of attributes of ‘property’”.57 Abandoning the traditional private law category 
of property does not imply, however, that securities should henceforth be reclassified 
in traditional terms. Rather, it is illustrative of the perceived need for entirely new 
concepts. 
In the particular context of the US legal system, the rejection of the property 
concept goes hand in hand with eschewing negotiability.58 Negotiability, Mooney and 
Rogers argue, is inseparable from the reification of abstract rights and therefore from 
old property mechanisms.59 An application of the negotiability principle presupposes 
firstly, that the object that is being transferred can be identified;60 and secondly, that 
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 CW Mooney “Beyond Negotiability: A New Model for Transfer and Pledge of Interests in Securities 
Controlled by Intermediaries” (1990) 12 Cardozo LR 305 307. 
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 JS Rogers “An Essay on Horseless Carriages and Paperless Negotiable Instruments: Some 
Lessons from the Article 8 Revision” (1995) 31 Idaho LR 689 697-698. 
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 Mooney “Law and Systems for Intermediated Securities” in Discussion Paper Series 8. 
58
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purchasers almost take free from adverse claims; see JL Schroeder “Is Article 8 Finally Ready this 
Time? The Radical Reform of Secured Lending on Wall Street” (1994) Columbia Bus LR 291 355-
356. 
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 Rogers (1995) Idaho LR 695; JS Rogers “Negotiability, Property and Identity” (1991) 12 Cardozo 
LR 480; Mooney (1990) Cardozo LR. 
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the object that the transferor gets is the same one that the transferor had.61 Both 
assumptions require significant conceptual stretching where shares lose their 
corporeality. The problem that the negotiability principles addresses, namely whether 
a transferor takes the object of the transfer free from adverse property claims, must 
be rephrased in functional terms.62  
The new conceptual framework for an intermediated environment, developed 
initially by Mooney as a model of upper-tier priority, became known as a “security 
entitlement” in the revised article 8 of the UCC. As Mooney describes it, “[t]he 
interest of an ownership claimant through an intermediary is best characterised as a 
bundle of rights against the intermediary. The ‘property’ involved is the claimant’s 
interest in its account with its intermediary, not the fungible bulk that may or may not 
underlie that account”.63 It necessarily follows that the use of the property concept 
does not simultaneously signify that the rights are also in rem; in fact the essence of 
the concept of security entitlement is that is consists of a package of rights in rem 
and in personam. Instead of leaving transfer mechanisms, adverse acquisition, 
priority and insolvency questions to the law of property, article 8 sets out a number of 
rights in functional terms. Some of these rights can be enforced only against the 
relevant intermediary; others persist against third parties, such as intermediary 
creditors. 64  According to Rogers, this bundle of rights may be described as a 
property right, but with the caveat that it is in no way connected to the traditional 
rules on transfers of property. 65  Commonly, a security entitlement is therefore 
pronounced a sui generis right or relationship that refuses to fit neatly into any one of 
the traditional private law categories.66 
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 See especially Rogers (1995) Idaho LR 695-696. Rogers therefore also argues that securities 
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 Rogers (1995) Idaho LR 695-696. 
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 Mooney (1990) Cardozo LR 310-311. 
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 For a more detailed description of the package of rights, see 11 5 2 Legal framework. Also see 
Rogers (1996) UCLA LR 1450-1451. 
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Comment 2: “the incidents of this property interest are established by the rules of Article 8, not by 
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16 2 2 Joseph Sommer 
Joseph Sommer’s finds that the property versus contracts debate is sterile and 
elects to focus on a “law of accounts”.67 It must be stated from the outset, that his 
theory, like that of Mooney and Rogers catches, quite intentionally, only 
intermediated securities. In fact, the law of accounts is premised on intermediation, 
particularly tiered intermediation.68 
Sommer argues that accounts are entirely made up of communications. These 
communications, however, do not merely convey a promise, they are “the very 
performance promised in the message”. 69  Authenticated messages, therefore 
constitute the communication and create or attribute rights.70 Authenticated records, 
such as account entries, only provide evidence of the rights so created or 
attributed.71 Sommer specifies, however, that communication accounts only for the 
structure of a resulting relationship, in other words how rights are created, 
extinguished or attributed. 72  Communication does not determine the content of 
relationships; this is the dominion of substantive law.73 A law of accounts is therefore 
procedural. The communication is bilateral, meaning that it only links adjacent 
parties.74 It therefore performs an important function in reducing complex structures 
through compartmentalisation.75 From this he concludes that security entitlements 
are “dyadic relations” founded in communications. 76  Although we often find it 
“intuitively attractive” to conceive of them as things, Sommer contends that when 
security entitlements are transferred, in effect nothing is transferred. 77  Security 
                                                                                                                                       
and its entitlement holders is sui generis, and to state the applicable commercial rules directly, rather 
than by inference from a categorization of the relationship based on legal concepts of a different era”. 
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 JH Sommer “International Securities Holding and Transfer Law” (2001) 18 Ariz J Int & Com L 
685 696. 
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 JH Sommer “A Law of Financial Accounts: Modern Payment and Securities Transfer Law” (1998) 
53 Bus L 1181 1200-1201. 
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 Sommer (2001) Ariz J Int & Com L 697. 
70
 697. 
71
 697. 
72
 698. 
73
 698. 
74
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entitlements are therefore “just a series of bilateral relationships that affect the 
relationship among end-parties”.78  
While we therefore wish to view securities in accounts as something more real 
than a claim or right to sue, they are in effect “lawsuits in embryo”. 79  Sommer 
explains that the law at times encourages the impression that securities in accounts 
are real in a possessory sense.80 This, he argues, serves the purpose of reducing 
the great complexity of securities holding systems. The orderly functioning of a 
complex system requires not only good and clear law, but also “simple user rules”.81 
Thus, “[t]he users are under the illusion that they are dealing with … ‘securities,’ not 
intermediated choses of action”.82 
The law of accounts, Sommer continues, is characterised by two “engineering 
design principles”, namely privity and nominalism.83 Communication is bilateral and 
functions to reduce complexity due to the application of the legal doctrine of privity. 
Privity, every student of contract law will know, binds parties to a contract and limits 
the reach of the contract to those parties. Thus, a contract is generally said not to 
have implications for third parties. While a myriad of parties are involved in securities 
holding and transfers, privity “orders this complexity into simple pairwise 
relationships”.84 Privity in the particular context of financial markets, Sommer finds, is 
both structural and causal. It is structural because it significantly reduces the number 
of relations and also enables parties to avoid relationships. 85  Privity is causal, 
Sommer writes because it “does to account relationships what negotiability does to 
property relations. The doctrine of privity cuts off adverse claims, and abolishes the 
relevant history of the account”.86 Ordinary privity therefore keeps non-transacting 
parties out of the holding chain.87 In addition, the law of financial accounts knows 
vertical privity, which ensures that each holding tier can be conceived of separately, 
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 706. Sommer contrasts with this a transfer by assignment, but states that this does not affect 
intermediaries; see n 42. 
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 Sommer (1998) Bus L 1192-1193. 
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thereby cutting off claims to higher tiers. 88  Privity, unlike communication, also 
exceeds the dyadic relation between two parties; Sommer describes it as a triad, 
namely “two parties and a system of law”. 89  Privity has exceptions of course; 
insolvency may be one of them, creditor’s rights another. 90  Adverse claims are 
another exception; they may, however, be brought only in exceptional 
circumstances.91 An adverse claim, Sommer finds, is not only an exception to the 
privity principle, but also to the communicative nature of accounts, because it 
inevitably involves assertions external to the parties.92 However, the need for privity 
is stronger in financial markets than elsewhere.93 This is reflected by the need, for 
example to insulate an intermediary relation from the intermediary’s creditors; in this 
context absolute privity is maintained.  
Sommer sees the second element of negotiability mirrored in the principle of 
nominalism. By nominalism he means super-formalism. Authentic communications 
result in an attribution of rights to certain persons based solely on the data content 
of- and the rule-framework that governs the communication.94  
While Sommer does not dwell on the property-contract question, he recognises 
that security entitlements are simply rights to sue, but also finds that they exhibit 
some proprietary characteristics. 95  One of them is the duty that rests upon 
intermediaries to maintain sufficient assets.96 Another is that property binds third 
parties. Such a claim, he therefore finds, “straddles the distinction between property 
and contract”.97 For this reason we frequently conceive of accounts as contractual 
between the parties and as proprietary against third parties. 98  What Sommer 
therefore has in mind when he describes accounts as proprietary is very similar to 
what Mooney and Rogers perceive of as “property”, namely some type of third-party 
effect.  
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Furthermore, Sommer’s suitcase analogy must be noted.99 Sommer suggests that 
the underlying rights, in other words shares, are the contents of a suitcase. The 
account, and with it the rules and laws that govern its existence and operation, are 
the suitcase. When shares are held or transferred the contents of the suitcase are of 
little consequence. The features of the suitcase – its weight, volume, shape – matter. 
To Sommer the law of securities transfer and holding is the suitcase. An account, 
like the paper before it, is therefore simply a vehicle by which assets are held and 
conveyed.  
The law of accounts applies not only to indirectly held securities; it is at the same 
time an attempt to distil general principles that apply to all rights held in or through 
accounts, including money. Rights in a financial setting, Sommer points out, have 
oscillated between being “embodied” and “account-based”. 100  The next shift, he 
predicted in 2000, may well be back to “embodied-rights” if we can devise of the 
technology to link a unique electronic token to an unassailable electronic register.101 
16 2 3 Jeanne Schroeder 
The continued reference of American scholars to “proprietary interests” while at the 
same time avoiding the recognition of property as a system may be traced back to 
Hohfeld, legal realism and the bundle of sticks theory. In this sense, the debate on 
property rights in securities is therefore representative of the general status of 
property in US law. Schroeder is highly critical of this “supposed disaggregation of 
property” advanced by theorists who believe that “modern property is not a unitary 
right, but merely a bundle of sticks”.102 She similarly rejects Hohfeld’s dismissal of 
the legal object in property.103 This, she writes, is a denial of the “objective aspect of 
property”, which erases any unique and identifiable characteristics of property.104 
Schroeder argues that “objects” of property exist, but she finds that the UCC 
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recognises,105  that such objects can be legal creations; thus intangibles can be 
objects of property rights. 106  The crux of Schroeder’s argument is therefore the 
rejection of the “physical metaphor” of property. This, she writes is a conflation of the 
“symbolic” with the “real”.107 Something that is “real” has either a physical existence 
or it exists outside of, or prior to, the law.108 The law, however, is purely symbolic.109 
Property cannot exist without the law mediating between a subject or subjects and 
an object.110 Conceived of as a legal concept, property is therefore symbolic; a mere 
fiction. 111  Property nonetheless has reality. Schroeder argues that the fiction of 
property has utility in that property gives “structure and meaning to our lives”.112 
Property insinuates a level of authenticity and permanence that cannot be provided 
by the symbolic alone – for this reason we identify the “real” i.e. the object of 
property, with the “symbolic”, the law of property.113 Schroeder sets out to dispel the 
physical metaphor, but she denies that the recognition of property as symbolic rather 
than real leads to its disintegration. Repudiating that property is “real” does not mean 
that it does not have reality.114 As a symbolic creature, property “has reality in that it 
performs a coherent function in our legal and economic practices”.115 Despite being 
symbolic, property has an “objective existence … in the sense that it is played out in 
our actual, concrete, intersubjective economic and legal practices”.116 
The physical metaphor was readily apparent from the treatment of shares as 
negotiable instruments where the certificate as the “real” element was conflated with 
the “symbolic” notion of property.117 Commenting on the revised Article 8, Schroeder 
finds that the drafting was premised on precepts of legal realism in that the process 
duly recognised the interaction between law and practice.118 Article 8 takes, what 
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she terms a “transactional approach” by firstly identifying the transactions common in 
financial markets and as a second step prescribing legal effects that fit market 
practices.119 Article 8 should be understood against this background. It does not 
represent an attempt at characterisation and therefore eludes any categorisation 
according to the traditional paradigms of property and obligations. Yet, a rejection of 
the traditional property paradigm does not equal an elimination of property rights in 
securities. Schroeder clearly identifies property aspects of securities, such as 
possession (in the sense of control and the right to exclude), enjoyment (in that all 
benefits must be passed down by intermediaries), and alienation.120 Market practices 
dictate that these proprietary aspects are not always absolute. In addition, not all 
elements of security entitlements are proprietary in the first place; thus the sui 
generis nature of security entitlements.121 
Schroeder may reject the legal realists’ approach to the unbundling of property, 
yet she endorses their functional methodology. This is reflected in her description of 
the “objective existence” of property as well as in her analysis of revised Article 8 as 
a more precise rendition of market practices and legal effect. Realism is regularly 
associated with a functional or pragmatic approach to law.122 In fact, the reform 
project of Article 8 is a compelling illustration of the lasting impact of realism on 
American law, or how Singer formulates it: “The slaying of conceptualism has been 
quite successful”.123 Realism rejected abstract concepts such as title and property for 
their vagueness, indeterminacy and contestability.124 This is the aspect of the realist 
project that Schroeder rejects. She argues that the UCC, even in rejecting property 
terminology and the application of traditional property rules and analysis to many 
issues that arise, still retains an overarching system of property.125 The realist project 
also sought to understand legal rules within their particular social, moral, institutional 
and policy context.126  This latter aspects is most commonly associated with the 
functional element of legal realism. Singer identifies another aspect that is also 
reflected in revised Article 8, namely the aim of realists to make rules more context 
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specific and thus to recognise that certain transactions, in this case the holding and 
transfer of securities, are unlike others.127 
To conclude this analysis it must be mentioned that Schroeder points out, that for 
legal purposes outside the realm of securities holding and transfer, the law regularly 
reverts to the traditional common law terminology and classification of an entitlement 
holder as a beneficial owner.128 This is typically the case in terms of state corporation 
laws and it indicates that there are spheres where the traditional paradigms do apply. 
16 3 Perspectives from German law 
16 3 1 Securities as “Wertrechte” 
Parallel to the development of global certificates and collective custody, German law 
saw the emergence of securities, notably government bonds, being issued without 
certificates. Through legislative intervention these uncertificated instruments were 
made equal to other certificated securities in that the framework of the law of things 
was made to apply to them as well. This practice contradicts the materialisation 
theory, which holds that the provisions of the law of things can only apply to 
securities if they have a real tangible existence and thus the certificate takes 
prevalence over the rights embodied therein. 129  The uncertificated rights were 
termed “Wertrechte” (securitised rights), a term thought to have been coined by 
Opitz.130 Not only has this development elicited deliberations about the theoretical 
justification for placing securitised rights under the umbrella of the law of things, but it 
has also prompted critical voices to question whether the continued certification of 
securities is still appropriate. These two debates will briefly be considered in turn.  
A central register for government bonds and other securities issued by the state 
and therefore a book-entry system for such securities is not novel – it has existed in 
Germany at least since 1891.131 Brink shows that the transfer of such book-entry 
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securities was effected on the basis of the law of obligations. 132  Good faith 
purchases were therefore largely impossible.133 It was only on the 31st of December 
1940 that the rules regarding the deposit and administration of collectively 
administered book-entry securities and securities held in collective deposit were 
equated.134 The legal significance of this step was that book-entry securities were 
removed from the sphere of obligations and were henceforth subjected to the rules 
of the law of things.135 Book-entry securities continue to exist in this form in Germany 
and their issue is recorded in a public, central register that is said to be comparable 
to the deeds register.136 Such securities are known as “Schuldbuchforderungen” and 
the creditor’s rights recorded in this manner by book-entry are referred to as 
securitised rights.  
Opitz recognised that, dogmatically, it is the physical manifestation that transforms 
a claim, creditor’s right or membership right into a right that may be alienated and 
vindicated in accordance with the rules of the law of things. Even if the certificate 
therefore has a merely servient function, the claim is inextricably linked to the 
paper.137 According to Opitz, the elimination of the certificate nonetheless did not 
result in the theoretical reconceptualisation of such securities from proprietary- to 
obligationary instruments.138 He found the reason in the German trust (“Treuhand”), 
which rests on a proprietary basis.139 A securitised right therefore only comes into 
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existence if uncertificated rights are deposited with an intermediary who holds them 
in collective deposit, in other words where the intermediary acts as a trustee.140 This, 
Opitz argues, is a special type of trust in terms of which the trustee does not become 
owner of the rights, but instead fulfils an administrative function which makes him 
appear as an owner, but actually endows him only with the ability to exercise and 
enforce rights.141 On this basis he places securitised rights within the realm of the 
law of things, even if there is no special legislative provision to this effect.142 The 
general legal definition of things, Opitz posits, has therefore been expanded to 
include not only corporeal objects, but also such objects that can be equated to 
corporeal objects.143  
The legal classification of securitised rights has always given rise to debate. The 
thrust of general opinion agrees that the equal treatment of book-entry securities and 
collective securities in terms of which securitised rights are attributed a “thingness” 
usually characteristic of corporeal objects, is based on a legal fiction 
(“Gleichstellungsfiktion”).144 In the context of this fiction, Opitz and others suggest a 
“Verdinglichung” (reification)145 of obligations.146 The reification theory is disputed by 
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others, most prominently Canaris, who argues that the application of the rules of the 
law of things as contained in the BGB is not direct, as some of the essential 
requirements for the application of the relevant provisions are absent, most notably 
corporeality. The rules must therefore rather be said to apply by analogy. 147 
According to Canaris a reification of obligationary rights does not take place as the 
mere fact that a right is made subject to the rules of the law of things does not imply 
that such a right is, or becomes real.148 
The replacement of individual certificates with global certificates held collectively 
ignited a discussion of whether the theory of securitised rights can and should be 
extended more broadly to all securities. Authors such as Zöllner, Canaris and 
Fabricius strongly criticised the institution of the global certificate, arguing that from a 
practical perspective, the certificates no longer fulfil any of its traditional functions. 
While the certificate has always had a merely servient function in that the content 
and value of the rights, not the paper, were decisive, the certificate aided, for 
example, the transferability of the rights as well as legitimated the performance by 
the company to the holder thereof.149 Where securities are immobilised in a global 
certificate these functions fall away and factually a book entry takes the place of the 
certificate. In the literature this development is termed the “Funktionsverlust der 
Urkunde”.150 Zöllner therefore described the collective or global certificate as a mere 
“Denkbehelf” or “geistige Krücke”. 151  Canaris labelled the development a “lazy 
compromise”, dogmatically-speaking, with tradition152 and Fabricius described it as a 
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“detour”.153 These scholars therefore advocated for the transformation of collective 
deposit (“Sammelverwahrung”) to a system of collective administration or 
management (“Sammelverwaltung”). Against the backdrop of the development of 
securitised rights in conjunction with the loss of the functional relevance of 
certificates, it was contended that certification is no longer imperative – neither from 
a practical nor from a legal perspective.154 The contribution to this debate of Zöllner 
in particular, will be considered in more detail immediately below. The more recent 
works of Micheler and Lehmann will likewise be examined. 
Other academic commentators rejected the complete abandonment of certificates 
on the basis that the expected rationalisation would be negligible considering that the 
costs of printing and administering global certificates are manageable and that the 
establishment of a register would in turn attract significant costs.155 In addition, it was 
pointed out that a book-entry system requires that the register be administered by a 
neutral and unbiased third-party.156 Than cautioned that the blanket introduction of 
an account-based system may be risky in an international context; thus any change 
must be underscored by an adequate legislative foundation.157 In effect the impetus 
for a dematerialisation of securities must originate in the market which, owing to the 
insignificant potential for cost-saving and rationalisation, is currently content with the 
system of dematerialised global certificates which continue to exist alongside 
dematerialised public debt instruments. 
16 3 2 Wolfgang Zöllner 
Zöllner examined whether the functional aims of certificates can also be attained 
through book-entries. In doing so he argued for a modification of some of the central 
tenets of the term “Wertpapiere”158 and also critically questioned whether, in the 
absence of any physical token, the continued legal categorisation under the law of 
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things could be said to be appropriate.159 A detailed exposition of the first aspect 
would be too lengthy without adding much substance to the core question under 
consideration here, namely the impact of a (possible) dematerialisation on the 
property-obligations dichotomy. In considering the objective of “transactional 
security” (“Verkehrsschutz”), 160  he found that, correctly construed in the modern 
context, “transactional security”, as a type of protection of legitimate expectations, is 
founded on trust. 161  Possessory constructs, on the other hand, have become 
irrelevant.162 A statutory solution should therefore abandon contemplations founded 
in the law of things.163 Any legal order, Zöllner argued, may determine the scope of 
“transactional security” independently of the existence-, or movement of corporeal 
things. 164  He therefore advocated for a model of transactional security tailored 
specifically to the demands of uncertificated, dematerialised securities.165 To enable 
the easy and efficient transfer of securities, it makes no difference, according to 
Zöllner, whether the root of the transfer is a certificate held in collective deposit or an 
obligation recorded in a register.166 Even the co-ownership interest put forward in the 
Depotgesetz, he argued, comes within the grasp of the law of obligations if viewed 
from the angle of accounting.167 Zöllner is careful to point out that he sees no blurring 
of the boundaries between the law of things and the law of obligations. 168  His 
suggestions have rather been interpreted as an appeal to recognise uncertificated 
instruments as being sui generis in nature.169  
16 3 3 Eva Micheler 
The broad outlines of the approach taken by Micheler have been sketched above.170 
It must be noted that her argument applies equally to German law. Micheler 
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meticulously shows how the German law on “Wertpapiere” follows the law of things, 
but transcends its requirements in important ways. She therefore argues that the 
existing transfer rules for “Wertpapiere” should be applied to dematerialised 
instruments in totality by analogy and not through the intervention of assumptions of 
the possession of physical certificates.171 Her approach differs from Zöllner’s in that 
she does not argue for a system of unique rules “outside” the traditional categories of 
property and obligations, but posits that traditional property rules and mechanisms 
continue to apply, but by analogy, not though the “gate” of corporeality. Micheler 
herself categorises her solution as de lege lata – a solution that falls back on the law 
in its existing form and does not require development of the law de lege ferenda.172 
Her solution has often been criticised for its lack of doctrinal justification.173 
16 3 4 Matthias Lehmann 
Lehmann similarly identifies the momentous change that financial markets have 
experienced over the past decades; changes which have not left securities 
unscathed. The first part of Lehmann’s critique aims to demonstrate that the existing 
law on securities (“Wertpapierrecht”) is antiquated. It does not take into account that 
certificates have lost their function,174 ignores the increasing internationalisation of 
the trade in securities175 and provides an inadequate framework for the creation of 
new financial instruments. 176  The first part of his solution jettisons the existing 
category of “Wertpapiere” and suggests the creation of a new category of “financial 
instruments” (“Effekten”/“Finanzinstrumente”).177 Lehmann’s proposal therefore goes 
a step further than the suggestions of Zöllner and others to abandon physical 
certificates in conjunction with a modification of the definitional- and terminological 
margins of “Wertpapiere”. He designs a system in terms of which all instruments 
traded on financial markets are grouped together. Dogmatically, the resulting “law of 
financial instruments” is not located “between” or even “outside” the existing 
categories of subjective rights. Rather, Lehmann strongly criticises the existing law of 
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things for its preoccupation with corporeality.178 The consequential rejection of all 
incorporeal assets from the category of things, Lehmann argues, results in the ill fit 
of the modern German securities deposit- and trading systems with the law of 
things.179 Lehmann therefore remains loyal to the “law of things”, but suggests that it 
be reformed to a “law of property” in the wide sense to accommodate the inclusion of 
incorporeal assets such as the instruments that populate his newly created category. 
This is the second part of his solution. The solution represents his attempt to avoid 
the trap into which Micheler, in his opinion, fell: Corporeality is a prerequisite for the 
application of the German law of things. To overcome the problems connected to the 
materialisation of “Wertpapiere” it is insufficient to abandon certificates and apply the 
law of things by analogy. A more fundamental criticism of the dogmatic structure of 
the law of things is called for.180 In developing his criticism, Lehmann considers the 
bases for the distinction between the law of obligations and the law of things. For 
reasons that cannot be elaborated in any detail, he finds that the distinction can be 
drawn neither on the basis of content (personal vs real rights) nor effect (relative vs 
absolute rights). 181  The dichotomy, he argues, must be understood against the 
backdrop of the social functions of the two areas of the law, namely the movement of 
goods and the allocation of goods. 182 The distinction is contained in the idea that the 
law of obligations should regulate the passing of scarce resources, in the form of 
contractual ordering for example, and the law of things should allocate them. 183 
While the former therefore pertains to a “right to receive” (“Bekommensollen”), the 
latter extends to an already-existing “have” (“Haben”).184 The law of things must 
therefore allocate or determine legal positions clearly and unambiguously.185 For this 
reasons its rules are said to be largely mandatory and operate absolutely. 186 
Lehmann takes cognisance of the work of Wiegand, who argued that an integral 
function of the law of things is also circulation and therefore the passing of 
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resources.187 Wiegand traced back this function to the law of property in the wide 
sense (“Vermögensrecht”) and it therefore applies to both the law of things and the 
law of obligations. 188  This does not mean, however, Lehmann posits, that the 
allocative function of the law of things should be dismissed. While Lehmann 
therefore approves of the distinction between the functions of “passing” and 
“allocation”, he sets out to show that a distinction on this basis has two key 
implications: Firstly, it shows that a sharp distinction between the law of obligations 
and the law of things is a fallacy.189 Secondly, the restriction of the law of things to 
corporeals is not justified.190 Incorporeals must be allocated to specific persons as 
well.191 In fact, modern developments show that the allocation of incorporeals as 
items of wealth regularly exceeds that of the allocation of corporeal things.192 As 
such the law of things, restricted as it is to corporeal objects, fails to fully fulfil its 
function of the allocation of resources.193 Applied to the specific context of securities 
(“Wertpapiere”), Lehmann establishes the allocation of the securities to specific 
persons as a central purpose of the law on securities (“Wertpapierrecht”).194 It shares 
this purpose with the law of things.195 Through tracing this congruence of function, 
Lehmann seeks to, at once, highlight the need for, and justify a modification of the 
concept of “things”. 
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16 4 Perspectives from South Africa 
16 4 1 The case law 
16 4 1 1 Delineating the legal nature of shares  
The dual nature of shares as both personal rights and incorporeal units is evident 
from South African case law.  
In the early case of McGregor’s Trustees v Silberbauer,196 the question arose 
whether the seller had transferred shares to the buyer before becoming insolvent. In 
deciding the matter, the court equates shares to rights of action transferable by 
cession. 197  In Randfontein Estates Ltd v The Master, 198  the legal question was 
whether shares held by one person and registered in his name on behalf of another 
form part of his estate. Shares, it was found, are “simply rights of action – jura in 
personam – entitling their owner to a certain interest in the company, its, assets and 
dividends”.199 According to the court they “pass from hand to hand, and form the 
subject of many transactions without the original registration in the books of the 
company being disturbed”.200  
Similarly, in Liquidators Union Share Agency v Hatton,201 a share is described as 
“a jus in personam, a right of action, the extent and nature of which and the liability 
attaching to the ownership of which depend upon statute”.202 Innes CJ further states 
that “[t]he common law also, where it is necessary to classify incorporeal rights as 
movable or immovable regards a jus in personam as movable…but that does not 
alter the juristic nature of such a rights, or its general characteristics”.203 The nature 
of a share as a right of action and an incorporeal right was also emphasised by the 
court in Jeffrey v Pollak and Freemantle.204  
One of the most influential statements on the legal nature of shares comes from a 
decision by Corbett JA in Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Ocean Commodities 
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Inc.205 Corbett JA reasoned that “[a] share in a company consists of a bundle, or 
conglomerate, of personal rights entitling the holder thereof to a certain interest in 
the company, its assets and dividends”.206 The “bundle of rights” idea runs like a 
golden thread through case law and literature following on Ocean Commodities. In 
De Leef Family Trust v Commissioner for Inland Revenue,207 the court summarises 
that “[t]he nature of a share may be elaborated on by stating that it represents a 
complex of rights and duties of a shareholder”.208 In Cooper v Boyes,209 the court, 
after referring to prior cases and the literature, concludes that “it is clear that there is 
no simple definition of a share”.210 “The various definitions emphasise a complex of 
characteristics which are peculiar to it. The gist thereof is that a share represents an 
interest in a company, which interest consists of a complex of personal rights which 
may, as an incorporeal movable entity, be negotiated or otherwise disposed of”.211  
16 4 1 2 Property language, remedies and mechanisms 
16 4 1 2 1 Vindication of shares 
The rei vindicatio is the primary remedy by which ownership is protected in the law of 
property. It allows an owner to recover his property wherever he may find it. The rei 
vindicatio is a real remedy and is concerned with asserting ownership and restoring 
physical control over a res.212 It is traditionally applied to the vindication of corporeal 
objects, both movable and immovable.213 In the cases of Oakland Nominees and 
Ocean Commodities the possibility of vindicating shares was nevertheless 
contemplated by the court. 
In Oakland Nominees Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & Investment 
Co (Pty) Ltd,214 shares were misappropriated by a nominee and sold to a third party. 
The beneficial owner accordingly sought an order to declare him the owner of the 
shares. The buyer, on the other hand, sought to estop the plaintiff from making any 
                                            
205
 1983 1 SA 276 (A). 
206
 288H. 
207
 1993 3 SA 345 (A). 
208
 356G. 
209
 1994 4 SA 521 (C). 
210
 535B. 
211
 535B-C. 
212
 AJ van der Walt & GJ Pienaar Introduction to the Law of Property 7 ed (2016) 163; ZT Boggenpoel 
Property Remedies (2017) 41. 
213
 Van der Walt & Pienaar Property 164; Boggenpoel Property Remedies 42. 
214
 1976 (1) SA 441 (A). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
309 
 
claim for ownership and registration in the share register.215 The defence of estoppel 
has been discussed and will not be analysed here. 216  More interesting is the 
question whether shares are capable of vindication. The court takes cognisance of 
the argument on behalf of the appellant (defendant) that shares, consisting entirely 
of rights in personam, are incapable of sustaining a rei vindicatio. 217  It was 
contended that the respondent (plaintiff) was not permitted to reclaim the shares by 
vindication from a party outside the contractual nexus. This line of argument was 
rejected by the court as being “at odds with the realities of the situation”,218 and a 
“beneficial owner” deprived of ownership of shares was held to be entitled to bring an 
action for delivery of the shares or share certificates provided that such a claim is not 
defeated by a successful reliance on an estoppel.219 The court asks: 
“When a beneficial owner of shares finds that they have been stolen or, if you like, that 
the share certificates registered in the name of his nominee, have been stolen, must he 
bring an action asserting 'contractual rights in personam ' against his nominee? Or does 
he sue in the name of his nominee? Or must he first obtain, from his nominee, a transfer 
form signed in his favour? All this would stifle the effectiveness of the practical concept of 
a beneficial owner.”220 
In Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Ocean Commodities Inc,221 a claim was 
brought for the “delivery” of shares, which were at the time of institution of the action 
not in the “possession” of the respondents. The respondents were the beneficial 
owners of the shares and claimed delivery from their nominees. 222  Corbett JA 
recognised the conceptual difficulty of reconciling a claim based on a bundle of 
personal rights with a “true rei vindicatio”.223 Nonetheless, he held that the claim 
brought by the respondents against the nominee was not merely the enforcement of 
a contractual right, but constituted delivery of shares. As a result “[t]here is thus 
much to be said for the view that the cause of action should be classified, or 
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characterized, as one analogous to the rei vindicatio in respect of property situated 
within the jurisdiction”.224 
Both cases exhibit the conceptual and terminological lacunae that may arise when 
personal rights also exist as incorporeal assets that circulate and behave in the 
market in a manner closely aligned to that of corporeal movables. The courts identify 
the need for a remedy that is functionally equivalent to the rei vindicatio, but at the 
same time acknowledge the lack of comparable tools in the law of obligations, to 
which shares belong.225 Hence the great caution with which the courts use terms 
such as “ownership” and “rei vindicatio”, which are said to apply by analogy only. 
The assertion by the South African Law Reform Commission that the primary 
remedy at the disposal of the owner is the rei vindicatio is therefore misplaced.226 
The remedy applied by the courts, but obscured by the use of proprietary 
terminology, is as Lubbe points out, simply a declaratory order that is vindicatory in 
nature in that the beneficiary is declared the creditor of the company and the 
company is mandated to undertake all formal steps required to put the creditor on 
the register.227 
16 4 1 2 2 Quasi-possession and the mandament van spolie 
A similar argument was made by the appellant in Tigon Ltd v Bestyet Investments 
(Pty) Ltd,228 albeit in the context of the mandament van spolie. To reiterate the facts 
briefly: Bestyet was recorded on the register of Tigon as a member (today a 
shareholder) of a certain number of shares, which it held as a nominee. The 
ownership and holding of the Tigon shares had come about as a result of a sales 
transaction in terms of which the seller had sold shares, shareholder’s loan accounts 
and an interest in one company (EuroPoint Communications) to a second-tier 
subsidiary of Tigon, payable with shares in Tigon.229 The Tigon shares were subject 
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to a two-year restraint on dealing with the shares.230 Five days before the expiry of 
the restraint Tigon notified Bestyet of the cancellation of the agreement of sale on 
the basis of its being void.231  Tigon subsequently expunged the shares held by 
Bestyet from the register. Bestyet sought to have its name restored to the register on 
the basis of spoliation. 232  Tigon argued that the mandament van spolie is not 
applicable as the rights of a shareholder are personal in nature, not real.233 
The mandament van spolie is a remedy aimed at ensuring that unlawfully 
deprived possession is restored in a timely manner. It protects factual possession, 
not property rights,234 and as such the merits of the dispute are irrelevant.235 The 
relief granted by the mandament is temporary until the dispute regarding the merits 
has been resolved. The remedy is said to prevent self-help.236  
For a successful reliance on the mandament, an applicant must prove firstly, that 
he was in peaceful and undisturbed possession and secondly, that he was unlawfully 
deprived of such possession. Possession ordinarily requires physical control of a 
thing coupled with the intention to derive some benefit from such control.237 South 
African law, however, recognises the quasi-possession of rights.238 The extension of 
the remedy to incorporeal assets incapable of being physically controlled therefore 
attracted considerable debate.239 In particular the extension of the mandament to 
incorporeals raises the questions as to what kind of rights are capable of being 
possessed, and, how are they possessed? The courts have repeatedly held that the 
mandament van spolie is not a “catch-all” remedy that extends to the quasi-
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possession of all rights. In particular, it is not appropriate where contractual rights are 
in dispute, particularly where specific performance of a contractual right is 
claimed.240 The application of the remedy in the context of incorporeals is therefore 
often said to be restricted to two groups of cases, those of “servitudal rights” and 
cases that exhibit certain “incidents of possession”.241 Required for both is a close 
nexus between the use of a right and the possession of a corporeal thing.242 A 
servitude, for example, is a right that exists over immovable property. In the second 
group of cases, services such as the provision of water and electricity relate to the 
possession of premises. From a review of two more recent cases on quasi-
possession,243 Boggenpoel therefore identifies the tendency of courts to focus on the 
characterisation of the nature of the right.244 Furthermore it has been held that such 
quasi-possession is effected through the exercise or use of the right.245 
The extension of the mandament did not find favour with all academic authors. 
While Sonnekus criticises the application of the remedy to incorporeals, which are 
historically and theoretically incapable of being possessed, he argues that it extends 
to some cases because they exhibit such an extraordinarily close link between the 
possession of the right and a corporeal thing, that any deprivation thereof actually 
amounts to a deprivation of the possession of the corporeal thing.246 Van der Walt 
credits the extension of the mandament to what he perceives to be its purpose, 
namely the protection of the public order against disturbances of the peace.247 Yet, 
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he similarly views the presence of a corporeal thing as the boundary within which the 
remedy must operate.248  
Tigon v Bestyet was decided against this backdrop. The court is well aware that 
the remedy cannot be applied to “purely” personal rights. It therefore examines the 
nature of the rights, finding firstly that the Companies Act designates shares to be 
“movable property”,249 and secondly, that “a distinction (not always recognised) may 
be drawn between the share itself, which is an incorporeal movable entity, and the 
bundle of personal rights to which it gives rise”.250 The court further concludes that 
registration, like holding, pledging, bequeathing and otherwise dealing with and in 
shares, is an instance of possession.251 It concludes that expunging shares from a 
register without following proper procedure cannot be said to leave the rights of 
shareholder unaffected and therefore amounts to an unlawful deprivation of 
possession.252  
The decision often goes unmentioned by recent contributions on quasi-possession 
and the mandament van spolie.253 Both Van der Walt and Sutherland, as well as 
Larkin and Cassim point out that the court could have resolved the issue with 
reference to the right to be on the register without having to look into the nature of 
shares.254 The main problem, however, that arises from the decision is that the court 
assumes that principles set out in Bon Quelle and other cases falling into the two 
categories set out above, apply seamlessly to the facts at hand. Even if the court 
attempts to show that shares transcend purely personal rights, it fails to recognise 
that the required (if indirect) link to corporeal things, present in the existing body of 
case law, is clearly missing. This is also the crux of the criticism by Van der Walt and 
Sutherland.255 Consequently this case is a further extension of the mandament, but 
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the court does not provide an adequate theoretical basis on which such an extension 
can rest. In addition, Van der Walt and Sutherland argue that the extension of the 
mandament is not warranted on policy grounds as the removal of a shareholder’s 
name can hardly be said to trigger the purpose of the mandament, namely the 
protection against self-help and the maintenance of public order. 256  Lastly, the 
authors show that section 115 of the Companies Act257 provided adequate relief 
where a shareholder’s name is removed from the register through unilateral 
action.258 While the relief granted through ordering the rectification of a register is at 
times compared to a spoliation order,259 it is at most functionally equivalent.260 The 
extension of the mandament to such cases is therefore not only “unnecessary and 
unwise”,261 but also demonstrates the conceptual difficulty of applying proprietary 
terms such as “possession” and “spoliation” to obligations. 
16 4 1 2 3 Usufruct over shares 
Another decision that concerned the application of precepts of property law to 
shares, Cooper v Boyes, was received with much more enthusiasm than Tigon v 
Bestyet.262 The dispute in Cooper v Boyes arose following a testamentary bequest in 
1984 in terms of which the testator’s son (the plaintiff) was to receive one-half of the 
estate subject to a usufruct in favour of the testator’s wife.263 Included in the residue 
of the estate were shares. Unbeknown to the plaintiff, the usufructuary had disposed 
of some of the shares with the proceeds invested otherwise. The value of the shares 
had increased in the meantime and upon the death of the usufructuary a dispute 
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arose regarding the date of valuation of the shares.264 If the shares had been the 
subject of a usufruct, ownership would have immediately vested in the ultimate 
beneficiary subject to the use and enjoyment of another person. 265  On this 
construction, the increase in value over time would therefore have accrued to the 
ultimate beneficiary. If the shares had been the subject of a quasi-usufruct, 
ownership would have vested in the usufructuary subject to a guarantee that the 
usufructuary would return an equivalent amount or quantity. Upon devolvement to 
the ultimate beneficiary the value would therefore be determined with reference to 
the time of the passing of the testator not the usufructuary.266 Hence the question 
arose whether a usufruct or a quasi-usufruct is created in respect of shares. 
From an array of Roman- and Roman-Dutch sources, the general principles of 
which have been received into South African law,267 the court finds that a usufruct 
can be created over any property whether movable or immovable, corporeal or 
incorporeal. Exceptions are fungibles and consumables; these are subject to a 
quasi-usufruct considering the impossibility of maintaining the substance of the 
property.268 The defendant argued in favour of classifying shares as consumables by 
virtue of their fluctuating value, the eventuality of liquidation of the company and the 
possibility of contingencies such as mergers, take-overs or a reduction or variation of 
share capital.269 Determining the nature of shares as “a complex of personal rights 
which may, as an incorporeal movable entity, be negotiated or otherwise disposed 
of”, the court rejects the notion of shares as consumables.270 Shares can therefore 
be subject to an ordinary usufruct. 
The principles of the usufruct, by design and evolution, are not fixed on the pivot 
of corporeality. These cases therefore broach neither the difficult line of corporeality 
nor of effect. An application of the principles of usufruct therefore does not 
necessitate a reconsideration of the boundary between the law of property and the 
law of obligations, whether it is drawn on the basis of content or effect. In effect a 
court deciding a matter of this sort only has one question to consider: whether 
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shares are incorporeal objects or property not in the nature of fungibles or 
consumables.  
16 4 2 The views of South African academic commentators 
The legal nature of shares regularly receives no more than a cursory mention from 
most South African authors. Echoing the case law, they mostly agree that shares are 
personal rights, albeit not purely personal rights.271 Yet there is no comprehensive 
and robust breakdown of what this might mean for legal theory or commercial 
practice. The legal nature of shares is predominantly analysed from the perspective 
of company law. As a result, there is scarce recognition and discussion of the private 
law aspects raised by this question. Furthermore, there is very little discussion on the 
implications that a change from certificated to uncertificated shares has on the legal 
nature of shares and its pursuant relationships. 
Malan describes shares as personal rights, but emphasises that they “involve[s] 
more than a claim for repayment of a loan.272 In other words, a share is not simply a 
debt. He recognises the tensions inherent in shares and argues that a share is a 
personal right that is not only “a legally recognized relationship between a creditor 
and a debtor entitling the former to a performance by the latter”.273 A share is “also a 
unit of wealth and as such similar to corporeal property forming part of a man’s 
estate”.274 The nature of wealth, he writes, has “changed considerably during the 
past centuries”. 275  He therefore views critically the law’s continued fixation with 
corporeal assets as the primary units of wealth. 276  Difficulties with the use of 
terminology such as “ownership”, “possession” and the “pledge” of shares, according 
to Malan, can be traced back to the law’s preoccupation with corporeality.277  
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According to Hahlo’s, shares are clearly “objects of property which are bought, 
sold, mortgaged, bequeathed, even bequeathed by way of a usufruct”. 278  They 
represent a “proprietary interest in the company, not its assets”279 and are “made up 
of various rights”.280 While these rights are contractual in nature,281 Hahlo elusively 
concludes that “the concept of a share serves different functions”.282 
The characterisation of the rights that make up a share as contractual is described 
by Van der Walt and Sutherland as “artificial”283 as they flow from the memorandum 
of incorporation and the Act, thus being more of a statutory rather than a real 
contract. 284  Van der Walt and Sutherland also warn that descriptors such as 
“property”, “ownership” and the availability of the “rei vindicatio” to recover shares 
should be used with caution.285 They further argue that “the description of shares as 
moveable property does not take the argument any further as [i]t does not change 
the shares from being incorporeal personal rights”.286 
Vermaas states that the transformation from certificated to uncertificated shares 
has no implications for the legal nature of shares.287 This finding is based on the fact 
that the mechanism of registration remains unchanged.288 At the same time Vermaas 
recognises that “[t]he basic rules on the legal nature, transfer and pledge provisions 
of securities were formulated when securities were transferred individually by 
physical delivery of certificates evidencing or representing them”.289 In an electronic 
environment “[t]he legal nature and ‘ownership’ of securities cannot easily be 
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defined”.290 This, according to Vermaas is particularly true for shares in multi-tiered 
chains of intermediaries.291 
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Chapter 17: The legal nature of shares: a theoretical framework 
17 1 A functional approach 
An idea that features prominently in the academic discussions on shares is 
functionalism. At the core of the functional approach lies the rejection of concepts 
and categories such as property and obligations “and all the rest of the magic ‘solving 
words’ of traditional jurisprudence”.1 Nevertheless, a functional approach is not the 
antithesis to conceptual reasoning; it must rather be viewed as providing alternative 
conceptual explanations. The proposition advanced in this thesis is therefore that 
shares and securities are always premised on a conceptual basis, but that the 
conceptual basis may have shifted, wholly or in part, from a strictly doctrinal to a 
more functional approach. 
Functionalists take what Schroeder terms a “transactional approach”. They 
formulate rules about how an object, such as a share, is held, transferred, provided 
as security or otherwise transacted with. As such they place a strong focus on 
practical, actual experiences and market practices. Systematisation is, however, not 
foreign to functionalism. In terms of a functional approach functions, patterns, 
arrangements and relationships in legal transactions and in markets are collated. 
Article 8 of the UCC is a good illustration of systematisation on a functional level. The 
article does not merely collect actual experiences to translate them into disjunctive 
rules; it organises them into a coherent framework. Conceived as such, a functional 
approach is not simply a response to market mechanisms, but at the same time 
shapes those practices. This is also in very broad strokes, the gist of Schroeder’s 
argument: system remains significant.2 
The declared preference of functionalism to abandon meaningless concepts and 
to replace them with redefined or new ones3 makes a comparison between legal 
systems premised on functionalism and legal systems based on doctrinal reasoning, 
difficult if not impossible. The contributions by Mooney, Rogers and Schroeder neatly 
illustrate this point.4 The security entitlement is an example of such a new concept 
                                            
1
 F Cohen “Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach” (1935) 35 Columbia LR 809 820. 
2
 See above, 16 2 3 Jeanne Schroeder. 
3
 According to Cohen (1935) Columbia LR 824 the real value of the functionalist exercise must be 
sought, not in its negative rejection of traditional concepts, but rather in its positive contribution to the 
creation and advancement of knowledge. 
4
 See above, 16 2 1 Rogers and Mooney and 16 2 3 Jeanne Schroeder. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
320 
 
that has no equivalent in other jurisdictions.5 Part of the reason is that the security 
entitlement repackages rights and duties of the issuer-investor, the investor-
intermediary and the intermediary-intermediary relationships into a single legal 
category. Rights and duties inherent in these relationships are mingled and 
conceptual categories of obligations, property, agency and deposit become 
indiscernible. 
A functional approach can provide important lessons. When reference is made to 
the in rem and in personam components of security entitlements, what is meant is 
their absolute or relative effect. The security entitlement is therefore recognition that 
absolute and relative rights can exist in relation to one and the same “object”. This is 
the essence of the sui generis concept.6 A functional approach therefore highlights 
the need to uncouple property and obligations from absolute and relative effect. 
The functional approach manifests that how relationships and transactions play 
out in the real world should be an important consideration for the law and legal 
development. As such it must necessarily inform doctrinal reasoning. However, 
functionalism does not need to be all-encompassing. Functional considerations are 
equally valuable in a more traditional context. They have utility for re-determining the 
usefulness of existing doctrinal categories.7  The lessons of functionalism can be 
applied even where the functional exercise is not exhaustive. The UNIDROIT 
Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities is an example. It 
imposes functional rules that are doctrinally neutral and therefore permits the 
application of uniform rules in the context of highly diverse backgrounds.8 
The South African model is not a fully functional one as it does not evidence the 
unmasking of traditional legal concepts and the level of rearrangement and 
functionally-based systematisation that is necessary for a comprehensive functional 
framework. The Financial Markets Act, The Companies Act, the Rules of Strate and 
other legislative instruments rather provide a number of rules, many of them 
functional, that supplement, suffuse and modify the private law framework. 
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Applied to more doctrinally rigid legal systems, a recourse to functional, and other 
underlying considerations, it is proposed in the model developed below,9 can help 
solve conceptual dilemmas. By contending that functional arguments can serve as 
the basis for a continued application of doctrinal, property-based rules, and perhaps 
even as the impetus for more fundamental legal changes, Micheler and others 
endorse such a conception of functionalism.  
17 2 A law of accounts 
An assertion that the law on securities is a law of accounts has at least two separate 
parts: Firstly, it assumes that there exists a category of “securities” or “financial 
instruments”. The law of accounts does not concern itself with individual instruments. 
Secondly, it implies that all the instruments that make up the category are, or should 
be subject to uniform rules and procedures. 
The question whether there is a need for a single legal category is one that 
features prominently in the work of Lehmann. The question is particularly acute in the 
German legal context, because the category of “Wertpapiere” is at once incredibly 
broad,10  and also restrictive because the numerus clausus bars the inclusion of 
innovative financial instruments.11  Anglo-American and South African law already 
have a category of the sort that Lehmann envisages. The category of securities in 
Anglo-American and South African law is much narrower than the term 
“Wertpapiere”, which Lehmann finds so problematic, because it does not include 
most of the traditional negotiable instruments such as promissory notes or bills of 
exchange. In addition, it has been shown that the category is flexible and open-
ended and allows innovative securities to be included.12  
While these definitions are unsuitable for identifying common substantive 
characteristics shared by all instruments that are part of the group of “securities” or 
“financial instruments”, there is clearly a need for regulatory and procedural 
uniformity of rules. The existence of accounts is the common denominator of a group 
comprised of otherwise disparate instruments. The notion of accounts-based rights 
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also suffuses the definition of “securities” in the UNIDROIT Convention and the 
Hague Securities Convention.13 
Sommer and Dubovec both strongly emphasise the procedural nature of the law of 
accounts. 14  The law of accounts relates not to the substantive content of the 
relationships and the rights and duties that flow from such relationships, but rather 
creates rules and procedures for how these rights and duties are created, transferred 
and extinguished. The law of accounts, to put in in Sommer’s terms, is the suitcase 
for conveying the underlying rights.15 
In Sommer’s estimation a law of accounts is free from doctrinal overtones. In 
terms of the UCC, rights are attributed to a certain person through a series of 
messages and communications that culminate in an account entry. The 
communication attributes (or creates) the rights; the account-entry evidences it. 
South Africa also has a law of accounts. It is contained in the instructions, 
confirmations and other communications sent by participants in the settlement 
system16  as well as in the provisions requiring account entries for a transfer of 
securities. The account entry therefore at once formalises relationships, lists financial 
transactions and sums economic positions. Based as it is on accounting functions, a 
“law of accounts” cannot, however, regulate the consequences of account entries.17 
The law must do this. A “law of accounts” primarily refers to the “transfer” function. 
Transfer, it has been stated at the outset of this thesis,18 is a complex cluster of 
procedural mechanisms and legal rules. What a “law of accounts” clearly evidences 
is a relative increase in the importance of the procedural aspects of transfer. A 
transfer can be sufficiently described and carried out using commercial language and 
mechanisms. To analyse a transfer using legal doctrinal terminology may not be 
necessary in a great preponderance of day-to-day transactions. Nonetheless, a “law 
of accounts” is only one leg; the other leg is legal concepts, whether determined in a 
functional or doctrinal manner. 
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A law of accounts is useful, therefore, because it provides commercial practice 
with mechanisms for transactions in securities that can firstly be applied to all 
securities 19  and that are secondly clear, efficient and capable of application 
regardless of doctrinal background. In addition, the notion of a law of accounts 
creates scope for the development of pragmatic and transaction-specific legal rules 
that can supplement or even alter traditional private-law rules. 
Sommer rightly points out that a law of accounts is characterised by formalism and 
draws parallels to the law of negotiable instruments. 20  The law of negotiable 
instruments is the epitome of formalism.21 The new formalism shares with negotiable 
instruments its two basic precepts: 1. It sets a simple (mechanical) transfer 
mechanism; and 2. It lays down a rule for the acquisition of title in good faith. These 
two aspects are mechanical because they make transfer and title acquisition 
determinable with reference to objectively ascertainable acts or facts without having 
to consider the subjective intentions of the transacting parties. The law of negotiable 
instruments focuses on “transfer”; the same focus can be observed in the law of 
accounts. This explains why in the context of transfer mechanisms of shares and 
securities, an increase in formalism and a decrease in conceptual reasoning can be 
observed.22 On the other hand, the law of negotiable instruments had implications 
beyond transfer: It also shaped how such obligations were held (through bailment or 
deposit) or enforced (though possession). In one respect, however, the new law of 
accounts differs from the old law on negotiable instruments; it does not reify the 
obligation. For this reason the new formalism may have a smaller impact beyond the 
mechanisms of transfer and title acquisition. Thus, by steering clear of reification or 
tokenisation, the law of accounts leaves room for conceptual analysis. 
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17 3 Models of Intermediation 
17 3 1 Introductory remarks 
The possibility of employing a person to intermediate the personal relationship 
between an issuing company and an investor, whether intermediation is “simple” or 
“systemic”, has an important implication: Functionally, it results in a splitting of the 
ability to enforce performance from the entitlement to receive the benefits of such 
performance.23 Conceptually this splitting is explained in different ways.24 The rise of 
intermediary relationships raises a number of questions in the context of the legal 
characterisation of shares and securities: Does intermediation transform the asset 
held by an investor? Does it lead to the creation of an entirely new asset in the hands 
of the investor? If yes, what is the legal nature of the transformed or newly created 
asset? The legal nature of intermediary relationships has been considered from a 
more practical angle in Part 2. Two theoretical approaches have been selected to 
supplement this discussion; the theory of a burdening or “splitting-off” of personal 
rights and the idea of rights against rights. 
17 3 2 The burdening of a personal right 
The idea that a personal right consists of a number of distinct components or 
entitlements originates in German legal theory. 25  The core of the right is the 
beneficial interest that the creditor has in the performance of the debtor.26 Included in 
the personal right is the entitlement to demand and collect performance, 27  the 
entitlement or capacity to dispose of the right to performance28 as well as the right to 
institute legal action.29 So construed a personal right or claim consists of a bundle of 
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 See for example K Larenz Allgemeiner Teil des deutschen Bürgerlichen Rechts 7 ed (1989) 200-
201 §12 II; M Wolf & J Neuner Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen Rechts (2012) 207-208 § 19 IV. 
26
 Larenz Allgemeiner Teil 201 § 12 II; Lubbe (1989) THRHR 497. 
27
 S Enchelmaier Übertragung und Belastung unkörperlicher Gegenstände im deutschen und 
Englischen Privatrecht (2014) 29. 
28
 GF Lubbe “Sessie in securitatem debiti en die komponente van die skuldeisersbelang” (1989) 52 
THRHR 485 497. 
29
 In general, see Larenz Allgemeiner Teil 201 § 12 II and in the South African context S Scott The 
Law of Cession 2 ed (1991) 22. 
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entitlements (not to be confused with the “bundle of rights” that are shares).30 An 
“owner” of a personal right can therefore surrender entitlements piece by piece.31 
Lubbe shows at the hand of security cessions that a construction of personal rights 
or claims as bundles of entitlements that can be split off is reconcilable with South 
African law.32 He further recognises that the intermediation of shares by nominees 
evidences a comparable split.33 
When shares and securities are intermediated the entitlement to demand 
performance is split-off from the personal right and relinquished to the intermediary. 
The intermediary, not the investor, can therefore demand performance from the 
issuer. This constitutes a burdening of the personal right.34 A burdening is therefore 
the splitting-off of distinctive entitlements from a personal right. A burdening must be 
distinguished from an outright transfer. An outright transfer comprises the entire 
personal right. A burdening also involves a transfer, but only a partial one.35 The 
mechanisms for an outright transfer and the transfer of a burden differ. Shares are a 
particularly good illustration of this point. In the context of shares the ability to enforce 
rights can be distinguished from the right or entitlement to benefit from such rights.36 
A share itself, constituting the core right, is transferred from a seller to a buyer thereof 
in accordance with the transfer mechanisms set out in Part 2. The ability to enforce 
the right against the issuer flows from a contractual relationship between the owner of 
the shares and a nominee in terms of a contract of mandate. The burdening or 
splitting-off theory posits that the latter constitutes a “transfer” of the entitlement to 
demand and enforce performance from the owner or rights-holder to the nominee. 
According to von Thur an outright transfer constitutes a translative or quantitative 
transfer of rights. The loss of the owner of the rights is final and encompasses all 
entitlements and accessory rights. 37  A partial transfer, on the other hand, is 
constitutive or qualitative. It includes a transaction in terms of which a lesser right or 
                                            
30
 Lubbe (1989) THRHR 493. 
31
 493. 
32
 Lubbe (1989) THRHR 493-496. Also see S Scott “Verpanding van Vorderingsregte: Uiteindelik 
Sekerheid?” (1987) 50 THRHR 175 184-185. In the case of security cessions this construction is today 
widely accepted. 
33
 Lubbe (1989) THRHR 497-498. 
34
 Enchelmaier Übertragung und Belastung 29. 
35
 29. 
36
 See above, 8 5 Taking stock. 
37
 A von Thur Der Allgemeine Teil des Deutschen Bürgerlichen Rechts 2(1) (1914) 59. 
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entitlement is split off from the content of a personal right and transferred to a 
different subject.38 The derivative entitlement is qualitatively different from the right of 
origin, but can be traced back to entitlements that are part and parcel of the right of 
origin.39 It is not a disposal because the right of origin continues to vest in the same 
person, but rather a burdening of the right of origin.40 Entitlements can be split-off 
without compromising the character of the core right.41 
A burdening of a personal right can take several forms. A personal right is 
burdened where it is offered as security. Similarly, a direct debit authorisation gives a 
bank the entitlement to demand payment. Such an authorisation differs from 
providing a security as collateral in that it is aimed only at the convenience of the 
“owner” of the personal right and can be revoked at any time.42 The entitlement of an 
intermediary to demand performance from the issuer is comparable to the latter 
example. German law uses the term “Einziehungsermächtigung” to describe such 
cases where another person is given the power to collect performance.43 While the 
theory of the burdening of rights is traditionally not invoked in relation to German 
bearer shares, it features in the case of dematerialised “Wertrechte”. The prevailing 
view is that the power of an intermediary to collect the benefits that flow from a 
holding of shares are based on a “Ermächtigungstreuhand”, which has been 
described by courts as a “false” administrative trust in terms of which an intermediary 
or person so authorised acquires not the obligation or claim, but is merely authorised 
to collect the performance.44 
                                            
38
 62. 
39
 62. 
40
 62. 
41
 Larenz Allgemeiner Teil 201 § 12 II. 
42
 Enchelmaier Übertragung und Belastung 29. But see S Scott Scott on Cession; A Treatise on the 
Law in South Africa (2018) 83-86, who finds (but not in the particular context of securities) that an 
authorisation to collect, akin to an “Einziehungsermächtigung” constitutes a mandatum in rem suam in 
terms of South African law and is therefore irrevocable. Scott, however, does not take into account 
that an agent may act in its own name for an undisclosed principal. In the context of listed shares in 
particular, beneficial interest disclosures mean that the issuer is aware of the agency-status of a 
nominee and it is therefore unnecessary to classify the nominee as a mandatary in rem suam. Also 
see above, 8 3 5 4 Agency, representation and mandate. 
43
 Enchelmaier Übertragung und Belastung 29; Scott Law of Cession 160-161. 
44
 See BGH, 03.04.2014 – IX ZR 201/13 para 25: “Eine Einziehungsermächtigung ist demgegenüber 
ein abgespaltenes Gläubigerrecht, das die Verfügungsbefugnis des Ermächtigten über ein fremdes, 
dem Ermächtigenden verbleibendes Recht durch den Begriff der Einziehung klar umgrenzt.” And para 
26: “Die Einziehungsermächtigung beruht auf einer unechten uneigennützigen Verwaltungstreuhand, 
weil der Ermächtigte … nicht die Forderung erwirbt, sondern lediglich zu ihrem Einzug befugt ist”. 
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17 3 3 Rights against rights 
English law may reach the same result, namely that the benefits of performance and 
the ability to demand and collect these benefits accrue to different persons. 
Conceptually and terminologically, it reaches this outcome in a different fashion. 
The split is most often construed as resulting from the legal concept of a trust and 
the contrast between legal and equitable title inherent in trusts.45 Writing on English 
law, McFarlane and Stevens suggest an alternative conceptual explanation (but one 
within the trust construct). 46  They argue that the concept that is central to 
intermediation in English law is a right to or against a right.47 Equitable property 
rights, they write are rights against rights. While the trustee therefore holds the “core 
right”, the beneficiary has a rights against the trustee’s right.48 As his right follows the 
core right, it is capable of having an effect on third parties and is therefore more than 
a mere personal right.49 
The contrast to the theory whereby personal rights are burdened is patent. The 
core right is held by the intermediary, not the investor. In fact, the “underlying right”, 
which is the share, is “immobilised” at the top of the pyramid. If A (a CREST member 
and legal owner of a share) holds the right for B, who in turn is the intermediary of 
investor C, B has a right against the underlying right held by A and this right, in turn, 
becomes the core right against which C has a right. The underlying right is therefore 
intact. It is not burdened and no entitlements are split-off. “The key feature of 
intermediated securities” McFarlane and Stevens write, “is that an investor is given 
the benefit of a right without holding the right itself”.50 This is the inverse of the 
position according to the burdening theory.51 
The burdening theory is frequently said to create rights over rights.52 Yet, von Thur 
cautions that, correctly described, these are rights from rights.53 On this construction 
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 See above, 8 3 2 Transfer and holding in English law and 8 5 Taking stock. 
46
 B McFarlane & R Stevens “Interests in Securities: Practical Problems and Conceptual Solutions” in 
L Gullifer & J Payne (eds) Intermediated Securities: Legal Problems and Practical Issues (2010) 33. 
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 37, 58. 
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 37. 
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 37. 
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 34. 
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 Rephrased, the position according to the splitting-off theory is as follows: “The key feature of 
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an intermediary has a right that derives from the right of the investor. In terms of the 
alternative theory in English law, an investor derives his right from the right of the 
intermediary and therefore has a right against it.54 This is the context within which the 
direction of disbursement of rights or entitlements has been said to differ. 55 
Furthermore, the “underlying right” from which all entitlements or rights flow is 
“located” at opposite ends of the holding chain. 
An investor therefore acquires, McFarlane and Stevens conclude, firstly personal 
rights against an intermediary or holder of the core right arising from the relationship 
(likely contractual) between them. These personal rights do not flow from the core 
right. Secondly, the investor acquires rights against the core right of his intermediary. 
These are not merely personal in nature.56 
The notion of a “right against a right” also explains why investors are today thought 
to hold “interests in securities” instead of “securities”. According to Gullifer, “the 
ultimate investor’s asset is so far removed from the original securities that it makes 
no sense to conceptualise it as ‘securities’”.57 
Mention of “interests in securities” leads to associations with “security 
entitlements”. In fact, the “rights against rights” theory can similarly explain many of 
the features of security entitlements. Security entitlements are detached from the 
“underlying rights” in the same manner as “interests in securities” or “beneficial 
interests” are disconnected from them.58 In addition, one security entitlement can 
become the “object” of another security entitlement one tier down.59 
17 3 4 Transformation of assets and the creation of new assets and rights 
The proposition that systemic intermediation results in the creation of new assets was 
first advanced in the US and English law followed suit. A security entitlement is 
considered by many writers to be a separate asset, distinct from underlying securities 
                                                                                                                                        
53
 Von Thur Allgemeine Teil 66. 
54
 Or a right to it if the investor is the only beneficiary, which is however unlikely in the case of pooled 
securities; see McFarlane & Stevens “Practical Problems and Conceptual Solutions” in Intermediated 
Securities 37-38. 
55
 See above, 8 5 Taking stock. 
56
 McFarlane & Stevens “Practical Problems and Conceptual Solutions” in Intermediated Securities 38. 
57
 L Gullifer “Ownership of Securities: The Problems Caused by Intermediation” in L Gullifer & J Payne 
(eds) Intermediated Securities: Legal Problems and Practical Issues (2010) 1 19. 
58
 See above, 16 2 1 Rogers and Mooney, the text to n 63. 
59
 See, 16 2 1 Rogers and Mooney, text to n 50. 
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but derived from them. Its value is identical to that of the underlying securities. In 
English law, beneficial interests in trusts are similarly considered to be rights and 
assets in their own right and can become the trust property of a sub-trust.60  
The notion of the creation of separate assets does not find favour with all 
academic commentators. Khimji argues, and I quote him at length: 
“The assumption that underlying securities have a sort of independent existence 
disconnected from the indirect holder is both unncecessary and mistaken. … What is 
disconnected from the indirect holder is any personal relationship with the issuer. This, 
however, affects investment securities in only one of the capacities in which they operate: 
as a package of personal rights as against the issuer. The ultimate beneficiary of these 
personal rights is the investor at the bottom of the chain. It has no bearing, however, on 
the other capacity in which they operate: as assets subject to property rights.”61 
It is useful to distinguish the transformation of rights or assets from the creation of 
new rights or assets and to determine in whose hands the transformed or newly 
created rights or assets are held.  
In the context of both English and US law, the “rights against rights” theory 
suggests that the underlying rights or asset, the share, is not transformed. Khimji can 
be said to be in agreement with this postulate. At dispute is rather who holds this 
untransformed asset. In terms of the “rights against rights” theory the underlying 
rights are no longer held by an investor, but by an intermediary in the top tier. A new 
asset is therefore created in the hands of an investor – the security entitlement or the 
beneficial interest. This is not a single new asset; in fact multiple new assets are 
created in the hands of investors and intermediaries in the holding chain. This second 
finding is disputed by Khimji, who maintains that “[t]he asset delivered will be shares 
… The asset delivered simply cannot be anything else.”62 Khimji therefore argues 
that an investor continues to have a claim against the underlying securities, but as 
only the securities in an account can be sufficiently identified for purposes of a 
                                            
60
 See for example R Goode “Security Entitlements as Collateral and the Conflict of Laws” (1998) 7 
JIBFL 22 25, who sets out that following a deposit with a securities intermediary, “the subject matter of 
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proprietary claim, the claim can be exercised only against an intermediary. This 
analysis, he argues, achieves the same compartmentalisation between tiers of 
intermediaries and thus the same functional advantage, but without denying that the 
investor holds or “owns” the underlying securities.63 According to Khimji systemic 
intermediation therefore not only leaves the underlying rights intact, but it also does 
not provide an impetus for the creation of new assets – at least not in the hands of 
the investor. 
If the burdening theory is applied to South African law, the core right, it has been 
found, retains its essential character despite being burdened. From this perspective, 
the transformation of the right or asset is negligible. Furthermore, the core right 
continues to be held by the investor. This conclusion finds support if the principles of 
agency are brought to bear on the question. The agency analysis shows that in a 
holding system based on consecutive sub-mandates, “ownership” continues to vest 
in the investor as the person who stands to benefit economically from the shares and 
who also carries the economic risks associated with them.64 Therefore no new asset 
is created in the hands of the investor. 
Intermediation, however, vests an entitlement in an intermediary. Such an 
entitlement is typically derivative and hinges on the core right. Larenz recognises that 
it is not always easy to determine whether a burden is merely an entitlement or an 
independent right. 65  The answer depends on the independent alienability of the 
entitlement and on the weight and importance that is attached to it.66 The entitlement 
to collect performance can be “transferred” from one intermediary to another, but 
firstly, not without the consent of the holder of the burdened core right and secondly, 
it cannot exist independently of it. These are indicators that an independent right 
does not come into existence. 
Such a conclusion must not be understood to imply that intermediaries hold no 
rights. In addition to the entitlement, a number of rights flow from the legal 
relationship with their client originating in contract and statute. One of these is the 
right to be remunerated for the services that intermediaries offer in connection with 
the collection of the performance. These rights are assets in an intermediary’s estate 
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and are likely to qualify as assets for purposes of compiling financial statements. As 
McFarlane and Stevens point out, these rights or assets do not arise directly from the 
core right.67 
17 3 5 Management or custodial rights 
In an intermediary a myriad of rights and duties come together: those rights and 
duties that originate from contract, those that flow from statute as well as those that 
arise from or against the core right, however construed. In fact, a myriad of additional 
entitlements, powers or rights can be created by contractual arrangement or splitting-
off between an investor and a custodian. These can include voting powers or rights, 
cash management, collateral management, securities lending, foreign exchange 
services as well as brokerage services.68 From a commercial perspective there is 
some utility to bundle all these rights, duties and entitlements together and conceive 
of them as “management” rights or custodial rights represented by a single account 
entry. It is certainly recognition of the fact that the powers of modern intermediaries 
advance far beyond the ability to collect performance. 
This raises the question whether a management right in the sense described 
above can be construed as sufficiently independent to be able to function as an 
autonomous object of rights? In English law it is abundantly clear that a beneficial 
interest, which is an essential part of management rights, can be the object of 
another beneficial interest. The same applies to security entitlements. Sub-agency 
constructs are similarly possible where the direction of rights or entitlements is 
bottom-up. In all these constructions, however, the contractual aspects of 
management rights, such as the level of remuneration for the services offered or 
cash management arrangements, depend on specific agreement between the parties 
at each tier of intermediation and cannot be passed on. Management rights can be 
construed as secondary rights in that they hierarchically derive from another right, 69 
but technically only certain portions or strands of management rights are secondary 
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 See text to n 56 above. 
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in nature, such as an entitlement to collect performance or even an entitlement to use 
the core right (in the context of short selling for example). In addition, parties can 
contractually determine the scope of such rights or entitlements and the degree of 
independence and authority of the agent. If the question therefore arises in which 
circumstances such amalgamated management rights can have absolute effect, a 
bundling together of the different strands of rights or entitlements is not useful. Such 
an approach results in the mingling of the proprietary and contractual aspects of 
shares. As Micheler writes: 
“In reality, one custodian does not neatly fit into the other. There is no stick and no 
connection between issuer and investor. We are looking at a series of independent 
contractual links reflecting the preferences of the custodians concerned.”70 
If anything, the notion of management rights should drive home the principle that 
intermediaries as managers or custodians of their clients, in whichever respects and 
in relation to the entire package of “management rights”, act as fiduciaries. The 
importance of the fiduciary dimension of the relationship is embedded not only in the 
concepts of trust, agency or deposit, but it has been statutorily reinforced in the case 
of securities intermediaries.71 On Fiduciary duties, Easterbrook and Fischel write: 
“These legal duties reflect both the nature of the principal's choice (he is hiring expertise) 
and an obvious condition (the principal is unwilling to put himself at the mercy of an agent 
whose effort and achievements are both exceedingly hard to monitor).”72 
The advantage of a regime of fiduciary duties, whether they derive from contract or 
statute, is that they compensate for the impossibility of writing “complete” contracts or 
drafting comprehensive laws. 73  On the other hand, it is important to carefully 
distinguish between the fiduciary and the contractual elements.74 The centrality of 
fiduciary duties to the characterisation of the intermediary-client relationship also 
explains, in the South African context, why the common law concept of agency 
continues to be of value – it automatically invokes a comprehensive protective regime 
of fiduciary rights and duties that safeguards the interests of a mandatory. At the 
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same time, the imposition of a comprehensive statutory fiduciary regime necessarily 
leads to the conclusion that the legal concept at play is, at least in part, a statutory 
mandate in terms of which the common law rules apply only where the legislation 
does not put forward a specific rule. 
Lastly, the notion of “management rights” emphasises that intermediation must be 
reconceived from a state of “static” holding often associated with traditional legal 
concepts such as agency and deposit, to a more dynamic management and 
administration function. 
17 4 The idea of property and obligations in law 
17 4 1 Drawing the boundary between property and obligations 
Property is a term that is almost invariably characterised by vagueness and 
ambiguity. “Property”, Grey asserts, is “a conceptual mirage” and “an emotive phrase 
in search of meaning”.75 Part of its elusiveness stems from the practice, widespread 
among jurists and laymen alike, to use the term to describe either objects of rights or 
those rights themselves.76 Associating property with objects, particularly corporeal 
objects, is common in everyday usage. 
An added level of difficulty encountered in finding a suitable and comprehensive 
definition of property is that its meaning almost invariably depends on context. Where 
the term is used in specific contexts or legislative instruments, its meaning may vary. 
Furthermore, in the constitutional context, property is usually given a wide meaning.77 
In a more restricted sense, the term property is used to denote the rights that can 
exist in respect of an object or thing. Legally, this use of the term is taken to be the 
correct one.78 This description of property is not uncontested. To understand why, the 
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purpose or utility of defining it in the first place must be kept within sight. Modern 
private law, especially civilian law, is constructed on the division between property 
and obligations. A definition of property must therefore be capable of drawing the line 
between the two disciplines. The same is true of a definition of obligations. The 
definitional exercise is therefore at once a taxonomical one. Taxonomy or 
classification not only aims to depict a part of the law in an orderly and abstract 
fashion. It aims to draw the boundaries between categories; to describe categories 
through demarcation and differentiation.  
A rigorous systematisation of the law is often associated with civilian legal 
systems. Systematisation plays a prominent role in German law, where it is said to be 
formative for legal thought and argumentation.79 South African private law has a 
dogmatic structure that is comparable to the system of private law in German law, if 
somewhat less rigorous. The dichotomy between property and obligations therefore 
features prominently in both legal systems. Taxonomy has also become more 
prevalent, if not always more popular, in the common law.80 Such a statement cannot 
be made without a disclaimer: In the common law, the exercise of mapping the 
private law81 is frequently met with disdain. Many argue that in the common law, 
practical experience of the law is logically prior to theoretical systematisation.82 Few 
will disagree, however, that the common law organises and arranges as well; the 
disputes rather concern the priority of the systematisation exercise and the exclusivity 
of categories. This is the context within which a statement like the one made by Reid, 
that – “the border between obligations and property, has little interest – little meaning 
even – for the student of English law” – must be placed.83 An analysis of shares 
belies, at least to some extent, this statement. It is true that the categories in English 
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law are often drawn along different lines – between real and personal property, the 
latter of which includes choses in possession and choses in action. The breadth of 
particularly “choses in action” can lead to the assumption that everything is property 
and makes this distinction particularly unhelpful.84 In fact, English law traditionally 
knows no independent category of obligations, but the need does arise to distinguish 
between property and personal rights. Beyond legal categories, terminology and 
concepts, the analyses show that, in relation to shares, English law struggles with the 
same problem, namely whether shares can be property? 
A commonly encountered definition of property is that property is that area of the 
law that concerns itself with rights or relationships between persons in respect of 
things. So construed, property is therefore two-pronged: (1) it consists of rights and 
actions of persons (2) with respect to an object or thing.85 Taken individually, any one 
of these elements gives rise to a range of questions.  
Property, so the thrust of general opinion, relates to real rights as opposed to 
personal rights, which fall within the domain of the law of obligations.86 Determining 
property as relating to real rights only solves part of the definitional conundrum of 
property. The definition of real rights suffers from much the same ambiguity as the 
definition of property. A real right is defined as “a claim of a legal subject to a thing as 
against other persons”.87 This definition is similarly unusable for distinguishing real 
rights from personal rights and other patrimonial rights. Scholars therefore make use 
of a range of theories to illuminate the distinguishing characteristics of real rights.  
The “classical theory” is based on the distinction formulated by Grotius,88 and 
posits that real rights establish a relationship between a person and an object or 
thing, whereas personal rights narrate legal relationships between two persons.89 A 
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Registrability of Rights” (1992) 55 THRHR 170 182-186. 
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Merwe Things 36-37. Also see the definition of property by W Blackstone The Commentaries on the 
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distinction drawn along these lines still enjoys much support among South African 
scholars and has featured repeatedly in case law. In Absa Bank Ltd v Keet90 it was 
held that: 
“[r]eal rights are primarily concerned with the relationship between a person and a thing, 
and personal rights are concerned with a relationship between two persons”91  
A comparison on this basis has been found to compare criteria that do not match – 
an object on the side of property and a personal relationship in the context of 
obligations.92 The theory has further been criticised for ignoring that all rights, even 
real rights, are in essence relationships between persons in respect of things.93 Van 
der Walt is of the opinion, however, that this criticism should not detract from the fact 
that the theory contains an element of truth. Real rights, when compared to personal 
rights, evidence a direct bond between a person and a thing; an equivalent bond is 
absent in the case of personal rights.94 That real rights additionally concern subject-
subject relationships does not negate the truth of this assertion.95 
Other scholars draw the distinction between real and personal rights on the basis 
of their effect. What distinguishes real rights from other rights, they argue, is their 
ability to bind third parties.96 This is the basic premise of the “personalist theory” 
employed to distinguish real rights from personal rights by identifying the person or 
persons against whom the rights can be enforced.97 A real right is said to be able to 
bind the world at large. This is so because the exigibility of the right is determined by 
the location of the object or thing.98 Personal rights, on the other hand, are relative, 
not absolute, as they can be enforced against parties to the obligation and thus 
                                                                                                                                        
Laws of England II 4 ed (1876 edn by RM Kerr) 1: “that sole and despotic dominion which one man 
claims over the external things of the world”. 
90
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Holiday Spa Shareblock Ltd 2016 6 SA 181 (SCA) 201-202; National Stadium South Africa (Pty) Ltd v 
Firstrand Bank Ltd 2011 2 SA 157 (SCA) para 31; Smith v Farelly’s Trustee 1904 TS 949 958. Also 
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Grond, Verjaring en Regsdwalings oor Kenmerke van Saaklike Regte” (2018) TSAR 134. 
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94
 Van der Walt (1992) THRHR 185. But see below, n 132. 
95
 185-186. 
96
 Swadling “Property” in English Private Law 174-175. 
97
 On the personalist theory, see Badenhorst et al Silberberg & Schoeman’s Property 51-54; Van der 
Merwe Things 36; Van der Walt (1992) THRHR 186. 
98
 P Birks “Definition and Division: A Meditation on Institutes” in P Birks (ed) The Classification of 
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against specific persons only.99 The same idea is expressed, from the perspective of 
the law of obligations, in the notion of a vinculum iuris – a legal bond between parties, 
traditionally thought to be of a purely personal nature.  
Critical voices point out that not all real rights have absolute effect.100 It is also 
contended that the personalist theory compares apples to oranges. While the 
description of a right as absolute is based on effect, observing that a right is relative 
between subjects alludes to the content of the relationship.101 Van der Walt points out 
that: 
“[T]he personalist theory does illustrate at least one aspect of the difference between the 
two rights in the sense that the object of a personal right (a performance) involves a 
specific person who must perform, while the object of a real right does not involve any 
person”.102 
Many academics do not deny, however, that real rights relate to both, the element 
of absoluteness and the existence of an object external to the right.103 In Absa Bank v 
Keet, the court continued:  
“The person who is entitled to a real right over a thing can, by way of vindicatory action, 
claim that thing from any individual who interferes with his right. If, however, the right is 
not absolute, but a relative right to a thing, so that it can only be enforced against a 
determined individual or a class of individuals, then it is a personal right”.104 
The two theories are therefore increasingly combined. Proponents of the classical 
theory do not deny that real rights are absolute and those who advocate for the 
personalist theory recognise that real rights relate to objects or things. The difference 
then becomes merely one of the order in which these criteria are applied. The result 
is that the different criteria have been fused into inseparable categories – real rights 
are always absolute; personal rights are always relative. 
A method to further taper the definition of property is by narrowly tailoring the 
second element of the definition of property, namely “things”. Where “things” are for 
                                            
99
 Van der Merwe Things 36. 
100
 Van der Merwe Things 36; Van der Walt (1992) THRHR 186. 
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example, defined widely to include any patrimonial objects, the definition is one of 
property as wealth. This is the widest meaning of the term. Property in the first sense 
can include any asset that has a monetary value and can become part of a person’s 
estate.105 This idea of property as wealth has immensely increased in importance. 
Such a definition of property is, however, said to be imprecise and of limited use in 
defining property as distinguished from other legal concepts, most notably 
obligations. 
What constitutes “things” or objects of property rights is a fiercely debated matter 
among property scholars. In Roman law the category of “things” included both 
corporeal and incorporeal objects.106 Jurists writing on Roman-Dutch law followed the 
same approach.107 The exclusion of incorporeal objects from the definition of things is 
of more recent origin and can be traced back to Pandectist theories.108 Accordingly, 
many South African authors continue to emphasise the corporeality element of 
things. Van der Merwe limits the concept of things to corporeal objects.109 He thus 
consistently refers to the body of rules as the “law of things” instead of property 
law.110 Similarly, in Germany, things for purposes of the application of the rules of the 
law of things (“Sachenrecht”) are always corporeal as determined by § 90 BGB. The 
implication of this approach is as follows: If one applies the classical theory, the 
distinction between property and obligations is drawn, not merely on the basis that 
property relates to an object, but based on the assertion that such an object can only 
be corporeal. Corporeality becomes the key to enter the realm of property.  
Adherence to the physical model can differ in scope. Those that observe the 
physicalist conception of property strictly, deny the existence of incorporeals. 111 
Others recognise not only the existence, but also the importance of incoporeals, but 
like the authors of Silberberg & Schoeman, suggest that “the characteristic of 
corporeality should be maintained for purposes of the concept of a thing. Inherent in 
the rejection of the characteristic of corporeality is the danger that the definition of a 
                                            
105
 Van der Merwe Things 5; Badenhorst et al Silberberg & Schoeman’s Property 9. 
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thing may become too vague to have scientific value”.112 Van der Walt and Pienaar 
similarly identify corporeality as one of the characteristics of the narrow definition of a 
thing.113 Yet, they prefer to include within the ambit of property “everything which can 
form part of a person’s estate”.114 Accordingly, they argue that almost any asset can 
be an object for purposes of property, but they do recognise that assets such as 
shares do not fit the traditional, narrower ambit of property.115 The wider meaning of 
property in terms of the Constitution, Van der Walt and Pienaar argue, should be 
reflected in the common law.116 
17 4 2 The boundary in the context of shares 
The physical model has become unfashionable in a sense. Many a theorist has set 
out to demonstrate the fallacy of the physicalist conception of property or to show 
how it can be overcome. Shares are an apt case study in this regard. What even a 
cursory examination of the debates surrounding shares also shows, however, is how 
pervasive the physical model, or its ghost, still is – not only in South Africa, but also 
beyond.  
Of all the treatises on shares considered above, Pretto-Sakmann’s is the only one 
that endorses the physical model as necessary and appropriate in drawing the 
boundary between property and obligations. 117  On the other hand, a variety of 
arguments have been crafted to show why incorporeals, and therefore shares, fall 
within the ambit of property. Benjamin rests her rejection of the physical model on a 
historical basis and invokes the Gaian tripartite division of the law to do so. 118 
Schroeder draws on philosophy to show why the corporeality requirement must be 
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rejected 119  and Lehmann proposes that the boundary should be based on the 
respective functions of property and obligations.120 
The physical model is paradigmatic of reification in law. The trouble with shares is 
that they are traditionally subjected to a “double-reification”; firstly the reification of 
the share in the share certificate and secondly, the reification of property as corporeal 
objects. In law, reification functions on various levels. One of them is the association 
of certain legal rights with “thinghood”.121 This is the root of Schroeder’s criticism.122 
Reification also exerts significant influence on a theoretical level by creating a fertile 
environment for treating the law “as an immutable object instead of a fluid 
construction”.123 The latter effect is particularly evident from an analysis of the idea of 
property in law.  
At the core of shares is the relationship between an issuer of shares and an 
investor. This is the basis on which shares are classified as obligations. The debate 
about the contractual nature of the share124 is an issue of the inward classification of 
the category of obligations and reveals nothing about the outward classification of 
obligations as distinguished from property. A recurring finding in the discussions on 
the classification of shares is that shares transcend the personal relationship. Shares 
can be alienated or vindicated. They share this fate with many obligations, primarily 
contracts, as Pretto-Sakmann points out. 125  They differ from ordinary contracts 
because transferability is an inherent part of their design.  
Shares go beyond the personal relationship, said to be characteristic of 
obligations, in other respects as well, exhibiting characteristics that are said to be 
typical of property, but not of obligations. One such example is the third-party, 
absolute effect that shares must have to operate in modern, fast-paced markets. 
Shares, even if intermediated, must be shielded from the creditors of an intermediary. 
Furthermore, there is a perceived need to protect bona fide purchasers of shares. 
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The narrative of shares is therefore one in terms of which obligations can be 
enforced, if not “against the world at large”, at least against a part of the world. 
One solution to the conundrum is a complete rejection of the physical model, as 
undertaken by Benjamin, with the effect that shares, but also almost all obligations, 
are property.126 English law, precisely because of the absence of an independent 
category of obligations, is more likely to lean toward such a conclusion. Yet, the 
physicalist conception of property is also dismissed by Lehmann in the context of 
German law127 and by Schroeder writing on US law.128 While Lehmann focuses on 
finding a different set of criteria for determining the boundary between the law of 
property and the law of obligations, Benjamin and Schroeder dismiss the physical 
model of property without offering alternative theoretical explanations. Their 
propositions are, however, particularly relevant for showing that part of the problem 
with the distinction between property and obligations is the fact that the former are 
always deemed to have absolute effect and the latter are always relative. There is a 
need to separate these criteria. 
An appreciation of the importance of uncoupling “real” from “absolute” and 
“personal” from “relative” points towards another solution – one that describes shares 
as sui generis. 129  This description not only conveys that shares are located 
somewhere between property and obligations, but also that they are “unique” in the 
sense of being a class of their own. Yet shares illustrate certain problems that 
increasingly arise in a wider context where obligations become fungible, 
commoditised or ambulatory. 
A third solution may be to advocate for an application of certain property 
mechanisms and remedies based on analogy. Micheler suggests this model in the 
context of German law.130 The “analogy” idea also features in South African case 
law.131 The problem with this solution is that it is, dogmatically speaking, an easy, but 
lazy compromise. It avoids having to reconsider or even meddle with established 
classifications and boundaries, it lacks explanatory force and, as South African case 
law shows, it often obscures the true state of affairs. 
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17 4 3 Developing an explanatory model 
All these solutions fail, from a theoretical perspective, to show why and in which 
circumstances shares and obligations can be said to have absolute effect. What is 
needed is an explanatory and predictive model. Finding a workable model for 
drawing the boundary between the law of property and the law of obligations by 
proceeding from the premise of property is marred by uncertainty and disagreement. 
It is useful therefore to approach the matter from the angle of the law of obligations. 
Instead of asking what is property as distinguished from obligations the enquiry 
becomes what sets obligations apart? 
It is today widely accepted that an obligation relates to an object as well, found in 
the performance of the debtor.132 What distinguishes obligations from property is not 
so much the presence or absence of an object, an object is present in both, but 
rather the presence or absence of a vinculum iuris, a personal bond. An obligation 
creates a relationship between a person and an object (the performance) as well as a 
relationship between a debtor and a creditor.133 Beyond the subject-object dimension, 
rights to property in the traditional sense are enforceable between persons as well.134 
Property law nonetheless lacks the personal relationship that characterises the law of 
obligations. 135  From this perspective it becomes unnecessary to resort to the 
corporeality of the object as a distinguishing characteristic. 
Michaels, writing on German law, differentiates between an internal and an 
external sphere of obligations.136  The internal sphere encompasses the personal 
bond that characterises obligations. Property lacks this internal sphere. In the internal 
sphere rights are always relative.  
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The external dimension describes the subject-subject dimension of obligations, 
and also of property.137 Property rights are said to be absolute and operative against 
the whole world in the external sphere because the right follows the object or thing, 
not the person. Every obligation also has external effect in the sense that it is 
protected against interference by parties external to the personal relationship. 
The nature and scope of the external effect of an obligation is determined by its 
characterisation in the internal sphere. The content of a personal right can be 
directed at an object or a thing (defined widely to include corporeals and 
incorporeals) or can simply constitute an act.138 In developing this idea Michaels 
lends from Gaius, who distinguished between those obligations that are aimed at the 
delivery of an object or thing (obligatio dandi) and those obligations that are aimed at 
a specific action (obligatio faciendi).139 
The paradigmatic example of an obligatio dandi is the procurement of ownership 
and therefore the conveyance of a tangible thing or an in rem right to such a thing. 
What distinguishes a tangible thing as an object of property from performance as an 
object of an obligation, is the fact that in the former case, the object is external to the 
parties contracting about it so that it can be conveyed from one to the other, whereas 
in the traditional sense, performance as an object is an integral part of the 
relationship between the parties; if the relationship dissolves so does performance as 
an object. The pertinent question is therefore whether the object of an obligation 
assumes such nature that it can be said to become an object external to the personal 
relationship between the parties.  
Penner proceeds from the assumption that property is a right to things. In 
characterising things he develops the “separability thesis” in terms of which a thing 
encompasses everything that is separable from ourselves, our person and our 
personality rich relationships.140 The primary element that determines whether an 
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object is separable, according to Penner, is the level of personality inherent in a 
relationship.141 As a secondary factor he identifies certainty or definability of the value 
of the object.142 
That separability relates to an object of certain, or independently determinable 
value is also reflected in the original notion of an obligatio dandi, which was also 
known as a certa obligatio because it has an objectively ascertainable and 
perceptible value, so that the value of the obligation “is co-extensive with the value of 
the object of the act”.143 
Dooyeweerd emphasises that a subject-object relationship is an essential 
component of every subjective right and finds, in turn, that an object can be anything 
that is susceptible to economic value. 144  He describes a legal object as being 
“primarily a juridical objectification of an economic interest”. 145  Implicit in this 
argument is also an element of a lack of personality. 
Two elements are therefore of central importance: personality and certainty of 
value. This development of the notion of what can constitute an object for purposes 
of an obligation gives a new dimension to the concept of an obligatio dandi. An 
obligation (obligation x) can be described as object-related if it connects to a 
performance that becomes “separable” from its subject-subject relationship that 
characterises this obligation (obligation y) in the internal sphere. This is achieved if 
an obligation (obligation y) becomes relatively impersonal. It is useful, therefore, to 
plot an obligation (obligation y) on a continuum from the purely personal to the 
impersonal. In such cases, the content of obligation x is directed at an object, which 
is obligation y. This enquiry is an interim step, however, because it can merely reveal 
how an obligation (obligation x) may behave in the external sphere. It can neither 
determine conclusively that an obligation will have an effect in the external sphere, 
nor what the scope of this effect is. Therefore, if an obligation relates to an object or 
thing (obligation y) in the sense delineated above, it is an indication that the 
obligation (obligation x) may have absolute effect in the external sphere. 
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The purpose of this analysis is not primarily to determine whether obligations can 
be transferred. It is today widely accepted that obligations can be alienated and can 
also be conveyed by other means such as by inheritance or a mortgage. In addition, 
it is inaccurate to argue that a personal right is subject to the rules of property law 
because it is transferable; rather, it is transferable because it evidences certain 
characteristics that make it comparable to “property” or objects of property.146 This 
analysis is, therefore, rather aimed at determining whether and to what degree 
obligations can have third-party, absolute effect akin to the erga omnes effect of 
property rights. 
Before proceeding with an analysis of the external dimension of obligations, it is 
apt to illustrate the internal dimension, and in particular the propensity of shares to 
serve as objects external to a transaction or obligation involving shares. Shares, it 
was illustrated in Part 1, exhibit many features that plot them on the impersonal, 
object-related end of the continuum: In the first place, shares consist of a number of 
distinct rights.147 And although it is true that these rights can only be performed and 
enforced between an issuer and an investor or shareholder, the law regulating 
companies, particularly listed companies, has developed in such a way that the 
identity of shareholders plays only a subordinate role from the perspective of an 
issuing company. Thus, a listed company no longer has the power to reject a 
transfer. In addition, it was shown that shares are more than a numerical percentage 
of the company’s share capital; they are units of capital in their own right.148 This 
strengthens the characterisation of shares as objects by highlighting, that shares 
have a value that, although it can be subject to significant fluctuation, is still 
objectively determinable with reference to market values. It also underscores the 
conclusion that the meaning of “objects” transcends the physical paradigm by 
detaching the value of shares from the value of share capital and from the value of 
the assets held by the company. This conclusion is reiterated by the entity theory.149 
Macpherson, therefore, who analyses changes in the concept of property in relation 
to the development of capitalism, finds that, fuelled by “the rise of the modern 
corporation, and the predominance of corporate property”, “property is again being 
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seen as a right to a revenue or an income, rather than as rights in specific material 
things”.150 
Shares, as obligations, may act as objects of other obligations. As between an 
issuer and a shareholder or investor, there exists a personal relationship that 
dictates, amongst other factors, how shares are created, how and to whom 
performance must be made and who is entitled to enforce performance. As between 
the parties in the internal sphere, shares are complex, multifaceted obligations.151 
Whenever shares are transacted with they may act as objects of the obligations so 
entered into, whether it be a contract of sale, a contract of mandate, a real security 
transaction or a usufruct. 
Every obligation has an external effect. In the case of obligations that are not 
object-related and that evidence a high level of person-relatedness in the internal 
sphere, the external effect encompasses a right against interference by persons that 
are not party to the relationship.152 This finds expression, for example, in the general 
duty not to intentionally induce one of the contracting parties to breach the 
contract.153  The right against interference is not a manifestation of the absolute 
operation of rights, comparable to the erga omnes effect of property law.154 On the 
other hand, obligations that display an object-relatedness in the internal sphere can 
have absolute effect in the external sphere. The relativity of the obligation diminishes 
and a measure of absoluteness emerges, but only in relation to parties outside the 
debtor-creditor relationship.  
The finding that an obligation is object-related in the internal sphere is only an 
indicator of absolute effect in the external sphere. There are two factors that 
determine the scope of their real operation. In the first place, the level of separability 
of the object from its own internal subject-subject relation and therefore the 
prominence of its property-like or thing-like features can reveal something about the 
degree of external effect. In the second place, it is up to the legislator, policy-makers 
and courts to decide whether and how to flesh out this third-party effect.155 Such an 
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evaluation must be made taking into consideration principles such as autonomy and 
accountability, which mitigate against third-party effect, and the existence of special 
relationships such as agency, as well as general economic considerations, which 
advocate for absolute effect.156 As part of this evaluation, functional considerations 
find their rightful place. So must constitutional- or human rights considerations. An 
enquiry along these lines is indispensable because a finding that rights have absolute 
effect “binds” parties external to an agreement and must therefore be carefully 
justified. At the very least, a contemplation of underlying principles and 
considerations can assist in answering why certain objects, whether corporeal or 
incorporeal, are treated as having third-party effect. Categories such as “property” 
and “obligations” do not have intrinsic value. The value of systematisation lies in the 
framework it provides for such an evaluative exercise.157 
The dual nature of obligations is not a novel idea. It has been developed in the 
context of cessions to explain how and why personal rights, traditionally thought to be 
inalienable, have become susceptible to a transfer by cession or assignment.158 One 
dimension of obligations, or personal rights, is the relationship between two subjects 
– the debtor and the creditor. When transferring a personal right, a substitution of 
creditors takes place in the obligationary realm. 159  This is the primary function 
undertaken by the law of cession. 160  The other dimension is the notion of an 
obligation as a patrimonial asset that can be transferred from the estate of the cedent 
to that of the cessionary.161 This is the proprietary dimension of personal rights. Scott 
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rightly points to a number of cases on shares where the dual nature of shares was 
raised, even recognised, but poorly understood.162 
That obligations can be accorded limited real operation has been recognised by 
South African courts in cases governed by the doctrine of notice.163 In these cases, a 
third party to whom an asset is transferred in breach of a personal right, such as, for 
instance a right of pre-emption granted to another, can be obliged to give effect to the 
right of pre-emption if she had knowledge thereof.164 The real operation is therefore 
limited to the party who had actual knowledge.165 This stands in contrast to a real 
right, which operates against the world at large because everybody is deemed to 
have knowledge of the right.166 Of central importance for real operation, whether in 
property law or for the operation of the doctrine of notice, is therefore an element of 
publicity.167 The finding by the court that the publicity precondition is satisfied where 
the third party has knowledge of the right of pre-emption illustrates the importance of 
analysing the underlying justifications for the real operation of rights.  
The publicity requirement is particularly instructive in the context of shares 
because it can also explain why account entries are now required for a valid transfer 
of securities. Traditionally, a transfer of personal rights by cession is valid without any 
publicity as can be found in the delivery requirement of movable corporeals.168As Van 
Huyssteen et al postulate, “the belief that the incorporeal nature of the asset does not 
create a significant risk that third parties may be misled by such transfers, seem to 
play a part”.169 This assumption does not hold in the context of listed shares and 
securities, which are frequently highly mobile and liquid. Thus, a publicity mechanism 
in the form of a book-entry or register system was introduced. That securities 
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ownership, transfer and holding is deemed to be sufficiently public, also explains why 
these rights may have limited real operation.170 
South African courts are correct insofar as they highlight the dual nature of shares 
as personal rights and incorporeal objects. The lacuna in their analysis is a proper 
appraisal of how and why the finding that shares are incorporeals induces third-party 
effects. The model developed, can assist courts and legislators to determine, 
categorise and explain the third-party effect of shares and other obligations. In the 
first step it is useful to picture obligations on a continuum from person-related to 
object-related. Secondly, the nature of the object deserves scrutiny; and thirdly, 
underlying principles and considerations must be contemplated, examined and where 
necessary, weighed up.171  
Does it matter whether shares are property? Property and its boundaries – an 
even cursory glance of the literature shows – remain highly contested. Even the idea 
of the dual nature of obligations can lead to different conclusions on the property-
obligations dilemma. Based on his model, Michaels concludes that all matters that fall 
within the external sphere must correctly be classified as belonging to the law of 
property. So construed, cession or assignment would fall under the law of property 
not the law of obligations.172 Scott, also in the context of cession, takes note of the 
divergent constructions, but concludes that cession necessarily relates to both the 
law of property and the law of obligations. 173  Canaris, on the other hand, 
distinguishes between a “reification of obligations” (“Verdinglichung obligatorischer 
Rechte”)174 and an application of property rules by analogy.175 The former entails that 
under particular circumstances, an obligation is accorded real characteristics and 
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effects.176 The result is a complex mixture that must be doctrinally located between 
the law of property and the law of obligations.177 In the case of shares and other 
securities he argues, however, that property rules are merely applied by analogy.178 
What matters more than conclusive classifications, however, is the recognition that 
shares and other obligations can have absolute effect in the external sphere. 
Whether such rights or entitlements are, in the external sphere, classified as 
property,179 analogous to property180 or sui generis,181 is not only irrelevant for the 
classification of the obligation in the internal sphere, which remains intact as an 
obligation, but is also, in the external sphere, less important than an illustration of old 
and new connections between property and obligations, a re-consideration of how 
they relate to one another, a return to underlying principles and perhaps the 
awareness that the boundaries are more permeable than generally assumed. This, 
naturally, does not absolve us from the duty of constructing new hypotheses for 
explaining and predicting legal consequences. 182  The increasing importance of 
incorporeal objects of wealth, coupled with the proliferation of legal relations at the 
boundary between property and obligations all necessitate a redetermination of the 
ambit of both property and obligations. Shares provide an illustration of a hypothesis 
that can be advanced in, if not redrawing the boundaries, illuminating individual 
aspects of the connection between property and obligations. 
17 5  A selective application of the findings 
17 5 1 General remarks 
To show how the theoretical, doctrinal and conceptual considerations outlined above 
can be applied to intermediated holdings in South African law, three questions will be 
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briefly considered. 1. Why is an investor protected against the creditors of an 
intermediary? 2. Why is good faith acquisition provided for? 3. Does the theory 
support the notion of quasi-possession and justify a recourse to the mandament van 
spolie? The aim is not to show that investors can be put into the same position they 
were in before systemic intermediation emerged. This, Gullifer finds, is unattainable 
due to differences in the systems and availability of information brought about by 
systemic intermediation.183 Systemic intermediation raises novel issues and concerns 
and other risks, including the increased exposure to intermediary creditors as well as 
a renewed urgency to resolve the bona fide acquisition dilemma,.are significantly 
amplified by systemic intermediation,  
The model and underlying theory is essentially used to answer one crucial 
question: To what degree (if at all) can an obligation be given binding third-party 
effect and if, against which parties? There is no one-size-fits-all answer. The question 
must be asked and answered in respect of each individual obligation as it arises. 
Also, not every third-party effect is necessarily against the “world at large”. Some are 
limited third-party effects. Important, however, is that the model permits us to 
construe these third-party effects not as exceptions, but as flowing naturally from the 
nature and quality of the personal relationship as it manifests itself in the internal 
sphere of an obligation and as bolstered by underlying considerations. 
17 5 2 Why is an investor protected against the creditors of an intermediary?  
In the relationship between an investor and an intermediary, the obligation is 
contained in the contract of mandate or in a contract containing elements of mandate. 
In terms of this obligation, the intermediary becomes the holder of an entitlement to 
collect, while the investor retains the core right.184 The intermediary has the duty to 
collect performance and pass it on to the investor. This obligation is intrinsically 
connected to the core right, which, as was argued above, retains its essential 
character.185  An examination of the internal sphere of the obligation is therefore 
object-related. The object it relates to is the share or the core right, which is capable 
of sustaining an existence sufficiently separable from the personal relationship 
between issuer and investor.  
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The ordinary principles of the law of agency, as supplemented by legislation, 
dictate that an intermediary must segregate any property or proceeds of the principal 
from own property.186 Despite this rule and the conceptual split between the core 
right, retained by the owner, and the entitlement to enforce and collect that settles in 
the intermediary, there is some risk associated with the use of an intermediary. If 
shares are held through intermediaries, there is a risk that creditors of an 
intermediary will seek to attach the assets of the intermediary either, to satisfy a 
judgment, or in the case of insolvency of the intermediary.187 
The special relationship that exists between an investor and an intermediary is 
therefore one of the underlying factors that should be taken into account when 
determining the third-party effect of shares. Based on the dynamics of the 
intermediary-investor relationship, shares should have a limited real effect; real 
because the owner thereof should be able to “vindicate” the right from a creditor of an 
intermediary and limited, because this effect does not operate against the world at 
large, but only against creditors of intermediaries. The limited real effect can also be 
explained with reference to the principle of publicity. Account entries made by an 
intermediary in favour of a client publicise that the intermediary does not hold shares 
for its own benefit. Publicity, it has been shown above, is a factor that justifies the 
limited real operation of rights.188 The conclusion that a creditor of an intermediary 
cannot attach shares held through an intermediary is also supported by the 
burdening theory, which posits that an intermediary holds merely an entitlement to 
collect, not the core right. This entitlement is not a self-standing right. 
Sommer’s account of the operation of the principle of privity in intermediated 
holding chains is also instructive. 189  The two explanations are not opposites, 
however. Sommer’s theory shows why the fact that the relationship is obligationary 
keeps third parties out in the first place. The explanatory model strengthens this 
conclusion by showing that, if creditors do intervene in the relationship, the 
contracting parties have stronger remedial protection. If anything, this conclusion 
reinforces the importance of privity in financial markets. 
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17 5 3 Why is good faith acquisition provided for? 
The obligation at question in this scenario is a contract of sale in terms of which the 
performance of the seller consists of the duty to transfer shares. From the 
perspective of its internal sphere (the seller-buyer relationship), the obligation is 
object-related because it is connected to a share that originates from another subject-
subject relationship between the issuer and the investor. The risk that third parties 
will be mislead about ownership, holding or transfer of shares is significant. This is so 
because of the strong “object-related” nature of shares in the internal sphere i.e. the 
ability of shares to constitute an object sufficiently separable from the personal 
relationship that sustains it. In fact, the mobility of listed shares frequently surpasses 
that of movable things, unburdened as they are by a corporeal body, unconstrained 
by delivery requirements and amplified by their remarkable liquidity. The mobility of 
shares is a risk not only to third parties, but also to the owners thereof. According to 
the ordinary principles of property law, the risk to owners is mitigated by the principle 
of publicity, which functions in conjunction with the real operation of rights. Owners of 
property can therefore ordinarily enforce their rights erga omnes. The real operation 
of rights is bolstered by the nemo plus iuris doctrine – nobody can transfer to third 
parties rights that they themselves did not have. The protection of ownership is 
therefore two-pronged.  
While publicity mechanisms in the form of registers and accounts similarly protect 
owners of shares by allowing them to enforce their rights against certain third parties, 
such as creditors of intermediaries,190 they provide no protection to purchasers of 
shares, who are similarly exposed to the risks created by the characterisation of 
shares as highly mobile objects. In addition to a limited real operation of rights, a 
good faith purchaser rule therefore serves to allay this risk. The property-like features 
of shares and securities serve as a justification for such a rule. The rule gives 
recognition to the fact, also highlighted by Micheler, that shares are intended for 
circulation.191 The rule is a special legal attribute of shares, but also of negotiable 
instruments and of money. It is interesting because it allows title to be renewed and 
therefore diminishes the real effect of rights by prohibiting rights to be “vindicated” 
from purchasers who acquired them in good faith. The good faith purchaser rule 
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illustrates that, even if an obligation is characterised as object-related in the internal 
sphere, there may be factors that mitigate against a third-party effect in the external 
sphere. It further shows that even if obligations as incorporeal objects share many 
features with corporeal assets, they are different in nature and must be analysed and 
treated differently.  
17 5 4 Does the theory support the notion of quasi-possession and justify a recourse 
to the mandament van spolie? 
“Quasi-possession” of shares must be associated with the right to be on the register. 
Van der Walt and Sutherland point out that the court in Tigon Ltd v Bestyet 
Investments (Pty) Ltd,192 fails to sufficiently distinguish between two aspects, namely 
shareholding (or membership as it was then) and ownership (beneficial holding).193 It 
is accurate that ownership is not necessarily co-extensive with shareholding. Yet, 
shareholding must derive in some way from ownership. Therefore, both an owner 
and a holder of a split-off entitlement to collect performance have the right to be on 
the register. In both cases, the obligation at question is therefore one between an 
issuer and an investor, in the latter case, the obligation is just intermediated by a third 
party, the nominee. 
It was argued above that even if shares are capable of constituting an incorporeal 
object that is sufficiently separable from its subject-subject relationship, it does not 
change the characterisation of shares as personal rights in the internal sphere.194 
The right to be on the register is an inherent part of the subject-subject relationship. 
The obligation between the issuer and the investor is therefore not object-related. In 
addition it was found that the entitlement to collect, even if split-off from the core right, 
is not independent from it and therefore does not constitute a self-standing right.195 It 
can therefore not constitute an object on which the right to be on the register can 
hinge. 
That the existence of an independent, sufficiently separable object is of 
importance appears from the requirements for the mandament van spolie. The 
mandament, courts have found, can be extended to incorporeal rights, but these 
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rights must relate to a corporeal object. 196  Even if setting aside the element of 
corporeality, the features inherent in this requirement are firstly, that, to sustain a 
mandament, a right must be object-related and secondly, that such an object must 
exist separately from the right. Boggenpoel therefore rightly identifies that it is 
important, as a first step, to determine the nature of the right.197 More particularly, it 
must be ascertained whether, in the internal sphere, the obligation from which the 
right originates is object-related or not. 
The court in Tigon v Bestyet failed to recognise that the matter concerns only the 
subject-subject relationship as it exists in the internal sphere. That shares are also 
incorporeal objects is irrelevant in the context. 
17 6 Back to “embodied” rights? 
Rights in a financial setting, Sommer points out, have oscillated between being 
“embodied” and “account-based”.198 The next shift, he predicted in 2000, may well be 
back to “embodied-rights” if we can devise the technology to link a unique electronic 
token to an unassailable electronic register.199 
That technology is now widely thought to be available in the form of distributed 
ledger technology, such as the blockchain.200 The basic operation of the blockchain 
can briefly be summarised as follows: 
“The blockchain is a computer network that encrypts each incoming ledger transaction 
and aggregates it into a group of similarly-timed transactions, termed a ‘block.’ Each block 
serves as a data storage container that connects in chronological order to the previous 
block in the transactional chain. A new block can only connect to the transactional chain 
after ledger users reach consensus as to the block's validity.”201 
If each block represents a number of transactions and the chain is extended 
through the addition of new blocks, the blockchain is a ledger that contains the 
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complete transaction history of the asset in question.202 The ledger is distributed 
because a record of all transactions is stored on each computer of the network.203 It 
is also decentralised because the validity of transactions is not evaluated and verified 
by a central authority, but through a decentralised consensus mechanism. If a 
transaction is requested it is not added to the blockchain automatically. Rather, a 
network of devices, known as nodes, assess the validity of the transaction based on 
cryptographic algorithms and if they reach consensus the transaction is timestamped 
and grouped together with similar transactions to form a block that is added to the 
blockchain.204 
The stated benefits of the distributed ledger technology include transparency of 
the ledger, immutability of the ledger, a reduction of processing time which enables 
an immediate exchange, the easy verifiability of transactions, a reduced need for 
intermediaries as well as significant cost-savings flowing mainly from a reduction of 
both transaction costs and transaction time.205 
Although the blockchain technology is most commonly associated with crypto-
currencies, the potential application of the technology to a wide variety of industries is 
attracting considerable attention. The technology is said to be particularly suitable for 
industries and transactions that traditionally rely on intermediaries to establish a level 
of trust between transacting parties.206  Therefore, the financial industry is at the 
forefront of the endeavour to extend the technology to a wide array of financial 
products and mechanisms. “Crypto-securities” represent one such area of 
application. 
In the context of securities the technology has the potential to address multiple 
problems: 1. The lack of transparency of the central register and the intermediary 
records. It is not apparent from the central register or the records maintained by the 
intermediaries who the true beneficiary of the rights is. In addition, it is impossible to 
retrace previous holdings. Increased transparency not only makes “true ownership” 
visible, thereby eliminating the distinction between legal and beneficial ownership that 
exists in some legal systems. It also makes transacting easier because a purchaser 
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has certainty about the ownership of the seller. The use of distributed ledger 
technologies can therefore re-establish a direct relationship between an issuer and 
an investor. This not only facilitates the direct flow of benefits, but also gives an 
investor direct legal recourse against the issuer.207  2. The risks created by long 
intermediary chains. In intermediated environments an investor is exposed to 
significant risks, including systemic risk, risks associated with complexity and 
intermediary risk.208 An investor holding through intermediaries is exposed not only to 
the risk of insolvency of the issuer, but additionally to the risk of intermediary 
failure.209 Micheler points out that investors no longer hold shares or securities, but 
something else, namely beneficial interests or so-called “interests in securities”.210 
The analysis above shows that this is not true in all legal systems observed, but only 
in some.211 The systems are, however, functionally equivalent in that the investor 
receives the benefits that flow from shares while other functions, such as the 
collection of the performance, are performed by intermediaries. Even if ownership 
continues to vest in the investor, the lack of transparency in record-keeping means 
that it is difficult to determine who holds which rights or entitlements. Investors are 
therefore exposed to intermediary risks in all the legal systems surveyed. 3. The lack 
of direct contact between buyers and sellers of securities. The intermediated nature 
of securities holding implies that sales transactions cannot proceed directly between 
a buyer and a seller of securities. Distributed ledger technology, by making 
intermediation obsolete, enables peer-to-peer transactions. 212  The technology is 
therefore said to be “trustless” because it enables transactions without the mediation 
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of a trusted third party. 213  In fact, it does not even require trust between the 
transacting parties. 
Doubt must be expressed whether the elimination of intermediaries is realistic. Not 
only do intermediaries have strong vested interests in the industry, but the example 
of crypto-currencies shows that new intermediaries tend to emerge. The economic 
theory of intermediation shows why this may be the case. Intermediation was initially 
devised to counter high transaction costs and information asymmetries. These are 
“trust” functions i.e. the intermediary acts as a trusted third party to bridge the lack of 
trust between the transacting parties. Intermediation theory also shows that, while the 
trust function remains essential, intermediaries have long transcended this trust 
paradigm, providing functions aimed at system access, reduction of complexity and 
convenience. It must be tested whether distributed ledger technology can 
accommodate all of the highly specialised functions performed by intermediaries in 
settlement and payment systems today. The technology certainly has disruptive 
potential. On the other hand, existing intermediaries may embrace the technology or 
certain components of it to enhance existing services.214 It is also conceivable that 
the technology will be characterised by a de-intermediation followed by a re-
intermediation. 
While most of the academic legal research on distributed ledger technologies 
focuses on crypto-currencies and smart contracts, crypto-securities, or the possibility 
of applying the technology to various stages of the life cycle of shares and securities, 
be it to the issuing of shares, ownership recording and tracing, investor-issuer 
communication, trading or settlement and payment, is receiving increasing attention. 
In the US this academic interest has been further animated by the amendment of 
Title 8 of the Delaware Code to provide for the use of distributed ledger technology in 
the context of corporate record-keeping, such as company records and stock 
ledgers. 215  A number of scholars have also analysed the technology within the 
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 Bolin (2018) Washington Uni LR 957-958; TI Kiviat “Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulating 
Blockchain Transactions” (2016) 65 Duke LJ 569 574. 
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 See Title 8 of the Delaware Code, particularly §§ 219 and 224. Also see JT Laster & MT Rosner 
“Distributed Stock Ledgers and Delaware Law” (2018) 73 Bus L 319. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
359 
 
context of Article 8 of the UCC, concluding that securities recorded on the blockchain 
can be said to fall within “uncertificated securities” as defined.216 Questions remain 
about the proper regulation of the blockchain environment. Regulators are, inter alia, 
grappling with the question whether assets recorded on the blockchain fall within the 
ambit of the definition of “securities”. 
In South Africa, the South African Reserve Bank has launched the Fintech Unit in 
2017 followed by the recent successful completion of a trial RTGS platform based on 
distributed ledger technology known as Project Khoka that performs some of the 
functions ordinarily facilitated by the South African Multiple Organ Settlement 
(SAMOS) system.217 South Africa’s CSD, Strate, has also entered into an agreement 
with NASDAQ to develop a solution for voting based on the distributed ledger 
technology 218  and is exploring the use of the technology in other post-trade 
processing functions. In addition, South African financial institutions, including major 
commercial banks have joined forces to explore the transformative potential of the 
technology through the South African Financial Blockchain Consortium (SAFBC). 
In theory, distributed ledger technology can be used in two different ways: 1. To 
establish a digital version of a financial asset, such as a share or other security, to 
replace the physical version, such as a certificated share; or 2. As a record-keeping 
system, to record, monitor, identify and validate transactions in financial assets as 
well as ownership thereof. 219  These options in turn spawn a number of design 
choices. Securities can be issued as digital assets or as tokens representing 
physical, certificated securities. 220  The data set can therefore be the security or 
bundle of rights itself or it can be a digital token thereof. Both can constitute a 
reification of legal rights in terms of which the “possessor” of the native digital asset 
or the token becomes entitled to performance. Such a design also has implications 
for the theft of digital assets or tokens, as seen in the case of crypto-currencies. 
Alternatively, the distributed ledger can simply record and represent transactions in 
securities. These design choices are comparable to the options available when 
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paper-based securities were either immobilised or dematerialised and a certain level 
of path-dependency in legal development may determine which option is elected.221 
Whether digital ledger technology therefore signifies a return to “embodied rights” 
must not only be determined by commercial and technological considerations, but by 
legal design: 
“The ownership rights and obligations associated with digital tokens and assets may not 
be clearly defined in today’s legal framework. Many ownership interests in assets, such as 
negotiable instruments and securities, are already represented using physical or 
bookentry records, and the corresponding legal frameworks are robust and have 
developed over time. Careful legal analysis must be done to understand how ownership of 
digital tokens on a distributed ledger fit into the current legal frameworks and what gaps 
need to be filled by contractual agreements or new laws and regulations.”222 
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Chapter 18: Conclusion 
18 1 Introductory remarks 
The two dimensions of shares which shape how this thesis is structured are the 
internal and the external spheres. These two perspectives were chosen because they 
are the main elements of an explanatory model that can assist in articulating what the 
rights and interests in obligations acting as objects are. 
The structure of obligations is highly complex and multifaceted. Shares are 
paradigmatic of obligations that evidence both “obligationary” and “proprietary” 
features and effects. This dichotomy has attracted the attention of legal scholars, not 
least because of the general sentiment that a legal characterisation of shares and 
securities as purely obligationary fails to sufficiently protect their owners. These 
uncertainties are compounded by the changes effectuated by the computerisation of 
markets that are accompanied by the phenomenon of systemic intermediation. The 
legal characterisation of shares is neither static nor does it exist in a vacuum, thereby 
necessitating an examination of the impact of these changes on an understanding of 
their legal nature.  
18 2 The internal sphere 
Located within the internal sphere of any obligation is a personal bond. In the context 
of shares, this bond entails the relations between a company that issues shares and 
an investor that purchases them, whether on the primary or on the secondary market. 
The chapters that comprise the analysis of the internal sphere thematise the nature 
and content of the personal bond. Shares are instruments utilised by a company to 
raise equity capital. Yet, to conceptualise shares simply as proportions of a 
company’s share capital, negates that shares assume the guise of capital 
themselves. Shares are titles to revenue that trade more or less freely on markets for 
capital.1 While the connection to the company is not severed – the existence and 
value of shares hinges on the bond with the company – it is depersonalised.  
The impersonal nature of the bond is further emphasised by two distinct, yet 
complementary theories.2 The entity theory propounds that the company is an entity 
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 See, Chapter 3: The concept of capital. 
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 See, Chapter 4: Considerations of ownership. 
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that is legally distinct from its shareholders, who have no access to its assets and are 
not liable for its debts. The nexus theory enquires not only into how a company 
comes into existence, but also questions whether shareholders can be regarded as 
owners of the company on a more abstract, conceptual level. By (mostly) asserting 
that shareholders own only their share, which gives them access to a number of 
rights and entitlements, it cements the separation between the company and its 
shareholders. By directing the focus to the rights of shareholders, the nexus theory 
provides context as to the nature and content of the obligationary bond. A scrutiny of 
the rights and entitlements that flow from shares reveals the economic content of 
these rights, which include the right to share in the profits of the company throughout 
the period of its existence, the residual right to surplus funds at its liquidation as well 
as control and participation rights.3 The rights and obligations that flow from the bond 
between the company and its shareholders are not highly personal in nature. 
To conclude the analysis of the internal sphere, the contractual aspects of shares 
were highlighted.4 Although the constitutional document is regularly treated as if it is 
a contract between the company and every shareholder, it evidences very few 
characteristics of a true contract. The contractual notion resonates more clearly with 
the process of selling shares on the market, which is achieved by a contract of 
allotment. Shares are therefore the result of a complex process of contracting which 
requires significant inputs from legislation and the result of which is an obligation of 
an impersonal nature. 
18 3 The external sphere 
Whereas the internal sphere can be described as an amalgamation of the 
characteristic features, rights and duties that comprise the obligationary bond, the 
external sphere is aimed at determining the effect of the obligation in relation to third 
parties. In the context of shares and securities this relates to the way in which the 
relationship between the issuing company and the investor can be intermediated so 
that the intermediary enforces the rights against the company. It also comprises the 
way in which shares can be transferred from one investor to another. In addition, it 
raises the question whether obligations can have a property-like, third-party or real 
effect.  
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Holding and transfer are uncontroversial in the sense that it is generally accepted 
that most obligations can be held and exercised through intermediaries and that they 
are transferable. The difficult question in relation to both is what the appropriate legal 
mechanisms are to achieve them in the context of computerisation and systemic 
intermediation. The legal nature of holding and the legal nature of transfer are 
therefore subsidiary questions to be considered when examining the legal nature of 
shares.  
In Part 2 these two questions have been considered from a comparative 
perspective. While the solutions to the first question are doctrinally different in that 
they range from trusts in English law, deposit in German law and agency in South 
African law, they share a common feature: In the context of the legal nature of 
intermediated holding, the responses to commercial changes are doctrinally path-
dependent, with the exception of the introduction of security entitlements in US law.5 
These rules are accentuated and modified by statute where necessary.  
When considering the legal nature of transfer mechanisms, however, the solutions 
suggest a departure from existing doctrinal explanations. Mechanisms of assignment 
in English law and negotiation in US law have been replaced by transfer mechanisms 
based on account entries. 6  Only in German law is the existing property-based 
transfer mechanisms of delivery modified, but many authors argue that it is ill-fitting.7 
On the basis of the comparative examples and with due consideration of relevant 
legislative provisions and applicable literature, it was found that South African law 
similarly evidences a discomfort with existing legal principles as they apply to 
cession. While these can be modified by postulating the account entries as a 
formality with which valid cessions of shares have to comply,8 it is suggested that the 
continued application of cession should be scrutinised more fundamentally. 9  In 
                                            
5
 While this may be a departure from previously applied principles of bailment, it has been pointed out 
above, that it evidences similarities with the common law concept of trusts. See above, Chapter 14: 
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particular, account entries are difficult to reconcile with the consensus-seeking 
principles of cession. Also, in the case of transfers based on account entries, the 
identities of the parties are not only obscured, for example by nominee holdings, but 
are in fact irrelevant for the transfer. The identity of the transacting parties is, 
however, of vital importance for cession. In addition to placing in jeopardy questions 
on the continued applicability of cession-based transfer mechanisms, the legislation 
also leaves other uncertainties unresolved. These include the question as to how the 
statutory provisions can be reconciled with the commercial mechanism of netting. 
Furthermore, there is considerable uncertainty on the power of courts to order as 
valid transfers that have taken place between the parties without account entries 
having been effected on the books of the relevant intermediaries and the continued 
reliance by courts on the principles of cession in this context. 
18 4 Synthesis 
Part 3 synthesises the various debates by considering the legal nature of shares, 
including the subsidiary questions named above, from a more theoretical vantage 
point. 
Traditional doctrinal categories such as property and obligations, the discourse 
shows, are not the only way in which the legal nature of securities can be conceived. 
Concepts expressed in functional terms are a workable alternative and a necessary 
supplement.10 In fact, the great benefit of a functional approach is that it lays open 
the underlying, evaluative considerations and criteria that frequently remain hidden 
behind the overly abstract categories of traditional doctrinal systematisations.11 While 
the approach taken by Article 8 of the UCC is exemplary of a functional approach, 
functionalism can similarly inform doctrinal reasoning by indicating where 
modifications or deviations may be apposite. In the context of transfer mechanisms, a 
functional perspective, in conjunction with the concept of a more formalistic “law of 
accounts” can at once explain the departure from existing doctrinal approaches and 
lay the theoretical foundations for conceptualising new approaches. 
                                            
10
 See, 17 1 A functional approach. 
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While the conceptual framework, whether grounded in doctrinal or functional 
reasoning, may be the key determinant for an analysis of the legal nature or 
characterisation of rights, the discussion on the “law of accounts” demonstrates that 
from a transactional perspective, a “law on securities” has two legs; a conceptual and 
a procedural one.12 A “law of accounts” is useful because it allows complex legal 
processes to be simplified and encourages order and clarity. It also permits the 
nature of the rights or objects to fade into the background, emphasising instead the 
common procedural characteristics shared by a multitude of rights recorded on 
accounts. For a proper functioning of transactions in securities there must, however, 
be a constant synergy between concepts and procedure. 
In the context of what has been termed systemic intermediation, the question of 
the legal nature of holding and transfer has another facet: It throws open the question 
whether intermediation transforms shares and securities in such a way that separate 
assets with their own character can be said to come into existence. Systemic 
intermediation, it has been set out above, emerged prior to computerisation, but is 
today significantly shaped by it. 13  It describes a form of intermediation that is 
structural in the sense that it is frequently not optional and the intermediaries regulate 
access to essential system infrastructure such as a clearing and settlement system. It 
is also relationship-based in that it results in a vertical layering of pairwise relations.  
Against this background, two theoretical models have been considered.14 On the 
basis of the theory on the burdening of rights, the core right (the security) is said to 
remain in the hands of the investor and an entitlement to collect is split-off and 
transferred to an intermediary. This theory, it is argued, most accurately reflects the 
doctrinal foundations of intermediation in South African law, which knows no dual 
conception of ownership and therefore requires a distinction to be drawn between 
registration and ownership. Its results are firstly, that no assets separate, but derived 
from a core asset (such as a share) are created; and secondly, that undivided 
ownership of the share continues to vest in the ultimate investor.15  
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 See, 17 2 A law of accounts. 
13
 See, 9 3 2 Relationship-based and systemic intermediation and 9 3 1 The economic theory of 
intermediation. 
14
 See, 17 3 Models of Intermediation. 
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An alternative theory is proposed in the context of English (and US) law based on 
the idea that the core right is located at the level of a central intermediary or group of 
intermediaries while the investor holds an entitlement to receive the benefits. This 
entitlement, which encompasses the benefit as well as a number of contractual rights 
against an intermediary, is construed as a separate asset and is duplicated and 
modified at every tier of intermediation. It is termed a “securities entitlement” in US 
law and an “interest in securities” by leading commentators on English law. 
The conceptual difficulties that arise as a result of systemic intermediation extend 
beyond the questions of how shares or interests in shares, however they are 
construed, can be held and how they can be transferred. More fundamentally, it is 
questioned whether “property rights” can vest in relation to systemically intermediated 
shares and if, in whom these rights vest.  
An investor owns shares, but the use of ownership in a more colloquial sense 
does not denote that shares so owned are also property in the technical sense. The 
question is therefore not: “Are shares property?” – In terms of the traditional division 
between obligations and property they are not. Shares are obligations. The correct 
question to ask is whether obligations can have a “proprietary” or real or limited real 
effect. Asking and answering the one question or the other can lead to different 
outcomes as appears from a review of the literature in chapter 16.16 
Engaging with the overlap between the law of obligations and the law of property 
inherent in shares and securities is not an easy task. It is made more arduous by the 
fact that the boundary between the law of property and the law of obligations remains 
highly contested. No theory succeeds in drawing a wholly harmonious and gapless 
picture.17 The importance of the discussion in the context of shares lies not so much 
in finding the definite boundary between property and obligations, but in showing the 
circumstances under which obligations can have absolute effect. The focus therefore 
falls on the second question posed above.  
The explanatory model brings together the internal and the external spheres of 
shares by suggesting that the characterisation of an obligation in the internal sphere 
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can reveal whether an obligation is object-related.18 The object to which an obligation 
can relate may be a corporeal thing, but it may also be another obligation that 
assumes the guise of a thing by being impersonal or “personality-poor”. As such it 
becomes separable from its subject-subject relation that defines the internal sphere. 
It also has an independently determinable value, in other words, it has a value that 
can be expressed in economic terms. Based on this analysis it is concluded that 
shares can function as objects of other obligations. Thus, if transactions or 
obligations are entered into that involve shares, such shares can function as the 
objects of these obligations. The purpose of this finding is to show that such object-
related obligations may have real or limited real effect in their external sphere i.e. in 
relation to third parties. This model is subsequently used to explain why, within the 
obligationary realm of the investor-intermediary relationship, the investor is protected 
from some third parties, such as creditors of the intermediary. This is an illustration of 
limited real effect. In addition, the model can show why an acquisition of ownership in 
good faith is provided for. 
The value of this model is that it redirects the focus away from overly doctrinal 
arguments to the evaluative exercise that necessarily underlies the consideration of 
the third-party effect of obligations. In a more abstract sense the model can have 
value beyond shares and extend to other accounts-based obligations that exhibit 
strong property-like features. 
A theoretical analysis of the legal nature of shares, which formed the subject of 
Part 3, in conjunction with an enquiry into the progression of concepts and 
mechanisms for holding shares and transferring ownership therein, which was 
undertaken in Part 2, is not merely an academic exercise. The nature of rights, how 
they vest and in whom they vest have implications in the commercial sphere. In 
addition, new commercial developments need a sound legal foundation that 
addresses the functional and transactional needs of markets, but is also sufficiently 
backed by sound conceptual legal reasoning. 19 
                                            
18
 See, 17 4 3 Developing an explanatory model. 
19
 See, 17 6 Back to “embodied” rights? 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
368 
 
INDEX OF SOURCES 
Bibliography 
A 
Alchian AA & Demsetz H “Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization” (1972) 62 Am Econ Rev 777-795 
Allen F & Santomero AM “The Theory of Financial Intermediation” (1998) 21 JBF 
1461-1485 
Allen F & Santomero AM “What do Financial Intermediaries Do?” (2001) 25 JBF 
271-294 
Anonymous “Notes: Reconsideration of Share Certificate Negotiability” (1940) 7 Uni 
Chicago LR 497-523 
Anonymous “The Legal Idea of a Corporation” (1885) 19 American LR 114-116 
Apfelbacher G & Niggemann G “§ 185” in Hölters W (ed) Aktiengesetz: Kommentar 
3 ed (2017) 1508-1513 München: C.H. Beck/Verlag Vahlen 
Armour J & Whincop MJ “The Proprietary Functions of Corporate Law” (2007) 27 
Oxf J Leg Stud 420-465 
Armour J, Hansmann H & Kraakman R “Agency Problems and Legal Strategies” in 
Kraakman R, Armour J, Davies P, Enriques L, Hansmann H, Hertig G, Hopt K, Kanda 
H, Pargendler M, Ringe W-G & Rock E (eds) The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A 
Comparative and Functional Approach 3 ed (2017) 29-48 Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
Armour J, Hansmann H, Kraakman R & Pargendler M “What is Corporate Law?” 
in Kraakman R, Armour J, Davies P, Enriques L, Hansmann H, Hertig G, Hopt K, 
Kanda H, Pargendler M, Ringe W-G & Rock E (eds) The Anatomy of Corporate Law: 
A Comparative and Functional Approach 3 ed (2017) 1-28 Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
Aronstein MJ “The Decline and Fall of the Stock Certificate in America” (1978) 1 
J Comp Corp L & Sec Reg 273-284 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
369 
 
Aronstein MJ “The New/Old Law of Securities Transfer: Calling a ‘Spade’ a ‘Heart, 
Diamond, Club or the Like’” (1990) 12 Cardozo LR 429-436 
Auerbach RD Financial Markets and Institutions (1983) New York: Macmillan 
Austen-Peters AO Custody of Investments: Law and Practice (2000) Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
 
B 
Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of 
Property 5 ed (2006) Durban: LexisNexis Butterworths 
Bank for International Settlement Delivery Versus Payment in Securities 
Settlement Systems (1992) 
Bank for International Settlement Recommendations for Central Counterparties: 
Consultative Report (2004) 
Bank for International Settlements The Role of Central Bank Money in Payment 
Systems (August 2003) 
Bank for International Settlements, Committee on Payment and Settlement 
Systems (CPSS) & Technical Committee of the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Recommendations for Securities Settlement 
Systems: Report of the CPSS-IOSCO Joint Task Force on Securities Settlement 
Systems (January 2001) 
Baur F, Baur JF & Stürner R Sachenrecht 18 ed (2009) München: Verlag C.H. Beck 
Beatson J, Burrows A & Cartwright J Anson’s Law of Contract 30 ed (2016) 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Beaves AW “Global Custody – A Tentative Analysis of Property and Contract” in 
Palmer N & McKendrick E (eds) Interests in Goods 2 ed (1998) 117-139 London, 
Hong Kong: LLP 
Bebchuk LA “Foreword: The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law” 
(1989) 89 Columbia LR 1395-1415 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
370 
 
Benjamin J Interests in Securities: A Proprietary Analysis of the International 
Securities Markets (2000) Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Benston GJ & Smith CW “A Transactions Cost Approach to the Theory of Financial 
Intermediation (1976) 31 Jnl of Finance 215-231 
Berle AA & Means GC The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932) New 
Brunswick, USA and London, UK: Transaction Publishers 
Birks P & Descheemaeker E (ed) The Roman Law of Obligations (2014) Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 
Birks P “Definition and Division: A Meditation on Institutes” in Birks P (ed) The 
Classification of Obligations (1997) Oxford: Clarendon 
Birks P “Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy” (1996) 26 UWA L Rev 
1-99 
Birks P “Mixtures” in Palmer N & McKendrick E (eds) Interests in Goods 2 ed (1998) 
227-249 London, Hong Kong: LLP 
Blackman MS, Jooste RD, Everingham CK, Yeats YL, Cassim FHI & De la Harpe 
R Commentary on the Companies Act (2002) (RS 9 2012) Lansdowne, South Africa: 
Juta 
Blackstone W The Commentaries on the Laws of England II 4 ed (1876, edn by RM 
Kerr) London: Murray 
Bluntschli JC Deutsches Privatrecht II (1854) München: Literar. -Artist. Anstalt 
Boggenpoel ZT “Applying the Mandament van Spolie in the Case of Incorporeals: 
Two Recent Examples From Case Law” (2015) TSAR 76-93 
Boggenpoel ZT Property Remedies (2017) Claremont, Cape Town: Juta 
Bolin K “Decentralized Public ledger Systems and Securities Law: New Applications 
of Blockchain Technology and the Revitalization of Sections 11 and 12(A)(2) of the 
Securities Act of 1933” (2018) 95 Washington Uni LR 955-980 
Borrowdale A “Shares and the Elusive Meaning of ‘Transfer’” (1985) 102 SALJ 277-
285 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
371 
 
Borrowdale A “The Transfer of Proprietary Rights in Shares: A South African 
Distillation out of English Roots” (1985) 18 CILSA 36-50 
Botha Z “Financial Market Terminology, Technicalities and Theories” in Van Wyk K, 
Botha Z & Goodspeed I (eds) Understanding South African Financial Markets 5 ed 
(2015) 199-247 Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers 
Böttcher L Depotgesetz (2012) Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Bradfield G “Agency” in Du Bois F Wille’s Principles of South African Law 9 ed 
(2007) 983-1003 
Bratton WW “Nexus of Contracts Corporation: A Critical Appraisal” (1989) 74 Cornell 
LR 407-465 
Brecher F “Vertragsübergang, Betriebsnachfolge und Arbeitsverhältnis" in Festschrift 
für Schmidt-Rimpler zum 70. Geburtstag (1957) 181-258 Karlsruhe: Friedrich-
Wilhelms-Universität Bonn 
Brink U Rechtsbeziehungen und Rechtsübertragung im nationalen und 
internationelen Effektengiroverkehr (1976) Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 
Brudney V “Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract” 
(1985) 85 Columbia LR 1403-1444 
Brunner H “Die Werthpapiere” in Endemann W (ed) Handbuch des Deutschen 
Handels-, See, und Wechselrechts II (1882) 140-235 Leipzig: Fues 
Büchner R Die treuhandrechtliche Organisation des Effektengiroverkehrs (1956) 
Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann 
Burns JM A Treatise on Markets: Spot, Futures and Options (1979) Washington, 
D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 
Burrows A English Private Law 3 ed (2013) Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Butler HN “The Contractual Theory of the Corporation” (1989) 11 George Mason 
University LR 99-123 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
372 
 
C 
Cahn A & Donald DC Comparative Company Law – Text and Cases on the Laws 
Governing Corporations in Germany, the UK and the USA (2010) Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press 
Canaris C-W “Die verdinglichung obligatorischer Rechte” in Jakobs HH, Knobbe-
Keuk B, Picker E & Wilhelm J (eds) Festschrift für Werner Flume zum 70. Geburtstag 
371-425 Köln: Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt 
Canaris C-W Bankvertragsrecht II 3 ed (1988) Berlin: De Gruyter 
Cassim FHI, Cassim MF, Cassim R, Jooste R, Shev J & Yeats J Contemporary 
Company Law 2 ed (2012) Claremont, South Africa: Juta 
Castellano GG “Towards a General Framework for a Common Definition of 
‘Securities’: Financial Markets Regulation in Multilingual Contexts” (2012) Uniform LR 
448-481 
Chafee Z, Jr “Rights in Overdue Paper” (1918) 31 Harvard LR 1104-1153 
Cheffins BR Company Law: Theory, Structure, and Operation (1997) Oxford: 
Clarendon Press 
Chen-Wishart M “Specific Performance and Injunction” in Beale HG (ed) Chitty on 
Contracts I 32 ed (2015) 1961-2027 London: Sweet & Maxwell 
Chun C Cross-border Transactions of Intermediated Securities: A Comparative 
Analysis in Substantive Law and Private International Law (2012) Heidelberg, New 
York, Dordrecht, London: Springer 
Cilliers HS & Benade ML Company Law 4 ed (1982) Durban: Butterworths 
Clearstream Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen der Clearstream Banking AG (25 
September 2017) 
Clearstream Kundenhandbuch (August 2018) 
Clements R & Abass A Equity and Trusts: Text, Cases, and Materials 4 ed (2015) 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
373 
 
Coase RH “The Nature of the Firm” (1937) 4 Economica 386-405 
Cohen F “Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach” (1935) 35 
Columbia LR 809-849 
Coing H Europäisches Privatrecht II (1985) München: Verlag C.H. Beck 
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) “CPSS Red Book - 
Payment, Clearing and Settlement Systems in the United Kingdom” in Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) Payment Clearing and Settlement Systems in the 
CPSS Countries (2012) 
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) “CPSS Red Book - 
Payment, Clearing and Settlement Systems in the United States” in Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) Payment, Clearing and Settlement Systems in the 
CPSS Countries (2012) 
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) “CPSS Red Book - 
Payment, Clearing and Settlement Systems in South Africa” in Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) Payment Clearing and Settlement Systems in the CPSS Countries 
(2012) 
Cross FB & Prentice RA Law and Corporate Finance (2007) Cheltenham, United 
Kingdom: Edward Elgar 
Crotty HD “California and the Uniform Stock Transfer Act” (1931) 19 California LR 
150-163 
 
D 
Dalhuisen JH Dalhuisen on International Commercial, Financial and Trade Law 
(2000) Oxford: Hart Publishing 
Daniel JW The Elements of the Law of Negotiable Instruments (1903) New York: 
Baker, Voorhis & Company 
Davies PL & Worthington S Gower & Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 9 
ed (2012) London: Sweet & Maxwell 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
374 
 
Davies PL Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 7 ed (2003) 
London: Sweet & Maxwell 
De la Harpe RA “Securities Registration and Transfer (ss 49-56)” in Yeats JL (ed) 
Commentary on the Companies Act of 2008 (OS 2018) 2-1007 – 2-1111 Claremont, 
Cape Town: Juta 
De Wet JC & Van Wyk AH De Wet en Yeats – Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en 
Handelsreg 4 ed (1978) Durban: Butterworths 
Deakin S, Gindis D, Hodgson GM, Huang K & Pistor K “Legal Institutionalism: 
Capitalism, and the Constitutive Role of Law” (2017) 45 J Comp Econ 188-200 
Delorme H Die Wertpapiersammelbanken (1970) Frankfurt am Main: Knapp 
Delorme H “Vom Wertpapier zum Wertrecht” (1981) 9 Die Bank 431-437 
Delport PA (ed) Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (RS 5 2016) 
Durban: LexisNexis 
Dendy M & De Wet JC “Agency and Representation” in Joubert WA & Faris JA 
LAWSA 1 3 ed (2014) paras 125-184 Durban: LexisNexis 
Department for Business Innovation and Skills BIS Research Paper 261: 
Exploring the Intermediated Shareholding Model (2016) 
Depository Trust Company (DTC) Custody Service Guide 
Depository Trust Company (DTC) Deposits Service Guide 
Depository Trust Company (DTC) Operational Arrangements (Necessary for 
Securities to Become and Remain Eligible for DTC Services) (June 2018) 
Depository Trust Company (DTC) Rules, By-Laws and Organizational Certificate of 
the Depository Trust Company (August 2018) 
Depository Trust Company (DTC) Settlement Service Guide 
Deutsche Börse AG http://deutsche-boerse.com/dbg-de/ueber-uns/gruppe-
deutsche-boerse/unternehmensgeschichte/text-collection/2552990?frag=2552994 
(accessed 29-09-2018) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
375 
 
Diamond DW “Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring” (1984) 51 
RESTUD 393-414 
Donaldson T & Preston LE “The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, 
Evidence, and Implications” (1995) 20 Acad Manag Rev 65-91 
Dooyeweerd HJ “Grondproblemen in de Leer der Rechtspersoonlikheid” (1937) 98 
Themis 367-421 
Druey JN “The Practitioner and the Professor: Is there a Theory of Commercial 
Law?” in Wymeersch E & Tison M (eds) Perspectives in Company Law and Financial 
Regulation: Essays in Honour of Eddy Wymeersch (2009) 607-616 Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press 
Du Plessis P Borkowski’s Textbook on Roman Law 5 ed (2015) Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
Dubovec M The Law of Securities, Commodities and Bank Accounts: The Rights of 
Account Holders (2014) Cheltenham, UK & Northampton, MA, US: Edward Elgar 
Dulckheit G Die Verdinglichung obligatorischer Rechte (1951) Tübingen: Mohr 
 
E 
Easterbrook FH & Fischel DR “Contract and Fiduciary Duty” (1993) 36 J Law & 
Econ 425-446 
Easterbrook FH & Fischel DR “The Corporate Contract” (1989) 89 Columbia LR 
1416-1448 
Edelman J & Elliot S “Two Conceptions of Equitable Assignment” (2013) 
http://www.supremecourt.wa.gov.au/_files/Two_Conceptions_Equitable_Assignment
_%20EdelmanJ.pdf (accessed 01-03-2018) 
Ehrle CG “The Uniform Stock Transfer Act” (1921) 5 Marquette LR 91-102 
Einsele D Wertpapierrecht als Schuldrecht: Funktionsverlust von Effektenurkunden 
im internationalen Rechtsverkehr (1995) Tübingen: Mohr 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
376 
 
Einsele D “Wertpapiere im elektronischen Bankgeschäft” (2001) 1 WM 7-16  
Einsele D Bank-und Kapitalmarktrecht: nationale und internationale Bankgeschäfte 3 
ed (2014)  
Eisenberg MA “The Conception that the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and 
the Dual Nature of the Firm” (1999) 24 J Corp L 819-836 
Enchelmaier S Übertragung und Belastung unkörperlicher Gegenstände im 
deutschen und Englischen Privatrecht (2014) Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 
Eng S “Fusion of Descriptive and Normative Propositions. The Concepts of 
‘Descriptive Proposition’ and ‘Normative Proposition’ as Concepts of Degree” (2000) 
13 Ratio Juris 236-260 
Eng S Analysis of Dis/Agreement – With Particular Reference to Law and Legal 
Theory (2003) Dordrecht: Springer Science & Business Media 
EUREX Clearing AG Clearing Bedingungen: Allgemeine Bedingungen (January 
2018) 
Eurex Clearing AG Glossary http://www.eurexclearing.com/clearing-
en/resources/glossary (accessed 29.09.2018) 
Euroclear CREST Glossary (October 2018) 
Euroclear CREST Reference Manual Chapter (October 2018) 
European Central Bank & Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago The Role of Central 
Counterparties (2007) 
European Central Bank The Use of Central Bank Money for Settling Securities 
Transactions (May 2004) 
Ewart JS “Negotiability and Estoppel” (1900) 16 LQR 135-159 
 
F 
Fabozzi FJ & Modigliani F Capital Markets: Institutions and Instruments 2 ed (1996) 
Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
377 
 
Fabozzi FJ “Overview of Financial Instruments and Financial Markets” in Fabozzi FJ 
(ed) Handbook of Finance: Financial Markets and Instruments I (2008) Hoboken, 
New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons 
Fabricius F “Zur Theorie des stückelosen Effektengiroverkehrs mit Wertrechten aus 
Staatsanleihen” (1963) 162 AcP 456-484 
Facciolo FJ “Father Knows Best: Revised Article 8 and the Inidividual Investor” 
(2000) 27 Florida State Uni LR 615-714 
Fama EF “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm” (1980) 88 J Polit Econ 288-
307 
Flannigan R “The Economic Structure of the Firm” (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall LJ 105-
150 
Flume W Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen Rechts I: Die juristische Person (1983) 
Berlin: Springer 
Freeman RE “Stockholders and Stakeholders: A New Perspective on Corporate 
Governance” (1983) 25 Calif Manag Rev 88-106 
French D, Mayson SW & Ryan CL Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law 31 ed 
(2014-2015) Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Freund E The Legal Nature of Corporations (1897) Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press 
Friedman M & Friedman RD Capitalism and Freedom 40th Anniversary ed (2002) 
Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press 
Fry E & Northcote GR A Treatise on the Specific Performance of Contracts 6 ed 
(1921) Farmington Hills, Michigan: Thomson Gale 
 
G 
Galpin N & Park H “The Roles of Financial Intermediaries in Raising Capital” in Kent 
BH & Martin GS (eds) Capital Structure and Corporate Financing Decisions: Theory, 
Evidence, and Practice (2011) 263-280 Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
378 
 
Garton J, Moffat G, Bean G & Probert R Moffat’s Trust Law: Text and Materials 6 
ed (2015) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Genberg H “The Changing Nature of Financial Intermediation and its Implications for 
Monetary Policy” in Bank for International Stettlements (BIS) Financial Market 
Developments and Their Implications for Monetary Policy (2008) 100-113 
Gierke J, von Das Recht der Wertpapiere (1954) Köln: Heymann 
Gierke O “Juristische Person”, in von Holtzendorff F Rechtslexikon II 3 ed (1881) 
Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot 
Gierke O Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht: Die Staats- und Korporationslehre 
des Altertums und des Mittelalters und ihre Aufnahme in Deutschland III (1881) 
Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung 
Gierke O Political Theories in the Middle Age (1900) (translation by Maitland FW) 
Gilmore G “Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments” (1979) 13 Creighton 
LR 441-461 
Goode R “The Nature and Transfer of Rights in Dematerialised and Immobilised 
Securities” (1996) JIBFL 167-176 
Goode R “Security Entitlements as Collateral and the Conflict of Laws” (1998) 7 
JIBFL 22-28 
Goode R, Kanda H & Kreuzer K Hague Securities Convention: Explanatory Report 
2 ed (2017) The Hague: The Hague Conference on Private International Law 
Permanent Bureau 
Goode RM “Ownership and Obligation in Commercial Transactions” (1987) LQR 433 
Gordon JN “The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law” (1989) 89 Columbia LR 
1549 
Gordon WM Roman Law, Scots Law and Legal History: Selected Essays (2007) 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
379 
 
Gorton G & Winton R “Financial Intermediation” in Constantinides GM, Harris M & 
Stulz R (eds) Handbook of the Economics of Finance IA (2003) 431-552 Amsterdam: 
Elsevier/North-Holland 
Grantham RB “The Doctrinal Basis of the Rights of Company Shareholders” (1998) 
57 Cambridge LJ 554-588 
Gray K “Property in Thin Air” (1991) 50 Cambridge LJ 252-307 
Grossman SJ & Hart OD “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of 
Vertical and Lateral Integration” (1986) 94 J Polit Econ 691-719 
Group of Thirty Clearance and Settlement Systems in the World’s Securities 
Markets (1989) 
Group of Thirty Global Clearing and Settlement: A Plan of Action (1990) 
Grundmann S “The Evolution of Trust and Treuhand in the 20th Century” in Helmholz 
R & Zimmermann R Itinera Fiduciae: Trust and Treuhand in Historical Perspective 
(1998) 469-494 
Grundmann S “Trust and Treuhand at the End of the 20th Century: Key Problems 
and Shift of Interests” (1999) 47 Am J Comp L 401-428 
Gullifer L & Payne J Corporate Finance Law: Principles and Policy 2 ed (2015) 
Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing 
Gullifer L “Ownership of Securities: The Problems Caused by Intermediation” in 
Gullifer L & Payne J (eds) Intermediated Securities: Legal Problems and Practical 
Issues (2010) 1-32 
Gurley JC & Shaw ES Money in a Theory of Finance (1960) Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution 
Gursky K-H Wertpapierrecht 3 ed (2007) Heidelberg: Müller 
Guynn RD Modernizing Securities Ownership, Transfer and Pledging Laws: A 
Discussion Paper on the Need for International Harmonization (1996) London: 
Capital Markets Forum, International Bar Association 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
380 
 
H 
Habersack M Die Mitgliedschaft – subjektives und ‚sonstiges‘ Recht (1996) 
Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 
Häcker B Consequences of Impaired Consent Transfers: A Structural Comparison of 
English and German Law (2009) Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 
Haentjens M “Between Property Law and Contract Law: The Case of Securities” in 
Van Erp S, Salomons A & Akkermans B (eds) The Future of European Property Law 
(2012) 165-181 Munich: Sellier European Law Publishers 
Hakes RA “UCC Article 8: Will the Indirect Holding of Securities Survive the Light of 
Day?” (2002) 35 Loyola of LA LR 661-786 
Hanks JJ “The New Legal Capital Regime in South Africa”, in Mongalo TH Modern 
Company Law for a Competitive South African Economy (2010) 131-150 Claremont, 
South Africa: Juta 
Hansmann H & Kraakman R “The Essential Role of Organisational Law” (2000) 110 
Yale LJ 387-440 
Hansmann H, Kraakman R & Squire R “Law and the Rise of the Firm” (2006) 119 
Harvard LR 1335-1403 
Harms LTC & Rabie PJ “Estoppel” in Joubert WA & Faris JA LAWSA 18 3 ed (2015) 
paras 50-102 Durban: LexisNexis 
Harris J Property and Justice (1996) Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Hart O “An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm” (1989) 89 Columbia 
LR 1757-1774 
Hayden GM & Bodie MT “The ‘Unincorporation’ and the Unraveling of ‘Nexus of 
Contracts’ Theory” (2011) 109 Michigan LR 1127-1144 
Heider K “§§ 1-14” in Goette W, Habersack M & Kalss S (eds) Münchener 
Kommentar zum Aktiengestz 4 ed (2016) München: Verlag C.H. Beck/VerlagFranz 
Vahlen 
Heinsius T, Horn A & Than J Depotgesetz (1975) Berlin: De Gruyter 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
381 
 
Henderson A & Van der Linde K “Uncertificated shares: A Comparative Look at the 
Voting Rights of Shareholders II” (2014) TSAR 724-741 
Henssler M “§ 688 Vertragstypische Pflichten bei der Verwahrung” in Säcker FJ, 
Rixecker R, Oetker H & Limperg B (eds) Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen 
Gesetzbuch V(II) 7 ed (2017) München: Verlag C.H. Beck 
Holdsworth WS “The Origins and Early History of Negotiable Instruments, Part 1” 
(1915) 31 LQR 12-29 
Holdsworth WS “The History of the Treatment of ‘Choses’ in Action by the Common 
Law” (1920) 33 Harvard LR 997-1030 
Horn N “Die Erfüllung von Wertpapiergeschäften unter Einbezug eines Zentralen 
Kontrahenten an der Börse: Sachenrechtliche Aspekte” (2002) 20 WM 1-23 
Horwitz MJ “Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory” (1985) 
88 West Virginia LR 173-224 
Hudson A Understanding Equity and Trusts 3 ed (2008) London: Routledge-
Cavendish 
Hueck A & Canaris CW Recht der Wertpapiere 12 ed (1986) München: Vahlen 
Hüffer U & Koch J Aktiengesetz 13 ed (2018) München: Verlag C.H. Beck 
Huston CA The Enforcement of Decrees in Equity (1915) Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press 
 
I 
International Accounting Standards Board International Accounting Standards 
(IAS) 32 Financial Instruments: Presentation  
International Accounting Standards Board International Accounting Standards 
(IAS) 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement 
International Accounting Standards Board International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS): The Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting (2010) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
382 
 
International Accounting Standards Board International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) 9 Financial Instruments 
International Monetary Fund Balance of Payments and International Investment 
Position Manual 6 ed (2009) Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund 
Ireland P “Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership” (1999) 62 MLR 
32-57 
Ireland P “Property and Contract in Contemporary Corporate Theory” (2003) 23 
Legal Studies 453-509 
Ireland P, Grigg-Spall I & Kelly D “The Conceptual Foundations of Modern 
Company Law” (1987) 14 J Law & Soc 149-165 
 
J 
Jansen N “Assignment of Claims” in Jansen N & Zimmermann R (eds) 
Commentaries on European Contract Laws (2018) 1626-1724 Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
Jensen MC & Meckling WH “The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structures” (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305-360 
Jensen MC “Organisation Theory and Methodology” (1983) 58 Acc Rev 319-339 
Johansson E Property Rights in Investment Securities and the Doctrine of Specificity 
(2009) Berlin & Heidelberg: Springer Verlag 
Jooste RD “Capitalisation of Profit Companies (ss 35-48)” in Yeats JL (ed) 
Commentary on the Companies Act of 2008 (OS 2018) 2-274 – 2-506 Claremont, 
Cape Town: Juta 
Joubert DJ & Van Zyl DH “Mandate and Negotiorum Gestio” in Joubert WA & Faris 
JA LAWSA 17(1) 2 ed (2009) paras 1-40 Durban: LexisNexis 
Joubert WA “Die Betekenis van die Subjektiewe Reg en die Betkenis van ‘n 
Realistiese Begrip Daarvan vir die Privaatreg” (1958) 21 THRHR 12-15, 98-115 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
383 
 
JSE Limited Equities Rules (26 January 2018) 
JSE Limited Listing Requirements 
Judge K “Fee Effects” (2013) 98 Iowa LR 1517-1574 
 
K 
Kalman L Legal Realism at Yale, 1927 – 1960 (1986) Chapel Hill and London: 
University of North Carolina Press 
Kaser M Das Römische Privatrecht I 2 ed (1971) München: C.H. Beck 
Kay J The Truth about Markets: Why Some Nations are Rich but Most Remain Poor 
(2004) Penguin Books 
Kerr AJ The Law of Agency 4 ed (2006) Durban: Lexis Nexis Butterworths 
Kershaw D Company Law in Context: Text and Materials 2 ed (2009) Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
Khimji MF “Intermediary Credit Risk – A Comparative Law Analysis of Property 
Rights in Indirectly Held Securities” (2005) J Bus L 287-325 
Khimji MF “The Role of Legal Concepts in Commercial Law: Comments on Spink, 
Rogers and Scavone” (2007) 45 Can Bus LJ 94-102 
Khimji MF “The Securities Transfer Act – The Radical Reconceptualization of 
Property Rights in Investment Securities” (2007) 45 Alberta LR 137-169 
Kiviat TI “Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulating Blockchain Transactions” (2016) 65 
Duke LJ 569-608 
Kleyn D “The Protection of Quasi-Possession in South African Law” in 
Descheemaeker E (ed) The Consequences of Possession (2014) 185-210 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 
Koller I “Der gutgläubige Erwerb von Sammeldepotanteile an Wertpapieren am 
Effektengiroverkehr, 1. Teil” (1972) Der Betrieb 1857-1861 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
384 
 
Koller I “Wertpapierrecht” in Bundesministerium der Justiz (ed) Gutachten und 
Vorschläge zur Überarbeitung des Schuldrechts II (1981) 1427-1514 
Kümpel S “Ablösung der ‘Wertrechte’ durch (Dauer)Globalurkunden? Zu den 
Reformvorschlägen für das Wertpapierrecht” (1982) 27 WM 730-738 
Kümpel S “Der Bestimmtheitsgrundsatz bei Verfügungen über 
Sammeldepotguthaben – zur Theorie des Bruchteilseigentums sui generis” (1980) 16 
WM 422-437 
Kupman C “Financial Instruments”, in Basedow J, Hopt KJ, Zimmermann R & Stier A 
(eds) The Max Planck Encyclopaedia of European Private Law I (2012) 697-701 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
L 
Laband P “Die Stellvertretung bei dem Abschluss von Rechtsgeschäften nach dem 
Allgemeinen Deutschen Handelsgesetzbuch” (1866) 10 ZHR 183-241. 
Langdell CC A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction 2 ed (1908) Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard Law Review Association 
Lange KW “Aktiengesetz §§1-14” in Henssler M & Strohn L “Gesellschaftsrecht” 3 ed 
(2016) München: Verlag C.H. Beck 
Larenz K Allgemeiner Teil des deutschen Bürgerlichen Rechts 7 ed (1989) München: 
Verlag C.H. Beck 
Larkin MP & Cassim FHI “Company Law (Including Close Corporations)” in 2001 
Annual Survey of South African Law (2001) 506-556 
Laster JT & Rosner MT “Distributed Stock Ledgers and Delaware Law” (2018) 73 
Bus L 319-336 
Leenen D BGB Allgemeiner Teil: Rechtsgeschäftslehre 2 ed (2015) Berlin/Boston: 
De Gruyter 
Lehmann M Finanzinstrumente: Vom Wertpapier- und Sachenrecht zum Recht der 
unkörperlichen Vermögensgegenstände (2009) Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
385 
 
Leland HE & Pyle DH “Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial 
Intermediation” (1977) 32 Jnl of Finance 371-387 
Leos E “Quasi-Usufruct and Shares: Some Possible Approaches” (2006) 123 SALJ 
126-146 
Leyens PC “Financial Intermediaries” in Basedow J, Hopt KJ, Zimmermann R & Stier 
A (eds)The Max Planck Encyclopaedia of European Private Law I (2012) 701-704 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Liew YK Guest on The Law of Assignment 3 ed (2018) London: Sweet & Maxwell 
Lin TCW “Infinite Financial Intermediation” (2015) 50 Wake Forest LR 643-669 
Litowitz D “Reification in Law and Legal Theory” (2000) 9 Sout Cal Interdisc LJ 401-
428  
London Stock Exchange Rules of the London Stock Exchange: Rule Book (18 June 
2018) 
Lubbe G & Du Plessis J “Law of Contract” in Van der Merwe CG & Du Plessis JE 
(eds) Introduction to the Law of South Africa (2004) 243-274 The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International 
Lubbe G “A Doctrine in Search of a Theory: Reflections on the So-Called Doctrine of 
Notice in South African Law” (1997) Acta Juridica 246-272 
Lubbe G “Assignment” in MacQueen H & Zimmermann R (eds) European Contract 
Law: Scots and South African Perspectives (2006) 307-330 Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press 
Lubbe GF & Murray C Contract: Cases, Materials and Commentary 3 ed (1988) 
Claremont, Cape Town: Juta 
Lubbe GF & Nienaber PM “Cession” in Joubert WA & Faris JA LAWSA 3 3 ed 
(2013) Durban: LexisNexis paras 128-184 
Lubbe GF “Sessie in securitatem debiti en die komponente van die 
skuldeisersbelang” (1989) 52 THRHR 485-501 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
386 
 
M 
Macey JR “An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders 
the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties” (1991) 21 Stetson LR 23-
44 
Macey JR “Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder 
Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective” (1999) 84 Cornell LR 1266-
1281 
Mackay of Clashfern (ed) JPH Halsbury’s Laws of England 3(1) 4 ed (2005 
Reissue) London: Butterworths 
Macpherson CB “Capitalism and the Changing Concept of Property” in Kameneka E 
& Neale RS (eds) Feudalism, Capitalism and Beyond (1975) 104-124 
Macpherson CB “The Meaning of Property” in Macpherson CB (ed) Property: 
Mainstream and Critical Positions (1978) 1-13 Oxford: Blackwell 
Maitland FW “Moral Personality and Legal Personality” in HAL Fisher (ed) The 
Collected Papers of FW Maitland III (1911) 304-320 Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press  
Maitland FW Equity – A Couse of Lectures 2 ed (1936) (revised by J Brunyate) 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Maitland FW Selected Essays (1936) (edited by Hazeltine HD, Lapsley G & Winfield 
PH) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Malan FR & Oosthuizen MJ “Brokers, their Customers and the Transfer of 
Securities” (1988) TSAR 477-495 
Malan FR & Oosthuizen MJ “The Safe Deposit of Securities” (1989) TSAR 502-508 
Malan FR “Share Certificates, Money and Negotiability: Recent Cases” (1977) 94 
SALJ 245-256 
Malan FR Collective Securities Depositories and the Transfer of Securities (1984) 
Johannesburg: Centre for Banking Law, Rand Afrikaans University 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
387 
 
Malan FR “Depositories, Nominees and the Uncertificated Security” (1987) Moderne 
Besigheidsreg 73-81 
Marais EJ “Expanding the Contours of the Constitutional Property Concept” (2016) 
TSAR 576-592 
Marx K Capital: A Critique of Political Economy I (1867) (English edn by Engels F, 
1887) Moscow: Progress Publishers 
Marx K Capital: A Critique of Political Economy II (1885) (English edn by Engels F, 
1907) Moscow: Progress Publishers 
Marx K Capital: A Critique of Political Economy III (1894) New York: International 
Publishers 
Mattei U “Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World’s Legal 
Systems” (1997) 45 Am J Comp L 5-44 
Mazando FHC “The Taxonomy of Global Securities: Is the U.S. Definition of a 
Security too Broad?” (2012) 33 NJILB 121-197 
McFarlane B & Stevens R “Interests in Securities: Practical Problems and 
Conceptual Solutions” in Gullifer L & Payne J (eds) Intermediated Securities: Legal 
Problems and Practical Issues (2010) 33-59 Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart 
Publishing 
McIntish TH Capital Markets: A Global Perspective (2008) Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell 
McKendrick E (ed) Goode on Commercial Law 4 ed (2010) London: LexisNexis UK 
& Penguin Books 
McLoughlin J Introduction to Negotiable Instruments (1975) London: Butterworths 
Meppen D Das Inhaberpapier: Von der Verbriefung zum unverbrieften Wertrecht? 
(2014) Göttingen: V&R unipress 
Merril TW & Smith HE “The Property/Contract Interface” (2001) 101 Columbia LR 
773-852  
Merrill TW “Ownership and Possession” in Chang Y (ed) Law and Economics of 
Possession (2015) 9-39 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
388 
 
Meyer CH The Law of Stockbrokers and Stock Exchanges, and of Commodity 
Brokers and Commodity Exchanges I (1931, supplemented 1936) Baker, Voorhis & 
Co 
Michaels R “The Functional Method of Comparative Law” in Zimmermann R & 
Reimann M (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (2006) 339-382 Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 
Michaels R “Vor § 241: Systemfragen des Schuldrechts” in Schmoeckel M, Rückert 
J & Zimmermann R (eds) Historisch-kritischer Kommentar zum BGB III (2007) 1-97 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 
Micheler E & Von der Heyde L “Holding, Clearing and Settling Securities through 
Blockchain/Distributed Ledger Technology: Creating an Efficient System by 
Empowering Investors” (2016) 11 JIBFL 652-656 
Micheler E “Farewell Quasi-Negotiability? Legal Title and Transfer of Shares in a 
Paperless World” (2002) J Bus L 358-378  
Micheler E Wertpapierrecht zwischen Schuld- und Sachenrecht: Zu einer 
kapitalmarkstrechtlichen Theorie des Wertpapierrechts. Effekten nach 
österreichischem, deutschem, englischem und russischem Recht (2004) Wien, New 
York: Springer-Verlag 
Micheler E Property in Securities: A Comparative Study (2007) Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press 
Micheler E “The Legal Nature of Securities: Inspirations from Comparative Law” in 
Gullifer L & Payne J (eds) Intermediated Securities: Legal Problems and Practical 
Issues (2010) 131-149 Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing 
Micheler M “Custody Chains and Asset Values: Why Crypto-Securities are Worth 
Contemplating” (2015) 74 Cambridge LJ 505-533 
Michie RC The Global Securities Market: A History (2006) Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press 
Millon D “Theories of the Corporation” (1990) 39 Duke LJ 201-262 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
389 
 
Mills D, Wang K, Malone B, Ravi A, Marquardt J, Chen C, Badev A, Brezinski T, 
Fahy L, Liao K, Kargenian V, Ellithorpe M, Ng W & Baird M “Distributed Ledger 
Technology in Payments, Clearing, and Settlement” (2016) Finance and Economics 
Discussion Series 2016-095, Finance and Economics Discussion Series Divisions of 
Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs Federal Reserve Board, Washington, DC 
10 <https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2016/files/2016095pap.pdf> 
(accessed 20-06-2018) Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System 
Mooney CW “Property, Credit, and Regulation Meet Information Technology: 
Clearance and Settlement Systems in the Securities Markets” (1992) 55 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 131-158 
Mooney CW “Beyond Negotiability: A New Model for Transfer and Pledge of 
Interests in Securities Controlled by Intermediaries” (1990) 12 Cardozo LR 305 
Mooney CW “Law and Systems for Intermediated Securities and the Relationship of 
Private Property Law to Securities Clearance and Settlement: United States, Japan, 
and the UNIDROIT Draft Convention” in Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, 
Bank of Japan Discussion Paper Series 2008-E-7 (2008) 
Mooney CW, Jr, Rocks SM & Schwartz RS “An Introduction to the Revised U.C.C. 
Article 8 and Review of Other Recent Developments with Investment Securities” 
(August 1994) 49 Bus L 1891-1906 
Moore BJ An Introduction to the Theory of Finance: Assetholder Behaviour Under 
Uncertainty (1968) New York: Free Press 
Morawetz V A Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations I 2 ed (1886) Boston: 
Little, Brown, and Company 
Mugdan B Die gesammten Materialien zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch für das 
Deutsche Reich 1 (1899) Stockstadt am Main; Keip 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
390 
 
N 
National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC) Rules & Procedures (August 
2018) 
Nofer M, Gomber P, Hinz O, Schireck D “Blockchain” (2017) 59 Bus Info Systems 
Engineering 183-187 
 
O 
Oechsler J “§ 929 Einigung und Übergabe” in Säcker FJ, Rixecker R, Oetker H & 
Limperg B (eds) Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch VII 7 ed 
(2017) München: Verlag C.H. Beck 
Oechsler J “Anh. §§ 929-936” in Säcker FJ, Rixecker R, Oetker H & Limperg B (eds 
Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch VII 7 ed (2017) München: 
Verlag C.H. Beck 
Opitz G “Wertrechte und Wertpapiere” in Opitz G Fünfzig depotrechtliche 
Abhandlungen (1954) 426-442 (original publication in 1941) Berlin: De Gruyter 
Opitz G Depotgesetz: Gesetz über die Verwahrung und Anschaffung von 
Wertpapieren vom 4. Februar 1937 2 ed (1955) Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co 
 
P 
Paech P “Market Needs as Paradigm – Breaking up the Thinking on EU Securities 
Law” in Conac P-H, Segna U & Thévenoz L (eds) Intermediated Securities: The 
Impact of the Geneva Securities Convention and the Future European Legislation 
(2013) 22 
Peel E Treitel on the Law of Contract 14 ed (2015) London: Sweet & Maxwell 
Penner JE The Idea of Property in Law (1997) Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Pennington R “Can Shares in Companies be Defined?” (1989) 10 Company Lawyer 
140 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
391 
 
Pennington RR Pennington’s Company Law 8 ed (2001) Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
Pentz A “§§ 23-53” in Goette W, Habersack M & Kalss S (eds) Münchener 
Kommentar zum Aktiengestz 4 ed (2016) München: Verlag C.H. Beck/VerlagFranz 
Vahlen 
Peters K “Bucheffekten – eine Alternative zum Wertpapier? Möglichkeiten einer 
Weiterentwicklung des Effektenwesens” (1976) 35 WM 890-897 
Pettit PH Equity and the Law of Trusts 11 ed (2009) Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Pilbeam K Finance and Financial Markets (1998) Basingstoke, Hampshire: 
MacMillan Business 
Pretorius JT, Delport PA, Havenga M & Vermaas M Hahlo’s South African 
Company Law through the Cases 6 ed (1999) Cape Town: Juta 
Pretto-Sakmann A Boundaries of Personal Property: Shares and Sub-Shares (2005) 
Oxford & Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing 
 
R 
Rachlitz R “Disclosure of Ownership in South African Company Law” (2013) 3 Stell 
LR 406-429 
Rademacher L Verkehrsschutz im englischen Privatrecht: Zur Beständigkeit von 
Erwerbsvorgängen nach Englischem Sachen-, Stellvertretungs-, Abtretungs- und 
Bereicherungsrecht (2016) Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 
Ramakrishnan RTS & Thakor AV “Information Reliability and a Theory of 
Intermediation” (1984) 51 RESTUD 415-432 
Rambure S & Nacamuli A Payment Systems: From the Salt Mines to the Board 
Room (2008) London: Palgrave Macmillan 
Reade R & Mayme D “Securities on Blockchain” (2018) 73 Bus L 85-108 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
392 
 
Reid K “Obligations and Property: Exploring the Boundary” (1997) Acta Juridica 225-
245 
Reitz CR “Reflections on the Drafting of the 1994 Revision of Article 8 of the US 
Uniform Commercial Code” (2005) 10 Uniform LR 357-367 
Rice DG “The Legal Nature of a Share” (1957) 21 The Conveyancer & Property 
Lawyer 433-447 
Richter R Essays on New Institutional Economics (2015) Cham, Heidelberg, New 
York, Dordrecht, London: Springer 
Rogers JS “Negotiability, Property and Identity” (1991) 12 Cardozo LR 471-508 
Rogers JS “An Essay on Horseless Carriages and Paperless Negotiable 
Instruments: Some Lessons from the Article 8 Revision” (1995) 31 Idaho LR 689-698 
Rogers JS “Policy Perspectives on Revised U.C.C Article 8” (1996) 48 UCLA LR 
1431-1545 
Rogers JS “The Revision of Canadian Law on Securities Holdings through 
Intermediaries: Who, What, When, Where, How and Why?” (2007) 45 Can Bus LJ 49 
Rogers JS The End of Negotiable Instruments: Bringing Payment Systems Law out 
of the Past (2012) New York: Oxford University Press 
Rosenthal AJ “Negotiability – Who Needs It?” (1971) 71 Columbia LR 375-402 
Rosenthal E On ‘Change Through the Years: A History of Share Dealing in South 
Africa (1968) Cape Town: Flesch Financial Publications 
 
S 
Savigny FC, von Das Obliationenrecht als Theil des Heutigen Römischen Rechts II 
(1853) Berlin: Veit 
Schiller R Irrational Exuberance 3 ed (2016 revised & expanded) Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press 
Schmidt K Gesellschaftsrecht 4 ed (2002) Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
393 
 
Scholtens B & Van Wensveen B “A Critique on the Theory of Financial 
Intermediation” (2000) 24 JBF 1243-1251 
Scholtens B & Van Wensveen D “The Theory of Financial Intermediation: An Essay 
on What it (Does) Not Explain” (2003) Discussion Paper: SUERF – The European 
Money and Finance forum Vienna 2003 Vienna:SUERF 
Schroeder JL “Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregation of 
Property” (1994) Michigan LR 239-319 
Schroeder JL “Is Article 8 Finally Ready This Time? The Radical Reform of Secured 
Lending on Wall Street” (1994) Columbia Bus LR 291-489 
Schroeder JL “Death and Transfiguration: The Myth that the U.C.C. Killed ‘Property’” 
(1996) 69 Temple LR 1281-1341 
Schroeder JL “Bitcoin and the Uniform Commercial Code” (2016) 24 Uni Miami Bus 
LR 1-79 
Schultz H & Opitz G “Sammeldepots beim Kassenverein: Gutachten, erstattet 
namens der Rechtsabteilung der Deutschen Bank, Berlin“ in Opitz G Fünfzig 
depotrechtliche Abhandlungen (1954) 1 (original publication in 1926, 16 
Sonderbeilage Bank-Archiv) Berlin: De Gruyter 
Schulz F Classical Roman Law (1951) Oxford: Clarendon Press 
Schulze WG “Depositum, Deposit and Deposit-taking Institutions – Birds of a 
Feather? Not Quite” (2001) 13 SA Merc LJ 78-95 
Schwarz S “Intermediated Securities” in Basedow J, Hopt KJ, Zimmermann R & Stier 
A (eds) The Max Planck Encyclopaedia of European Private Law (2012) 950-954 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Schwarz S Globaler Effektenhandel: Eine rechtsstaatliche und rechtsvergleichende 
Studie zu Risiken, Dogmatik und Einzelfragen des Trading, Clearing und Settlement 
bei nationalen und internationalen Wertpapiertransaktionen (2016) Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck 
Schwerin C, von Recht der Wertpapiere (einschließlich Wechsel- und Scheckrecht) 
(1924) Berlin: De Gruyter 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
394 
 
Schwintowski H-P “§ 16 Depotgeschäft” in Schwintowski H-P (ed) Bankrecht 4 ed 
(2014) 759-784 Köln: Heymann 
Scott AW “The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust” (1917) 17 Columbia LR 
269-290 
Scott S “The Comparative Method in Action – Aspects of the Law of Cession (Part 
2)” (2001) 34 De Jure 1-28 
Scott S “The Comparative Method in Action – Aspects of the Law of Cession (Part 
1)” (2001) 33 De Jure 211-234 
Scott S “Verpanding van Vorderingsregte: Uiteindelik Sekerheid?” (1987) 50 THRHR 
175-194 
Scott S “Vorderingsregte as Onliggaamlike Sake – Waarom Nie?” (2010) 73 THRHR 
629-637 
Scott S Scott on Cession; A Treatise on the Law in South Africa (2018) Claremont, 
Cape Town: Juta 
Scott S Sessie in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg LLD thesis University of South Africa 
(1977) 
Scott S The Law of Cession 2 ed (1991) 
Sherwin E “Legal Taxonomy” (2009) 15 Legal Theory 25-54 
Siems MM “The Foundations of Securities Law” (2009) 20 Eur Bus LR 141-171 
Sigwadi M “The registration of securities under the new Companies Act 71 of 2008” 
in Mongalo TH (ed) Modern Company Law for a Competitive South African Economy 
(2010) 73-86 Claremont, South Africa: Juta 
Silke JM The Law of Agency in South Africa 3 ed (1981) 
Singer JW “Legal Realism Now” (1988) 76 California LR 465-544 
Smith A The Wealth of Nations (1776) Edinburgh, Thomas Nelson 
Smith M & Leslie N The Law of Assignment 2 ed (2013) Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
395 
 
Smith RB “A Piece of Paper” (April 1970) 25 Bus L 923-930 
Smith RB “A Piece of Paper Revisited” (July 1971) 26 Bus L 1769-1777 
Sohm R The Institutes of Roman Law (1892) Oxford: Clarendon 
Sommer JH “A Law of Financial Accounts: Modern Payment and Securities Transfer 
Law” (1998) 53 Bus L 1181-1215 
Sommer JH “Against Cyberlaw” (2000) 15 Berkeley Tech LJ 1145-1175 
Sommer JH “International Securities Holding and Transfer Law” (2001) 18 Ariz J Int 
& Com L 685-710 
Sommer JH “Commentary: Where is the Economic Analysis of Payment Law?” 
(2008) 83 Chi-Kent LR 751-767 
Sonnekus JC “Mandament van Spolie – Kragtige Remedie by Kragonderbreking?” 
(1985) TSAR 331-338 
Sonnekus JC “Saaklike Regte of Vorderingsregte? – Traditionele Toetse en ’n 
Petitio Principii” (1991) TSAR 173-180 
Sonnekus JC “Vervalbeding as Beperkende Voorwaarde by Koop van Grond, 
Verjaring en Regsdwalings oor Kenmerke van Saaklike Regte” (2018) TSAR 134-157 
Sonnekus JC Sakereg Vonnisbundel (1980) Durban: Butterworths 
South African Reserve Bank Report: Project Khoka (2018) 
Sprankling JG Understanding Property Law 3 ed (2012) New Providence, New 
Jersey: LexisNexis 
Stadler A Gestaltungsfreiheit und Verkehrsschutz durch Abstraktion: Eine 
rechtsvergleichende Studie zur abstrakten und kausalen Gestaltung 
rechtsgeschäftlicher Zuwendungen anhand des deutschen, schweizerischen, 
österreichischen, französischen und US-amerikanischen Rechts (1996) Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck 
Stein P “Roman Law in the Commercial Court” (1987) 46 Cambridge LJ 369-371 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
396 
 
Stein P Die Aktiengesellschaft: Gründung, Organisation und Finanzverfassung 
(2016) Wiesbaden: Springer Gabler 
Steinberg MI Understanding Securities Law 6 ed (2014) New Providence, New 
Jersey: LexisNexis 
Strate “Nasdaq to Deliver Blockchain e-Voting Solution to Strate” (22 November 
2017) <http://www.strate.co.za/blog/2017/11/nasdaq-to-deliver-blockchain-e-voting-
solution-to-strate/> (accessed 20-06-2018) 
Strate <http://www.strate.co.za/strate/supervision/participants> (accessed 29-09-
2018) 
Strate Directive SA.4: Requirements for Own Name Clients Special Gazette No S1-
2018 of 15-05-2018 
Strate Directive SC.1: Operational Market Windows – On-market – Equities – JSE 
Special Gazette No S14-2016 of 25-11-2016 
Strate Directive SC.2 Operational Market Windows – Off-market – Equity Securities 
– JSE and A2X Special Gazette No S10-2017 of 05-10-2017 
Strate Equities Handbook version 17 (2014) 
Strate Rules of Strate Pty (Ltd) (September 2017) 
Strate Rules of Strate Pty (Ltd) (February 2014) 
Sutherland P “Companies and Other Business Entities” in Van der Merwe CG & Du 
Plessis JE (eds) Introduction to the Law of South Africa (2004) 365- 398 The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International 
Swadling W “Property: General Principles” in Burrows A (ed) English Private Law 3 
ed (2013) 174 Oxford: Oxford University Press  
Swart L & Lawack-Davids VA “Understanding the South African Financial Markets: 
An Overview of the Regulators” (2010) Obiter 619-637 
Sweet C “Choses in Action” (1894) 10 LQR 303-317 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
397 
 
 
T 
Teubner G “Expertise as Social Institution: Internalising Third Parties into the 
Contract” in Campbell D, Collins H & Wightman J (eds) Implicit Dimensions of 
Contract: Discrete, Relational, and Network Contracts (2003) 333-364 
Than J “Wertpapierrecht ohne Wertpapiere?” in Horn N, Lwowski H-J & Nobbe G 
(eds) Bankrecht - Schwerpunkte und Perspektiven: Festschrift für Herbert 
Schimansky (1999) 821-836 Köln: RWS Verlag Kommunikationsforum 
The Clearing House The Custody Services of Banks (2016) 
The Giovannini Group Cross-Border Clearing and Settlement Arrangements in the 
European Union (2001) 
The Giovannini Group Second Report on EU Clearing and Settlement 
Arrangements (April 2003) 
Thévenoz L “Intermediated Securities, Legal Risk, and the International 
Harmonization of Commercial Law” (2008) 13 Stan JL Bus & Fin 384-452 
Thur A, von Der Allgemeine Teil des Deutschen Bürgerlichen Rechts 2(1) (1914) 
Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot 
 
U 
UNIDROIT Study LXXVIII – Doc. 44: Working Paper Regarding So Called 
“Transparent Systems” (October 2006) 
 
V 
Van den Berg B Understanding Financial Markets and Instruments (2000) Roosevelt 
Park South Africa: Eagle Rock Financial Services CC 
Van der Linde K “The Solvency and Liquidity Approach in the Companies Act 2008” 
(2009) 2 TSAR 224-240 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
398 
 
Van der Merwe CG “Law of Property” in Van der Merwe CG & Du Plessis JE (eds) 
Introduction to the Law of South Africa (2004) 201-242 The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International 
Van der Merwe CG The Law of Things (1987) Durban: Butterworths 
Van der Walt AJ & Pienaar GJ Introduction to the Law of Property 7 ed (2016) 
Claremont, Cape Town: Juta 
Van der Walt AJ & Sutherland PJ “Dispossession of Incorporeals or Rights – Is the 
Mandament van Spolie the Appropriate Remedy?” (2003) 15 SA Merc LJ 95-109 
Van der Walt AJ “Nog Eens Naidoo v Moodley – ‘n Repliek” (1984) 47 THRHR 429-
439 
Van der Walt AJ “Toepassing van die Mandament van Spolie op Onroerende Sake” 
(1986) TSAR 223-232 
Van der Walt AJ “Die Mandament van Spolie en Quasi-Besit” (1989) 52 THRHR 
444-453 
Van der Walt AJ “Personal Rights and Limited Real Rights: An Historical Overview 
and Analysis of Contemporary Problems Related to the Registrability of Rights” 
(1992) 55 THRHR 170-203 
Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2011) Claremont, Cape Town: Juta 
Van der Walt AJ Property and Constitution (2012) Pretoria: PULP 
Van Erp S “Editorial: Ownership of Digital Assets?” (2016) 5 EuCML 73-76 
Van Erp S “Fluidity of Ownership and the Tragedy of the Hierarchy” (2015) 4 EPLJ 
56-80 
Van Huyssteen LF, Reynecke MFB & Lubbe GF Contract: General Principles 5 ed 
(2016) Claremont: Juta 
Velasco J “Shareholder Ownership and Primacy” (2010) University of Illinois LR 897-
956 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
399 
 
Vermaas M “The Reform of the Law of Uncertificated Securities in South African 
Companies Law” (2010) Acta Juridica 87-116 
Vermaas MR Aspekte van die Dematerialisasie van Genoteerde Aandele in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg LLD thesis University of South Africa (1995) 
Vetter E “Aktiengesetz § 23” in Henssler M & Strohn L Gesellschaftsrecht 3 ed 
(2016) München: Verlag C.H. Beck 
Von Savigny FC System des heutigen römischen Rechts II (1840) Berlin: Veit 
 
W 
Watson A The Digest of Justinian II (1985) Philadelphia, Pa: University of 
Pennsylvania Press 
Weber M Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (1978) 91 
(translation of the German original Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriss der 
verstehenden Soziologie, edited by Roth G & Wittich C) Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
California: University of California Press 
Westermann H Sachenrecht 4 ed (1960) Karlsruhe: Müller 
Westermann H-P “Allgemeine Vorschriften §§ 1-29” in Bürgers T & Körber T (eds) 
Aktiengestz 4 ed (2017) 25-149 Heidelberg: C.F. Müller 
Wieacker F & Wollschläger C (ed) Zivilistische Schriften (1934-1942) (2000) 
Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann 
Wiedemann H Gesellschaftsrecht I (1980) München: Verlag C.H. Beck 
Wiegand W “§ 929 Einigung und Übergabe” in Wiegand W (ed) J. von Staudingers 
Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit Einführungsgesetz und 
Nebengesetzen 3(2) (2017) Berlin: Sellier/De Gruyter 
Wiegand W “Die Entwicklung des Sachenrechts im Verhältnis zum Schuldrecht” 
(1990) 190 AcP 112 
Wieling HJ Sachenrecht 5 ed (2007) Berlin: Springer 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
400 
 
Will A “Depotgeschäft” in Kümpel S & Wittig A Bank- und Kapitalmarktrecht 4 ed 
(2011) 2323-2386 Köln: Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt 
Williams RC “Companies: Part 1” in Joubert WA & Faris JA (eds) LAWSA 4(1) 2 ed 
(2012) paras 1-351 Durban: LexisNexis  
Williamson OE “The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes” (1981) 19 
J Econ Lit 1537-1568 
Withers H Stocks and Shares 2 ed (1917) London: Murray 
Wolf M & Neuner J Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen Rechts (2012) München: 
Verlag C.H. Beck 
Woods PR Set-off and Netting, Derivatives, Clearing Systems 2 ed (2007) London: 
Sweet & Maxwell 
Worthington S “Proprietary Remedies: The Nexus between Specific Performance 
and Constructive Trusts” (1996) 11 J Con L 1-25 
Worthington S “Shares and Shareholders: Property, Power and Entitlement” (2001) 
22 Company Lawyer 258 
 
Y 
Yates M & Montagu G The Law of Global Custody: Legal Risk Management in 
Securities Investment and Collateral 4 ed (2013) Haywards Heath, West Sussex: 
Bloomsbury Professional 
 
Z 
Zimmermann R The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition 
(1996) Oxford: Clarendon Press 
Zöllner W Zurückdrängung des Verkörperungselements bei den Wertpapieren in 
Raiser L & Baur F (eds) Funktionswandel der Privatrechtsinstitutionen: Festschrift für 
Ludwig Raiser zum 70. Geburtstag (1974) 249-285 Tübingen: Mohr 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
401 
 
Zweigert K & Kötz H Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung: auf dem Gebiete des 
Privatrechts 3 ed (1996) Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
402 
 
Official publications 
South Africa: 
Reviewing the Regulation of Financial Markets in South Africa: Policy Document 
Explaining the Financial Markets Bill, 2011 (2011) 
South African Law Commission Protection for a Purchaser of Securities Working 
Paper 21 (1987) 
South African Law Reform Commission “Report on the Protection of a Purchaser 
of Securities” Project 62 (1993) 
 
England: 
Financial Markets Law Committee Property Interests in Investment Securities: 
Analysis of the Need for and Nature of Legislation Relating to Property Interests in 
Indirectly Held Investment Securities, with a Statement of Principles for an 
Investment Securities Statute (July 2004) 
 
International Instruments 
Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of Securities 
held with an Intermediary (2006) 
UNIDROIT Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities of 25 
September 2013 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
403 
 
Table of Legislation 
South Africa: 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 
Companies Regulations, 2011 GN R 619 in GG 36759 of 20-08-2013 
Custody and Administration of Securities Act 85 of 1992 
Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002 
Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28 of 2001 
Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 
Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017 
General Code of Conduct for Authorised Financial Services Providers and their 
Representatives Notice 80 GG 25299 of 08-08-2003 
Security Services Act 36 of 2004 
 
England: 
Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 
Companies Act 2006 
Law of Property Act 1925 
Stock Transfer Act 1963 
Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 (Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875) 
Uncertificated Securities Regulations 2001 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
404 
 
United States: 
Delaware Code 
Model Business Corporation Act 
Securities Act, 1993 
Securities Exchange Act, 1934 
Uniform Commercial Code 
Uniform Stock Transfer Act 1910 
 
Germany: 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 
Depotgesetz 
Handelsgesetzbuch 
Kreditwesengesetz 
Preussisches Allgemeines Landrecht 
Verordnung über die Behandlung von Anleihen des Deutschen Reichs im Bank- und 
Börsenverkehr vom 31. Dezember 1940 
Wertpapierhandelsgesetz 
Zivilprozessordnung 
Zweites Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz 
 
Switzerland: 
Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
405 
 
European Union: 
Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 
on markets in financial instruments (“MiFID I”) 
Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 
on markets in financial instruments (recast) (“MiFID II“) 
Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
July 2014 on improving securities settlement in the European Union and on central 
securities depositories (“Central Securities Depositories Regulation”) 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
406 
 
Table of Cases 
South Africa: 
Absa Bank Ltd v Keet 2015 4 SA 474 (SCA) 
Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) 
Agricultural and Industrial Mechanisation (Vereeniging) (Edms) Bpk v Lombard 1974 
3 SA 485 (O) 
Albatross Fishing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Ramsay 1968 2 SA 217 (C) 
Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974 3 SA 506 
(A) 
Bavasah v Stirton 2014 JDR 0230 (WCC) 
Belonje v African Electric Co (Pty) Ltd 1949 1 SA 592 (E) 
Bloom v The American Swiss Watch Company 1915 AD 100 
Bloom’s Woollens (Pty) Ltd v Taylor 1961 3 SA 248 (N) 
Bon Quelle (Edms) Bpk v Munisipaliteit van Otavi 1989 1 SA 508 (A) 
Botha v Fick 1995 2 SA 750 (A) 
Brook v Jones 1964 1 SA 765 (N) 
City of Cape Town v Strümpher 2012 4 SA 207 (SCA) 
Cooper v Boyes 1994 4 SA 521 (C) 
David Trust v Aegis Insurance Co Ltd 2000 3 SA 289 (SCA) 298 
De Leef Family Trust v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1983 1 SA 276 (A) 
Dreyer NNO v AXZS Industries (Pty) Ltd 2006 5 SA 548 (SCA) 
Estate Fitzpatrick v Estate Frankel, Denoon v Estate Frankel 1943 AD 207 
Evans and Jones v Johnston 1904 TH 238 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
407 
 
Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) 
Farrar’s Estate v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1926 TPD 501 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v CIR; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a/ 
Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) 
Firstrand Ltd t/a Rand Merchant Bank v Scholtz NO 2008 2 SA 503 (SCA) 
Gertenbach & Bellow v Mosenthal (1876) 6 Buch 88 
Gohlke & Schneider v Westies Minerale (Pty) Ltd 1970 2 SA 685 (A) 
Grobbelaar v Shoprite Checkers Ltd [2011] ZASCA 11 
Hansa v Dinbro Trust (Pty) Ltd 1949 2 SA 513 (T) 
Inland Property Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Cilliers 1973 3 SA 245 (A) 
Isaacman v Miller 1922 TPD 56 
Jacobsohn v Simon & Pienaar 1938 TPD 116 
Jeffrey v Pollak and Freemantle 1938 AD 1 
Johaadien v Stanley Porter (Paarl) Pty Ltd 1970 1 SA 394 (A) 
Johnson v Incorporated General Insurances Ltd 1983 1 SA 318 (A) 
Jones v East Rand Extension Gold Mining Co Ltd 1903 TH 325 
Karaolias v Sulam t/a Jack’s Garage 1975 3 SA 873 (R) 
Kennedy v Loynes (1909) 26 SC 271 
Koenigsberg’s Trustees v Taylor 1925 TH 277  
Krige v Van Dijk’s Executors 1918 AD 110 
Liquidators Union Share Agency v Hatton 1927 AD 240 
LTA Engineering Co Ltd v Seacat Investments (Pty) Ltd 1974 1 SA 747 (A) 
Lynn & Main Inc v Brits Community Sandworks CC 2009 1 SA 308 (SCA) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
408 
 
Mallison v Tanner 1947 4 SA 681 (T) 
McGregor’s Estate v Silberbauer (1891) 9 SC 36 
McKenzie v Farmers’ Co-Operative Meat Industries Ltd 1922 AD 16 
Mead v Clarke 1922 EDL 49 
Moosa v Lalloo 1957 4 SA 207 (N) 
National Credit Regulator v Opperman 2013 2 SA 1 (CC) 
National Sorghum Breweries Ltd v Corpcapital Bank Ltd 2006 6 SA 208 (SCA) 
National Stadium South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Firstrand Bank Ltd 2011 2 SA 157 (SCA) 
Nino Bonino v De Lange 1906 TS 120 
Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & Investment Co (Pty) Ltd 1976 1 SA 
441 (A) 
Off-Beat Holiday Club v Sanbonani Holiday Spa Shareblock Ltd 2016 6 SA 181 
(SCA) 
Peacock v Marley 1934 AD 1 
Phillips v Fieldstone Africa (Pty) Ltd 2004 3 SA 465 (SCA) 
Pillay v Harichand 1976 2 SA 681 (D) 
Plaatjie v Olivier NO 1993 2 SA 156 (O) 
Pretorius v Natal South Sea Investment Trust Ltd 1965 3 SA 410 (W) 
Pretorius v Van Beeck 1926 OPD 197 
R v Heroldt 1957 3 SA 236 (A) 
R v Milne & Erleigh (7) 1951 1 SA 791 (A) 
Rabinowitz v De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd 1958 3 SA 619 (A) 
Randfontein Estates Ltd v The Master 1909 TS 978  
Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
409 
 
Rooibokoord Sitrus (Edms) Bpk v Louw's Creek Sitrus Koöperatiewe Maatskappy 
Bpk 1964 3 SA 601 (T) 
S v Heller 1971 2 SA 29 (AD) 
Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining Co Ltd 1969 3 SA 629 (A) 
Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape 2015 
6 SA 125 (CC) 
Smith v Farelly’s Trustee 1904 TS 949  
Smuts v Booyens 2001 4 SA 15 (SCA) 
Smuts v Booyensmarkplaas (Edms) Bpk v Booyens 2001 4 SA 15 (SCA) 
South African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx & Vereinigte Bäckereien (Pty) Ltd 1982 3 SA 
893 (A) 
South African Mutual Life Assurance Society v Anglo-Transvaal Collieries Ltd 1977 3 
SA 642 (AD) 
Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Ocean Commodities Inc 1980 2 SA 175 (T) 
Standard Bank of South Africa v Ocean Commodities Inc 1983 1 SA 276 (A) 
Strydom v Roodewal Management Committee 1958 1 SA 272 (O) 
Telkom SA Ltd v Xsinet (Pty) Ltd 2003 5 SA 309 (SCA) 
Tigon Ltd v Bestyet Investments (Pty) Ltd 2001 4 SA 634 (N) 
Transvaal Cold Storage Co Ltd v Palmer 1904 TS 4 
Turkstra v Kaplan 1953 2 SA 300 (T) 
United South African Association Ltd v Cohn 1904 TS 733 
Uxbury Investment (Pty) Ltd v Sunbury Investment (Pty) Ltd 1963 1 SA 747 (C) 
Van Blommenstein v Holliday 1904 21 SC 11 
Van Rhyn No v Fleurbaix Farm (Pty) Ltd 2013 5 SA 521 (WCC) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
410 
 
Van Staden v Firstrand Ltd 2008 3 SA 530 (T) 
Verrin Trust & Finance Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Zeeland House (Pty) Ltd 1973 4 SA 1 
(C) 
Verrin Trust & Finance Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Zeeland House (Pty) Ltd 1973 4 SA 1 
(C) 
Watson v Sachs 1994 3 SA 655 (A) 
West v De Villiers 1938 CPD 96 
West v Pollak & Freemantle 1937 TPD 64 
Wright & Co v Colonial Government 1891 8 SC 260 
Zulu v Minister of Works, Kwazulu 1992 1 181 (D) 
 
England: 
Archer-Shee v Garland [1931] AC 212 
Ayerst (Inspector of Taxes) v C&K (Construction) Ltd [1976] AC 167 
Baker v Archer-Shee [1927] AC 844 
Balfour v The Official Manager of the Sea Fire Life Assurance Company (1857) 3 
Common Bench Reports (New Series) 300 
Bligh v Brent 2 Y & C Ex 268 
Borland’s Trustee v Steel Brothers & Co 1901 1 Ch 279 
Bradbury v English Sewing Cotton Company Ltd 1923 AC 744 
Burkinshaw v Nicolls (1878) 3 App Cas 1004 
Cadbury Schweppes Plc v Halifax Share Dealing Ltd [2006] EWHC 1184 (Ch) 
Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1893] 1 QB 256 
Child v Hudson’s Bay Co (1723) 2 P Wms 207 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
411 
 
Coggs v Bernard (1703) 2 Ld Raym 909 
Colonial Bank v Cady (1890) 15 App Cas 267 
Colonial Bank v Whinney (1886) 11 App Cas 426 
Cud v Rutter (1719) 24 ER 521 
David Nelson v Greening & Sykes (Builders) Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 1358 (CA) 
Don King Productions, Inc v Frank Warren [1998] RPC 817 
Durham Brothers v Robertson [1898] 1 QB 765 
Eckerle v Wickeder Westfahlenstahl GmbH [2013] EWHC 68 (Ch); [2014] Ch 196 
Fitzroy v Cave [1905] 2 KB 364 
Frederick Bloomenthal v James Ford [1897] AC 156 
Fuller v Glynn, Mills, Currie & Co [1914] 2 KB 168 
Grey v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1958] Ch 375 (ChD) 
Grey v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1958] Ch 690 (HL) 
Harrold v Plenty [1901] 2 Ch 314 
Holt v Heatherfield Trust Ltd [1942] 2 KB 1 
Humble v Mitchell (1839) 11 Ad & El 205 
Hunter v Moss [1993] 1 WLR 934 
In Re A Debtor [1943] Ch 213 
In re Florence Land and Public Works Company; Nicol’s Case v Tufnell & 
Ponsonby’s Case (1885) 29 ChD 421  
In Re Fry, Chase National Executors and Trustees Corporation v Fry [1946] Ch 312 
In Re Kayford Ltd (in liquidation) [1975] 1 WLR 279 
In re London and Northern Bank, Ex parte Jones [1900] 1 Ch 220 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
412 
 
In Re Montagu’s Settlement Trusts, Duke of Manchester v National Westminster 
Bank Ltd [1987] Ch 264 
In Re Rose, Midland Bank Executor and Trustee Company Limited v Rose [1949] Ch 
78 
In Re Rose, Rose v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1952] Ch 499 
In Re Sir William Thomas Paulin; In Re Percy Crossman [1935] 1 KB 26 
In Re Steel Wing Co, Limited [1921] 1 Ch 349 
J Sainsbury Plc v O’Connor (Inspector of Taxes) [1991] 1 WLR 963 (CA) 
Jackson v Anderson (1811) 128 ER 235 
James v Williams [2000] Ch 1 
Jones v Humphreys [1902] 1 KB 10 
Knight v Knight (1849) Beav 148, 49 ER 58 
Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85 
Lord Strathcona Steamship Co v Dominion Coal Co Ltd [1926] AC 108 
Lumley v Gye 118 ER 749 (1853) 
Lyle and Scott Ltd v Scott’s Trustees and British Investment Trust Ltd 1959 AC 763 
Macaura v Northern Assurance Co Ltd [1925] AC 619 
MacMillan Inc v Bishopsgate Trust (No 3) [1995] 1 WLR 978 992 
Master v Miller (1791) 4 Term Rep 320 
National Westminster Bank plc v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1995] 1 AC 119 
Nightingale v Devisme 98 ER 361, (1770) 5 Burrow 2589 (KB) 
Oughtred v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1960] AC 206 
Paragon Finance plc v DB Thakerar and Co [1999] 1 All ER 400 
Pennington v Waine [2002] 2 BCLC 448 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
413 
 
Pilcher v Rawlins (1872) LR 7 Ch App 259 
Raiffaisen Zentralbank Österreich AG v Five Star General Trading LLC [2001] EWCA 
Civ 68, [2001] QB 825 
Re Bahia and San Francisco Railway Co Ltd (1868) LR 3 QB 584 
Re Harvard Securities Ltd (in liquidation) [1998] BCC 567 
Re Heaton’s Steel and Iron Co, Blyth’s Case (1876) 4 ChD 140 
Re London Wine Co (Shippers) [1986] PCC 121 
Re VGM Holdings Ltd [1942] Ch 235 
Robson and Sharpe v Drummond (1831) 109 ER 1156 
Salomon v A Salomon and Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 
Secure Capital SA v Credit Suisse AG [2015] EWHC 388 (Comm) 
Secure Capital SA v Credit Suisse AG [2017] EWCA Civ 1486 
Sheffield Coporation v Barclay [1905] AC 392 (HL) 
Short v Treasury Commissioners [1948] 1 KB 116 
Société Générale de Paris v Walker (1885) App Cas 20 
Swift v Dairywise Farms Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 1177 
Tinsley v Milligan [1994] 1 AC 340 
Torkington v Magee [1902] 2 KB 427 
Warner Bros Records Inc v Rollgreen Ltd [1976] QB 430 
Warner Bros. Records Inc. v Rollgreen Ltd. And Others [1976] QB 430 
Watson v Spratley (1854) 2 CLR 1434 
Webb v Webb [1994] QB 696; ECJ, 17.05.1994 – C-294/92 
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669 (HL) 706 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
414 
 
Wood Preservation Ltd v Prior (Inspector of Taxes) [1969] 1 WLR 1077 
 
United States: 
Allen v Pegram 16 Iowa 163 
Bank v Lanier 78 U.S. 369 (1870) 
Blodgett v Silberman 277 U.S. 1 (1928) 
Coats v Guaranty Bank and Trust Co 170 La 871 (1930) 
Davis Laundry & Cleaning Co v Whitmore 92 Ohio St. 44 (1915) 
First National Bank of Richmond v Holland 99 Va. 495 (1901) 
Hale v Henkel 201 U.S. 43 (1905) 
In the Matter of the Succession of Dunham 408 So. 2d 888 (1981) 893 
Jermain v The Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company 91 N.Y. 483 
(1883) 
Jones v Central State Investment Co 654 P.2d 717 (1982) 
Landreth Timber Co v Landreth 471 US 681 (1985) 
Leyson v Davis 17 Mont. 220 (1895) 
Lockwood v United States Steel Corp. 209 N.Y. 375 (1913) 
Ouderkirk v Central National Bank of Troy 119 N.Y. 263 (1890) 
Pattison v Syracuse National Bank 80 N.Y. 82 (1880) 
Pierpoint v Hoyt 260 N.Y. 26 (1932) 
Reves v Ernst & Young 494 U.S. 56 (1990) 
Reynolds v Reynolds 54 Cal. 2d 669 (1960) 
Santa Clara County v Southern Pacific Railroad Company 118 U.S. 394 (1886) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
415 
 
SEC v CM Joiner Leasing Corp 320 U.S. 344 (1943) 
SEC v Howey Co 328 U.S. 293 (1946) 
Shields v Newbridge Securities Inc No. 90-0985S; 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1706 (1992) 
Slaymaker v Bank of Gettysburg 10 Pa. 373 (1849) 
State v Standard Oil Company 49 Ohio St. 137 (1892) 
Stuart v Sargent 283 Mass. 536 (1933) 541 
Tcherepnin v Knight 389 U.S. 332 (1967) 
Trustees of Dartmouth College v Woodward 17 U.S. 518 (1819) 
Winslow v Fletcher 53 Conn. 390 (1886) 
 
Germany: 
BGH (1956) NJW 1315 
BGH (1959) NJW 35, 1536, 1539 
BGH (1971) NJW 1608, 1609 
BGH (1985) NJW 376, 378. 
BGH (2004) NJW 3340, 3341 
BGHZ 10, 81 (BGH, 11.06.1953 – IV ZR 181/52) 
BGH, 03.04.2014 – IX ZR 201/13 
 
Australia: 
Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 5 16  
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
416 
 
Canada: 
Hodgkinson v Simms [1994] 3 SCR 377 (SCC) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
